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INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
Regional Science and Urban Economics are two interrelated fields of research that have
developed very rapidly in the last three decades. The main theoretical foundation of
these fields comes from economics but in recent years the interdisciplinary character has
become more pronounced. The editors desire to have the interdisciplinary character of
regional sciences as well as the development of spatial aspects of theoretical economics
fully reflected in this book series. Material presented in this book series will fall in three
different groups:
- interdisciplinary textbooks at the advanced level,
. monographs reflecting theoretical or applied work in spatial analysis,
- proceedings reflecting advancement of the frontiers of regional science and urban
economics.
In order to ensure homogeneity in this interdisciplinary field, books published in this
series will:
- be theoretically oriented, i.e. analyse problems with a large degree of generality,
- employ formal methods from mathematics, econometrics, operations research and
related fields, and
- focus on immediate or potential uses for regional and urban forecasting, planning
and policy.
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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
is a nongovernmental research institution, bringing together scientists from around the
world to work on problems of common concern. Situated in Laxenburg, Austria, IIASA
was founded in October 1972 by the academies of science and equivalent organizations of
twelve countries. Its founders gave IIASA a unique position outside national, disciplinary,
and institutional boundaries so that it might take the broadest possible view in pursuing
its objectives:
To promote intemational cooperation in solving problems arising from social, economic,
technological, and environmental change
To create a network of institutions in the national member organization countries and
elsewhere for joint scientific research
To develop and formalize systems analysis and the sciences contributing to it, and promote
the use of analytical techniques needed to evaluate and address complex problems
To inform policy makers and decision makers of how to apply the Institute's methods to
such problems
The Institute now has national member organizations in the following countries:
AUItria
The Austrian Academy of Sciences
Bulpria
The National Committee for Applied
Systems Analysis and Management
Canada
The Canadian Committee for IIASA
CzechollloYBkia
The Committee for IIASA of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
Finland
The Finnish Committee for llASA
FI'lIDCe
The French Association for the
Development of Systems Analysis
German Democratic Republic
The Academy of Sciences of the German
Democratic Republic
Fedenl Republic of Germany
Aasociation for the Advancement
of llASA
DIIASA
Hunpry
The HUlllarian Committee for Applied
Systems Analysis
It.Iy
The National Research Council
Japm
The Japan Committee for llASA
Netherlands
The Foundation llASA-Netherlands
Polan4
The Polish Academy of Sciences
Sweden
The Swedish Council for PlanniDg and
Coordination of Research
UDiou of Soviet SodaIist RepubIb
The Academy of SCiencea of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vaited $lata of America
The American Acsdemy of Arts and
Sciences
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Preface
This volume originates from two meetings, set apart in time but closely connected by
continuing collaborative efforts between researchers in an international network. The first
of these meetings took place at The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) in October 1984, organized by IIASA:s Regional Issues Project under the title
"Dynamic Analysis of Spatial Development". About half of the papers in this volume
were presented at that meeting. These contributions have been elaborated and revised
considerably during the preparation of the volume, and can now be regarded as mature
papers embracing the frontiers of spatial and economic dynamics..
Another set of contributions was presented during the European Summer Institute in
Regional Science held at the University of UmeA in June 1986. The Summer Institute was
organized by CERUM (Centre for Regional Science at Umed University) in collaboration
with the Departments of Economics and Geography at the same university. The
contributions have been drawn from the sessions on technological change, nonlinear
dynamics in spatial networks and infrastructure development This is reflected in the three
parts of the volume (1) Competition, specialization and technological change, (2) Spatial
interaction, (3) Urban and regional infrastructure.
In essence there is an unbroken line between the fIrst and second meeting, with a joint
focus on slow adjustment processes governing the change of urban and internodal
network infrastructure. Many of these studies have been supported by the Swedish
Council for Building Research (BFR). A related issue is the interdependence between
economic and spatial processes operating on different time scales. Studies in this fIeld
were initiated in the beginning of the 1980's within the IIASA-project "Nested Dynamics
of Metropolitan Processes and Policies". Many of the ideas in this project originated from
collaboration with our friend and colleague Giorgio Leonardi, whose passing soon after
the Summer Institute in 1986 was a great loss to so many of us. This volume is dedicated
to his memory.
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xCENTRE FOR REGIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (CERUM)
CERUM is a research organisation at UmeA University in Sweden. Its basic objective is
to participate in and contribute to the development of regional science in a national and
international context. In view of this goal, the centre coordinates nation-wide research
programmes; it promotes studies focussing on spatial aspects of regional, national and
international social, political and economic systems. The research emphasizes the
development and assessment of theories as well as pertinent models and applied methods
of research. The centre also hosts the Secretariate for Systems Analysis which aims at
facilitating the interaction between Swedish researchers as well as research organisations
and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. In this
effon the secretariate is guided by the Swedish member organisation of IIASA, i.e., The
Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research.
Research Orientation
The research tradition within regional science is multidisciplinary.The discipline has
developed as a result of contributions from many scientific fields such as civil
engineering, demography, geography, economics, sociology, political science, urban and
regional planning, applied mathematics and systems analysis. CERUM's task is to
continue with this tradition so as to utilize and combine contributions from the social,
natural and engineering sciences in the study of spatial and regional development.
CERUM has two in-house series of publications: (I) Working Papers from CERUM, and
(2) CERUM Repons. The centre has a national board with current members from the
universities ofLund, Luled, Umed, Uppsala, Sundsvall-HiirnOsand, Ostersund; the Royal
Institute ofTechnology, the Association ofSwedish Municipalities, the Expert Group of
Regional Development Research of the Ministry of Industry, the Institute for Future
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CHAPTER 1
Progress in Spatial Theory and Dynamics:
A Prefatory Review
D.F. Batten and P. Nijkamp
1. INTRODUCTION
During the late sixties and seventies, the youthful field of regional science moved
gradually towards a more mature phase as the interdisciplinary scholarship of economists,
geographers, mathematicians, engineers and others displayed some welcome signs of
synthesis and consensus. The basic spatial problems - those associated with location,
market areas, land use, trade and regional development - were painted clearly and broadly
by Walter Isard and others in the fifties (see, for example, Isard, 1956). Important
progress has been made in tackling these well-posed problems, perhaps most notably in
the fusing of location theory with spatial interaction models, transportation planning and
regional economic analysis.
But new problems had already emerged before these old ones could bask in welcome
solution. The late seventies and eighties have seen pronounced slowdowns in the
economic or population growth rates of many places - be they cities, regions or nations.
Widespread processes of economic and physical obsolescence are becoming relatively
severe in some of these places. Quite often we have witnessed abrupt changes to the
smooth urbanization trends experienced in earlier decades.
These sudden discontinuities and structural economic changes prompt a need for new
concepts and new tools which can probe beyond the traditional optimization and lifecycle
theories familiar to regional scientists. In short, technological changes and the march
towards internationalization may be expected to have a profoundly different impact on
spatial patterns of human activity than we have witnessed in earlier decades.
Spatial dynamics can be observed in all countries of the world. In some cases, regions
and cities display a smooth transition pattern, while in others sudden changes take place.
The Silicon valley development pattern, the rapid expansion of the Shinkansen Region
and the Greater Boston Area, and the growth of metropolitan areas in many developing
countries reflect a transition that may be denoted as structural dynamics and which may
exhibit unstable systems behaviour. Unstable behaviour may lead to sudden oscillations
in the prosperity enjoyed by particular places, and considerable uncertainty with regard to
the future.
But perhaps there are even more convincing reasons for a necessary review of our
progress in the field of spatial dynamics. It seems probable that we have recently entered a
structural transition of global dimensions, which might be described as a Logistical
Revolution (see Andersson, 1985); associated with the growth of information processing
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and communication capacity as well as an expansion of the knowledge base. This
development goes hand-in-hand with further improvements to the transportation system,
especially to the structure and operation of the air transport network. Improvements to
telecommunication and air transport capacity are jointly increasing the discrete network
character of the world economy. Contiguity of places and regions is thus becoming less
significant. Our traditional theories associated with central place hierarchies may be seen
as less convincing. Instead we must concern ourselves with changes occuring across
multiple layers of networks (i.e. people, commodities, money, information) from one hub
or node to another.
The above discussion serves to emphasize the need for an even more comprehensive
theory of social and economic development. Not only should such a theory embrace both
the time and space dimensions, but it must also recognize the dynamic interplay of forces
transmitted across several different levels and layers of spatial networks. Knowledge
capacity is rapidly becoming a fundamental nodal parameter when we study networks of
information exchange. Speed and certainty of communication is beginning to affect our
choice of telecommunication device, just as speed of movement has traditionally played an
important part in the modal choices made by travellers.
Despite relevant partial contributions, a unifying theory for analysing evolutionary
patterns over space is lacking. It has been suggested by several authors that technological
progress may be an important factor behind spatial development patterns, though only a
few operational attempts have been made to include innovation as an endogenous impulse
in spatial growth patterns. In order to shed more light on the intriguing role of innovation
in spatial development patterns, the next section will be devoted to a concise discussion of
long wave theories and innovations, and to their relevance for spatial development
fluctuations. For these purposes, both external and internal factors affecting spatial
dynamics will be taken into account.
2. SPATIAL DYNAMICS
2. 1 External Determinants
Spatial economic systems have always been characterized by a state of flux. This
dynamics may to a certain extent be ascribed to drastic changes in the environment outside
the urban system leading to profound changes inside the system itself. For instance, the
rise of oil prices in the seventies had a great impact on urban transportation systems and
urban residential patterns (see Beaumont and Keys, 1982). A revival of interest in
structural economic changes has therefore emerged, not only in the economic sense of
innovation patterns but also in the geographical sense of reorientation of cities and regions
(see e.g. Johansson and Nijkamp, 1987).
For many decades, economic fluctuations, long wave patterns and spatial dynamics
have always commanded a great deal of attention by economic historians (cf. Adelman,
1965; and Schumpeter, 1939), but the emergence of the current economic recession and
its inherent future uncertainty has stimulated a new interest in structural dynamics of
economic systems (including inter alia such issues as industrial perturbations, unbalanced
growth, disequilibrium analysis, international and geographical equity, and multi-actor
conflicts (see e.g. Olson, 1982). In this respect, Kondratieffs theory of long cycles has
stimulated new reflections and scientific debates (see, for instance Freeman et al., 1982,
Mandel, 1980; and Mensch, 1979). Kondratieffs original theory distinguished five
stages in the long-run cyclical pattern of a free enterprise economy: take-off, rapid
growth, maturation, saturation and decline. The real existence of such long-term
fluctuations is difficult to demonstrate due to lack of historical data. In general, only price
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data have been used to test the long-wave hypothesis, although fortunately in recent years
new efforts have been made to provide a more substantial empirical foundation for the
long-wave hypothesis by means of industrial innovation and R&D data (see Kleinknecht,
1986). Several other cycles of shorter duration (e.g. Kuznets and Juglar cycles) may also
be of interest.
2.2 Internal Determinants
An urban or regional economy may also display fluctuations that are internal to the
system, caused inter alia by social, demographic, political, or economic forces. Such
developments are particularly related to innovations in the industrial sectors, either basic
innovations (leading to new products, new firms or even new industrial sectors) or
process innovations (leading to new industrial processes in existing sectors). Basic
innovations are assumed to take place periodically and to cluster, leading to economic
fluctuations. In this respect it is usually assumed that after a period of growth a period of
saturation may take place, leading to a recession. Such growth processes are often
described by means of a logistic (S-shaped) curve characterized by the following phases:
introduction, growth, maturity, saturation and decline (see, e.g. Batten, 1982).
Apart from innovations per se, the filtering and diffusion processes by which new
inventions spread and evolve warrant our attention. For'instance, although new
innovations may emerge in nodal centres, in the long-run these innovations or their
offspring may be observed elsewhere. It is here that the spatial version of product cycle
theory can provide useful insights. Especially during a phase of saturation and decline,
basic innovations and radical technological changes may be effective vehicles for a
developing economy.
When we consider supply and demand perspectives simultaneously, the appropriate
combination of R&D capital, production equipment, public overhead capital (or network
infrastructure) and new markets is a necessary ingredient for creating radical technological
changes (see Schmookler, 1966). Such changes are essentially the catalytic factors behind
the process of structural economic development in various places.
2 .3 The Importance of Network Infrastructure
The presence of satisfactory urban or regional infrastructure is thus a necessary condition
to foster a breeding place for new activities (Rosenberg, 1976). This requires, in general,
favourable educational facilities, communication possibilities, market entrance, good
environmental conditions and agglomeration favouring innovative activities. In recent
studies, dense import networks entering a node have been recognized as an innovation
promoting system property (Johansson and Westin, 1987). The above may also explain
why monopoly situations and industrial concentrations (including patent systems) often
have greater technological and innovative opportunities. There is some empirical evidence
to suggest that only a limited number of industrial sectors account for the majority of
innovations (such as electronics, petrochemicals and aircraft) although in various cases
small firms may be a source of major innovations (see Rothwell, 1979). This also implies
that economic sectoral adjustment and spatial fluctuations may go hand in hand when
perceived in terms of nonlinear relative dynamics (see e.g., Batten, 1985).
Another important question asks whether or not city size is a decisive factor for
economic fluctuation and structural adjustment. In the debate on geographical
concentration and specialisation, it is often argued that city size favours innovative
propensity (cf. Alonso, 1971; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Jacobs 1977; Pred, 1966;
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and Richardson, 1973). More recently we may observe that the innovative potential in the
U.S. - which was traditionally concentrated in large urban agglomerations - may now be
declining in the largest urban concentrations (see Markusen et at, 1986; Norton and
Rees, 1979; and Sveikauskas, 1979).
Part of the explanation for this trend reversal may lie in the global transition towards a
network economy. Growth seems to be proportional to size in a central place city but not
necessarily in a network city. Network cities have accounted for most of the recent
additions to the urban array, notably the fast-growing industrial newcomers (see
Hohenberg and Lees, 1985). This argument is summed up in Figure 1, a simple schema
that builds on the work of Robson (1973). Evolutionary models drawn from various
scientific disciplines may also be useful for the analysis of innovation and spatial
diffusion processes (see, e.g. Batten et al., 1987; Nelson and Winter, 1982). In this
tradition one should observe that urban regions have vintage properties. This means that
large and previously prosperous cities and metropolitan nodes may start to decline
because of obsolescence. Cyclic patterns result when infrastructure investments bring
about renewal of the economic system.
Growth
rate
r......:::::.
I ~Network .-..:: _
...~~~~-----------~--~
.1 . --£I c -_.-- . _-:::----..
I C~ntral placeci~y--
o ! -"'~ C' .Ity size
Figure 1 The relationship of growth and size in two urban systems.
3. AN ILLUSTRATION OF SPATIAL FLUCTUATION
3.1 Capital Formation in a Spatial System
The evolution of a spatial system may demonstrate fluctuations, unbalanced growth or
perturbations. In the present section, a more fonnal approach to spatial long-term
fluctuations will be presented (based on the previous section). First, the main driving
forces of a spatial system will be described by means of a simplified arrow diagram (see
Figure 2). The assumption made here is that R&D capital is assumed to incorporate
knowledge and communication technology. Various production factors may thus exert an
impact on spatial dynamics, as reflected in the impact model of Figure 1. For the moment,
the diffusion processes of innovations will be excluded.
A simple mathematical representation of the driving forces of such a system can be
found in Nijkamp (1986). This simplified model was based on a quasi-production
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function (including productive capital, infrastructure and R&D capital as factors). The
dynamics of the system was described by motion equations for productive investments,
infrastructure investments and R&D investments. Several constraints were also included
to control congestion effects and consumption rates. Equilibrium solutions were obtained
using optimal control theory.
It is evident that if we focus on qualitative changes in a non-linear dynamic system,
sudden jumps and discontinuities may emerge (see e.g., Allen and Sanglier, 1979;
Andersson and Kuenne, 1986; Batten, 1982; Dendrinos, 1981; Isard and Liossatos,
1979; Mees, 1975; and Wilson, 1981). In the following section the issue of non-linear
dynamics will be demonstrated using a well known equation in difference form.
k
x
-
r
x
-
-
i
x
-
I.
x
energy e
x
Imaterials xm ~ I
Figure 2 The process of capital formation
3.2 A Simple Model for Generating Spatial Fluctuations
Consider a (closed) urban or regional economl- characterized by a 'generalized'
production function including p!Oductive capital (x ), labour (xl.), energy (xe), materials
(xm) network infrastructure (Xl) and R&D activities (xf) as arguments. The fIrst four
components are often found in KLEM production functions dealing with substitution
effects between capital, labour, energy and materials (see for instance Lesuis et.al.,
1980). The fifth component indicates the necessary public overhead capital needed as a
complement to private productive capital, along the lines suggested by Hirschman (1958),
in order to facilitate spatial interaction and so achieve a balanced growth strategy. The
inclusion of this infrastructure component led to the notion of the quasi-production
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function in recent literature (see Nijkamp, 1984). Finally the sixth component is reflecting
the innovation effects due to R&D investments (including knowledge capacity and
communication) in the spatial system.
Hence, the following generalized production function may be assumed:
-f(k.t em i 1"\Y - x, X ,x ,x ,x, x- " (1)
where y is the volume of production (in terms of market share). The parameters of the
location-specific production technology depend on the general state of the technology
worldwide and on specific agglomeration factors at the urban or regional level.
If a normal Cobb-Douglas specification is assumed, one may rewrite (1) as follows:
y = a(xk)~ (x.t)'Y (xe)8 (xm)E (xi)~ (xf)Tl , (2)
where the parameters ~,... ,Tl reflect the production e~asticities concerned. These
elasticities are assumed to be positive in the range (ymm), (ymax). Below a certain
minimum threshold level, ymm, the economy may be too small for agglomeration
advantages to accrue, and thus a marginal increase in one of the production factors may
have a zero impact on the total production volume. In other words a city needs a minimum
endowment or'production factors before reaching a self-sustained growth. Furthermore,
beyond a certain maximum capacity level of urban size, bottlenecks and capacity ten'sions
(due to a high concentration of capital) may cause a negative marginal product of some of
the production factors (e.g., productive capital, R&D).
Shifts in the urban or regional production volume over a certain period of time may be
written in difference form as:
~Yt = (~kt + y.tt + 8et + Emt + ~it + Tlrt)Yt-l
with
and
~Yt =Yt - Yt-l
h h
~ - x t-l
ht = h
xt-l
, h = k, .t, e, m, i, r
(3)
(4)
(5)
Thus the arguments of (5) are written as relative changes in terms of the original
variables.
Within the range (ymin, ymax), the urban system will exhibit a noncyclical growth
pattern characterized by stable behaviour and self-sustained growth. This self-sustained
growth path may be curtailed from two causes:
- external factors: scarcity of production factors or lack of demand
- internal factors: emergence of congestion effects leading to negative marginal
products.
External factors imply that the system will move towards an upper limit set by the
constraint concerned. Internal factors may lead to perturbations and qualitative changes in
systemic behaviour. Consider, for instance, a congestion effect caused by the exessive
concentration of capital in an urban agglomeration. Then each additional increase in
productive capital will have a negative impact on the urban production level. In other
words, beyond the capacity limit, ymax, an auxiliary relationship reflecting a negative
marginal capital product may be assumed:
D.F. Batten and P. Nijkamp
13t = ~(ymax - lC}'t_1)/ymax
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(6)
This implies that the production elasticity has become a time-dependent variable.
Analogous relationships indicating a negative marginal product may be assumed for other
production factors. Substitution of all these relationships into (3) leads to the following
adjusted dynamic spatial production function: .
~Yt = (~kt + ~Lt + Set +~t + ~it + 1'\rt) (ymax - "Yt-1) Yt_1/ymax (7)
At fIrst glance this may appear to be a simple non-stochastic dynamic relationship.
However, it can be shown that this equation may characterize unstable and even erratic
behaviour leading to periodic fluctuations.
The standard form of (7) may be rewritten as:
~Yt =Vt(ymax - lC}'t-1) Yt_1/ymax
with:
Vt = (~kt + ~Lt + 8et + fil t + ~it + 1'\rv
(8)
(9)
Equation (8) has similar properties to the well-known difference equation model
analyzed by May (1974). Applications in a spatial setting may be found among others in
Brouwer and Nijkamp (1985) and Dendrinos (1981). In the present context, the dynamic
trajectory of the urban economy can be studied more precisely by rewriting (8) as:
~Yt =Vt(1 - Yt-1/ymax)Yt-1 (10)
Equation (10) is a standard equation from population dynamics and has some very
interesting properties. On the basis of numerical experiments, it has been demonstrated by
May (1974) that this model may exhibit a remarkable spectrum of dynamical behaviour,
such as stable equilibrium points, stable cyclic oscillations, stable cycles, and chaotic
regimes with a-periodic but bounded fluctuations. Two key parameters determine the
stability properties of (8), viz. the initial values of Yt and the growth rate for the urban
system (which depends on vv. Simulation experiments indicate that the growth rate has a
major impact on the emergence of cyclic or a-periodic fluctuations. It must be assumed
that Yt is standardized (as in our model).
May has also demonstrated that a stable equilibrium may emerge if 0 ~ Vt ~ 2;
otherwise stable cycles or unstable fluctuations may be generated. Li and Yorke (1975)
have since developed a set of sufficient conditions for the emergence of chaotic behaviour
for general continuous difference equations.
Our preliminary conclusion from the above discussion is that even very simple spatial
systems may be found to exhibit a rich variety of dynamic trajectories, of which balanced
or cyclical growth are but two possibilities. Such heterogeneity in spatial development
patterns may also be observed in the wide diversity of regional and urban trends allover
the world. In our simple formulation of the urban economy, dynamic trajectories are
supposedly determined by initial city size and the growth rate of the urban production
system. Of course reality is certainly much more complex than this, although the fact that
Vt is not a constant (but a time-dependent variable) suggests that if it is regarded as a
control variable, a more stable spatial trajectory might result.
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4. OUTLINE OF THE VOLUME
The above remarks and rudimentary analytical perspectives do scant justice to the many
challenging problems which are associated with economic and social development over
space. In this volume, a much broader collection of recent advances in the field has been
assembled from leading scholars in different parts of the world.
Part A of the book focuses on the marketplace by scrutinizing the key processes of
competition, specialization and technological change. Chapter 2 by Kuenne reviews the
small body of literature on spatial oligopoly and suggests some lines of departure for
future research in the light of current deficiencies. In the third chapter, Batten and
Johansson derive a theoretical foundation for the widely-obselVed relative dynamics of
substitution in terms of Lancaster's model of consumer behaviour. This general
substitution model is remoulded to capture the dynamic processes of spatial interaction
and relocation of production, thereby offering an analytical window through which a
product cycle can be viewed as the result of both product substitution and spatial
substitution proceeding in combination. In a complementary paper (Chapter 4), Aubin
explores the use of viability theory to portray the notion that the evolution of a technical
process of production has greater "inertia" than the evolution of the quality of the products
generated by a given technology. The complementarity between Chapters 3 and 4 lies in
their common concern with the nonlinear lifecycle characteristics of products or
processes.
Chapter 5 continues in the vein of technical change, with the emphasis on the role of
women. Chatterjee develops an agenda for research on the contemporary relationship
between technology and women's employment, having explored various theoretical
frameworks to analyse sex segregation in the workplace and the household economy. In
Chapter 6, Hartwick reflects on Chichilnisky's suggestion that an oil importing region
could benefit from an exogenous increase in the price of its imported oil. His examination
of the "substitution effects" in such a model puts the economics of a booming sector on a
sounder footing. The next chapter contains a rigorous derivation of the 'direct'
equilibrium of an economy by Dejon, Giildner and Wenzel. By concentrating on the
notion of relative demand (the quotient of purchases to supply at each price level), they
are able to define a general equilibrium state without recourse to the explicit equality of
supply and demand levels. Part A is completed by a study of rivalrous consonance by
Kuenne. This chapter is a clear example of the suggestions made in Chapter 2.
In Part B, the focus shifts to spatial interaction analysis. Puu begins this section with
an extension of his earlier work in which Hotelling's (1921) model for population growth
and dispersal was given an economic rationale. By including capital accumulation as an
explicit process in the model, the resulting two-input production function produces a
spatially homogeneous solution which is unstable if the capital stock exceeds a certain
critical value. Tony Smith follows up in Chapter 10 with a finite approach to multivariate
spectral analysis. His chosen process, designated as the circular smoothing of the given
sample, is shown to have a finite spectral representation which may be derived by simple
matrix methods. In Chapter 11, Haag endeavours to improve the construction of the
classical spatial interaction model by adopting a master equation approach. This type of
model is also the focus of some discussion in the final chapter within Part B, where
Barentsen and Nijkamp distinguish three levels on which nonlinear dynamic processes
can be modelled and the resulting models classified.
The focus of Part C is urban and regional infrastructure. Mills and Carlino open the
collection with an exploration of the determinants of county growth in the USA from
1970 to 1980. Considerable evidence favouring central city location over nonmetropolitan
location is uncovered, emphasizing the junctional importance of the interstate highway
system. In Chapter 14, Andersson and Kobayashi develop an equilibrium theory for the
analysis of accessibility and density distributions. By examining nodal congestion and
impacts on the resulting spatial equilibrium of population, an earlier model is given a more
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general framework. The spatial equilibrium approach is again the focus of attention in
Chapter 15, where Nagurney presents a general dynamic spatial price equilibrium model
with gains and losses.
In Chapter 16 Lakshmanan examines the concept of infrastructure, its attributes and its
role in long-term transformations of the economic system. He emphasizes the key role
which network infrastructure will play in the transition to a serVice economy. On the other
hand, Quigley and Varaiya analyze the problem of a consumer-investor who must choose
a level of initial investment in insulation and other energy-saving capital to produce a flow
of housing services over some time horizon. Crucial to the optimal level of investment is
the expected increase in future energy prices. Rogner's paper on dynamic energy complex
analysis for metropolitan planning (Chapter 18) represents a continuation 0{ the energy
theme. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive systems approach encompassing both
energy production and consumption. The book concludes with a dynamic model for the
behaviour of a profit-taking developer in the housing market (Chapter 19). Kobayashi,
Zhang and Yoshikawa employ the concept of infmitesimal transformations in Lie group
theory to describe the taste changes of households, thereby deriving some conservation
laws in the market for housing.
The above collection of writings constitutes but a small step along the path towards a
better understanding of the many aspects of spatial change. Major problems which may
command our attention in the coming decade concern the interdependence between
technological change, knowledge creation and the formation of urban as well as internodal
network infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 2
The Dynamics of Oligopolistic Location:
Present Status and Future Research Directions
R.E. Kuenne
1. INTRODUCTION
15
The purpose of this paper is a modest one. It is to review the rather small body of
literature on spatial oligopoly, judge the degree of progress it has made in yielding
insights into spatially conditioned decision making in relevant economic contexts, and to
suggest some lines of departure for research in the light of its present revealed
deficiencies.
By "dynamic" I simply mean strategic reaction through time on the part of
knowledgeable rivals that mayor may not converge to a steady solution. Spatially
conditioned decisions are locations and prices. Relevant contributing characteristics of the
environment are number of firms, configurations of the space involved, demand function
characteristics and the spatial density of demand, and firms' conjectures about their rivals'
reactions.
After an extremely rich research history, which has seen pioneering applications of the
calculus of variations, simulation, and catastrophe theory, among other innovations in
economics, where does the theory of spatial oligopoly stand today? Why has so little been
done in the last ten years? Have the various strands of investigation converged to common
conclusions about the desirable path of future research? What are the paths indicated? It is
these questions I should like to address in this paper, with an emphasis upon the bearing
of past research upon the future.
2. THE PRESENT STATUS OF SPATIAL OLIGOPOLY ANALYSIS
In existing spatial oligopoly analysis interest focuses upon two questions: (1) the
locational structure of the steady state equilibria, if they exist, and (2) the convergence or
nonconvergence of the reactive process to such steady states. Most of the early work
centers upon the first question, but as the inherent complexity of the real oligopoly market
structure intruded into later analysis, simulation techniques had to be used. In such
modelling the two problems merge. If, in a reaction sequence, when each firm is given
the opportunity to adjust while its rivals remain quiescent, the solution cycles without
converging, doubt is cast on the existence of a steady state that closed analysis cannot
isolate. If it does converge consistently to one or a few configurations from widely
different starting points, some support is given to the hypothesis that they are equilibria.
Condition 3:
Condition 4:
Condition 1:
Condition 2:
16 Dynamics of Oligopolistic Location
Following the lead of Gannon (1972, 1973), although generalizing his concept, I may
define one body of research that originated in Hotelling's classic article (1929) as "simple
spatial oligopoly". Its notable features are simplicity of demand structure and of
conjectures of rival responses to initiating moves. This set of models was treated
defmitively in Eaton and Lipsey (1975) for the following assumptions:
1. the spatial configuration is linear, circular, or a disc, with consumers distributed
uniformly or as a density function that is integrable;
2. each consumer purchases one unit of good from the firm with lowest delivered
price, so that sales are proportionate to consumers in the firms' market areas;
3. all ftrms charge the same f.o.b. prices, with transport costs that increase with
distance, and with identical, fixed marginal profit;
4. no more than one fum can occupy a location and relocation costs are zero;
5 . firms locate to maximize profits subject to two alternative conjectures:
(i) Coumot, or that rivals will not respond to initiating actions;
(ii) game theoretic, or that rivals will respond in manners that maximize the loss of
the initiating fum's market;
6. fums relocate in a dynamic quiescent sequence with the steady state identified with
a Nash equilibrium.
The results of the Eaton-Lipsey analysis are too complex to be related in complete
detail in this short paper, but the broad outlines are relevant for my later conclusions. For
linear or circular market spaces, under Coumot expectations, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a steady state solution may be stated quite simply. Each firm will have a
long side and a short side to its market segment Then the conditions are as follows:
No fum's total sales are less than some fum's longside sales.
Peripheral fums are always paired when they occur, so their short
sides are (nearly) zero in size.
For every unpaired fum the number of customers at its left- and
right-hand boundaries are equal.
For every paired firm the number of customers at the short-side
boundary is no less than the number at the long-side boundary.
Hotelling left the impression that spatial oligopoly competition had a tendency to
cluster ftrms in space, or, more generally, to minimum differentiation in any dimension
with spatial analogue (political programs, product brands, etc.), a hypothesis that
Chamberlin (1948) sensed would not be general. Eaton and Lipsey reveal that Hotelling's
pairing of firms at the center of the linear market does occur for n = 2 under Cournot
expectations. But for n = 3 no equilibrium exists: Chamberlin, in asserting a corttrary
position, failed to grasp the significance of Condition 2. For n = 4 pairing occurs at tlJ.e
first and third quartiles, and for n = 5 a steady state exists with pairs at locations 1/6 and
5/6 and an unpaired firm at the center. But, for n > 5 an infinite number of steady states
exists under simple oligopoly. If, following the suggestion of Chamberlin, we bend the
line into a circle, for n = 2 all configurations are equilibria and for n > 2 an infinite
number of solutions exists. By no means, therefore, is there a general tendency toward
the pairing of rivals or of minimum differentiation.
As the models are increased in complexity, the indeterminacy becomes more general.
In 2-space, when the market area is confined to a disc with uniform population
distribution and Cournot conjectures, the solutions, if they exist, could not be obtained
for n ~ 3, and simulation was necessary. LOschian hexagons, squares, and rectangles
were not sustainable as steady state market area patterns. For 3 S n S 17 the dynamic
adjustment process failed to converge, and Eaton and Lipsey conjecture that no Nash
equilibrium exists for n > 2 in simple spatial oligopoly. Shaked (1975) has provided a
nonexistence proof for n =3.
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The fIrst step to what I shall call "complex spatial oligopoly" models was taken by
Lerner and Singer (1937) and, more importantly, by Smithies (1941), with the
introduction of more complicated demand assumptions and the consequent introduction of
price as an endogenous variable simultaneously determined with location.
Smithies's research broadened and deepened the Hotelling analysis by introducing
linear demand functions, joint determination of prices and locations, and more
complicated patterns of price and location conjectures, although these latter remained
symmetrical for both rivals. He derives a measure of the strength of the forces pulling
duopolists toward the poles of a linear market by combining the transport rate, the size of
market, and a surrogate for demand elasticity into a single parameter s.. He related location
to values of this measure under three different conjecture assumptions. The relation of
price to s. was too complex to be subjected to closed analysis, although he found a general
tendency for fIrms to absorb freight costs as they anticipated greater competitive reactions
from rivals.
Gannon (1972, 1973) extended Smithies's work by introducing nonlinear demand
functions and explicit marginal expectations of rivals' responses. In general, like
Smithies, the burden of Gannon's work is that Hotelling's determinateness disappears
with the introduction of these complications and general propositions in the absence of
specifIed functions and parameters are not possible. Once more, in a framework of
essential simplicity, the resources provided by general deductive frameworks are
insuffIcient to yield insights.
Another predictable line of attack for spatial oligopolistic analysis in both I-space and
2-space has been more extensive applications of game theory than the minimax conjectural
variation assumption of Eaton and Lipsey permits. Stevens (1961) modified the Hotelling
problem by assuming a fInite number of points on the line at which location could occur,
and, to make the game zero-sum, assumed that the payoff function to firms was the
difference in their sales at alternative locations. Straightforward two-person, zero-sum
attack upon the spatial duopoly problem concludes that a minimax solution with pairing at
the center is consistent with Hotelling's results. The work was an interesting introduction
of game theoretic conjectures into an essentially Hotelling framework.
More extensive applications of game theory were made by Isard and Smith (1967,
1968). In a Hotelling economy with linear demand curves, they use standard isoprofIt
contour analysis to derive a Cournot solution to the duopoly problem with each fIrm
located one-third of the distance from the end-points of the linear market. Of course, both
fIrms can benefIt from a collusive agreement, and the authors consider various plausible
dynamic procedures to attain such agreement. They also analyze the possibility of side
payments, beginning at the joint profIt maximization solution (at one of the quartiles) and
negotiating over the division of the spoils. The Weber agglomeration economies problem
is melded with the Hotelling case by introducing the former into the analysis. Most
interestingly, the Weber agglomeration case is analyzed on its own, with various
cooperative dynamic movement schemes discussed that iteratively reduce the space within
which agglomeration can occur. The later article introduces the possibility of coalition
formation into this agglomeration analysis.
As in all realistic oligopoly analysis, the strength of game theory ironically inheres in
its disappointing results, for it succeeds in highlighting the richness of realistic processes
through the methodology's general indeterminateness. It serves to reinforce the
conclusions of our earlier discussions: spatial oligopoly presents dynamic adjustment
potentialities that in the general case are essentially indeterminate in outcome. Hence, such
problems must be accepted as sui generis, work is most profItably confIned to specifIc
cases via simulation, and the theoretical ambitions of the analyst should be constrained to
the limited applicability of the theorems and conjectures that emerge from such analysis.
Such conclusions are not happy ones for the economic theorist. We are too much
fascinated by the universal theorems of the physical scientist. The role of pure theory in
illuminating applied research is a different one in the simpler universe of the physicist.
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When, in our own field, it points in the direction of simulation by indicating the
essentially noncorrectible oversimplicity of our methods, we simply walk away. When,
so to speak, we find our theory of hydrodynamics cannot explain the flow of air around
an aircraft, we do not stoop to build wind tunnels. We simply do without aircraft as not
worth the condescension from respectable abstraction necessary to achieve them.
3. SUGGESTED RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A rather compelling theme emerges from this record of research progress, in my opinion.
It is that pure theory has reached the limits of its ability to illuminate spatial oligopoly
using the traditional frameworks available to the oligopoly analyst. Newer methodologies
must build upon the foundation of the old, but wisely. These methods must include
specific assumptions about demand functions and costs, sacrificing generality of results
for evaluable solutions. They must be operational, with parameters capable of estimation.
And they should be flexible - more so than the rigid models of trcKtitional oligopoly theory
- with the capability of treating a broad spectrum of industry mixtures of competition and
cooperation and of tailoring to comply with specific industry structures and folkways.
And, lastly, perhaps more susceptible of indictment as pure personal preference, I should
like to see the insights obtained when spatial oligopoly is placed within the matrix of
stochastic processes, or at least when random behavior is incorporated into spatial
demand.
I have some ideas about each of the three directions - simulative theorizing, cooperative
rivalry, and stochastic process - but they are only investigatory beginnings or
contemplations. I discuss each briefly below.
3.1 Simulative Theorizing
In a published article (Kuenne, 1977) I experimented with a simulation using n. firms
serving m discrete market points in space, where the firms can locate anywhere within the
convex hull of the market points. Various metrics were also used to permit economic
distances to approach more closely those resulting from concave transport cost functions
over distance. Costs are constant for each firm but may differ among firms, linear demand
functions are assumed at sinks in terms of delivered prices, which in turn are f.o.b. prices
at sources plus transport costs proportionate to distance.
The resulting model is a very complicated nonlinear programming model with no
constraints other than defmitional identities and non-negativity constraints. The objective
function - arbitrarily chosen as the maximization of joint profit - is not jointly convex in
the endogenous variables and hence yields only local optima. Moreover, it is very difficult
to solve, due entirely to the presence of the spatial dimension. It was solved by iterative
use of two algorithms. The first assumes prices fixed and employs a multisource Weber
point branch-and-bound algorithm to derive tentative source locations. The second
assumes those locations to be fixed and determines optimal prices in a straightforward
nonlinear programming application. Each of the two algorithms will converge to optimal
solutions given the fixity of price or source location, since branch-and-bound is an
exhaustive search technique and the programming problem is convex in prices. The
iterative processes are stopped when convergence criteria are met.
At least, the branch-and-bound algorithm converges for small to medium size numbers
of sources and sinks, and obtains very good answers for larger numbers. The price model
, was solved by the Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Technique (SUMT), a penalty
function algorithm which is readily adapted to sequential quiescent sequences. Our
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solutions converged well for 4 to 6 fIrms and 8 to 10 sinks, approaching the same
solutions for widely varying initial assumptions.
The model was used to exploit Smithies's insight into the importance of transport rate,
size of market, and demand elasticity in spatial oligopoly, or the ~ measure discussed in
Section 2. Also the model was used to measure changes in locational patterns and prices
when joint profIt maximization is compared with purely competitive pricing and Cournot-
myopic expectations of rivals' responses.
One diffIcult problem occurs in extending this framework to permit multi-objective
decision making in a spatial context by including constraints in the spatial dimension.
Those objectives that impact only prices directly are easily handled, but combinatorial
programming algorithms like branch-and-bound fInd it diffIcult to deal with constraints.
Hence, constraints on location, which exist in the realistic location decisions 'of fInns, are
diffIcult to include. Research into means of incorporating them into branch-and-bound
algorithms, or into developing alternative heuristic algorithms as substitutes, would be
extremely valuable.
In a deeper sense, we also need a better framework for efficient parameter
manipulation of such simulations to derive insights of maximum generalizability. Are
there general methods for quickly discerning the sensitive parameters in such models?
Can the notion of Smithies's artificial S. parameter that economically combines the
influences of several parameters be generalized? Are there general methods for placing
upper and lower bounds on parameters? Must each sensitivity analysis be an ad hoc
procedure without general principles of structure, fonnulation, or interpretation, or can
general frameworks be found to generalize such analysis?
We truly require an "econometrics of simulation" that specifIes general guidelines for
structuring and codifying models and post-optimality analysis, if simulative theorizing is
to become a tool of theoretical research.
3.2 Rivalrous Consonance
In recognition of the varying mixtures of rivalry and cooperation that characterize market
structures, ranging from joint profIt maximization through Coumot disregard of rivals'
profIts into active warfare, the simulative joint-profit maximization objective can be
decentralized to permit each ftrm to maximize its own proftt plus the weighted sum of
rivals' proftts. The weights reflect the ftnn's conception of the industry power structure in
the broadest sense from its own viewpoint Other goals can be incorporated as constraints
if the algorithmic difficulties discussed above were solved.
I have advocated this framework in nonspatial oligopolistic studies for a variety of
reasons, ranging from its ability to model mature oligopolistic industry behavior more
realistically to the possibility of developing a theory of general oligopolistic equilibrium
(see Chapter 8 in this volume). It would be most interesting to see what its application in
the spatial dimension would imply. How is tacit cooperation or bounded competition
reflected in location patterns? In what manners do they change as rivalry increases? What
is the locational equivalent of active price war, set off when ftnns value rivals proftts at
negative values? At the present time I am most interested in making this extension of the
rivalrous consonance framework, with and without the multi-objective complication. For
example, as a start, it would be interesting to model the Eaton-Lipsey cases on the disc for
n between 3 and 17. One could approximate the assumption of a unifonn continuous
distribution of demand by increasingly dense evenly distributed discrete demand points,
and use the multisource Weber point and optimal pricing algorithms in tandem for
solutions. This might conftnn or refute the conjecture of nonequilibrium
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3 . 3 Stochastic Process Theory
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Stochastic process theory has been extensively used in spatial economics only in the
adoption of diffusion theory to explain the spread and patterning of innovations and
similar phenomena over space. My surmise is that it could be usefully employed in
explaining the nature of certain types of contingency demand over space, the evolution of
market areas, the sequence of rival entries, and the resulting spatial patterning of locations
and prices. No doubt, as is true of stochastic processes with any degree of complexity,
simulation would have to be resorted to once more. However,the discernment of steady
state patterns and their changes under different parametric regimes could be quite
rewarding.
My only excursion into such areas has been an investigation of an elementary Poisson
demand process in space and its implications for the market area of a single finn (Kuenne,
1984). If the occurrence of demands in a time period over space were Poisson (which I
assumed) and the amount of demand with such an occurrence followed a geometric
distribution (which I did not assume), then demand over space is a "stuttering Poisson"
process with a negative binomial probability function. It is well known that for a
sufficiently large number of occurrences the normal distribution approximates this
function, and it would be relatively simple to study the nature of oligopolistic decision
making under such regimes, when joint profit maximization, Cournot conjectures, or,
more broadly, rivalrous consonance, is assumed.
4. CONCLUSION
Spatial oligopoly theory developed along several paths from Hotelling's original
formulation of a linear economy with perfectly inelastic demand. These included
differently shaped spaces, with and without interiors, elastic demand functions, game
theoretical rivalry, the endogenization of prices, and non-Cournot conjectural variation.
Some of the efforts were definitive, notably that of Eaton and Lipsey's extension and
generalization of the Hotelling problem. All have explicitly or implicitly reached the
conclusion that general deductive analysis with nonspecified models could go no further
profitably.
The field of spatial oligopoly analysis, as a consequence, has been dormant for the last
decade or so. There is a clear need to stimulate analysis in this most relevant market
structure as it relates to space. The need to investigate simulative alternatives with
specified parameters and functions seems clear. Among other advantages it will permit the
investigation of differentiated oligopoly, blends or rivalry and cooperation, multi-
objective decision making and larger numbers of rivals. Most importantly, it offers the
only presently perceived route out of the impasse that current methods have engendered.
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CHAPTER 3
Dynamics of Product Substitution
D.F. Batten and B. Johansson
1. INTRODUCTION
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Industrial sectors in most nations of the world are undergoing gradual but major
technological changes. Although most consumers still have relatively few basic needs -
such as food, clothing, shelter, transportation, education, employment and the like - there
are myriads of changes occurring at the intermediate stages of production as well as in the
individual choice processes of households. Regardless of whether we consider
intermediate or final users, advancing sophistication and technological evolution consist
mainly of substituting new means of consumer satisfaction for old ones. The basic needs
do not undergo radical change, but the detailed ways and means of satisfying them may
alter markedly. Under these circumstances, the notion of competitive substitution as a
model of technological change will apply.
There is ample evidence to suggest that, under freely competitive conditions, the
dynamic processes of market penetration and product substitution follow S-shaped
curves. The trajectory of the product cycle generally portrays sales growth as exponential
during a product's formative years, with an inevitable slowdown as the product matures
and new competitors enter the market. Quite often, the logistic curve can provide a useful
framework for modelling the substitution process in relative terms (see, for example,
Fisher and Pry 1971; Peterka 1977; Batten and Johansson 1985a). This type of
observation has been used as a constraint on the model framework developed in the
subsequent analysis, which comprises the following aspects: (i) products, characteristics
and substitution, (ii) dynamics of supply and demand, and (iii) deliveries over
geographical space.
1.1 Products, Characteristics, and Competitive Substitution
Our initial objective is to derive a theoretical foundation for the substitution process
(under very general conditions) in terms of Lancaster's model of consumer behaviour. In
this respect, the preference functions of consumers and producers are assumed to rank
products (or groups of products) via the characteristics they possess. The specific form
of each customer group's preference function in this product-characteristic space (and
thus his sensitivity to price variations) determines the feasible substitution possibilities.
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By introducing a space of characteristics (or attributes) we obtain an invariant structure
in which the dynamic competition between products take place. The dynamics in the
model has the form of adjustments to changing conditions such as development of
relative prices, production costs, attributes of products, and preferences. These
adjustments generate temporal patterns of a sigmoid nature, and are initiated by
instabilities and discontinuities in supply and demand behaviour. Such unstable situations
have a catalytic influence on the entry into a market by entirely new products. Partial or
complete penetration result depending on the composition of different customer groups.
In this respect, the formulations extend and enrich some earlier work on industrial
evolution (Batten, 1982) by integrating studies of product competition (Johansson, 1978)
into a structure of differential equations describing adjustments to changing prices and
product characteristics.
1.2 Product Cycles, Interregional Trade, and Relocation in Space
The second purpose of the paper is to refine the general substitution model in order to
capture the dynamic processes of spatial interaction and relocation of production. In
broad terms, a product cycle can be viewed as the result of both product substitution and
spatial substitution proceeding in combination. The evolution of spatial cycles of
production in terms of customer choice, regional specialization and changing regional
market shares can therefore be explored using a similar system of nonlinear differential
equations.
A fundamental feature of such change is the gradual spatial relocation of production
centres between regions and an associated gradual or abrupt transformation of trade
flows. Relocation and adjustment of delivery patterns can be seen as a response to the
penetration of new competitors into the domestic and export markets and a resulting
desire to find profitable trade links and cost-reducing locations. In this respect, the
framework outlines a "duality" between the behaviour of customers ranking collections of
product characteristics and the behaviour of firms facing decisions about product mix,
trade and location. Each can be seen to influence the competitive substitution of more for
less favoured products over space and time. The paper ends by providing a few empirical
examples which illustrate some dynamic processes derived from the analyses.
2. PRODUCTS, CHARACTERISTICS AND SUBSTITUTION
In Lancaster's model of consumer behaviour, products (or good.s) possess objectively
measurable characteristics (or attributes). Customers buying a specific product generally
comprise both households, firms and other organisations. In principle all these various
customers use products, singly or in combination, as inputs to a production or
consumption process. Preference orderings are assumed to rank collections of
characteristics and only to rank products or collections of products indirectly via the
characteristics they possess (c.f. Lancaster, 1971).
2.1 Preferences of Customer Groups
We consider a product group to consist of products which (i) have certain characteristics
in common, and (ii) may be perceived as satisfying a similar purpose or need. In the
present study we do not deliberate upon the interdependence between different product
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groupS. Associated with such a group is a market in which any product may be displaced
by a new product with a preferred bundle of characteristics or as a consequence of relative
price changes. In this market we identify n ~ 1 products ieI, where I is the index set of
the group. Let
x = (xl, ..., xn) e X = {x e Rn: x i:; O}
be a vector of products, where xi denotes a quantity of product i. Let
z = (zIt ... , Zrn) e Z = {z e Rm : z i:; O}
(1)
(2)
be a vector of characteristics, where ZIc denotes a quantity of characteristic k. Moreover,
let C be an attribute mapping from X to Z which relates every vector of products to a
vector of characteristics so that
z = C(x) (3)
Finally, let u(z) signify a real-valued preference function which describes a customer's
evaluation of z-vectors, and assume that each customer chooses a situation which
maximizes u(z). The preference structure may vary in character for different types of
customers and may also change over time due to changes in the production techniques of
producers using products xeX as inputs. As a point of reference we adopt the following
orthodox assumption
u is continuous, strictly quasi-concave and differentiable with all ftrst
order derivatives positive (all characteristics positively desired). (4)
For each market (product group) we recognize the set G of customer groups. Each
group geG is identified by its preference function ug and budget mg which at each
point in time is allocated to purchase products from group I.
2 .2 Customer Choice and Demand Functions
The set-valued mapping K describes the choice set of customer group g
K(p,mg) = {x eX: px ~ mg } (5)
where p = (PI, ..., Pn) and Pi is the price of product i; px denotes the inner product of p
and x. The amount of different characteristics (attributes) associated with one unit of
product i is described by a vector hi = (hi, ..., b~) ~ 0 with at least one b~ > O.
If every customer can combine any of the products to obtain a desired amount of
characteristics, each vector x is assumed to be transformed to a characteristic vector
z = C(x) as follows
C(x) =Bx (6)
where B is an irreducible matrix with hi as its i'th column vector. If products cannot be
combined, the following transformation applies
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(7)
where C(xi) = bi Xi (compare Lancaster. 1982). With the specification in (6) the demand
of customer group g can be expressed as
Fg (p,mg) ={xeK (p.mg) : ug (Bx) =max ug (Bx) }
Application of (7) yields the demand
1\
Fg (p.mg) = { xeK (p.mg) : ug (C(xi)) = max ug (C(Xj)) }
(8)
(9)
1\
Both Fg and Fg may be set-valued. An element of Fg is a vector with components
xf = vf (p) mg/Pi (10)
where for a given budget vf is a func9,on describing the share of mg which is spent by
group g on product i. An element of Fg has the form (0•...• xf•...• 0). Formula (10)
also applies in this case.
Observe that mg/Pi is the maximum amount of product i that group g is able to
purchase. Hence. 0 ~ vf(p) ~ 1. Moreover. K (p.mg) is a bounded set (convex
polyhedron). Then one may conclude from (8) and (10)
Lemma 1 Let vg (p) = (vf (p)•...• v~(p)). If Fg (P. mg) is vector-valued. vg (p)
is unique. Assume that (4) and (6) applies. Then Fg is upper semi-continuous with
convex images (see Berge. 1959. pp 122-123). The same property is naturally
valid also for
F(p,m) =I Fg (p.mg)
geG
(11)
Consider a customer group for which (7) applies. which means that goods cannot be
combined. In this case vf (p) is either zero or one. As long as vf (p) = 1. xf varies
continuously with Pi' However. when Pi is gradually increased. and all other prices are
kept constant. the budget share. vf (p). will drop abruptly and discontinuously to zero.
while vf (p) simultaneously jumps from zero to unity for some other product j -:F- i. At
the point of discontinuity. p =p*. vf(p*) = 1 (P*) = 1.
Let m = ~g mg and formulate the following overall budget share function Vi such that
Vi (P) =I v~ (P) mg/m1
geG
(12)
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Then we observe
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Remark 1 Assume that (7) and (9) apply. Then vi exhibits the same type of
discontinuities as vf as long as the market consists of a finite number of customer
groups. As the number of such groups with differentiated preference functions ug
increases, the relative size of the discontinuous jumps in vi will shrink:.
Remark 1 pertains to customers who buy only one product to achieve a desired bundle
of characteristics during a given time interval. In the sequel the analysis is focussed
primarily on cases where a customer can combine two or more products to obtain a
desired constellation of characteristics. An example is a finn using several different types
of equipment, such as machines and trucks. Another example is a household using one
car and a caravan instead of a combi-van as a means of producing part of its transportation
and accomodation services.
2.3 Excess Demand and Actual Sales
For each product i and at each point in time we identify the set Gi of customer groups
with such production and consumption activities (and knowledge about such activities)
that they are able to contemplate using product i as an input to their respective activities.
Let g e Gi and define group g's potential demand as Df (p) = mg/Pi. The aggregate
potential demand can then be calculated as
Di (P) = L Df (p)
geGi
(13)
The notional demand is obtained from (12) and (13) as Vi (p) Di (p) = Vi (P) mlPi' Let
Xj be the supply of product j. Then we may express the actual sales as ~j Xj' where
~j = min { 1, vj(p)m / Pj Xj }
Note that m - Ij ~j Pj Xj may also be positive when the supply of some products is
greater than what is demanded. Consequently, we introduce the following excess demand
expression for product i:
Ei = Di(P) - Ij ~ij Xj (14)
where ~ij = v/p)m / Pi Xj and ~ii = 1. In order to use the Ei-function in our dynamic
specification of market development and product substitution, we need to establish certain
properties of this function. Lemma 2 prescribes conditions which guarantee stronger
continuity properties than those presented in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Consider the conditions given by (4)-(6) and (8). Let the attribute
vectors hi of B in (6) be linearly independent for all ieI. Then the functions v~
1
will be continuous and with unique values for each p. A proof is outlined in the
appendix.
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From Lemma 2 it follows that vi(P) varies continuously with p as long as all bL
vectors are linearly independent which means that every product ieI is uniquely
differentiated from the remaining products in the product group. This also implies that for
fixed Xj' ~ij is a continuous function of prices. Naturally, the same is true for Ei.
In OIuer to evaluate ~ we rewrite (14) as
Ei = m/Pi - .~ Vj (p) m/Pi - Xi
J~
which may also be written as
~ = m/Pi - (1 - Vi(P»m/Pi - Xi
First we use (16) to find that
8Ei/8Pi = (8vi/8Pi) m/Pi - Vi(P)m/(Pi)2 < 0
(15)
(16)
(17)
The condition about the sign follows from 8Vi/8Pi ~ O. Our second task is to evaluate
8Ei /8Pj from (16), which comes out as
8Ei /8Pj = (8Vi/8Pj) m/Pi ~ 0 (18)
The expression in (18) can be equal to zero, since for certain prices the optimization
problem in (8) may yield "corner solutions". A product k may for example at some price
vector p satisfy {(p) = 1 and v~(p) =0 for all h *" g. This means that one customer
group g is spending all its budget (for product group I) on product k, while all other
groups do not buy k. It is a "sticky" corner solution, in so much as small price variations
around p will not necessarily alter this situation. However, if there is at least one g such
that 0 < vf(p) < 1 and 0 < vf(p) < 1, then 8Ei /8Pj > O. This follows from the
assumption about ug in (4). We may thus summarize the results in this subsection as
follows:
Proposition 1 Given the assumptions in Lemma 2 we may conclude that
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
~Ei ~Pi <0
~E· ~p' ~O1 J
~Ei ~PJ' > 0 if 0 <~ < 1 and 0 <~ < 1 for at least one g.
1 J
3. DYNAMICS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND
In Section 2 we described how the excess demand variable Ei is affected by price
alterations. Over time Ei is also influenced by the supply behaviour of finns. This is
evident from formula (15). We will assume that the state Ei < 0 influences Xi to
decrease and the state where ~ > 0 changes Xi in the opposite direction, provided the
price Pi yields a sufficiently high profit. We may summarize this assumption as follows:
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iq /xi = {
ai Ei if xi:S; xi
ootherwise
(19)
where xi denotes the capacity to supply product i at each time. The coefficient ai ~ 0
may be interpreted as a response coefficient which is sensitive to the profit levels
associated with deliveries to different regional markets (compare Mansfield, 1961). From
(19) it follows that iq =~i as long as Xi =Xi and Xi > O.
3.1 Sigmoid Development Paths
Assume that all products are uniquely differentiated so that Lemma 2 applies. From (16)
we know that ~ may be written as
Ei = (m/Pi) Vi (p) - Xi
from which we obtain the following form of (19):
Xi = ai [ (m/Pi) Vi (p) Xi - X~]
(20)
(21)
which is immediately recognized as a growth path of the logistic type belonging to the
wider family of sigmoid distributions. Writing Ai(P) = (m/Pi) Vi (P), it becomes clear that
Xi = ai Xi [Ai(P) - Xi] will reach a stationary state at the point Xi = Ai(p). Moreover,
gradual reductions of Pi relative to other prices Pj mean that Ai(p) will expand over time.
Similarly, Xi will decline if Ai(P) < Xi'
Consider a gradual stepwise expansion of Ai(P). Such an expansion will have a
definite limit if we introduce the following assumption. First, let the unit profit be TIi = Pi
- ci(xi), where Ci(xi) is the unit cost. Assume that ac/axi < 0 as Xi < xand that Cj(Xj)
~ ci = crin. Assume next that there is a profit level it which serves as a minimum mark
up. If the price Pi falls below ci(Xj) + it, no capacity investments are carried out. In this
way we obtain an upper bound for Aj(p).
In accordance with the above we assume that the following price-setting rule applies
for a product in a phase of capacity expansion:
Pi(xi) = Cj(xi) + it (22)
During a phase of decline there are no new investment costs to cover. Hence, we can
introduce the price setting condition Pj ~ Cj(Xj) for phases of decline. To reflect this
asymmetry between expansion and decline, capacity changes may be associated with the
dynamics of output in the following way:
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OJ = {
oif xi> xi > Yi xi
1 otherwise
(23)
where 0 < Yj < 1, and Yi = Yi (xi, xi)'
Treating ai as a constant, we may consider the ratio Fj =Pi xi / (m-Pi xi) to derive
Fi =m (Pi xi + Pi xi ) / (m-pi Xi)2
From this we obtain
F/Fi =m (Pi xi + Pi Xj) / Pi xi (m-pi x) (24)
A logistic development path obtains if the ri~ht hand side of (24) assumes a constant
value. In this case, Verhulst-Pearl's equality F/Fi = hi is satisfied, where hi is a
constant which is positive as Fi grows. When examining this case we observe that (24)
describes a simultaneous adjustment of price and quantity. Therefore we need an
assumption about the motion of Pj. Let us assume that the price is adjusted in such a way
that (22) is satisfied. This corresponds to a growth process. In addition we assume that
Cj(Xj) is scale-dependent, which is described by the following specification:
Cj(Xj) =c~ exp {- kj Xi } + Cj (25)
where c~ > 0, ki > 0 and Cj is a lower bound. The price-setting rule in (22) together
with (25) yields pj =Gi(Xj) + C, where Gi(xi) =Ci(xi) - Cj and C=Cj + it Hence,
P·· - -k· G· (x.)~.1- 1111 (26)
Let us consider a development path along which x = Xj > 0, A prerequisite for this
process is that Pi remains low enough (relative to other prices) to ensure that Ai(P) - Xi
remains positive. Let 0i (Xi) = Gi (Xi) + Cand apply the price adjustment process in (26)
to formula (24). Then we obtain (for F/Fi = h)
h 0i (Xi) Xi (m - OJ (Xi) Xi) = -m ki Gj (Xi) Xi + m 0i (Xj) Xi
Dividing both sides by Xi, we get
Xj /xi = h 0i (Xi) [m- OJ (Xi) xi]/ m [Oi (Xi) - ki Gi (Xi)] (27)
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The condition F/Fi = h means that market shares develop along a logistic path.
Fonnula (27) demonstrates that this market-share behaviour also implies that the produced
quantities follow a sigmoid growth path which terminates (Xi =0) as Gi (x) xi =m ~
Ci xi' This corresponds to complete market penetration by the (new) product i.
3.2 Market Shares
During a growth phase, (26) portrays a gradual price reduction such that profits are at
each stage just sufficient to cover the associated investment costs. When'production is
falling, (26) and (27) taken together reveal that the price will not rise as long as Xi >Yi Xi'
Product its market share fi =Pi Xi I m develops in the following way:
f· - (11m) (G· (x·) x· - x· k· G· (x·) x·)1- 11111111 (28)
This means that fi grows when Xi [ Gi (Xi) (l - kj Xi) + Ci ] > 0 ; requiring that Xi > 0,
which depends on the prices of all products. Moreover, the market share will grow only if
k· < H· (x·) - c'/x' G· (x·) + l/x·111-1111 1 (29)
According to (26), ki Gi (Xi) < 1 implies that Xi Gi (Xi) will grow when Xi grows.
Hence, Hi (Xi) will gradually decline as Xi expands. Thus ki may exceed Hi (Xi) for
large values of Xi whereupon fi < 0 as Xi > O. However, for values of Ei close to zero
we may write fi == Ai (p) Pi 1m = Vi(P) which means that any reduction in fi will induce
a reduction of Ei which, in tum, retards the rate of increase in Xi so that Xi approaches
zero. In this way, a previously expanding market share may cease either because fi = 1
or because ki ~ Hi (Xi). The latter case implies an instability phenomenon. A price-
reduction policy from an established product, or the introduction of a new, slightly
superior product j, will temporarily induce the condition Ei = Ai (p) - Xi < O. This
induces a continuing fall in output which, after some delay implied by (23) and (26),
forces Pi to increase. Hence, whenever Ei is almost zero, any small alterations in
relative prices may cause a growth phase to be transfonned into a phase of decline. From
(28) it is evident that each such path will assume the shape of a sigmoid distribution.
3.3 Introduction of New Products and Catastrophic Shifts in the
Dynamics
Let us consider a specific customer group. Moreoever, let there be m distinct
characteristics which are positively valued by these customers. Supppose that there are n
different products which are uniquely differentiated in the sense that their attribute vectors
b I , ..., bI1 are linearly independent. Let us then introduce a new product n+l such that
bo+I can be expressed as a linear combination of the initial n attribute vectors. We are
especially interested in the case where n+1 is intermediate in the sense that
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n
bn+ l = I eli bi
i=I
as eli ~ 0 for all i and elj > 0 for at least one j. Then product n+ I may attract all
customers of those products j such that elj > 0 . A case of this kind is illustrated in
Figure 1. This case has two attributes and three products, represented by the attribute
vectors bl , b2 and b3. The figure describes a price constellation p* such that vf(p*) bl/p;
+ ~(p*) b2/p; = b3/pi. Obviously, any reduction & > 0 such that P3 = pi - & will cause
vf and v~ to drop to zero. Hence, if the prices of products I and 2 are not reduced
accordingly, these products will lose customer group g.
z 1 u 9
{
A=V 1b:/ P1
B=v 2 b /P2
Z2
Figure 1 Introduction of an intennediate product
Proposition 2 Let the conditions in (4)-(6) and (8) be given and let the attribute vector bl=
el2 b2 + ... + elk bk, where all bi ~ 0, bi "* 0, and all eli> O. Assume that bl contains
all attributes of product group I which are relevant for customer group g. Then there
exist prices p; and p(i) = (p;,...,p~) such that (a) EI(pi + &, p(~» ~ 0, (b) EI(p~, p(~»
is undecided, and (c) EI (p; -&, p(~»= mg/(p~ - &) - xl > 0, where & > 0 is arbitrarily
'"small, and X I < mg/PI .
A proof of the proposition is given in the appendix. The proposition complements the
statement in Lemma 2. In the appendix the following remark is also assessed:
Remark 2 Let all conditions of Proposition 2 be given, except that b i now does
not necessarily contain all attributes (in the product group) which are relevant
for customer group g. The assumptions in the proposition guarantee that b i
contains all attributes that can be obtained from a combination of b2, ... , ~.
Suppose that vi(P; + &, p(~» > 0 for all i + 2, ..., k. Then
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( * *a) E I (Pt + e, P(l) = 0
(b) E I (p; p(;» is undecided
( * *c) E I (Pt- e, P(l) = 0
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Proposition 2 and Remark 2 have strong implications for the relation between the
number of products and attributes. One such implication is described in the following
corollary, which is self-evident given Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Let the conditions of Proposition 2 apply for a product group I with n
products such that bi ~ 0, hi ~ 0 for all ieI, and ! bi > O. Let m'-'denote the
number of attributes. If n ~ m, one can always construct a new intermediate
product of the same kind as product 1 in Proposition 2.
Proof. The conditions in Corollary 1 imply that the attribute vectors bI , ... , bn are
linearly dependent. Hence, there exists a combination CL I bI+ ... + CLnbn = 0 for
(CLI> ... , CL n) ~ O. Collect all negative terms on the RHS and all positive terms on the
LHS, so that RHS = LHS. This is an appropriate vector value for the new product.
A similar type of discontinuous behaviour in the Ei-function was described for
products which cannot be combined in connection with Remark 1. The background for
this property is illustrated in Figure 2. Here we should note that all three vectors bi/pI>
b2/P2 and b3/P3 satisfy the same value of customer group g's preference function. Hence,
at this price constellation the Fg-function in (9) is discontinuous in such a way that if any
price is altered at least one product will lose all its sales to customer group g. In
Johansson (1978) this situation is analysed for the case with several distinct customer
groups.
3.4 The Effect of having Distinct Customer Groups
One important effect of having several different customer groups is that discontinuous
changes in demand will usually affect only one customer group at a time, (Le., several
groups in a predictable sequence, given the relative price changes). A second, interrelated
aspect is that different customer groups may not perceive the same subsets of attributes to
be relevant. Thus a new and superior product may not necessarily capture the whole
market but may only attract the sales of certain customer groups. Formally, this means
that of(p) in (13) may be zero for all p-values while it is positive for D~(p).
To reflect the division of customer groups we may define the relevan~ market budget of
product i as
mi = 2: mg
geG j
where Gi is the set of customer groups which are potential buyers of product L Some or
all of these customers may be industrial firms. Their short term preferences depend on the
production technique they apply. In the longer term information about alternative
techniques diffuses to all firms and they may invest in completely new production
systems. As a consequence their preferences will change. In our present setting, this can
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3
- - b /P 3
Zz
Figure 2 Point of discontinuity for products which cannot be combined
be represented as a switch to another customer group. If this type of transition is a gradual
process, it may be portrayed as a smooth increase in the overall customer budget of
product i so that mi =~i mi (m - mi)' In addition the size of the market itself may grow
in so much as the budget m is expanded. In this context, the division of market budgets
between different product groups is affected by the development of the aggregate price
levels of the different groups. We shall not discuss this inter-group competition here, but
instead consider the question of competitive substitution effects over geographical space.
4 • SPATIAL DELIVERIES
In the preceding section, our interest is concentrated on the competition between different
products. The supply behaviour and price-setting rules do not reflect any explicit
competition between different ftrms producing the same product. Such an approach is
consistent with the view that the output of one ftrm is always differentiated to some extent
from that of all other fmns.
When we introduce different regions or locations, additional features are then essential
and therefore we may allow firms in different locations to produce goods which are
identifted as identical. In this way, spatial aspects such as delivery costs are emphasized.
4.1 Origin-Destination Relationships
Consider a spatial economy which is identifted by a set of locations r,s =1, 2.... , and a
displacement cost coefficient c~ for each product i and origin-destination pair r,s. Each
location represents a separate market with its own price formation process - for example
different regions or countries. A delivery from r to s is denoted by x~s, and the
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production (output) in r by x~' Forregion s, we introduce the following excess demand
expression
E~ =A~(pS) - " x~IlL 1
r
(30)
where pS = (p~' ... , p~) is the price vector of product group I in region s; A~(pS) =
(ms/p~) v~(pS), where mSand v~(pS) denote the budget in region s and product its budget
share in region s, respectively (compare formula (15». In accordance with our earlier
analysis the deliveries from r to s are assumed to increase only if E~ > O. However,
with several regions involved the delivering region r generally faces a whole set of
customer regions. We assume that each supply region has a higher propensity to deliver
on links which offer high profits. More specifically, we assume that deliveries are
gradually redistributed in response to the profit differentials of alternative links (r,s),
(r,k), etc. The profit of a link (r,s) is defined as
rs S rs r
1ti = Pi - ci - ci (31)
where < denotes the production cost per unit output in region r, c~ the delivery costs on
the link r,s, and P~ the market price in region s.
The customer model introduced in section 2.2 necessitates one price for each product
in a market. In order to retain the earlier assumption about price-setting suppliers, the
market price in region s is assumed to reflect the cost structure of all suppliers in the
following way (compare Batten and Johansson, 1985b):
S IrsrsIrs
Pi = r Pi Xi / r Xi (32)
where p~s =<s + c~ + ~' and where it~ is the mark up level in (22) wich reflects the same
profitability (or rate of return criterion) in region r. By analogy with (21) we assume that
delivery changes respond to E~ as follows:
. rs rs rs-rs
Xi / Xi = <Xi Ei
{
E~ if <X~ > 0
-rs 1
E. =
1 rs
1 if <Xi ::S;O
(33)
rs r rs . rs . r
where <Xi = <Xi (1t i ) IS less than zero as 1ti < O. In general we may thmk of <Xi as a
function with the following properties (compare Mansfield, 1961; Peterka, 1977):
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r rs rs - r
cti (1ti ) > 0 as 1ti ~ 1ti
r -r r rs
cti (1ti) > cti (1ti ) > 0 as
r rs rs
cti (1ti) < 0 as 1ti < 0
rs -ro:5 1ti < 1ti
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(34)
Formulas (33) - (34) imply that x~s is reduced when the link profit becomes negative,
irrespective of which sign Ef currently assumes. With this formulation the competition
between "identical" flows x~ and x~ will differ from that between x~ and xj , j "" L In
the latter the substitution is determined by ct~ and ct rs as well as by A~(pS) and A~(pS),
1 J 1 J
where
A~(pS) = v~(pS) mS/p~ =[ 1 -L v~(pS)] mS/p~.
1 1 1 j J 1
However, the substitution between x~s and x~s is not influenced by v~(pS), since this
factor is shared by the two competing flows. Their substitution is only affected by the
difference between ct~ and ct~s. When vf(pS) changes, the size of their joint market in
region s will expand or contract
4.2 Interaction Between Price and Quantity Adjustments
From (32) we can see that the development of Pf is affected by changes in both P~ and
rs W·th li . 1 d 2 th -S O'f Is 2s d' IsXi . 1 two supp ers to regIOn s, sayan, note at Pi < 1 Pi < Pi an xi>
x~S. Suppose now that act: / a1t~s > O. Then the rate of growth will be faster for flows x~s
which have a cost advantage in the sense that P~s < p~. These are the flows with the
highest link profits 1t~. The share tf = x~/ Lr x~ will naturally grow for flows such that
ct~ > 0 if L x~ declines. The latter may occur ifmany suppliers have ct~ < O.
Consider now a situation in which Pj ~ 0 for all j "" L Next, observe that
'S ~ rsp. LX' =1 1
r
L -rs rs ~ rs s).rsp. x· + L (p. - p. x·1 1 1 1 1
r r
(35)
We know that flows which expand have P~ < p~. Hence, the last term on the right hand
side is never positive. This implies that Pf is gradually reduced if L P~ x~ :5 0 and
ct~ Ef > 0 for at least one pair (r,s). When this applies we have ms~ ~ 0, where ~ = P~
L r x~ / mS• This means that Pf L r x~ > - i>f L r x~s. As long as this condition lasts
there will be at least one flow for which if > 0 until product i is only delivered from
region r, (Le., GS =1).
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By analogy with (24), we can write 11 =~ / (l - ~) and F: /F: =~ / ~ (l - ~).
Hence, we may argue in a similar way to the non-spatial case. Observe ftrst that ~ mS =
'S'" rs s",.rs Itrod . d I fth .Pi L xi + Pi L xi' n uce next a pnce eve opment process 0 e same type as 10
(26), and approximate this process by
P· ~ =k~ G~ (d~) d~1 1 1 1 1
where d: =Ir x~s. Then we may write (compare 28):
~ S S S' S S sIrs rs-rs
mS i =- ki Gi (di)di di + Pi r CLi xi Ei
(36)
(37)
In this case the change in Gi(d~ will reflect the development of each cost term c~ =
c~ (x~) and <= <(Is x~). If the cost functions decline as the scale increases, d~ > 0
will bring about a gradual fall in P:' If we assume similar properties of G: as Gi in (26),
G: (d:) will gradually approach zero if d: does not become constant at an earlier stage. In
either case the ftrst term on the right hand side will approach zero. As the price level
stagnates the second term will also be reduced because of the properties of E~.
In summary, the previous characterization of the development of tf implies that the
number of regions which supply identical products to each region s will normally
decline. Each product group will therefore tend to contain only differentiated products. In
this respect, the spatial model becomes very similar to the non-spatial one, and will
likewise display similar properties. These properties include expansion and decline of
various products along sigmoid paths. In the spatial case, abrupt discontinuities
(catastrophes) will be more frequent due to the coexistence of basically identical flows
heading for the same destination.
4.3 Spatial Product Cycles
One explanation for a gradual reduction of P: over time is the emergence of a new supplier
in the proximity of region s with lower delivery costs than the established suppliers. If
the production technique has matured to such an extent that c~ ... c~ in many locations r
and k, the establishment of production in a location k closer to the buyer (i.e. where c~
< c~) will result in a lower value of P~ than P~ in the expression P: = I r p~s x~s/ I r
x~. This type of spatial redistribution is rather typical as a market strategy for a mature
product (see, e.g. Johansson and Karlsson, 1987; Norton and Rees, 1979).
The spatial model in section 4 has speciftc implications for the initiation of production
in any region r. From (34) we know that deliveries will be directed to destinations where
1t~ is higher than elsewhere. In general we may assume that cf < <s for each s'l'! r. If
P~ ... P:, this means that the delivieries from producers in region r (i.e. x~) will initially
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expand more rapidly on the intraregional (r,r) than on any interregional link (r,s),
extending from r. As production expands and production costs are reduced, the
interregional deliveries may in a second phase increase very quickly.
As the relative factor costs, cf, of other regions k begin to fall over time, the link-
related profitability criterion (31) ensures that locations outside r may gradually become
more favoured production centres; so much so that interregional deliveries then become
more attractive. These spatial delivery patterns may be written down in the form of link-
specific shares, viz:
rs s rs/' s rsh· =p. x· L p. x·
1 1 1 j J J (38)
The dynamic process of substitution over space may then be investigated by
comparing, among others, the trajectories of h~ and hf. In order to describe the relation
between substitution on the domestic and export markets we introduce the following
variables
f
1 =P~ I x~ Irrls 1
r
PI
hIe ,ssr"srs. = L p. x. ILL p. x.
1 ...... II ....... JJs~. s~. J
= ~ I p~ x~ / .2: I x~
j:t:i s J J j:t:l S J
p7 =~ I p~ x~/~ I x~
j:t:i s# J J j:t:i s# J
(39)
Let pI = t.1(1 - f) and F2 = h~el(l - h~1. Por each of these P-variables we have
1 1 1 1
tested a model with the following form:
log P = a + bt + C(Pi/PI) (40)
where a, b, c are constants of regression, t denotes time, and (Pi/PI) refers to (plP~)
when P =pI and to (pr/p~ when P =F2.
With regard to the domestic market, represented by pI, preliminary investigations
show that equations like (38) cover most of the dynamics in the market place (Batten and
Johansson, 1985a; Johansson and Larsson, 1985; Larsson, 1985). These studies indicate
that the development of relative prices (the term Pi/PI) has a significant influence on the
dynamics. At the same time, it is found that the pace of the substitution process frequently
is quite steady. This corresponds to markets in which the relative price indicator Pi/PI
changes monotonically, as indicated in the formulation of (25) - (27). As a consequence,
the substitution process can often be modelled as log P = a + bt, where time acts as a
driving force. Similar observations apply to the export market. In this case we illustrate
our earlier suggestion that initially the intraregional deliveries (xf) dominate, while export
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deliveries at a later phase may start to increase at a faster rate. Figures 3 and 4 depict
typical results in the case of Sweden.
Observe that the logarithm of the ratio of market shares for each product group,
namely log F, follows a straight line in both the domestic and export markets. Hence,
link-specific product flows display the same type of development pattern as has been
demonstrated in a non-spatial context (Fisher and Pry, 1971; Peterka, 1977; Batten and
Johansson, 1985a). A noteworthy feature of the dynamics depicted in Figures 3 and 4 is
that in the initial phase, t < to, Fl(t) > F2(t), which means expansion starts in the
domestic market as suggested earlier. For the two examples to is characterized by
~(to) .. 0.4.
At the same time we observe that F2 > F10 which should be a typical situation for all
delivering regions such that the domestic market is significantly smaller than the nearby
export markets. In the initial stages, low intraregional delivery costs favour local sales.
However, the size of foreign markets and the strong impact of high delivery costs for
declining products makes the substitution rate faster on the export links.
The above observations report on spatio-temporal patterns which may be referred to as
spatial product cycles. As a complement to (38) and (39), it is also instructive to
investigate directly the changing relationship between various interregional deliveries of
the same product We may define the following product-specific share
I'S sl'S/Lsl'Sg. =p. x. p. x·
I I I I I
S
In(f1/f2)
Export sales
Domestic sales
1 =electrical typewriters
2 =mechanical typewriters
(41)
1965 1975 1985
Figure 3 Substitution between electrical and mechanical typewriters
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and then explore the temporal pattern of spatial substitution between g~k and g~S,
. ed b ,.. rs I (' ,.. fS f) d"" rs 0 (. ,... rs . n A 1. .1constrain Y.Los gi =. l.e. .Lo Xi = xi an .Los gi = I.e. .Lo Xi = x ,. n mterestmg
example of this pattern is depicted in Figure 5, in so much as it displays the discontinuous
changes which are predicted by our model whenever a subset of bLvectors in a product
group are linearly dependent. The figure portrays the deliveries on export links from
Sweden (in this case certain panel products). In this instance there is an abrupt fall in
Sweden's delivery to Denmark of a kind we may call a "link catastrophe". Such a shift
may (in the model) be caused by three interrelated forces which are described in Sections
3.3 and 3.4. One such force is competition from other differentiated products which
generate a catastrophic drop in Denmark's budget share for the panel product in question.
A related force is the competition from identical products supplied from other regions. A
third cause for an abrupt change is the link: profit condition, specified in (33) - (34).
In(f1/f2)
Export sales
1 =particle board
2 =other boards and panels
1960 1970 1980
Figure 4 Market penetration of particle board
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The abovementioned substitution model for deliveries over space may be seen as a
"traditional" extension of the general substitution model described earlier in this paper. It
is traditional in the sense that space has been introduced by alluding directly to a set of
market locations and to the transportation costs accruing from the resulting delivery
problem. This view of the spatial economy is a standard one among regional economists.
There is another means of introducing space which would also be compatible with the
general substitution model, but perhaps be more in keeping with its demand-based nature.
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Value
of exports
1965 1970 1975
Total exports
Sales to
Norwa.y
Sales to
Denmark
1980
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Figure 5 Swedish exports of plaster panels by region of destination
This would be to define the region of production as a basic characteristic k to be included
as a component Zk' in each vector of characteristics z. The rationale for this lies with the
empirical observation that the preference structure of certain customer groups is
sometimes biased towards products manufactured locally, and often favouring supply
from distinct delivery regions. Quite naturally, such preference structures vary for
different types of customers and also may change over time. There are indications that,
among some groups, the traditional preference for locally-made products - attributable at
least in part to lower transportation costs - is gradually diminishing. Explanations may be
traced to price competition and the proliferation of multi-national fIrms. In any event, it
may be prudent and rewarding to include the region of origin in the vector of attributes,
and to analyse the resulting trajectories. Such an approach falls within the analytical
bounds of the general substitution model presented in Sections 2 and 3, and might
therefore be explored as a spatial corollary to the non-spatial case. As a consequence, the
excess demand expression E~ =A~(PS) - ~ xr:- in (30) would change to1 1 "'-'r 1
gs =Ar:-(pS) - xr:-
1 1 1
(42)
This version of spatial excess demand is a direct extension of the non-spatial
formulation in (20). Adopting (42), all results in Section 3 would hold also in the inter-
regional formulation. At the same time, this new model will be extremely sensitive to such
changes in the preference structure which imply that the customers become indifferent
with regard to the origin characteristic. Any change of this type over time would increase
the probability of discontinuities and link catastrophes dramatically.
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APPENDIX
A.I Lemma 2
Dynamics of Product Substitution
Consider a case with a single customer group, and omit the customer group index. From
Lemma 1 we have that F(p,m) = (x E K (p,m) : u(Bx) = urnax } is upper semi- continous,
given the assumptions about u and B in Lemma 1. These assumptions also imply that
F is continuous when it is vector valued (i.e. not set valued). We shall show that F is
vector valued and continuous when the column vectors, bk, of B are linearly
independent.
Let there be n goods, and let zk(p) = bkm!Pk' Moreover, let z =z(P) =
LVk(P) zk(p), where L Vk(P) = 1. Lemma 2 assumes that (i) u in (6) is strictly quasi-
concave, continuous, increasing and differentiable, and (ii) B in (6) is an irreducible
matrix and that the t>k-vectors are linearly independent. For z =Bx and z' =Bx' , this
implies
z~z' ~ x~x'
This means that ~ (x) =u (Bx) will be a continuous, differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave function. Hence, we can replace the optimization procedure in (8) by the (strictly
quasi-concave) Lagrange function L(p) =~ (x) + A(m-px), where A> 0 and px =L Pi
Xi' The properties of ~ guarantee that the maximization of L yields a unique solution
x for each p. By the implicit function theorem the solutions can be expressed as
generated by a continuous function x =x(P).
The above outline suffices to ascertain that x =F(p,m) is continuous. Since xk =
vk(P)m!Pk, the vk-functions will also be continuous in p.
We shall clarify the above result further by considering a subset of products,
1, ..., r (r ~ n). The associated bk-vectors are linearly dependent if and only if
r
zl(p) = 2: ctk zk(p)
k=2
(a. 1)
where at least one scalar ctk ~ O. The properties of u and B imply that F is set valued
only if one for some price p can find two constellations Vb'''' vr and vi ,... , v: such that
r r
2: Vi(P) zk(p) = 2: v~(p) zk(p)
i=l i=l
(a.2)
as Vi ~ 0 and (Vi + ... + vn) = 1. This means that F is set valued if, with an appropriate
indexation of the products, we can find a p such that M and N in (a.3) satisfy M = N.
r
M = 2: vk(P) zk(p)
k=l
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r r
N = L Vk(P) zk(p) +vI(P) L akzk(p)
k=2 k=2
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(a.3)
where the ak's apply to (a.I). From (a.I) follows that M = N only if linear
dependence applies. We may note that the v-coefficients associated with N can be
expressed as v; = vk + ak VI for k"# I, and v'i = O. Hence, with linear independence
there is only one v-vector associated with each p.
A.2 Pro.position 2 and Remark 2
The assumptions in Proposition 2 are the same as in Lemma 2. In addition we introduce
the condition that there exists a subgroup of products k E I such that
1"2" ()b = a2 b + ... + a r bC , r ~ n a.4
where all bk ~ 0, bk "# 0, and all ~k > O. By selecting a suitable set of prices we can
see that (a.I) is just a reformulation of (aA). The expression in (a.I) is transformed to
(aA) by choosing the ak-coefficients in (a.I) such that
"ak = ak PWPI (a.5)
This follows from zk(p)/m = bk/Pk' We also observe that (a.I) - (aA) concern one
single customer group which we now select to be group g in Proposition 2. All this
means that we can use the result in (a.3). Since bl contains all relevant attributes, we
know that at the price p* we can express M in (a.3) as M(p*) = b1m/p; =
zl(p*).Moreover, VI(P*) = I, vk(P*) = 0 and xI(P*) = m/p'i . For N we get v'i = 0 and
*() ( *) h "*I *) B' . * *vk p* =ak VI p = ak' were ak = ak Pk'Pt· y mcreasmg Pt to PI = Pt+ & we
obtain (for & > 0 and p = (PI, P(l»)
M(P'i + & , p('i») < M(p*)
N(p'i + & , p('i») = N(p*)
Analogously, reducing p; to p'i - & yield~
(a.6)
M(P'i - & ,p('i») > M(p*) = N(p'i - & , p('i») (a.7)
Hence, (a.6) implies that VI(P'i + & ,p('i») = 0, (a.7) implies VI (P'i- & ,p('i») = 1, and
M(p*) = N(p*) implies that VI(P*) is undecided. Noting that Ei = mVi(P)/Pi - Xi, this
completes the proof of Proposition 2.
The assumptions in Remark 2 mean that we cannot necessarily obtain the expression in
(a.I). Instead we can obtain two groups MI = M2
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r
M1 = I Vk(P*) zk(p*)
k=1
h
M2 = I Vk(P*) zk(p*) , h < r
k=1
Dynamics of ProdJlct Substitution
(a.8)
where Vl(P*) > Vl(P*) ~ O. This means that in M2 at least one of the products 2, ... , r
has left the convex combination. Therefore an increased budget share will go to product
1. In particular, this means that Vl(P~- & ,p(~») - Vl(P~+ &, p(~»)representsadiscrete
jump generated by an arbitrarily small & > O. This completes the proof.
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CHAPTER 4
Quality and Process Improvements in Dynamic
Production Processes
J-P. Aubin
4S
Ake Andersson has suggested that a distinction should be made between important
components of technological change and R&D in the analysis of the dynamics of
production processes. The fIrst component, which we shall denote by u, embodies the
strategy consisting of developing the quality of the products generated by a given
technological process. The second component, denoted by v, describes a given
technological process which has to be chosen from a class of available processes. An
often observed evolution of producer's strategies consists of improving fIrst the quality of
the products for a given process and then, when this strategy is no longer viable, to look
for a new technological process which allows the producers to satisfy the demand.
We propose in this paper to use viability theory for providing a mathematical metaphor
for the idea that the evolution of technological process has more "inertia", or else, is
"heavier", than the evolution of the quality of the products produced by a given
technology. Viability theory deals with the study of dynamical systems - deterministic or
not - whose trajectories must obey binding constraints called viability constraints. It does
not involve optimization of intertemporal criteria, and thus, does not use optimal control
techniques. This would assume the existence of one or several decision makers being able
to control the evolution of the system, who agree over intertemporal criteria involving
knowledge of the future (may it be stochastic) and who choose the optimal controls once
and for all at the outset
Instead, we are looking for controls which allow the trajectory of the system to remain
viable. When choosing among such "viable" controls becomes a problem, we propose
that the decision makers use at each instant mechanisms allowing them to minimize the
velocities 0/ the controls. Taking a decision such as this amounts to deciding in which
directions and how fast the controls must change. The consequences of such decisions are
discernible in the evolution of the trajectory.
We shall illustrate these points using a very simple metaphor of an entrepreneur
producing commodity bundles x with quality characteristics described by a control vector
u. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider prices explicitly but treat them as one of
the quality characteristics.
We assume that the aggregate demand for consuming such commodity bundles evolves
according to a differential equation of the form
x'(t) =f(x(t),u(t» (1)
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which is controlled by quality characteristics u(t) of the commodity bundle x(t) at time t.
We assume that the production process is described by a set-valued map relating the
given quality characteristics u and technological process v with the production set K(u,v)
of commodity bundles x. In other words, the production process is represented by
viability constraints of the form
x(t) E K(u(t),v(t».
u = quality v = technology
(2)
Vo = const
/
//
//
//
uo' /
Vo
PHASE 1
, x'(t)=
f(x(t), Uo)
x(t)EK(uo,vo)
/
/
/
/
/
PHASE 2
x'(t)=
f(x(t), u(t))
x(t)EK(u(t), vol
PHASE 3
x'(t)=
f(x(t), u(t))
x(t)EK(u(t), v(t))
time
Figure 1 Three phases of the evolution
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If we start at the initial instant t = 0 with a viable initial state
xQ E K(uo,vo)
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(3)
the fIrst problem is to obtain necessary and suffIcient conditions linking the dynamical
system (1) and the production constraints (2) which jointly specify viable trajectories of
(1), (2) for every viable initial condition (3). Then we shall describe an evolution of such
a system where we hold constant for as long as we can, fIrst the technological process,
then the quality characteristics; whereas the production evolves at will.
For instance, starting at time t=O with UO, Vo and xo EK(uo, vo), we let the state evolve
according to the differential equation x'(t) = f(x(t), uo) as long as x(t) remains in
K(uo, vo) - phase 1. When this is no longer possible, the technological process remains
constant, but the quality characteristics u(t) start to evolve, and the evolution of the
production is governed by the controlled system x'(t) = f(x(t),u(t) (as long as x(t) remains
in K(u(t),vo) for all t (phase 2). When this is no longer possible, the producer must
change his technological process and we enter phase 3. If at a later time the technological
process can be kept constant, the system returns to phase 2 again from which it can
evolve either to phase 3 or to phase 1, from which further phase changes of a similar kind
are possible.
We can represent this type of evolution in a diagram (see Figure 1) where the evolution
can be divided into three phases, each of which bears some relationship to the lifecycles
of a product of the production process as discussed widely in the economics literature.
To achieve our stated goals, we need to introduce an adequate concept of the
"derivative" of the set-valued map K describing the production process. This is not such a
diffIcult task, since it suffIces to return to Fermat's (1637) defInition of a tangent to a
function: If f is a differentiable function from R to R, the graph of the linear map u-+
f '(x)u is the tangent space to the graph of f at the point (x,f(x)) as shown in Figure 2.
graph f(x) =
TGraph (t) (x,f(x))
R
Y IV =f(x)
Figure 2 Graph of f at the point (x,f(x))
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We adopt the same idea for a set-valued map F from a vector space X to a vector space
Y. We take a point (x,f(x» as demonstrated in Figure 2.
Graph F: = {(x,y)eXxY IyeF(x)}.
We cannot defme the concept of "tangent space" to the graph ofF at (x,y), which is an
arbitrary set, without making very restrictive assumptions. But by relaxing our demand,
and being content with "tangent cones" instead of tangent spaces, we can always define
the concept of "contingent cone to the graph of F at (x,y)"
TGraph (F)(X,y)
which is always a closed cone (instead of a vector space). Now, we can regard this cone
as the graph of a new set-valued map (depending upon F, x and y) DF(x,y) from X to Y,
defined by
veDF(x,y)(u) <=> (u,v)eTGraph(F)(X,y)
which may be called the "contingent derivative" (see Figure 3).
TGraphF (x,y) =
= Graph DF (x,y)
x
Figure 3 The "contingent derivative"
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Hence the "contingent derivative" DF(x,y) of a set-valued map F at a point (x,y) of its
graph is also a set-valued map F from X to Y, which has a closed graph (a weak
extension of the concept of continuity) and which is positively homogeneous
VA. > 0, DF (x,y)(A.u) = A.DF(x,y)(u)
(a weak extension of the concept of linearity).
Needless to say, if F is a usual differentiable (single-valued) map, then the contingent
derivative coincides with the usual Frechet derivative
DF(x,F(x))(u) = F'(x)u.
Many properties of derivatives of differentiable maps can be carried over to contingent
derivatives of set-valued maps (for an account of non-smooth analysis, see chapter 7 of
Aubin and Ekeland 1984).
Now consider the following "chain rule" which plays a crucial role in our study. If x(t)
and y(t) are differentiable functions such that
y(t) E F(x(t)) for all t ~ O.
then
y'(t) E DF(x(t),y(t))(x'(t)) for all t ~ O.
We also see at once that the derivative of the inverse F"1 of F, defined by
x E F-l(y) <=> Y E F(x)
is the inverse of the derivative
D(F-l)(y,X) =DF(x,y)"l.
This is a very useful formula, even when F is single-valued.
Then, by "formally" differentiating the viability conditions (2), and taking into account
the differential equation (I), we obtain the formula
f(x(t),u(t)) =x'(t) E DK(u(t),v(t),x(t))(u'(t),v'(t)).
We can invert this and derive the velocities of the evolution of viable quality
characteristics and technological processes by way of the formula
(u'(t),v'(t)) E D(K-l)(x(t),u(t),v(t))(f(x(t),u(t)). (4)
In other words, we can derive from the original problem (1),(2) another "differential
inclusion" governing the evolution of the controls u(t) and v(t) regulating viable
trajectories.
We can also clarify the technical assumptions of a theorem stating in essence that the
necessary and sufficient condition for a solution to (1), ( 2), (3), (4) to exist is that there
exists some bound M such that BM - denoting the ball of radius M - satisfies the
following
V(u,v,x) E Graph K,
(5)
f(x,u) E DK(u,v,x)(BM,BM).
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This is the relation linking demand (whose evolution is described by the differential
equation (1)) and production (described by the viability constraints (2)). (See Aubin and
Cellina 1984 for precise statements in this respect).
Now assume that conditions (5) are satisfied. We know that we can solve the evolution
of the commodity bundles, their quality characteristics and the technological process.
Differential inclusion (4) shows that, in general, the producer has to choose at each instant
velocities u'(t) and v'(t) with which he will change either the quality characteristics, or the
technological process, or both.
We can naturally propose a variety of mechanisms allowing the producer to make such
choices. Here we shall describe the evolution proposed by A. Andersson.
For this purpose, assume that we are at time t and that x(t), u(t) and vet) are known.
We also know f(x(t),u(t)) and, in theory, the set
R(t) = D(K-l)(x(t),u(t),v(t))(f(x(t),u(t)).
We now have to choose the pair (u'(t),v'(t)) in the set R(t).
Case 1
If by any chance, the pair (0,0) belongs to R(t), this means that the zero velocities of the
two controls are viable, so that the system can keep the controls u(t),v(t) constant at time
1. In other words, for all times s ~ t, the system may keep the controls u(t),v(t) constant
as long as the state xes), which continues to evolve according to the differential equation
x'es) = f(x(s),u(t))
remains in the "viability niche"
xes) E CCu(t),v(t))
where
CCu,v): = {xEK(u,v) If(x,u)EDK(x,u,v)(O,O)}.
Thus, "heavy behaviour" of a producer implies that he will make this choice: keep
constant both the quality characteristics and the process as long as the system remains
viable.
Case 2
Assume instead that we are in a state when v'(t) = 0 and u'(t) :F- O. Then the producer is
permitted to keep his technological process constant, but is forced to change the quality
characteristics of the commodities. To take into account that the evolution of the processes
is "heavier" than the evolution of quality characteristics, we shall take v'(t) = 0 and keep
the process constant as long as the system remains viable.
Case 3
Assume now that we are in a state when u'(t) =0 and v'et) :F- O. The producer has the
possibility of keeping the quality characteristics of the commodity constant and, for that
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purpose, to change the process. However, if he obeys an evolution where the evolution
of processes is heavier, he will not implement this choice: he will change both the process
and the characteristics, taking the velocity v'(t) of the smallest norm and then, choosing
u'(t) such that (u'(t),v'(t» belongs to K(t).
General Case
In all cases, the producer will choose the pair of velocities (u',v') in R(t) by
a) first taking v'(t) such that
11Y'(t) II = min ( I lv' II 13 u' with (u',v') E R(t)}
b) second, taking ii'(t) such that
Ilii'(t) II = min ( Ilu' II I (u',v'(t» E R(t)}.
This choice mechanism is quite easy to represent in a diagram (Figure 4). We represent
in R2 the points of coordinates
(1Iu'll, Ilv' II) and by Set): = = {( 11u'11, I lv' II) I (u',v') E R(t)}.
We introduce the following sets
* V(x,u,v) is the set of velocities v' of minimal norm among velocities v' such that
(u',v') E D(K-l)(x,u,v)(f(x,u» for some u'
* U(x,u,v,v') is the set of velocities ii' of minimal norm among velocities u' such that
(u',v') E D(K-l)(x,u,v)(f(x,u».
Then the system of differential inclusions governing the evolution of viable solutions
of (1), (2) when the evolution of technological process is heavier than the evolution of
quality characteristics is
i) x'(t) = f(x(t),u(t»
ii) v'(t) E V(x(t),u(t),v(t»
iii) u'(t) E U(x(t),u(t),v(t),v'(t».
(6)
Such differential inclusions can be solved under "reasonable" technical assumptions
using the methodology of Aubin and Frankowska (1985).
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CHAPTER 5
Women and Technological Development
L. Chatterjee
1. INTRODUCTION
S3
"The work of a woman is never complete" is a common folk saying in various cultures.
While most of the early research on women's work was related to household sustenance
and reproduction, interest in the income generation activities of women is now increasing.
During the last decade an extensive volume of literature has been produced on the labor of
women - for the household and for the market. This paper is in this genre and focuses on
the association between technological developments in production processes and the paid
and unpaid work of women. It argues that women have facilitated innovations in
technology and that this aspect has been largely ignored in the literature. Most attention
has been paid to the impacts of technology on women rather than the way in which
women have fostered technological developments in production and consumption
processes.
The relationship between technological change - as represented by newer or improved
products, processes, production structures and organizations of production and
consumption - and gender remains complicated. There is a contradictory relationship
between gender and technology in that technological developments have had both negative
and positive impacts on the laboring characteristics of women. The history of women and
technology reflects a series of occupational readjustments which have helped women to
become emancipated from unpaid production and dependent relations at home and
allowed them to obtain paid employment in the market. Yet this transformation has been
accompanied by great hardships and onerous costs that have involved exploitative wages,
tedious repetitive work on machines designed for the greatest productive efficiency,
occupational health hazards and constant ideological struggles to justify the right for
women to work in technologically improved work environments.
A major strand of research about the interface of women and technology documents the
negative impact of technology on the employment of women, particularly the dis-
placements caused by the introduction of new technology (Dauber and Cain, 1981;
Knight and Wilmott, 1986; Maillier and Rosser, 1987). Technology, particularly that
related to the operation of machines, commonly decreases the labor component in any
production process and this is followed by a decline in employment opportunities in the
technologically obsolete sectors. Labor historians and labor market analysts have shown
that women are often concentrated in sectors that are technologically weak (Berg et al.,
1983; Hanawalt, 1986). Consequently, the introduction of technology in these sectors
has had a disproportionate impact on women - leading to the lowering of their wages
through labor market imbalances. An oversupply of workers relative to shrinking demand
has led to the impoverization of women workers and their households. In such cases
technological developments have marginalised women.
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The introduction of technology, however, has also opened up avenues for the employ-
ment of women. On the aggregate, technology increases the demand for labor since new
products are developed and new needs are created. In the past, new products have often
freed women from labor intensive, unremunerated labor in the home and increased the
range of possible employment opportunities in the market. Also, working conditions and
wages have improved with the increase in the range of work opportunities, at least relative
to those existing for women in earlier historical periods. However, men have improved
their working conditions and increased their wages more than women through these
technologically induced advancements in the manufacturing and service sectors. There has
been an unequal gender appropriation of the benefits of technological advancement, even
as women have fought for and achieved greater emancipation through technological
developments.
There is considerable empirical evidence from developing and advanced economies
about these dual impacts of technology, though the primary research emphasis has been
on documenting the negative impacts of technology on women's labor. Relatively little
attention has been paid to the impacts that women have had on the development of
technology. This paper briefly reviews the literature concerning impacts of technology on
women and argues that the empirically observable impacts can be more usefully
interpreted in the context of their functional relationship with the promotion of
technological developments in society. This paper focuses on how women, through their
adjustments to positive and negative technological impacts, have funhered the develop-
ment and incorporation of new technologies in the production process. That is, women
have not been the passive recipients of negative impacts of new developments of
technology; rather, through their active adjustments to technologically induced
displacements in their activities, they have aided the progression of technological
developments in society. In this facilitative role they have borne more than their "fair
share" of the costs of wastage and breakage associated with technological progress.
This paper adopts the increasingly dominant feminist perspective that there is a close
interaction between the two domains of women's work - their unpaid work for the
sustenance and reproduction of the household and their income earning activities. Both
these domains are linked through the time budget. An analytical separation of women's
work for the market and women's work for the household is theoretically unwarranted,
particularly in the analysis of women's role in facilitating technical change. Many
technological advancements have been stimulated in order to increase the allocation of
women's work time in favor of work for the market. Household labor saving products
have stimulated inventions and technological developments in infrasbUCture and appliance
industries. Since women have had to combine the time demands of two work domains -
income earning work and household maintenance work - this has important ramifications
for the role of women in facilitating technical change. In the contemporary period new
adjustments in women's production of services can be explained through the concept of
coproduction. Coproduction and its relation to service production in the two work
domains will be explored later in the paper. However, women have always had to divide
their labor time between the two productive spheres. This division is intricately related to
technological developments in production and consumption in society.
The paper is divided into four sections. There is a conceptual overview that discusses
and very briefly summarises the fmdings of the rich literature about women and their
laboring characteristics. The predominant attributes of female employment are linked to
the progression of technology in various sectors of the economy. In the two following
sections, the paper discusses the role of women in promoting technical change in the
manufacturing and the service sectors. In the concluding section, a framework for
analysing the role of women in technical change is provided.
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2. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
ss
In this section a general statement is made about the relation between technology and
women's employment. The relationship between technological change and employment
has received and continues to receive considerable analytical attention. In this literature,
however, the issue of gender has received less attention. Yet, technological developments
have increased and continue to increase women's employment opportunities; in most
countries of the world the percentage of employed women has increased during the post
war years (ILO, 1981; OECD, 1984). For example, in the U.S. women accounted for
16% of the labor force in 1870; by 1986 their share had increased to 44% (Bergman,
1986). Urquhart (1984) has shown that the primary source of new employment in most
advanced economies has been the employment of women who did not previously hold
jobs. Indeed, female employment has been increasing at a faster rate than that of males in
most high income countries (Chatterjee and Lakshmanan, 1987; Maillier and Rosser,
1987) and this also holds for less developed countries. In the majority of third world
countries, the number of women in fonnal wage employment has increased more rapidly
than that of men in the last two decades (UNIDO, 1980). The industrial sector has
absorbed a major segment of this fonnallabor force, particularly in the manufacture of
textiles, clothing and electronics. Nevertheless, the role that the market participation of
women plays in technological change remains inadequately explored in the vast
contemporary literature on technical change.
, It must be evident, even to the casual observer, that women at all stages of the life
cycle are drawn into the labor market in great numbers when major technical changes
occur in the market place. The expansion of women's employment during periods of
technological change is not only a contemporary phenomenon. There is considerable
evidence that, even in the proto-industrial phase, emerging types of manufacturing
production made special use of a female labor force, adapting types of technical change
specially suited to the work patterns of a gender specific labor force. For example,
economic historians have drawn attention to the fact that technical change in the textile
industries in the years between pre-industrial and industrial 18th Century Britain required
and adapted to the large scale use of female labor (Berg et al., 1983; Berg, 1985).
Technical change not only meant mechanization, but also the use of intermediate
techniques, changes in work organization, wider use of inexpensive labor, an increasing
division of labor, and variable industrial structures. What are the characteristics of a
gender bias in technological development? What role did the household production of
women play in determining the structure of work: organization and the response of women
to the new technologies? An understanding of this complex women-market-household
production nexus is crucial in unravelling the role women play in promoting technological
change.
Three existing strands of research are relevant to an understanding of this nexus. These
three research themes are:
• Sex segregation in the workplace
• Wage inequalities between male and female workers
• Ideology of the supplementality/marginality of women's work and its relation to
patriarchial elements of society.
The division of labor based on gender has been and is still common in both advanced
and developing economies. Reskin (1984, p.2) notes there are three expressions of this
sex segregation. First, women are relegated to different spheres of activity - women to the
home activities and men to market activities. Second, paid employees work in pre-
dominantly single-sex settings. In the U.S. in 1980, over 32 million workers were
employed in industries where the workforce was at least 80% male or female. The metal,
construction and railroad industries are more than 90% male. Women constitute more than
75% of the workers in direct sales, apparel and fabricated textile manufacturing. Third,
there is a functional segregation even in those industries which are integrated - that is men
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and women do different jobs within the same industry. In hospitals, for example, nurses
and clerical workers are predominantly female and doctors and administrators are
predominantly male. In spite of remarkable changes in the composition of the workforce
and occupational structure, sex segregation levels have remained stable throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While some gains have been made in the sexual
integration of jobs, most men and women work in sex typical jobs (Reskin and
Hartmann, 1985). Women are concentrated in a small range offeminizedjobs, most often
in less skilled, lower paying jobs relative to their male counterparts with equivalent
education and age.
In developing countries the manufacturing sector is also divided between feminized
industries and those where women are not employed in significant numbers. Aggregate
statistics on occupational sex segregation have been documented by the ILO (1981). In
addition, several case studies have traced this for specific industries in a variety of
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, in Morocco in the three main
industries which account for 75% of the manufactured exports - carpets, clothing and
food processing - women account for 70-100% of the workforce (Joekes, 1985). That
women have been incorporated into the industrial workforce on the basis of sex
segregation has been documented for the offshore multinational electronics factories in
Malaysia and Singapore, for textiles and assembly plants in Mexico, manual workers in
Brazil (Humphrey, 1985), and urban manual and clerical workers in India (Joshi and
Joshi, 1976). The adoption of technological inventions in the production process has been
made possible due to sex segregation. The association between sex segregation an"
technological developments will be illustrated for the manufacturing and service sectors in
a later section of this paper.
Two of the most consistent descriptors of female employment are the segregation of the
sexes in the workplace and the gap between the earnings of men and women. These two
variables are correlated. Sex segregation has aided the practice of paying low wages to
women workers at various stages of the production of final goods and services. A wage
gap has persisted since the early industrial revolution in the U.K., when women in
increasing numbers began to work for wages outside their household. The wage gap has
remained despite the extensive labor force participation of women and efforts of the
women's movement. The 'average' pay of females, whether involved in manual or non-
manual work, is always lower than that of males at each age level (Maillier and Rosser,
1987). For example, in 1987 in the U.S., more than 25 years after the women's
movement made the wage gap an issue, women were earning 70 cents to the dollar,
compared to what men earned (Mann and Hellwig, 1988). This can be compared to 60
cents to the dollar in the early sixties and 63 cents to the dollar in the late seventies. While
the gap is being reduced at a slow rate, it is not primarily due to comparable wages for
comparable jobs. Rather, this minor reduction reflects the loss of higher wage blue collar
jobs by men and the selective migration of women into male preserves such as law,
medicine, business and engineering. Treiman and Hartmann (1981) provide a
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of unequal wages. Roos and Reskin (1984)
have focused on the separate job ladders and exclusionary practices that restrict mobility
between male and female positions.
The wage gap exists in developing countries as well (Dauber and Cain, 1981). This is
true not only in the low technology traditional sectors. For example, Joekes (1985,
p.183) shows that in Moroccan clothing factories which use modem technology to
produce for the European clothing market, women machinists earned about 70% of the
pay of male machinists performing identical tasks on the assembly line with similar age,
experience and hours of work. This wage gap facilitates the incorporation of technology
into production processes since women provide a low wage reserve labor force that is
important in periods of technological transformation. There are structural parallels
between the increasing part time work of women in the areas of the service sector which
are characterized by low wages, and the low wage incorporation of women in the
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manufacturing sector. The connections between low wages, sex segregation and
technology development shall be illustrated later.
Sex segregation and low wages for women, both of which are important for techno-
logical development, have been justified on ideological grounds. Matthaei (1982)
discusses the undervaluation of women's work, particularly the concept of the gender
hierarchy of value that has been used to justify lower wages for women. According to
patriarchal ideology, women were expected to be temporary workers, gainfully employed
in predetermined periods of their life cycle - between maturity and matrimony. Though the
reality of women's participation in the labor force was quite different, this argument
justified the lack of investment in and commitment for skill development amongst women.
Women learnt their skills in an informal manner through practical experience and a trial
and error method. Their lack of skills was used to justify lower wages, through a circular
reasoning. In a sex segregated labor situation, jobs with lower skill, productivity and
technology were available to women and the adaptability of women provided a major
source of energy for the recomposition of economic activities during periods of technical
change.
The ideology of supplementary wages still exists in the third world where industrial
wages can be extremely low and insufficient for the subsistence needs of women. For
example, Mather (1985, p. 158) discusses the low wages received by women in West
Java. Even though female wages provided a major source of money for food, clothing,
and shelter in working class families, there was a tacit agreement between parents and
factory managers about the supplementarity of female wages. This permitted employers to
pay wages which were below subsistence level and kept the women dependent
During periods of technical change it is necessary to have a pliant and efficient labor
force that is willing to accept new work situations. In the next two sections documentary
evidence will be provided to demonstrate the adaptability and efficiency of women, both
at the experimental new technology end and the residual, obsolescent end of the
technology spectrum in the manufacturing and service industries. There is a need for low
wage labor since in the former there is the risk minimization logic of the entrepreneur and
in the latter there are in reality lower productivities.
The comparative level of women's wages has been an issue for feminists for more
than a hundred years. Yet there has also been resistance from union organisers, as
demonstrated by Feldberg (1983), who discussed the influential role of union organisers
in fighting for higher wages for men relative to women. The ideology of skill and family
wages was used in this fight. The concept of the family wage confirmed the perspective
of women as supplementary wage earners and extended the sexual division of labor in the
household to the market. Ideological arguments were also used to justify the part time
status of women workers.
These three variables, which reflect the conjunction of ideology and practice with
respect to women in a patriarchial society, can be directly linked to the role women have
played in the incorporation of technology as innovations in the production process and
their access to technological improvements. The differential pace of technological
development and its adoption in production processes has been made possible through
gender biases in the development and differential allocation of technological improve-
ments. Technological advances are usually made earlier in sectors of production
dominated by male workers, since their wages are higher and there is a greater incentive
for capital labor substitutions in those sectors. When technological advances are made in
the female dominated sectors this is commonly followed by displacement of female
workers in favor of male workers. Higher wages are possible since productivity increases
due to improvements in technology and male workers appropriate the higher wage jobs.
Such jobs are reclassified as 'skilled' through this process of technological
improvements. However, displacement of women workers does not eliminate the need
for women's employment. They shift to other low technology, low productivity sectors
which then become sex segregated and have low wages attached to them. In fact, it can be
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argued that low wages for women and their consistent placement in low productive
sectors have permitted the development of different production structures that maximise
profits and returns to capital.
This pattern of displacement and emplacement of female workers and their unequal
access to technological improvements can be found in all periods of history and in a wide
spectrum of developed and developing countries. What explains this consistency and why
have men and women accepted this unjust practice? The ideology of women's primary
work as pertaining to household maintenance and reproduction and their work for the
market as being supplementary has provided the rationale for this.
We can see this ideological debate with respect to women's employment in each cycle
of technological development whether it is in agriculture, manufacturing or services. It is
ironic that the clerical sector is dominated by women, yet three arguments were originally
used against the entry of women into the clerical professions. It was argued that clerical
work was not suited to women's nature, they lacked the capacity for physical endurance
and that their entry would displace men. All three arguments were derived from
patriarchial values that define femininity in terms of women's domestic role and the
supplementarity of their incomes.
In the next two sections these concepts are explored with respect to the manufacturing
and service sectors.
3. THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
TECHNOLOGIES
The role of women in the development of industrial technology results from the
conjunction of the three factors mentioned earlier and the profit making needs of
entrepreneurs. Historical evidence will be used in this section to demonstrate that
functional segregation of the sexes, and the low wages of women, have been used for the
advancement of technology in society. Functional segregation, as noted earlier, results
from the classification of specific jobs as male and female within integrated industries.
While it is possible to document the existence of functional sex segregation in job tasks at
any point in time, there is continuous reallocation of tasks between men and women over
time. Technological change in the industrial sector has been associated with the twin
processes of dynamic incorporation of women into production processes that were male
dominated and the incorporation of males into tasks that were female dominated. For
example, in the U.S. women were actually the first industrial workers (Glazer, 1980,
p. 264). They were displaced by males, primarily immigrants. Since union organizers
viewed women workers as threats, the ideology of female attributes and of supplementary
wages were used to deny women access to industrial work after their displacement. Until
the First World War blue collar work was considered to be a male activity except in a few
feminized industries. The enhanced demand for workers and the restricted labor supply
created by war time needs allowed women to demonstrate that they were competent to
work in engineering and other "male" jobs. The continuous reallocation of tasks between
men and women implies that no task is intrinsically male or female. It is societal needs
that determine what at any particular phase will be considered as specifically "women's
tasks" and on occasion through redefinition, as predominantly "male tasks". If this
observation is accurate then we need to explore the association between the varying
expressions of functional segregation and technological change.
While the actual tasks performed by women and the machines they operated varied in
time, their role in the development of technology in the production process has remained
constant. Functional sex segregation permitted them to be employed in tasks embedded
with lower levels of technology and low wages allowed profit extraction from their labors
even though overall productivity could be low in activities using obsolescent
technologies. During periods of technological change women were involved in both the
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high risk experimental phase of new technology and in the high risk, unstable,
obsolescent phase of old technologies. During the stable phase of an industry women
worked in subsidiary and auxiliary jobs. They aided male operators of machines and
made their use of new technological advancements more efficient - hence more
productive. That is, through their performance of auxiliary tasks they not only facilitated
the control of more productive technology by male workers, they allowed capital
formation to proceed more efficiently - capital that could be reinvested as new technology.
However, when new technology was introduced into female dominated sectors and
productivity increased, the benefits of higher productivity were appropriated by male
workers. These tasks became reclassified as male preserves.
However, two aspects remained constant. First, women were paid lower wages than
men, irrespective of whether they were in the experimental phases of new technology, the
stable phase of mature technology or the declining phase of obsolescent technology.
Women's wages were not commensurate with those of men in the different phases of
technological development in a particular production process. Second, sex segregation
remained as a characteristic of the male-female division of work. Through continuously
readjusting in their work spheres, women facilitated the process of technological
advancement. What guided this reallocation of tasks? Why was this reallocation
necessary? How was this process of a changing sexual division of labor related to the
development of technology? In summary, maximum returns to capital from the existing
technologies and investments of capital for new technology were facilitated through these
apparently changing manifestations of functional sex segregation.
One consistent thread that ties together these shifting task responsibilities is the
defmition of what constitutes "skill". Skill, in the labor process, is not defmed in terms of
human attributes. The definition of skilled and unskilled has been based on productivity
rather than on the true skills required for production. Since women have been primarily
incorporated into sectors and tasks that had lower levels of technology embedded in them,
or were technologically obsolete, they have had lower productivities. The use of lower
technologies that caused 'lower productivities' permitted women to be classified as
unskilled and to receive lower wages. In many instances lower technologies required
higher levels of skills. On the other hand, when male workers were reallocated to female
tasks with new production processes and higher levels of technology, these tasks were
reclassified as 'skilled' since productivity was increased through the incorporation of new
technology. Higher productivity permitted higher wages of which the men were
beneficiaries.
It is short sighted to concentrate on one phase of the cycle - the displacement of
women by technology and/or male workers - without paying attention to the whole cycle
and the role of technology in this. While such practices are clear examples of sexual
discrimination and exploitation that can be traced to patriarchial relations in society, there
has been a functional reason for this that is related to the way in which technology is
developed and incorporated into production processes. Through this redefinition of tasks
as male and female, society permitted the gradual development and incorporation of
technology, which is necessary for two purposes. First, technological advancements are
made in a piecemeal way due to the idiosyncratic nature of the development of inventions.
Second, there are economic risks attached to the transition from inventions to innovations.
Industrialists seek to minimise their risks by accepting innovations that have been tried
and proven successful by a few entrepreneurs. The piecemeal introduction of technology
into production processes has possibly been due to the adaptive role that women have
played in accepting jobs and the lower wages provided by them in a society dominated by
patriarchial values. Since the process of the invention of technology and the adoption of
inventions into the production process as innovations is uneven, women - through their
acceptance of lower wages, residual employment and absorption of the negative impacts
of technological development - have permitted entrepreneurs to selectively adopt
technological innovations into their production processes. Their lower wages have
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allowed entrepreneurs to experiment with technological developments and to continue
with the replacement of obsolete technology at a pace suited to their profit making needs.
The ideology of supplemental earnings, weaker physical stamina and like values that were
used to justify the lower wages and sex segregations were external manifestations of
deeper structural forces that relate to the relation between labor and capital as defined in a
patriarchial context
These patriarchial ideologies facilitated the adoption of technological development even
though male workers need not necessarily have been conscious of the expendable roles
that fragmented social divisions of labor create. (Parallels can be drawn for other fonns of
division - race, ethnicity and the like). What are the various mechanisms that have been
used to exclude women from the technologically more productive and financially more
lucrative occupations and job tasks within occupations? Since women have demonstrated
time and again the capability to perform a wide range of tasks and to use complex
machines, it will be interesting to analyse the various institutional and ideological
mechanisms that have permitted the transformation of female into male and male into
female specific tasks. The three most important mechanisms were and still are: the level of
capitalisation, access to training and continuity/periodicity of work.
While technology increases productivity it requires capital for its adoption. Capital has
been used as a mechanism to transfer women from higher productivity and hence from
higher wage to lower wage jobs. A few illustrations from studies by labor historians are
provided. Bennett (1986) notes that women produced commercial ale - one of the two
basic food items in medieval England - after the manufacture of bread, the other basic
food item, became professionalised. Baking required ovens and equipment that was
relatively expensive and professional bakers were male. It is ironic, however, that females
continued to be bakers in the household economy where it remained a labor intensive
activity. Ale making remained a lucrative household industry. The equipment required for
making ale in the cottage industry phase - large pots, vats and ladle, were available in
most households. Moreover, it was a labor intensive activity. The final product spoiled
rapidly and transported poorly. It required highly skilled people able to deal with these
uncertainties - hence the preponderance of ale-wives. However, when hops were
introduced from Europe and beer making became a commercial activity, brewing becarne
man's work and the ideology of woman's nature was used to exclude them. However,
women continued to work in the liquor sector as bar maids; i.e., in the service sector
rather than in the profitable production sector. This is but one exarnple of such practices
that occurred in the textile industry, lace making, garment manufacturing - a whole range
of activities that had been considered as commensurate with women's nature and which
remained as women's work in the household sphere.
The relegation of women to low technologies was perpetuated through the denial of
training to them. Young males were apprenticed and received fonnal training. Females
learned their skills informally from their parents or through domestic service in artisan
households. Orphaned children who received fonnal training in charity institutions learnt
crafts that were labor intensive such as spinning or sewing. Boys were taught to read and
write - knowledge that was denied to girls - hence the large preponderance of illiterate
working women. In printing shops, type setting and pulling the press were male activities
since women could not read enough to typeset (Davis, 1986). In the textile factories
women were not taught to repair the machines they worked on and their consequent
dependence on men was used to justify their lower wages (Bradley, 1986).
How was the relegation to lower skilled jobs institutionalised in society? Ideology was
used to justify the exclusion of women from fonnal training. This related to the definition
of femininity and the priority given to household maintenance in favour of labor for the
market. A woman's participation in household production of crafts was periodic since her
activity was determined by free time left after fulfilling the household tasks that included
food preparation, child care and the like. Thus, unwinding the cocoons and preparing the
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thread for bobbins was a female task since this could be accomodated with the many
household tasks that women had to perform as mistresses, wives and mothers.
Are there any deviations from this? Is there any evidence in labor history of women's
competence in male dominated sectors i.e. in cases where women had penetrated into
male preserves? Women's production during the craft industrial stage could be of three
kinds: they worked as independent artisans and entrepreneUFs; as unpaid helpers of male
members of the household; and as wage eaming artisans. Only in the first case do we find
that women had access to capital and technology. In the latter two cases - as household
workers and wage labor - they worked at the low technology end of the industry. A brief
discussion of women in male preserves can be very illuminating. In Lyon in the sixteenth
century, for example, there were highly qualified female entrepreneurs such as printers,
publishers, silk manufacturers, barber surgeons and cabinet makers (DaviS-; 1986). Such
independent entrepreneurs were either the daughters or widows of influential and
respected crafts families and as such inherited the capital and technology. They were not
perceived as threats since there were too few of them and they were maintaining family
enterprises for their sons or sons in law. Even so, restrictive actions were taken so as to
limit their capacity for growth and development during downturns in their industry. Davis
mentions the limitations imposed on female barber surgeons and their journeyman helpers
in Lyon during 1540, journeywomen in 1554, and the 1561 and 1583 rulings against
female master silk makers.
The textile industry is used to illustrate these concepts in greater detail since textiles
and kindred products are industries in which women have been overrepresented. The
textile industry absorbed a large percentage of the female labor force in the U.K. when
textiles were an important industry in that country. In developing countries today, where
much of the textile and apparel industry has migrated, it continues to absorb the majority
of women who are employed in manufacturing. Moreover, the textile industry was one of
the earliest industries to be affected by technological developments associated with the
capitalist production systems.
The textile industry provides a clear example of the shifting sex composition of jobs in
both weaving and spinning. Handloom weaving was performed by men when textile
production was a cottage industry. Weaving shifted to women during the putting out
system associated with proto-industrialization. Handloom weaving once again became a
male activity when weaving shifted to factory production. When factories became fully
equipped with power looms women, once again, became weavers. Women were spinners
in the spinning jenny and water frame stage and men became spinners when the more
productive mule spinning was introduced (Hartmann, 1979). Women moved in and out
of the tasks of weaving and spinning during different historical periods. This was
primarily due to changes in technology.
The specific example of the hosiery industry in Leicester is used to illustrate, in further
detail, the switching of tasks between men and women, with the progression of
technology and the need to maximise returns to capital. Bradley (1986) and Osterud
(1987) provide good documentation of the dynamics of job transformation between
female and male workers and the association between the feminisation of specific tasks
and technological development. The operation of knitting frames was considered to be a
male task in the eighteenth century. However, from the beginning of the nineteenth
century there are accounts of women being engaged in operating frames. This was despite
the fact that the Charter of 1745 disallowed women (except widows) to work frames. For
example, in 1845 the Royal Commission found that 25% of the frames in the town of
Leicester, and up to 50% in the surrounding villages, were worked by women. Some
individual employers had 66% of their frames operated by women. What underlay the
encroachment of women into a male preserve? The total profits that entrepreneurs could
make depended partly on the rents they collected on machinery, such as frames. It was
profitable for them to distribute their work over a large number of workers. The total
work was divided in such a way as to maximise rental incomes from the frames - hence
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the imponance of female labor. However, in operating these frames women were to be
found in the economically unstable and less expensive wrought hose branch while men
had begun to shift to knitting in the higher paid glove production.
There was increased feminisation when hosiery production moved to the factory. In
the early days of factory production women worked on machines in the new factories.
Bradley (1986, p.61) notes that by 1845 women were working in large numbers in the
factories operating machines, since men were not willing to accept the regular hours and
discipline of the factory. For example, in 1845 Thomas Collins had installed 55 rotary
machines and employed a predominantly female workforce to operate these machines.
However, the decline of cottage industry due to factory competition brought more males
into factory production where they became rotary machine operators by displacing
women. Women became relegated to subsidiary and supportive tasks while men became
the weavers. By the early 1890's the rotary machines, especially the Cotton's Patents,
were almost all worked by men. While 31 % of hosiery workers in 1861 and 73.5% by
1901 were female, the majority were now employed in specific female jobs such as
seaming, folding and pressing. However the practices of a few firms such as Stretton's,
which continued to use women on the Cotton's Patents inspite of union protests, proved
that women were competent to use complex machines.
A redefinition of female tasks occurred once again as labor shortages during the 1914-
18 war allowed women to work on all types of knitting machines and enter into other
higher paid male preserves such as countering and trimming. Women formed the major
part of the workforce in the hosiery industry until the mid twentieth century. However,
men once again became the knitters as improvements in knitting technology increased
productivity and wages. In 1983, when a single person was able to tend 18 machines
rather than one machine, and wages increased in that sector, men again became the
knitters in the sock industry in Leicester. In summary, knitting was a woman's task
during the cottage industry phase when frames were rented by the household; they
worked in factories when the narrow frame had become obsolescent with the development
of the more efficient wide frame which men began to operate; they also operated wide
frames during the world wars when there was a shonage of male labor. Women were
used on new technology when men refused and were supplanted when its inevitability
was demonstrated. They were displaced to old technology so that obsolescent technology
could be retired at a rate which could still provide profits to entrepreneurs.
What is true of textiles is true of other industries as well. Abbott (1969) mentions that
when cigar making was a home industry in the U.S. before 1800, it was a woman's
activity in the agricultural household. Early factories employed women who were later
displaced by male immigrants willing to work for similar low wages. By 1860 only 9%
of the workers were women in an industry that had previously been dominated by
women. In 1869, when the wooden mould was introduced from Europe, women became
the primary workers. Similar gender switchings, related to technology, have been
documented for the printing industry (Baker, 1964; Hartmann, 1979). This theme of the
association between technology, job switching and women's employment will continue in
the next section where it shall be documented for the service sector.
The well specified female and male areas of activity that characterise gender
concentrations in occupations at any point in time is primarily related to the needs of
capital. Technological development is a manifestation of this need. Sexual stereotyping
and sex segregation in occupations are institutionally created and ideologically supported.
Occupational sex segregation and ideology of the nature of women have been used to
exclude women from new and productive technologies. Patriarchial values have been the
instrumental variables.
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4 . THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNO-
LOGY IN THE SERVICE SECTORS
The steady growth in the participation of women in the contemporary labour force is
related to sectoral shifts and the increasing importance of the service sector in the
economy. Women moved into the service sector with the progressive mechanization of
the female dominated goods producing sectors such as textiles and the decline of the
family farm. For example, in the U.S. female non agricultural employment in domestic
and personal services declined from 67% in 1870 to 32% in 1930.
Employment in the service sector is also characterized by sex segregation and low
wages. Feminization of a particular service is also directly related to t~chnological
developments in that particular service. The introduction of improved processes and
related employment displacements is also associated with the progressive development of
technology in the service sector. The clerical sector is used to illustrate the relationship
between technology and women's employment in the service sector and the arguments
made in the paper thus far are continued.
The 1910's were characterized by a significant occupational redistribution with a
massive incorporation of women into service occupations. In 1870 women accounted for
0.2% of the labor force in the clerical occupations. By 1980, four out of five clerical
workers were women (Maillier and Rosser, 1987). In 1911 clerical work provided jobs to
3% of the total female labor force; by 1981 more than 33% of a much larger labor force
was employed in that sector. As in manufacturing, technology - in the form of new
machines - went hand in hand with new ways of organizing work. Feminization of the
clerical sector was as intrinsically related to machines as it was to new patterns in the
organization of work.
What is the relation between technical advances and the increased participation of
women in clerical occupations? The feminization of the clerical work force occurred in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the character of clerical work and its
organizational structure changed radically (Davies, 1982). The traditional office was small
with a low level of technology, characterized by close working relations between clerks
and employers. In the U.S. in the pre-civil war period the office was a male preserve and
there were no women workers (Davies, p. 27). The typical clerk, prior to this
transformation, was an apprentice manager or businessman. He performed a wide variety
of tasks in order to learn different facets of the business. Clerical work was viewed as
temporary and a period of preparation for higher and more rewarding tasks. In the late
nineteenth and early 20th centuries clerical work underwent dramatic changes in the type
of technology used by workers and the organization of the workplace. Technologies such
as the typewriter, telegraph, telephone, calculating and duplicating machines
revolutionized the office. This resulted in the need for a larger workforce, standardization
of tasks and greater specialisation among workers. By the end of the transformation
clerical work was primarily a dead end occupation; most clerical workers would remain in
their positions during their working lives. This transformation was accompanied by an
enormous expansion of clerical work, changing sexual composition of the workforce and
the introduction of new technology that made clerical work into a series of routine,
repetitive tasks and female clerical workers into office operatives. In the clerical sector the
development of typewriters and telephones had much to do with the feminization of the
work force, since the typewriter vastly increased the demand for correspondence and the
keeping of records i.e. filing. Feminization proceeded at different rates within the clerical
field. It proceeded most rapidly amongst typists and stenographers - both occupations
were marked by new technological developments. In 1880 women constituted 40% of all
stenographers and typists. In 1900 and 1930 the proportion had increased to 75% and
95% respectively. Bookkeepers and accountants continued to be male and it is only in the
last two decades that there has been a significant change in these clerical tasks.
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Machines did not cause the routinization of work, though they certainly facilitated it.
The successful invention and manufacture of the typewriter resulted from developments in
the organization of work that made these machines necessary. Women facilitated their
rapid diffusion because they adapted to the conditions of work and accepted the rigid
hierarchial structure of authority. The rigid hierarchial structures within an office
diminished opportunities for upward mobility. A typist who was involved in a restricted
and highly specialised task lost the opportunity to gain knowledge that would allow her to
take decisions over a range of tasks that the management role implied. Feminization of the
clerical work facilitated technological change.
Female employment is likely to be significantly influenced by new technological
developments such as microelectronics. New developments in information processing
will cause the elimination of much of the clerical staff, particularly those involved in
recording, storing and retrieval of information (Maillier and Rosser, 1987).
The earlier round of technology increased job opportunities in a variety of new sectors,
either through the replacement of males or in new tasks opened up by technology i.e.
typing, or telephone switch board operating. The elimination of paper as a medium of
information storage and the storage of information on disks will cause a basic
restructuring of the work force and severe cutbacks among typists and file clerks. Higher
levels of training in computers and word processors are likely to lead to a demand for a
higher paid and more male work force. While this is not a negative trend, and a better
sexual balance in all jobs is desirable, most of the jobs that are eliminated will belong to
women typists and clerks.
5. CONCLUSION
Society has witnessed a deluge of technological developments since the dawn of the
Industrial Revolution. On the aggregate these developments, relative to earlier societies,
have resulted in increased employment opportunities, increased productivity, increased
prosperity and higher levels of material and non material consumption for both men and
women. The increase in the paid labor force participation of women is a direct
consequence of the increasing incorporation of improved technologies in production
processes and the improved organization of work that this often entailed. However, two
factors have been constant in this incorporation. First, due to the patriarchial form of
societal structure, women have been assigned to the lower technology end of production
processes. As new innovations were adopted women were reassigned to tasks which had
relatively more obsolete technologies. Second, they have been paid lower wages than men
for their effort. As the aggregate increase in employment has been accompanied by
sectoral declines, women have been concentrated in the declining sectors due to their
assignment to the low technology end of production. This paper argues that women have
facilitated the adoption of new technology through their positive adjustments to
displacements and "acceptance" of lower levels of technology and lower wages.
There is nothing that is deterministic about the relation between women and
technology. The various arguments that have been put forward in favor of women's
assignment to low technology jobs, such as their weaker physical constitution, poorer
mechanical skills, inability to handle complex tasks, loss of femininity and other similar
sexist justifications do not stand the test of historical analysis. Even a cursory glance at
the relation between women and technology from a historical perspective provides
evidence that there has been no task that has been too complex for women or no
technology too onerous for them to use when appropriate training has been provided.
Occupational segregation with its attendant discrimination in training opportunities, access
to improved technologies, and lack of comparable wages has perpetuated itself through
relations of dominance and subdominance based on gender, race, region of origin and like
variables. The key question is whether greater awareness of women's issues will make
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this period of rapid technological change significantly different from earlier periods of
technological progress.
Past advances in technology have decreased labor demand in some areas and increased
them in others. We can expect similiar dislocations in the new round of technological
developments that are currently underway. For example, in the manufacturing sector
computer controlled technology will tend to eliminate repetitive jobs. The effect of this
will be felt disproportionately by women since they tend to be concentrated in jobs that
involve repetitive tasks and that have a high potential for automation. Maillier and Rosser
(1987, p.159) note that the repetitive assembly of electronic goods in female dominated
industries is likely to be affected by new technology. In the dawn of the new information
age and its related microtechnologies there is an opportunity to eradicate the unequal and
socially unjust use of women's labor which has been discussed in this paper. The advent
of these new technologies has the potential for raising the quality of life for those in the
manufacturing and service sectors. However, there is also a great potential for increasing
social inequalities in relation to both gender and class. The outcome will depend on those
who have access to the opportunities that open up as a result of the new technological
developments.
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CHAPTER 6
An Oil-Exporting Region versus an Industrialized
Region
J.M. Hartwick and M. Spencer
1 . INTRODUCTION
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Can an oil importing region or country benefit from an exogenous increase in the price of
the oil it imports? The simple answer is yes. That is, if by paying more for oil imports, it
increases the income of the oil exporter enough so that the oil exporter rapidly expands its
imports from the oil importing country. More informally, OPEC could raise the price of
its oil exports, receive more income, and then expand its imports of, say, industrial goods
by more than the increase in its oil revenues. The oil importer's economy can gain more
revenue than it loses through increased payments for oil imports. Chichilnisky (1983)
investigated this phenomenon in a two region or country model. In Hartwick (1984) the
sensitivity of her numerical results was investigated and the sensitivity of her results to
her choice of numeraire price was analyzed. In a two-region model the price of industrial
goods is the same in both regions so that price was selected as the numeraire. In this case,
the oil importing region never benefited from higher oil prices. In the jargon of
Chichilnisky, the "substitution effect" disappeared. But the basic Chichilnisky model
seemed unsatisfactory because commodity balance was absent in the industrial goods
sector and the link between capital goods and industrial goods (acting as investment) was
inadequate. We shall redevelop the basic model and exhibit the "substitution effect" in the
revised model.
There is a Keynesian element in the substitution effect besides the terms of trade or
relative price effect noted above. Unemployed capital goods are brought into production
as oil prices rise. Also we note that a rising GNP or gross domestic product is not a good
index of rising welfare. In the model below both wages and employment rates decline as
the exogenous price for oil imports rises, so workers fare poorly in the face of rising oil
prices. The model is special: the oil importing country's economy is fully specified, but
the economy of the oil exporting country is specified only to the extent that it sets the price
of its oil exports and imports industrial goods at an endogenously determined price. There
are two sectors in the oil importing country - an industrial goods and a basic or consumer
goods sector. Supply schedules with less than infinite price elasticities for labor and
capital for the oil importing country are given. The model is stationary given these factor
supply characteristics: capital is not accumulated nor does the population grow. In the
Appendix we set out the Chichilnisky model and briefly note the differences between that
model and the one that we describe immediately below.
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2. THE MODEL
Oil-Exporting versus Industrialized Region
The two commodities produced in the oil importing region have Leontief production
functions.
B = min (LB/a}. OB/b}. KB/CI) (1)
where LB, OB, and KB denote quantities of labor, oil, and capital used in the production
of the consumption good in quantity B. aI' b}. and cI are technical factor productivity
coefficients. For the industrial good, we have
I = min (O/a2, 01!b2, Kl1c2) (2)
where definitions are analogous to those for the consumption goods production function.
The associated 'dual' competitive price equations are
and
PB = aIw + bIpo + cIrpl
PI = a2w +~o + c2rpl
(3)
(4)
where w is the wage rate, Po the price of oil, r the rate of return for reproducible capital
or the interest rate, PI the price of industrial (new capital) goods and PB the price of the
consumption goods. PIT is a proxy for the user cost or the rental price of capital.
In spite of the fixity of production coefficients, the relative prices of PB and PI will
change as Po changes resulting in substitutability of industrial and consumer goods.
Since all wage income will be assumed spent on consumer goods, the labor supplied
will respond to its wage expressed in terms of its purchasing power.
L = ex . (w/PB), ex> 0 (5)
and existing capital utilized depends on the rate of return r, i.e., K = I3r. Total capital
utilized comes from the existing stock of say different vintages plus new capital goods ID
covering the depreciation on existing capital goods in use. Thus
KS = I3r + ID 13 > o.
Demand behavior is such that all wage income is spent on consumer goods
PBBD=wL
(6)
(7)
where the superscript D denotes domestic consumption by the oil importing region.
Labor, oil and capital demands are respectively
LD = aIBS + a21S (8)
OD = bIBS + a21S (9)
KD = cIBS + C2IS. (10)
Domestic demand for industrial goods produced derives from depreciation on capital
goods currently utilized. Thus
ID =rKD. (11)
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Implicit here is the assumption that as existing capital goods are being utilized, they
depreciate instantaneously at an exogenous rate y. This depreciated amount is replaced by
new capital goods from the current production of industrial goods. A steady state comes
to mind. (A different assumption would be depreciation equal to ".~, or only "old" capital
goods currently depreciate in use.)
Material balance requires that
KD=KS (12)
LD=LS (13)
BD=BS (14)
oD=oS (15)
X = IS - ID. (16)
The last two equations indicate oil used by the importing nation equals oil supplied
from abroad (the other country) and industrial goods currently produced and not used by
the oil importer, are exported to the oil supplier.
Equations (3) to (16) form our two country model. Therfrice of ba~ic !hoods is our
numeraire or PB = 1. We have fourteen unknowns: BS, B ,IS, ID, L ,L ,KS, KD,
OS, OD, X, w, r, PI. This is the model we solved, using parameter values from
Chichilnisky (1983). Before taking up our results (computer outputs) we report that
whether the value of exported industrial goods equals the value of imported oil depends
on the value of the rate of depreciation (a parameter to be selected) relative to the rate of
interest (a variable solved in the model). We then have
Pmposition: The value of oil imports exceeds (equals, fall short of) the value of
industrial goods exported as the rate of interest falls short of (equals,
exceeds) the rate of depreciation.
Proof: Using (15) and (9) we have
PoOS =blBSpo + ~ISpo = BS(PB - alw - clrPJ) + IS(PI(1 - c2r) - a2w)
using (3) and (4)
=wLD - w[LD - a21S] + rPJ[KD - C2IS] + PIIS - C21SrPI - a2wlS
using (7), (14), (8) and (10)
= PJ(lS - rKD)
~ PJ(IS - yKD) as r ~ y
where the value of industrial goods exported is PI(IS - ID) and ID = yKD from
(11).
The treatment of rental income from ownership of the employed capital stock is
obviously special. Wage income "soaks up" the value of basic goods produced leaving
rental income from capital to purchase current industrial goods produced net of oil
imports. (This follows from the fact that our Z (= wL + rplIS) equals GNP (= PBBS +
PIIS - PoOS». In the special case of current account balance rental income from capital
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equals the value of industrial goods used domestically. If one supposes that capital is
owned by the public sector, the treatment seems most reasonable. The main point is that
there is no current consumption out of income from capital by a rentier class. For the case
of a current account surplus, one might hypothesize that the income corresponding to the
surplus is being directed by a rentier class to consumption of foreign commodities but this
link is not explicit in the model.
We are interested in exhibiting a certain mode of behavior of the model - to display a
logical possibility. We make use of Chichilnisky's parameters which are constrained in
part as follows:
(i) M = al b l - a2bl > 0 the consumption or basic sector is relatively labor
intensive compared with the oil intensiveness of the industrial sector.
(ii) cl is small or the consumption good requires very few capital inputs. (By
setting cl= 0, Chichilnisky obtains comparative static results analytically. For
cl > 0, she appeals to numerical examples as we do.)
(iii) b1 is small or the consumption or basic good requires little oil in production.
These assumptions imply that the direct link between the price of oil and the price of
the basic good is very weak. In fact, since PB =1 (numeraire assumption) an increase in
the price of oil will directly lower the wage rate and given Assumption (iii) this effect will
be relatively small. For cl insufficiently small, no "substitution effect" is observed (see
Hartwick (1984».
3 . THE RESULTS
In this model, we have introduced a new technical coefficient, the rate of depreciation. We
indicated that the value of this parameter directly affected the trade deficit of the oil
importing country. It turns out that for small rates of depreciation (the oil importing
country with a current account trade surplus) rising oil prices result at first in
Chichilnisky's "substitution effect" and then in the "income effect". In other words, our
model displays all of the characteristics of Chichilnisky's model, which as we have
already noted, is flawed. For larger values of the rate of depreciation no "substitution
effect" of rising oil prices is observed.
The three runs l we described here make use of the parameters set out in Chichilnisky
(1983; Appendix A4). The rate of depreciation, the parameter peculiar to our version of
the two country model, is set at "( = 0.1, 0.4 and 0.8 in three runs. When "( = 0.1 the oil
importer always has a current account surplus and both GNP and GDP (this latter being
the value of all outputs produced by the oil importing country: GNP is GDP net of
imports (here of oil) and of course equals the value of domestic factors of production in
use - namely wL + rpIK, which we indicate by Z.) In brief, for "(= 0.1, we see GNP,
GDP, and Z eventually rise over the "early" range of exogenously increasing oil prices.
The Chichilnisky "substitution effect" is exhibited. See Table 1 and Figure 1. For "( =0.4,
the rate of interest, which varies, is on average slightly higher than "( and only GDP rises
in the "early" range of increasing oil prices. See Table 2 and Figure 2. At first there is a
small current account surplus for the oil importer, then a deficit and then again a surplus.
For "( = 0.8, GNP, Z and GDP decline as oil prices rise. No substitution effect is
exhibited. See Table 3 and Figure 3.
1These computer runs were solved as 8 full fourteen nonlinear equation system with the code ZSCNT of
the large package IMSL. The parameters used are a1 =0.2, 82 =0.2, bl =0.1, b2 =0.2, cl =0.001, c2 =
0.6, a =1.0 and P=2.0, Pa = 1.0. The depreciauon rate y assumes the values 0.1, OA, 0.8 in Wee
separate nms. The price of oil Po moves in each run from 0 to 10 as in Chichilnisky.
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Figure 1 Low Depreciation Rate and the Price of Oil Rises
The oil importing country always runs a current account deficit
Why does the run with 'Y = 0.1 exhibit the substitution effect and the one with 'Y = 0.8
not? Consider relative prices as the price of oil changes. For 'Y = 0.1 the ratios rPI/w and
PI/Po rise in the "early" range of oil price increases and then decline. See Table 1. (PI/Po
is indicated by TOT for Terms of Trade in the Tables.) For 'Y = 0.8 these ratios only
move in one direction as Po rises. See Table 3. This same monotonicity in relative prices
holds for 'Y = 0.4. See Table 2. Clearly then the magnitudes of as well as signs of
changes in relative prices maUer. Intuitively one thinks of the "substitution effect"
occurring because the terms of trade, PFPo, move strongly in favor of the oil importing
country and then move against this country in the "income effect" range of rising oil
prices. This intuiti§n is borne out in the data. Common to all three cases is a rise and then
decline in r, rPI I , ID, X, KS(=KD), and the value of exports, PIX. They all peak: at
about the same value of the price of oil. We ask the reader to verify these statements by
examining Tables 1,2, and 3 corresponding to runs with 'Y = 0.1, 04, and 0.8
respectively.
Is the "substitution effect" logically connected to a current account surplus in the sense
that the "substitution effect" will not be observed without a current account surplus? Of
course we ask this question within the confines of this model. We do not know. For
'Y = 0.4, GDP rose as a current account surplus was observed but both GNP and
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national income (Z equal to GNP) declined over this range of oil price increases. The
surplus turned to a deficit and back to a surplus over the range of oil price increases. One
might argue that extra industrial goods exports has a multiplier effect on aggre~ate supply
and thus the trade surplus is necessary for GNP to rise as oil import prices rise. Certainly
both the value of oil imports and current surplus increase over the phase in which the
"substitution effect" is exhibited. They decline over the phase in which the income effect
is exhibited. Of course, as we have noted, numerous series rise and fall in parallel with
GNP so one should perhaps not pinpoint a single source of the "substitution effect". Both
relative price effects and real effects mingle. We are dealing with a small general
equilibrium system and pinpointing causal links is difficult.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rapidly rising oil prices caused many economists to reflect on the effects these increases
could have on oil importing countries. The "Dutch Disease" (or "Gregory syndrome")
was the adverse effects on oil exporters of a rising relative price of the oil exporters
currency. The rising value of the currency led to a shrinking of international demand for
industrial exports from the oil exporting country. See for example Corden and Neary
(1982) and Corden (1983). Chichilnisky alerted economists to the logical possibility of
non-deleterious effects of oil price imports on an oil importing nation. She coined the term
"substitution effect" for an instance of rising prices of oil imports and a rising GNP in the
oil importing country. In this paper we have exhibited these "substitution effects" in a
restructured Chichilnisky model. The logical basis of such effects has been placed on a
sounder footing.
2 This argument, that a disequilibrium must exist for the "substitution effect" to manifest itself, carries
over to Chichilnisky's model where a material imbalance exists in the industrial good sector. See the
Appendix below and Hartwick (1984). Above, this disequilibrium is in the trade balance. Chichilnisky's
material imbalance (the size of her ID) increases over the phase of rising oil prices over which the
"substitution effect" is exhibited and declines over the phase over which the "income effect" is exhibited.
Our current account imbalance moves in "parallel" with her industrial goods material imbalance.
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Table 1 Low Depreciation Rate and the Price of Oil Rises
Al = 0.30 A2 =0.20 Bl = 0.10 B2 = 0.20 Cl = 0.001 C2 = 0.60
ALPHA= 1.00 BETA = 2.00 PB = 1.00 GAMMA =0.10
PO PI W R RPI RPI/W
1.0000 1.0611 2.9985 0.4106 0.4357 0.1453
2.0000 1.6530 2.6627 0.7264 1.2008 0.4510
3.0000 2.4830 2.3254 0.9517 2.3630 1.0162
4.0000 3.4316 1.9876 1.0850 3.7234 1.8733
5.0000 4.1017 1.6513 1.1262 4.6192 2.7974
6.0000 4.1341 1.3185 1.0769 4.4521 3.3766
7.0000 3.6604 0.9885 0.9392 3.4379 3.4777
8.0000 3.0309 0.6595 0.7143 2.1651 3.2832
9.0000 2.4582 0.3300 0.4015 0.9869 2.9903
10.0000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO IS ID X OD BS
1.0000 1.5058 0.0912 1.4146 1.2003 8.9913
2.0000 2.6786 0.1614 2.5172 1.2447 7.0898
3.0000 3.5157 0.2115 3.3042 1.2439 5.4077
4.0000 4.0121 0.2411 3.7710 1.1975 3.9505
5.0000 4.1664 0.2503 3.9162 1.1059 2.7266
6.0000 3.9857 0.2393 3.7464 0.9709 1.7379
7.0000 3.4769 0.2087 3.2682 0.7931 0.9772
8.0000 2.6449 0.1587 2.4862 0.5725 0.4349
9.0000 1.4868 0.0892 1.3976 0.3083 0.1089
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO LD KD Z PIX TOT·
1.0000 2.9985 0.9125 9.3888 1.5010 1.0611
2.0000 2.6627 1.6143 9.0281 4.1609 0.8265
3.0000 2.3254 2.1148 10.4051 8.2044 0.8277
4.0000 1.9876 2.4112 12.9284 12.9404 0.8579
5.0000 1.6513 2.5026 14.2865 16.0630 0.8203
6.0000 1.3185 2.3932 12.3930 15.4878 0.6890
7.0000 0.9885 2.0871 8.1524 11.9629 0.5229
8.0000 0.6595 1.5874 3.8717 7.5355 0.3789
9.0000 0.3300 0.8922 0.9895 3.4356 0.2731
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000
PO TRADE SURPLUS Y GNP
1.0000 0.3007 10.5891 9.3889
2.0000 1.6715 11.5175 9.0281
3.0000 4.4727 14.1373 10.4055
4.0000 8.1505 17.7184 12.9285
5.0000 10.5333 19.8161 14.2864
6.0000 9.6623 18.2150 12.3895
7.0000 6.4112 13.7041 8.1524
8.0000 2.9557 8.4515 3.8717
9.0000 0.6612 3.7638 0.9895
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 • Tenns of trade or PI/Po
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Table 2 Medium Depreciation Rate and the Price of Oil Rises
Al = 0.30 A2 =0.20 Bl = 0.10 B2 = 0.20 Cl = 0.001 C2 = 0.60
ALPHA = 1.00 BETA = 2.00 PB = 1.00 GAMMA =0.40
PO PI W R RPI RPI!W
1.0000 0.9566 2.9991 0.2733 0.2615 0.0872
2.0000 1.3139 2.6645 0.4833 1.6350 0.2383
3.0000 1.7187 2.3297 0.6329 1.0878 0.4669
4.0000 2.1155 1.9949 0.7221 1.5276 0.7658
5.0000 2.4242 1.6606 0.7508 1.8201 1.0961
6.0000 2.5783 1.3271 0.7194 1.8549 1.3977
7.0000 2.5665 0.9946 0.6284 1.6127 1.6214
8.0000 2.4293 0.6628 0.4780 1.1613 1.7521
9.0000 2.2248 0.3313 0.2686 0.5976 1.8035
10.0000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO IS 10 X 00 BS
1.0000 1.5035 0.3644 1.1390 1.2002 8.9948
2.0000 2.6731 0.6444 2.0287 1.2446 7.0998
3.0000 3.5072 0.8439 2.6633 1.2442 5.4275
4.0000 4.0050 0.9628 3.0422 1.1990 3.9797
5.0000 4.1666 1.0011 3.1655 1.1091 2.7576
6.0000 3.9939 0.9592 3.0346 0.9749 1.7613
7.0000 3.4892 0.8378 2.6514 0.7968 0.9893
8.0000 2.6550 0.6374 2.0176 0.5749 0.4393
9.0000 1.4920 0.3581 1.1339 0.3094 0.1098
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO LD KD Z PIX TOT
1.0000 2.9991 0.9111 9.2329 1.0896 0.9566
2.0000 2.6645 1.6109 8.1227 2.6654 0.6569
3.0000 2.3297 2.1098 7.7226 4.5774 0.5729
4.0000 1.9949 2.4070 7.6566 6.4360 0.5289
5.0000 1.6606 2.5027 7.3128 7.6738 0.4848
6.0000 1.3271 2.3981 6.2095 7.8243 0.4297
7.0000 0.9946 2.0945 4.3671 6.8049 0.3666
8.0000 0.6628 1.5934 2.2898 4.9015 0.3037
9.0000 0.3313 0.8953 0.6448 2.5227 0.2472
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000
PO TRADE SURPLUS Y GNP
1.0000 -0.1105 10.4330 9.2329
2.0000 0.1762 10.6118 8.1227
3.0000 0.8448 11.4554 7.7228
4.0000 1.6401 12.4525 7.6566
5.0000 2.1284 12.8582 7.3129
6.0000 1.9749 12.0588 6.2094
7.0000 1.2276 9.9445 4.3671
8.0000 0.3020 6.8892 2.2897
9.0000 -0.2618 3.4293 0.6448
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 3 High Depreciation Rate and the Price of Oil Rises
Al =0.30 A2 =0.20 Bl = 0.10 B2 = 0.20 Cl = 0.001 C2 = 0.60
ALPHA = 1.00 BETA = 2.00 PB = 1.00 GAMMA =0.80
PO PI W R RPI RPI/W
1.0000 0.8455 2.9997 0.0909 0.0769 0.0256
2.0000 1.0329 2.6661 0.1608 0.1661 0.0623
3.0000 1.2208 2.3325 0.2106 0.2572 0.1102
4.0000 1.4021 1.9989 0.2405 0.3372 0.1687
5.0000 1.5686 1.6654 0.2503 0.3926 0.2357
6.0000 1.7132 1.3320 0.2401 0.4113 0.3088
7.0000 1.8303 0.9987 0.2099 0.3843 0.3848
8.0000 1.9170 0.6656 0.1599 0.3065 0.4604
9.0000 1.9729 0.3327 0.0899 0.1773 0.5329
10.0000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO IS ID X OD BS
1.0000 1.5004 0.7274 0.7730 1.2000 8.9989
2.0000 2.6683 1.2865 1.3818 1.2445 7.1082
3.0000 3.5017 1.6852 1.8165 1.2444 5.4404
4.0000 4.0011 1.9237 2.0774 1.1998 3.9955
5.0000 4.1667 2.0022 2.1644 1.1107 2.7734
6.0000 3.9987 1.9208 2.0779 0.9772 1.7741
7.0000 3.4974 1.6796 1.8179 0.7992 0.9974
8.0000 2.6636 1.2789 1.3847 0.5770 0.4431
9.0000 1.4976 0.7190 0.7787 0.3106 0.1107
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO LD KD Z PIX TOT
1.0000 2.9997 0.9092 9.0684 0.6536 0.8455
2.0000 2.6661 1.6081 7.3752 1.4273 0.5164
3.0000 2.3325 2.1065 5.9821 2.2176 0.4069
4.0000 1.9989 2.4047 4.8062 2.9126 0.3505
5.0000 1.6654 2.5028 3.7560 3.3952 0.3137
6.0000 1.3320 2.4010 2.7618 3.5599 0.2855
7.0000 0.9987 2.0995 1.8042 3.3272 0.2615
8.0000 0.6656 1.5986 0.9330 2.6545 0.2396
9.0000 0.3327 0.8987 0.2701 1.5363 0.2192
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000
PO TRADE SURPLUS Y GNP
1.0000 -0.5464 10.2675 9.0676
2.0000 -1.0617 9.8642 7.3753
3.0000 -1.5156 9.7153 5.9821
4.0000 -1.8865 9.6053 4.8062
5.0000 -2.1582 9.3093 3.7560
6.0000 -2.3030 8.6247 2.7618
7.0000 -2.2674 7.3988 1.8042
8.0000 -1.9617 5.5492 0.9329
9.0000 -1.2591 3.0655 0.2701
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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To work back from the model we have described in this paper to the model which fIrst
presented Chichilnisky's substitution effect (rising GNP to the oil importer as oil prices
rise), one substitutes for our (6) the following capital supply equation:
KS =I3r 13 > O. (6')
In place of our equation (11) for domestic demand for industrial goods, one has
PoOS = PIX (11 ')
or the value of oil imports equals the value of industrial goods exported. Material balance
does not obtain in this version because there is no domestic demand specifIed for
industrial goods. She appeals to the relation x =IS - ID as we do, but ID, though positive
in her numerical runs, is used nowhere in the economy.
The revision above generates the numerical outputs reported in Appendix A.4 of
Chichilnisky (1983). We present one run using our computer program in Table AI. These
results are identical to those in her A.4, "Run 2". We present a computer generated graph
in Figure AI. Note the fact that her GNP, the measure of aggregate output in the oil
importing country, rises over a range of rising oil prices (her "sustitution effect") and then
declines (her "income effect").
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Table At Oil Price Rises in the Chichilnisky Model
Al = 0.30 A2 = 0.20 B1 = 0.10 B2 =0.20 C1 = 0.001 C2 = 0.60
ALPHA = 1.00 BETA =2.00 PB = 1.00 GAMMA =0.10
PO W R IS ID
0.5000 3.1667 0.2375 0.7917 0.1128
1.0000 3.0000 0.4500 1.5000 0.4050
1.5000 2.8333 0.6375 2.1250 0.8128
2.0000 2.6667 0.8000 2.6667 1.2799
2.5000 2.5000 0.9375 3.1249 1.7576
3.0000 2.3333 1.0500 3.5000 2.2050
3.5000 2.1667 1.1375 3.7917 2.5879
4.0000 2.0000 1.2000 4.0000 2.8800
4.5000 1.8333 1.2375 4.1250 3.0627
5.0000 1.6667 1.2500 4.1666 3.1249
5.5000 1.5000 1.2375 4.1251 3.0629
6.0000 1.3333 1.2000 4.0001 2.8801
6.5000 1.1667 1.1375 3.7917 2.5878
7.0000 1.0000 1.0500 3.5000 2.2050
7.5000 0.8333 0.9375 3.1251 1.7578
8.0000 0.6667 0.8000 2.6667 1.2800
8.5000 0.5000 0.6375 2.1250 0.8128
9.0000 0.3333 0.4500 1.5000 0.4050
9.5000 0.1667 0.2375 0.7917 0.1128
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PO TRADE SURPLUS PIX Z X
0.5000 0.0000 0.5806 10.1243 0.6789
1.0000 0.0000 1.2000 9.4438 1.0950
1.5000 0.0000 1.8417 9.1685 1.3122
2.0000 0.0000 2.4889 9.4084 1.3867
2.5000 0.0000 3.1250 10.2673 1.3673
3.0000 0.0000 3.7333 11.8010 1.2950
3.5000 0.0000 4.2973 13.9324 1.2038
4.0000 0.0000 4.8000 16.3429 1.1200
4.5000 0.0000 5.2250 18.4267 1.0622
5.0000 0.0000 5.5555 19.4430 1.0417
5.5000 0.0000 5.7746 18.9025 1.0621
6.0000 0.0000 5.8664 16.8638 1.1200
6.5000 0.0000 5.8139 13.8587 1.2039
7.0000 0.0000 5.6000 10.5349 1.2950
7.5000 0.0000 5.2084 7.3908 1.3673
8.0000 0.0000 4.6222 4.7111 1.3867
8.5000 0.0000 3.8251 2.6194 1.3122
9.0000 0.0000 2.8000 1.1467 1.0950
9.5000 0.0000 1.5306 0.2821 0.6789
10.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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CHAPTER 7
Direct Equilibria of Economies and Their Perfect
Homogeneity Limits
B. Dejon, B. Giildner and G. Wenzel
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
81
In the seventies stochastic choice theory became increasingly important in the realms of
traffic theory and location analysis; see, e.g., McFadden (1973; 1978), Daganzo and
Sheffi (1977). Dejon and Gilldner (1985) extended the scope of applicability of stochastic
choice theory to cover the choice of prices - as well as quantities - by economic agents in
the context of a location and land use model. Giildner (1984) addressed the problem of
economic general equilibrium modelling by stochastic choice methods in a nonspatial
framework. Dejon (1986) combined ideas from Dejon and Giildner (1985) and Giildner
(1984) to outline a stochastic choice model of a rudimentary spatial economy.
The single most important concept in extending stochastic choice theory to cover the
choice of prices - as well as quantities and other entities - is the concept of relative demand
at the various price levels of markets, introduced by Dejon and Giildner (1985). Relative
demand at some price level is the quotient of purchases by supply at that price level. By
adding penalty terms that depend on relative demand at the various price levels involved in
an economic agent's activity (called 'alternative' later on in this paper) to the original
neoclassical utility functions of economic agents, one prevents supply and demand from
drifting too far apart at any of the markets. Thus (stochastic) general equilibrium of an
economy may be defined without recourse to explicitly postulating equality of (expected)
supply and demand at the various markets. This is the reason for subsequently referring
to the 'direct' equilibrium of an economy.
In order to point out that there are connections between non-cooperative game theory
and stochastic equilibrium theory we have chosen to speak of weak Nash instead of
stochastic equilibria. It may be interesting to note that there are two different ways - an
elementary one, let us say, and a nonelementary one - of viewing stochastic equilibrium
as a generalization of Nash equilibrium. The elementary way shall be sketched in Section
2, the main task of which is to introduce the basic notions for later developments.
The nonelementary way is described by Theorem 8 and rests on the notion of perfect
homogeneity equilibrium. Perfect homogeneity of a population of economic agents
prevails when all agents behave perfectly alike. Within our modelling framework this is
achieved by assuming that all agents behave on the basis of a utility function that is the
same for all. Thus, while in the nonperfect homogeneity case the utility functions of
economic agents are conceived of as realizations of some random utility function, in the
perfect homogeneity case there is no randomness any more; there is a single deterministic
utility function to all agents of any single population.
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The notion of perfect homogeneity equilibrium applies not only in economic general
equilibrium modelling, but also in technically simpler situations like route choice
modelling in traffic equilibrium theory. This is briefly alluded to in Remark 2 of Section
4. In economic general equilibrium modelling, technical difficulties in passing to the
perfect homogeneity limit derive from some discontinuity of relative demand as a function
of supply and demand; see Remark I of Section 4.
In a route choice context, Theorem 8 describes passage from stochastic to deterministic
traffic equilibrium. The latter may be characterized in the following way: The route
choices of trip makers constitute a deterministic traffic equilibrium if, under the prevailing
traffic pattern, no trip maker has any incentive to unilaterally change his route. (This is
what is commonly called a 'user optimizing' equilibrium; see, e.g., Dafermos (1971)). In
other words: No substitute (different route) available to an economic agent (trip maker)
appears under the given state of the system (traffic pattern) more attractive than the
presently adopted alternative. The various routes chosen by the trip makers of any single
origin-destination pair thus belong to the same optimal indifference set of these trip
makers - who form a population in the sense introduced in Section 2. According to
Theorem 8 that idea carries over to more general situations.
In economic general equilibrium theory the optimal indifference sets adopted, under
perfect homogeneity equilibrium conditions, by economic agents of the various
populations possess additional and specific features relating to the eminent role of prices.
Thus, e.g., Theorem 9 says that, given some perfect homogeneity equilibrium, at each
nonempty market supply and demand concentrate at a single price level, or else, at two
neighboring ones. Two more specific features are quantity optimization by economic
agents for parametric prices, and certain forms of market clearing.
At the sequel of Theorem 9 in Section 4, quantity optimization behavior is obtained
under a so-called negligible rationing condition. The ensuing question of passage from
individual to aggregate demand is addressed in Remark 6, using an example of a
simplified shopping model. The outcome hinges upon the ease of obtaining the total
number of economic agents constituting the population of shoppers under study,
characterized, e.g., by zone of residence and available income.
In so-called bilevel models of an economy the sizes of populations are endogenous
variables. They are studied at what may be called the upper modelling level, while at the
lower level economic agents' choices of prices and quantities in various markets are being
emulated. The bilevel structure of an economy is briefly alluded to at the end of Section 2.
Market clearing is briefly discussed at the end of Section 4. For storable goods, market
clearing is introduced as stationarity of stock: supply from current production equals
transactions (which serve to offset, among others, depreciation of stocks). As to labor
and services (nonstorable commodities), in direct or perfect homogeneity (p.h.)
equilibrium purchases are typically less than current supplies. However, as equilibrium
prevails, it still appears expedient to speak of market clearing, thus introducing more or
less explicitly some 'natural' rate of unemployment of labor or service resources,
respectively.
Section 3 is mainly technical and serves to prove so-called exponential decay theorems
that are needed in order to prove Theorem 9 (while Theorem 8 could well have been stated
and proven at the end of Section 2).
2. WEAK NASH AND DIRECT EQUILIBRIA
The headline topics of this section shall be reviewed succinctly. A more detailed
presentation may be found in Dejon (1986).
N denotes a finite collection of behaviorally nearly homogeneous populations of
economic units (households, finns, etc.). To each population ne N, there is a finite choice
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set (or set of alternatives), denoted by An. (In game theoretic tenninology alternatives
would be called strategies.) pn(b) designates the number of economic units from
population n that are exercising alternative be An and will be called the occupation number
of b (a denomination taken from Markov chain theory). With the assumption that each
economic unit is exercising exactly one of its alternatives, the identity
LbeAn pn(b) = pn
holds, where pn designates the total number of economic units in population n. By of we
indicate (pn(b»neN,beAn, the vector of all occupation numbers. £ will take the role of
state vector of the system.
The choices of economic units are guided by utility functions. Let uf(bl£) denote the
utility which the economic unit ien attributes to alternative beAn, given the state of of the
system. (In order to be able to account for external effects in economic applications, the
utility values of alternatives are posited state dependent.) Let pn(bl£) denote the number
of economic units ien that consider alternative b to be optimal with respect to their
respective individual utility functions uf(·I£) (ties being excluded, for simplicity's sake).
pn(bl£) will be called the voted occupation number of b, as opposed to the actual
occupation number pn(b). A state of is called a weak Nash equilibrium state of the system
if pn(b) =pn(bl£) for all neN and beAn, that is to say, actual occupation numbers equal
voted ones.
In the particular situation where each population n consists of a single economic unit,
Le. pn = 1 for all n, a weak Nash equilibrium state £ constitutes an ordinary Nash
equilibrium in the following sense: Each player (Le. economic unit) judges the strategy
(Le. alternative) actually adopted as the best one possible given the choices of all other
players (as specified by the state vector £). Note: if any of the players would not judge
so, he would not give his vote to the strategy adopted, whence the voted occupation
number of that strategy would be zero while the actual one is one.
For the sake of precision, let us observe that the preceding interpretation of Nash
equilibrium does not fully agree with common usage of the term in noncooperative game
theory. The more common version would read as follows: A state ~ of the system is a
Nash equilibrium state if any single player, after switching to a strategy different from the
one presently chosen, would find that he has not improved on his previous choice (under
the usual proviso that all other players stay with their given choices). This rather subtle
distinction in the understanding of Nash equilibrium was discussed by Dafermos (1971)
in the context of the route assignment problem of traffic equilibrium theory. See Remark 2
in Section 4 for more detail on formulating the route assignment problem as a Nash
equilibrium problem. .
As it would be a hopeless task to try to identify all individual utility functions uf, one
makes the following stochastic utility assumption: There exists, for each neN, some
'strict utility function' un(·I£) such that the
ef(·I£) := 'iif(.I£) - un('I£), ien,
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may be reasonably treated as realizations of a random vector &n(-If), reasonable in the
sense that
pn(blf) "" pn - dn(bly) (for beAn, neN)
where dn(bly) denotes the probability that, for each aeAn,
&n(bl£) + un(blf) ~ &n(alf) + un(al£).
Under certain assumptions about the distributions of the random vectors &n('/f), the
probabilities dn(bly) may be calculated analytically. Thus, e.g.,
dn(bly) oc exp (yo. un(blf»,
if the components of &n are independendy and identically extreme value distributed, with
spread parameter yD. A more flexible formula for dn is obtained on the basis of the
generalized extreme value distribution for the components of en; see MacFadden (1978).
Direct equilibrium shall be introduced as a weak Nash equilibrium in the particular
context of economic general equilibrium modelling. Various types of economic systems
can be distinguished by their particular types of choice sets An and related strict utility
functions un(-1-). Another interesting feature of most economic systems is that one may
distinguish two (sometimes even more) levels of choice sets, which we shall label lower
level and upper level, respectively.
For the description of lower level choice sets, a few notions have to be introduced fIrst:
We consider finitely many commodity markets geG. For each market, there is a discrete
price-quantity plane (p-Q-plane) (pgxQ~uOg, pg denoting the (discrete) price axis of
market g, Qg its (discrete) quantity axis, and Og the null quantity. pg and Qg are [mite
subsets of the real axis R, the elements of Qg all being larger than zero. pgx Qg denotes
the Cartesian product of pg and Qg, Le. the set of all price-quantity pairs (Pg, qg),
pgepg and qgeQg. The null quantity Og is being handled separately as it will not require
any pairing with some price pg.
Lower level choice sets An are subsets of the Cartesian product ~[(pgxQg)uOg].
_ gcv
A population n is said not to participate in market g if the g-component of each of the
alternatives beAn is Og; otherwise the population is said to participate in market g. Let Ng
denote the set of all such populations. Ng is partitioned into two nonempty and disjoint
subsets NgS and NgD. The populations neNgS act as suppliers at market g, while
populations neNgD act as demanders at that market.
For the specifIcation of lower level strict utility functions the notion of relative demand
will play a crucial role. (Absolute) demand and (absolute) supply will have to be
introduced fIrst. Notice: demand, in this context, is always meant to be satisfied demand,
i.e. actual purchases. Demand of commodity g, in physical units, by population neNgD,
at price level pg is
on(pg) := L qg(b) pn(b),
beApg
(1)
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where Apg denotes the set of all those alternatives beAn the g-th price component of
which is pg, while qg(b) denotes the g-th quantity component of b. Aggregate demand of
commodity g, at price level pg is
D(pg) := L Dn(p~.
neNgD
(2)
As to supply, we distinguish supply from stock, Ssn(pg), of commodity g at price
level pg, by population neNgS, and supply from current production, SCn(pg).
Interpreting qg as a time rate of production, one obtains
scn(Pg) = L qg(b) pn(b), (3)
beApg
with the same meaning of Apg and qg(b) as further above in the context of equation (1).
(Dn(pg) and D(Pg), by the way, are also time rates.) In analogy to (2), one introduces
aggregate supplies from stock and from current production, respectively:
SS(pg):= L ssn(p~,
neNgS
SC(Pg):= L SCn(pg).
neNgS
(4)
(5)
Aggregate total supply is S(pg) := SS(pg) + SC(pg). Finally, then, relative demand for
commodity g, at price level pg, is
rg(pg):= {~(Pg)/s(Pg) for S(pg) *0
for S(Pg) = O.
(6)
As D(pg) is satisfied demand at price level pg, the inequality D(pg) S S(Pg) necessarily
holds, implying rg(p~ S 1.
We are now in a position to introduce the type of lower level strict utility functions
un(·I£> that are specific for the direct equilibrium approach:
un(blf) = u~(b) - L zng (rg(pg(b»).
geGb
(7)
Here u~(.) may, in principal, be any utility function which is common in neoclassical
theories when external effects are not being accounted for; u~(.) will be called the original
utility junction of population n. (Note: its argument is b, which comprises quantity as
well as price components.) Gb is the set of all those markets where alternative b is active,
and zng(.) is a penalty function, for population n at market g. If n is a supplier population
at that market, zng(rg(p~) penalizes price level pg whenever relative demand rg(pg) is
low, and conversely, if population n is on the demand side of market g, zng(rg(pg»
penalizes such price levels where rg(p~ is high, Le. near to 1. On the part of demanders,
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these penalties are interpretable as disutilities of search; on the part of suppliers, the
appropriate interpretation appears to be disutility ofuncenainty ofdemand.
While original utility functions are nonnally such that suppliers at any market g prefer
higher price levels and demanders lower ones, the penalty terms zng in (7) will induce
suppliers and demanders to avoid price levels where relative demand is rather small or
close to 1, respectively.
Upper level choice sets are loosely circumscribed by stating that typically some or all
of the alternatives of an upper level choice set are constituted by lower level populations.
To elucidate this point, consider, e.g., the choice of location by fIrms. On the lower level,
let there be populations of firms, pI, p2,... , pk, say, in geographic areas Zl,... , Zk,
respectively, these fIrms all being alike in all respects, except for their location. The
(lower level) decisions of these fIrms consist of choosing sales strategies and production
plans or, more precisely, prices and quantities. By contrast, locational decisions of these
fIrms are modelled as choices in an upper level choice set AO, the elements of which are
the geographic areas, Zl, ... , Zk, or, formally equivalent, the populations pI,..., pk. The
population pO of economic units whose choice set is A°consists of the union of all
populations pI,... , pk: pO =UPlC.
lC
Upper level strict utility functions typically make use of lower level information about
prices and quantities. We shall not dwell on this matter as the main focus of the remaining
parts of this paper will be on lower level issues.
To sum up: The constitutive elements of a weak Nash equilibrium system are the
following:
A finite set, N, of (fInite) populations, each endowed with
PI) a (finite) set An of alternatives,
P2) a strict utility function un(blf),
P3) a distribution function dn(bly,'fl).
In economic general equilibrium modelling, some of the sets of alternatives typically
consist of price-quantity pairs indexed by commodities. Weak Nash equilibria are then
more specifically called direct equilibria. The epithet 'direct' was briefly commented upon
in Section 1. In Dejon (1986), a brief outline may be found of a weak Nash equilibrium
system representing some spatial economy.
3 . QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIRECT EQUILmRIA
In the second paragraph of the previous section we stated that we were going to deal with
"nearly homogeneous" populations of economic units. This meant that their individual
utility functions where not all the same, but could be treated as a random sample of a
stochastic vector un(·If) + e;n('If) (where un(·If) was non-random). The variances of
the components of the random vector e;n may be taken as measures of the deviation of
population n from perfect homogeneity. In the sequel, we shall express by a single
parameter, yo, tending to infInity that the deviation of population n from perfect
homogeneity tends to zero. During that process the distributions dn(·I.u.;yn) grow
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increasingly peaked; see the later concentrability assumption for a precise statement. The
main focus of this section shall be on the behavior of direct equilibria as "f becomes very
large.
The results to be achieved depend crucially on the penalties zng(rg(pg(b»). We shall
repeatedly deal with prices pg at some market g where for sQ,me population n the penalty
zng(rg(pg(b») is larger than zero. This will then be expressed by saying that population n
is rationed at price level pg of market g.
A ftrst assumption to be made is one of monotonicity of the penalty functions zng as
functions of relative demand: Depending on whether population n is on the supply or on
the demand side of market g, the penalty function zng(rg) increases dr decreases,
respectively, as relative demand decreases.
A similarly natural postulate is that of monotonicity ofthe original utility junctions with
respect to prices (notwithstanding Veblen's 'conspicuous consumption'). To express this
formally, we need some notation: For any alternative beAn, neN, we designate by
b...,pg, and by b-,pg, qg the alternatives one obtains after replacing the g-th price
coordinate and the g-th price-quantity coordinate of b by pg and pg,qg, respectively.
Furthermore, pg <n P'g means:
P'g < pg if neNgD, and
P'g > pg if neNgS.
Monotonicity of the ug now reads:
pg <n P'g => u~(b-,pg) ~ u~(b...,p·g)
for all beAn with qg(b):F- Og.
Last, but not least we posit monotonicity ofthe distribution junctions dn(blll,"f) in the
following sense:
un(b') ~ un(b) => dn(b'lg, yD) ~ dn(blg, yD) (b, b'eAn).
We may now prove a further monotonicity property.
Theorem 1: In any direct equilibrium state £. of an economy, at any market g,
relative demand is a nonincreasing function of price: pg > P'g => rg(pg) ~ rg(p'g).
Proof (by contradiction): Assume there are two price levels pg > P'g with rg(pg) >
rg(p·g). Then for any population of suppliers neNgS and any alternative beAn with
qg(b) > 0:
un(b...,pg) ~ un(b...,p'~
and, thence, dn(b...,pgly,yD) ~ dn(b...,p'glll,yD) with ll:=(un(bl£.»neN,beAn. Therefore,
also qg pn dn(b...,pg,qglll,yD) ~ qg pn dn(b-,p·g,qglg,yD).
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By summing on both sides of this inequality for fixed b over all qgeQg, and
subsequently over all beAn in as much as they differ at some market g' other than g, one
obtains
SCn(pg) ~ SCn(p'g). (8)
Summing in addition over all neNgS yields SC(pg) ~ SC(p'g).
We now introduce the following proponional total supply assumption: At any price
level pg, total supply, S(pg), at market g is proportional to supply from cunent produc-
tion: S(pg) = U SC(pg), kg some constant larger than or equal to unity. The preceding
inequality then immediately implies S(pg) ~ S(p'g). In a similar vein, one deduces for
total demands, i.e. purchases: D(pg) ~ D(P'g). The last two inequalities imply rg(pg) ~
rg(p'~, contradicting the inequality we started out from.
Remark: The proportionality constant kg in the above proportional total supply
assumption would more plausibly be posited to depend on population n, too, i.e. to be
kng instead of kg. This, however, would render the proofs of Theorems 4 and 6 more
involved.
As our next assumption we introduce complementarity ofpenalty functions zng: To
any market g there is a number ag, 0 < ag < I,such that no supplier is rationed at any
price level pg with rg(pg) ~ ag, and no demander is rationed at any price level pg with
rg(pg) ~ ago (While this assumption may well appear to be too restrictive, it simplifies
subsequent reasoning. Relaxation of the assumption will have to be considered else-
where.)
With Theorem I in mind, we set pgS equal to the highest price level at market g at
which no supplier is rationed (provided such a price level exists), and similarly pgD equal
to the lowest price level at market g at which no demander is rationed (provided such a
price level exists).
Notice: pgS cannot be "much smaller" than pgD in the sense that there does not exist
pgepg such that pgS < pg < pgD. For at price level pg at least one neNgS and at least
one neNgD would be rationed in contradiction to the above complementarity assumption.
We shall soon prove that under certain conditions pgS cannot be larger than pgD. To
this end, we shall need the following assumption of concentrability of the functions dn:
n nFor any beAn and ~ > 0 let M.t" (b):= (aeAn lun(a) ~ un(b) -.6.} and dn(M.t" (b)Iy', yo) :=
LaeMg(b) dn(al],!, -yrt). The concentrability assumption then says: For any p > 0, ~ > 0
there exists "p, ~) such that dn(M~ (b) I],!, yo) ~ p dn(bly., yo) for all yo ~ y(p, M. This
means that for sufficiently large "fl the voted occupation numbers decay exponentially
with decreasing strict utility values of alternatives. In the case of generalized multinomial
logit models, e.g., this kind of concentrability prevails indeed.
In order to prove pgS ~ pgD (for sufficiently large YO) we need, in addition to
concentrability, the following assumption of strong monotonicity of the original utility
functions u~: There exists ~ > 0 such that
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qg qg
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(9)
for all neN, beAn, provided pg <n P'g. In many instances, inequality (9) is checked by
showing that
~ + u~(bopg,qg) :s; u~(b...,p'g,qg) (10)
holds for all qg, provided pg <n P'g. This simple procedure does not work out, however,
if one deals, e.g., with an (original) utility function u~ for consumers that<lepends only
on quantities consumed, but not on prices (and which takes the value -00 outside the
budget set). For in that situation, u~(b...,pg,qg) = u~(b...,p'g,qg) whenever both utility
values are finite (Le., bopg,qg and b...,p'g,qg are both within the budget set). Inequality
(9), however, will hold if there exists some quantity q'geQg that large that bopg,q'g lies
outside the budget set while b...,p'g,q'g still lies inside, and if the utility decrease from
b...,p'g,q'g to any bop'g,q"g, q"g < q'g, amounts to at least ~. If consumers attribute
some utility to savings, the original utility function u~ depends 0;; quantities consumed as
well as on prices paid and, normally then, inequality (10) should hold.
Theorem 2: In any direct equilibrium state f of an economy, at any market g, in
the nonrationed price range of any single population n, the occupation numbers P~g
at price levels pg decay exponentially with worsening price levels pg, provided "(II is
sufficiently large. More precisely: pg <n p'g:S;n pgS or pgD, respectively, implies
png:s; P pn'g for yn ~ y(p, ~).p p -
Proof: In equilibrium, actual occupation numbers pn(b) equal voted occupation
numbers pn dn(bll!., yn). For any beAn let ~ denote that alternative in the set
(bop'g,qg I qgeQg) which is optimal with respect to original utility u~. Because of
strong monotonicity (bopg,qg I qgeQg ) ~ M~(~). Therefore,
Lqgpn(bopg,qg) :s; pn (M~(~)) =pn dn(M~(~)lll,"(II):S; P pn dn(~lll,"(II)
- =P pn~) ~ PLqgpn(b...,p'g,qg)
for yn ~ "((P, ~) (concentrability!).
Summing both sides of the inequality over all beAn in as much as they differ at some
market g' other than gone fmally obtains pn :s; P pn'g for any yn ~ "((P, ~).
Theorem 2 will be called the single $;pulatiEn exponential decay theorem. By
summation over all populations neNgS, and neNgD in tum, one obtains what will be
called the all suppliers or all demanders exponential decay theorem, respectively:
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Theorem 3: In any direct equilibrium state £ of an economy, at any market g, the
summed occupation numbers pS g := L nENgs P~g decay exponentially with
worsening price levels pg~ pg~ provided all yo, nENgS, are sufficiently large.
An analogous statement holds for the summed occupation numbers
P~g := L nENgo P;g in the range pg ~ pgo.
As demand D(pg) at any price level pg is forcedly not larger than (total) supply S(pg)
the all suppliers exponential decay theorem induces an all demanders exponential decay
theorem in the price range pg ~ pgS. For its formulation some more notation is needed.
Let
q~ := max qg E Qg,
q~n := min qg E Qg > 0 (!),
and a:g (>0) equal the largest value of relative demand below which each population of
suppliers is rationed.
Theorem 4: In any direct equilibrium state f of an economy, at any market g, and
for any two price levels pg < P'g:s; pgS P~g ~PP~'g with
~ := ~ (q~J2, provided yo ~ ,,((p,Ll) for all nENgS U NgO.
ag g -qrnin
Notice: As p can be chosen arbitrarily small, so can ~.
Proof of Theorem 4:
pO g g
....E!. qmax D(Pg) qmax rg(pg) S(pg)
o ~ = --::------
PP'g q~in D(p'g) q~in rg(p'g) S(p'g)
gqmax rg(pg) SC(pg)
q~in rg(p'g) SC(p'g) (cf. proportional total supply assumption)
~ (q~J2 rg(pg)
q~ rg(p'g)
SPpg
--~SPp•g (
g J2qrnax 1q~ ag p.
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Theorem 4 will be called the secondary all demanders exponential decay theorem;
secondary, because it is derived from a "primary" exponential decay theorem, viz., the
one for suppliers.
We have already seen that pgS cannot be "much smaller" than pgD. In addition, we can
now state
Theorem 5: In any direct equilibrium state ~ of an economy, at any market g, it
cannot happen that pgS > pgD, whenever p is chosen smaller than (ig(q~/q~ax)2
and yo ~ y(p, ~) for all neNgS u NgD.
Proof (by contradiction): Notice first that the assumption made about p means that not
only p < 1, but also ~ < 1. Assume now pgS > pgD. Necessarily then rg(pgD) > a and,
therefore, also D(pgD) > O. For D(PgD) > aTheorem 3 says that ~g decreases strictly as
pg (~ pgD) increases. On the other hand, Theorem 4 says that Ppg does not decrease as
pg increases anywhere in the range pgD S pg S pgS. Thence, a contradiction!
Theorem 5, together with the observation that pgS cannot be "much smaller" than pgD.
says that for sufficiently large values of the yo either pgS = pgD or else pgS is just one
discrete price step below pgD (provided both prices exist, Le., provided no side of the
market is rationed at all prices pgepg).
In order to deduce a secondary all suppliers exponential decay theorem we have to
make three more assumptions. The first is the following bounded monotonicity
assumption for suppliers' original utility: There exists K > a such that for any ge G ,
neNgS
- n n!:i + uo(bopg,qg) ~ uo(b-,p'g,qg) (11)
for all beAn, qgeQg, whenever p'g is just one discrete price step above pg.
Another assumption to be made is a strong monotonicity assumption for the penalty
functions zng of suppliers neNgS at market g: There exists a < 11 < 1 such that any
decrease in relative demand by at least 100 11 % (in the range where zng is larger than
zero) induces an increase of zng by at least K +!:i; this is assumed to hold at all markets
g for all neNgS . -
The assumption implies that the maximal increase Kof original utility on the part of
any supplier when passing from one price level to the next higher one will be offset by at
least !:i if under that price step relative demand decreases by at least 100 11 % (in the
range ;here zng is larger than zero).
The last assumption to be made is a no complementarity gap assumption, and reads as
follows: For any relative demand smaller than ag all suppliers at market g are rationed.
This is assumed to hold for all markets. The assumption says that <X8 = (ig (see Theorem
4).
We are now in a position to prove the above-mentioned secondary all suppliers
exponential decay theorem:
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Theorem 6; In any direct equilibrium state f of an economy, at any market g,
under the ten assumptions made previously (listed at the end of this section) the
following holds: For any P'g > pg > pgS
provided "fl ~ ')'(p, ~) for all neNgS u NgD.S (g )2P~,g :S;...£.... qrnax
P 1-11 qg.pg rom
Proof: Case 1: rg(p'g) :s; (1-11) rg(pg). As then un(b-.p'g) :s; un(b-.pg) - A (because of
the strong monotonicity assumption for the penalty functions of suppliers i;; conjunction
with the no complementarity gap assumption), concentrability provides for the inequality
pn(b-,p'g) :s; p pn(b-,pg) (whenever"fl ~ ')'(p, A). Summing both sides of the inequality
over all alternatives beAn (in as much as theY differ not only by their price levels at
market g) and also summing over all neNgS one obtains
S S
Pp'g:S; P Ppg (provided "fl ~ ')'(p, ~) for all neNgS).
Case 2: rg(p'g) > (1-11) rg(pg). This means
D(p'g) D(p~
S(p'g) >(1-11) S(pg) ,
S(p'g) 1 D(p'g)
or <- .
S(pg) 1-11 D(p~
By the proportional total supply assumption then
SC(p'g) < _1_ D(p'g) .
SC(pg) 1-11 D~
Thence,
g S
qrninPp'g
g S
qmaxPpg
1
< -
1-11
g D
qmaxPp.g
g D
qminPpg
g
p qrnax
:s;- g
1-11 qrnin
or
S (g )2Pp•g P qrnax
-s- < - -- (>p).
P 1-11 qg.pg rom
Notice: The right hand side can be rendered arbitrarily small by choosing p sufficiently
small.
W· S resp.D ~ pS resp.D d . . f S resp. DIth p{pg>pgD}:=L.pg>pgD pg and an analogous efimuon 0 p{pg<pgS)
one deduces from the primary and secondary exponential decay theorems (by use of the
summation fonnula for the geometric series)
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pS resp. D p' S resp.D d
(pg>pgD) ~ I-p' PpgD an
pS resp. D < L pS resp.D
(pg<pgS) - I-p' pgS
where p' designates the largest of the two decay factors
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(12)
(13)
..£.... (q~J2 and ~ (q~gJ2, and where, in addition, p is so small that
1-" q~ ag qrnin
p'< 1. From (12) and (13) one obtains
Theorem 7: When all four exponential decay theorems hold and the preceding p'
is less than I, then the number of suppliers or demanders that find themselves on
price levels pgS and pgD, whether these coincide or not, is more than
p:~p-p')/(1 +p') or P:~t(1-p')/(1 +p'), respectively. Here P~t designates the total
number of those suppliers at market g that are active in that market, i.e. who have
D
not chosen qg:= Og. The analogous interpretation applies to P:ct'
To conclude this section, it appears expedient to provide a synopsis of the ten assump-
tions made so far:
(AI) Monotonicity of the penalty functions zng:
rg <n r'g.. zng(rg) ~ zng(r'g).
(A2) Monotonicity oforiginal utility functions ug with respect to prices:
pg <n p'g .. ug(b-,pg) ~ ug(b...,p·g).
(A3) Monotonicity of the distribution functions dn(b111,'yll) with respect to utilities:
un(b) ~ un(b') .. dn(bll!,'yll) ~ dn(b'Il!,'yll).
(A4) Proportional total supply assumption:
S(Pg) = kg SC(Pg).
(A5) Complementarity of the penalty functions zng: For rg ~ ~ no demander is
rationed; for rg ~ ~ no supplier is rationed.
(A6) Concentrability of the distribution functions dn(blll,'yll):
"fl ~ "f(p, A)" dn(M~(b)lll,"fl)~ p dn(blll,"fl).
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(A7) Strong monotonicity of the original utility functions u~: For some ~ > 0 and
pg <n P'g
~ + max u~(b-,pg,qg) :s; max u~(b-,p'g,qg).
qg qg
(A8) Bounded monotonicity of suppliers' original utility:
For some A > 0 and pg <n P'g by just one discrete step
- n n~ + uo(b-,pg,qg) ~ uo(b-,p'g,qg).
(A9) Strong monotonicity of suppliers' penalty functions zng:
zng«(l-T\)rg) - A-~ ~ zng(rg) (> 0).
(A10) No complementarity gap: For relative demand rg < ca all suppliers are rationed.
4 ° PERFECT HOMOGENEITY EQUILrnRIA AND THEIR
WALRASIAN PROPERTIES
We start out by introducing the following notion: Occupation vector .:e belongs to the
(p,~)-c/ass of some given vector!! of utilities means
npn(M~(b)):S; P pn(b) for all nEN, bEAn,
n
where M~(b) is defined as above in connection with the concentrability assumption. That
assumption, by the way, says that for yn ~ ')'(p,~) pndn(oly,yn) belongs to the
(p,~)-class of y.
A state~ is defined to be a perfect homogeneity equilibrium (p.h. equilibrium) of the
weak Nash equilibrium system (N,(An),(un(olo)),(dn(+))) iffor each population n there
is a function vn on An such that for any E; > O. P > 0, ~ > 0 there exists a weak Nash
equilibrium state £ with the following properties:
(i) I ~n(b) - pn(b) I < E;
(ii) I vn(b) - un(blf) I < E; for all nEN,beAn,
(iii) £. belongs to the (p,~)-class of (un(olf))nEN'
In general terms this means that p.h. equilibria can be arbitrarily well approximated by
weak Nash equilibrium states £ that belong to the (p,~)-class of (un(olf ))nEN.
Remark 1: If at the 'point' ~ the strict utilities un(bl£.), nEN,bEAn, depend
continuously on .:e, then necessarily vn(b) =un(bl~ for all nEN,bEAn. Unfortunately,
in economic general equilibrium modelling the utilities un(bl.f.) do not depend
1\
continuously on r. at 'points' .e that at some market geab induce vanishing supply S(pg)
at the price level pg of alternative b. This pertains to the fact that relative demand as
defined under (6) is, at the point 6(pg) = §(Pg) =0, a discontinuous function of the two
variables D(pg), S(pg). Note: The previous theorems, in particular Theorem 1, are not
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hampered by this discontinuity of relative demand. Terminology: The values vn(b) in the
above definition of a p.h. equilibrium ~ are called p.h. utilities pertaining to ~.
Theorem 8: Let ~ be a p.h. equilibrium of the weak Nash equilibrium system
(N,(An), (un(+»),(dn(olo»)) with pertaining p.h. utilities vn(b). Then ~ is a Nash
equilibrium state in the following sense: ~n(b) > 0 for some nEN,bEAn implies
that b is optimal with respect to vn, Le. vn(b) ~ vn(a) for all aEAn.
ftQQf (by contradiction): Assume there is some aEAn which vn(a) - vn(b) = 3~ > O.
As ~ is a p.h. equilibrium there exists for arbitrary p > 0 and l; ~ ~ a weak Nash
equilibrium state £satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) above. As (iii) implies pn(b) ~ p pn(a), as
furthermore Ipn(a) - ~n(a)1 < l;, Ipn(b) - ~n(b)1 < l;, and p as well as & may be chosen
arbitrarily small, one concludes that ~n(b) is arbitrarily small, Le. equal to zero. This
however, contradicts the assumption made in the Theorem.
Remark 2: The route assignment (or route choice) problem of traffic equilibrium theory
may be conceived of as a p.h. equilibrium problem for a weak Nash equilibrium system
of the following type: To each origin-destination pair, w, corresponds exactly one
population, also designated by w, the economic units of which are formed by the trips (or
the trip makers) to be assigned to routes connecting the origin of w to its destination. It is
these routes that constitute the set Aw of alternatives of population w. A state vector £
then is what is commonly called a traffic pattern. As strict utility functions uW(bl£) one
adopts the negatives of some generalized trip cost functions cW(blf). In traffic equilibrium
theory, weak Nash equilibria are commonly called stochastic user equilibria, see e.g.
Daganzo and Sheffi (1977). As a rule, generalized trip cost cW(bIf) depends continuously
on the traffic pattern £. Therefore, if ~ designates some p.h. equilibrium of our route
choice weak Nash equilibrium system, the pertaining p.h. utilities are vW(b) := -cW(bl~);
note Remark 1. Thus, contrary to what happens in economic general equilibrium
modelling, as for any possible p.h. equilibrium ~ one can specify a more or less simple
algebraic expression for vn(b), p.h. equilibrium can be calculated as the solution of the
following 'user optimization problem' (as it is commonly called in traffic equilibrium
theory; see, e.g., Dafermos (1971»: Determine that traffic pattern~, for which actually
used routes are all optimal in the sense of exhibiting minimal (load dependent) generalized
travel cost: ~(b) > 0 '* cW(bl~ ~ cW(al~ for all aEAw. This Nash equilibrium problem
for a game with the individual trip makers as players might as well be recast as a game
wherein the populations w are the players. As the payoff function of player w one would
then have to adopt the sum of integrals over certain link flows as is common in network
flow theory; see, e.g., Devarayan (1981) or Iri (1969). If, by the way, one adopts as the
payoff function a sum of products of certain link flows by the respective (load dependent)
individual link flow costs, one obtains a game whose Nash equilibria are, in traffic
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equilibrium theory. commonly called 'system optimizing' flow patterns; see. e.g.• Haurie
and Marcotte (1985).
Remark 3: In the context of the route choice problem. Theorem 8 was proven by
MUller (1980) for the particular case of distribution functions dn(·ly;yrl) as provided by
the multinomiallogit formula. Evans (1973) obtained an analogous result for the gravity
model proving convergence towards a linear programming model of the trip distribution
problem as dispersion in the gravity model tends to zero.
Remark 4: In economic general equilibrium modelling. the typical situation where
Theorem 8 comes to bear occurs when economic agents possess substitution possibilities.
In a spatial economics context a frequent case of substitutability is the one where
physically alike commodities are available at different geographical locations. More
specifically. consider some population of private households. y~. residing in zone ~. of
some metropolitan area. Let the consumption alternatives of that population consist of
buying. in various geographical zones r. certain amounts of the local composite good gr.
at a certain number of prices. For the sake of simplicity. let us assume that any single
household shops only in a single zone per trip - which means that the quantity
components qgr of any consumption alternative b are all zero. except for one. (This type
of model is outlined in greater detail in Dejon (1986». The original utility of such an
alternative could be of the form
1\ 1\
ur(b) := u&;(pgr + tr• qgI)
where r designates that zone in which. under alternative b. shopping actually occurs. and
tr is the unit transport cost as incurred by residents of zone ~ when shopping in zone r. In
p.h. equilibrium let there be. e.g.• five zones rl .....rS where shopping by households
from population y~ actually occurs. This means that the set of those alternatives beAY~
that are actually occupied may be partitioned into five non empty subsets Bn.....Brs
according to their non-vanishing quantity components qgr. Any two alternatives from any
single subset Btl differ by their price or quantity components at market gri, but are both
zero at all other markets. As p.h. equilibrium prevails. the p.h. utilities vY~(b) of the
alternatives be Bnu uBrs are all the same (and optimal) according to Theorem 8: ~ =
v(b) for all be Bnu uBrs . By use of the continuity argument outlined in Remark I
one obtains - for every be Bnu...uBrs
1\ 1\
v(b) =ur(b) - zYr.gr(rgr(pgr(b»),
if b means shopping in zone r. In Theorem 9 we shall see that the preceding disutility term
zY~.gr is practically negligible for sufficiently fme mesh spacings of the price axes pg.
Thus
1\ 1\
V = v(b)'" u&;(pgr + tr, qgI)
for all be BTlu ...u Brs . This near-equality still leaves open the possibility of
substitution between different price-quantity pairs at market gr. In Theorem 9, however,
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we shall see that this cannot happen to any appreciable extent (as in p.h. equilibrium there
will be at most two neighboring price levels being occupied at market gr).
Before stating Theorem 9 we shall introduce assumption (All) of bounded
monotonicity ofdemanders' original utility functions u~: There exists ~ > 0 such that for
any geG, neNgD
- n ntJ. + max uo(b-.pg,qg) ~ max uO(b-,p'g,qg)
qg qg
for all beAn, whenever P'g is just one discrete price step below pg.
Notice: ~ in this assumption and in the bounded monotonicity assumption for original
utility functions of suppliers may, without restriction of generality, be chosen identical, as
in both cases they only serve as upper bounds.
The final assumption to be made is (A12) continuity of the penalty functions zng as
functions of relative demand.
Theorem 9: Let ~ denote some p.h. equilibrium state of the economy
(N,(An),(un(+»),(dn(·I·»)). Then under the previous assumptions (Al-12) the
following holds:
1) At any market g at most two price levels in pg are being occupied. If it is
actually two, then the two price levels are neighboring ones.
2) If at market g two price levels are being occupied, 1tgS and 1tgD, say, (with
1tgS < 1tgD) then at level 1tgS suppliers are not rationed, while at level 1tgD
demanders are not. In case suppliers are rationed at level1tgD or demanders at
level1tgS, their rationing is negligible in the sense that
zng(rg(1tgS») < ~ +~ for any neNgD
and
zng(rg(1tgD») < ~ + 2~ for any neNgS
(14)
(15)
(with ~ as introduced in the strong monotonicity assumption for original utility
functions of suppliers).
3) If at market g only one price level is being occupied, ~, say, then at market g
suppliers may be non-negligibly rationed only when 1tg is at the lowest price
level in pg, i.e., 1tg =min pg, and demanders only when 1tg =max pg. More
precisely,
zng(rg(1tg») < ~ + 2~
for 1tg > min pg and neNgS as well as for 1tg < max pg and neNgD.
(16)
(14), (15) and (16) may rightly be interpreted as negligible rationing for the reason that
- under continuity of the original utility functions - ~ and tJ. grow arbitrarily small as the
mesh spacings of the various pg become ever finer (i.e. as-the maximal distance between
any two neighboring price levels tends to zero), in certain cases only when the Qg are
being refined simultaneously.
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£.rQQf of Theorem 9: In this proof, f. will always designate some weak Nash
equilibrium closely approximating~ in the sense of (i) and (ii) above. Because of (iii) one
will be allowed to assume £. to belong to any suitable (p,L\)-class as may be required in
the course of the proof.
Ad 1: Let us assume that at some market g there exist three price levels P'g,p"g,plllg
such that ~~,g ~ ~~lIg ~ ~~,"g > 0 ( ~~g := total number of ~ppliers at price level
pg). As then for some suitable p",O < p"< 1, not more than ~:cP-P")/(I+P") of all
suppliers active at market g find themselves concentrated on any two price levels, an
analogous negative statement holds for f., with some p', p" < p' < 1, in place of p".
This, however, contradicts Theorem 7. (Remember: f may be assumed to belong to any
(p,~)-class of y(·If) , P > 0.) Therefore, in the p.h. equilibrium state ~, at any market g,
at most two price levels are being occupied. If it is actually two, they are necessarily
neighboring ones, because otherwise f could not possibly exhibit two neighboring price
levels, nor a single one carrying almost all of the suppliers active at market g. This,
however, is requested by Theorem 7 for any state in any (p,~-class of .u'<-I~ with p
sufficiently small.
Ad 2: If '£ approximates ~ sufficiently closely, almost all of its active suppliers at
market g are concentrated on price levels 1tgS and 1tgD. As, according to Theorem 7, the
price levels pgS and pgD are the ones that carry almost all active suppliers [whenever f
belongs to some (p,~)-class of .u.(·If) with p sufficiently small], 1tgS necessarily equals
pgS, and 1tgD equals pgD. In state f, at 1tgS =pgS, at least one population of demanders
is rationed (by definition of pgD) but no suppliers, and at 1tgD = pgD all suppliers are
rationed, but no demanders. That means, in state f. the inequalities rg(1tgS) > ag >
rg(1tgD) hold (with ag as introduced in the complementarity of penalty functions
assumption). By continuity of relative demand as a function of the occupation numbers,
in state ~ the inequalities rg(1tgS) ~ ag ~ rg(1tgD) hold, which proves the first part of 2).
- We shall show by contradiction that the inequalities (14), (15) also hold. Assume, e.g.,
An -that for some nENgD with t' gS > 0 (14) does not hold. Then, in state f, zng(rg(1tgS))
_ 1t _n _n
~ L\ + ~ (by way of continuity of the penalty functions zng) implying P1tgS ~ P P1tgD'
As P > 0 may be assumed arbitrarily small [see (iii) above] the last inequality is not
compatible with f being an arbitrarily close approximation of ~; (notice ~:gs > 0).
Thence, (14) holds. In an analogous way (15) is proven.
Ad 3: If, in state ~, rg(1tg) happens to equal ag, none of the populations nEN are
rationed at market g. In case rg(1tg) :F- ag consider some population n with ~:g > 0
which is rationed at market g, i.e. rg(1tg) > ag in case nENgD or else rg(1tg) < ag in
case nENgS. In both cases the technique of proof is essentially the same and follows the
scheme presented under 2): In a first step, from zng(1tg) > ~ + 2~, to hold in state~,
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(17)
one deduces by way of continuity of the penalty functions zng that in state ~
_ _n _n
zng(d) ~ tJ. + tJ.. If then neNgS and d > min pg, one obtains P g ~ P P g (where
- 1t 1t1t~ designates the next lower price level in p~. As P > 0 may be arbitrarily small the last
inequality is not compatible with £being an arbitrarily close ~pproximation to~. Thence,
(16) holds for suppliers. As already said, the technique of proof is the same for
demanders. This terminates the proof of Theorem 9.
The price levels 1tgS and 1tgD, or 1tg, respectively, appearing in Theorem 9 will be
called p.h. equilibrium prices. When there are two p.h. equilibrium prices at some market
g they are necessarily neighboring ones, for which reason we shall refer to definiteness of
p.h. equilibrium prices.
Note: The assumptions (AI-12) made in proving definiteness of p.h. equilibrium
prices comprise no restrictions concerning the dependence of the original utilities ug on
quantities qK Note also that Theorem 9 does not preclude the possibility of having empty
markets g, i.e. markets where there is no supply at any of the price levels pg.
We now confront the extent to which p.h. equilibria possess Walrasian properties. In a
first step one may ask whether, under p.h. equilibrium conditions, economic units are
quantity optimizers - with respect to original (!) utility functions - for parametric price
vectors. In this context it appears mandatory to reveal that reasonable penalty functions
zng appear not only to depend on price levels (via relative demand), but also on quantities
according to a law, e.g., ofthe type
zng(qg;rg(pg(b))) = fTlg(qg(b)) zng(rg(pg(b))),
where the fTlg are suitably chosen positive functions with non-negative slopes.
The results obtained so far continue to hold in this more general case, because the
assumptions made referring to penalty functions, i.e. (AI), (AS), (A9), (AlO), and
(A12), may essentially be taken over unchanged (their verification in concrete situations
not becoming more difficult than before). The main point is that the negligible rationing
statements of Theorem 9 [inequalities (14), (15) and (16)] remain valid.
Therefore, it is of interest to note that for any p.h. equilibrium ~, Theorem 8 in
conjunction with the continuity argument in Remark 1 yields, for any beAn with
~n(b) > 0, the equality
ug(b) - LgeGb zng(qg(b); rg(pg(b))) =
a~n <b {ug(a) - LgeGa zng(qg(a); rg(pg(a)))},
where An® consists of all those aeAn for which qg(a) > 0 occurs only if at the same
time pg(a) is a p.h. equilibrium price pertaining to ~, or more briefly: a is active solely at
p.h. equilibrium price levels. (The reason is that only then is one assured that the relative
demand values occurring on the r.h.s of (17) are all well defined.)
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Equation (17) is a perturbed quantity optimization statement and implies the following
inequalities:
For any beAn with fm(b) > 0
max n n max n
aeAn® uo(a) ~ uo(b) ~ aeAn® uo(a) +
+ LgeGb zng(qg(b); rg(pg(b») - ae~® LgeGa zng(qg(a); rg(pg(a»), (18)
(notice, ~n(b) > 0 implies beAn(b). If ~ is a negligibly rationed p.h. equilibrium (Le.
rationing at the p.h. equilibrium price level(s) of any nonempty market g is negligible in
the sense specified in Theorem 9) then (18) yields
max n() n max n -
aeAn® Uo a ~ uo(b) ~ aeAn® uo(a) -IGI( A +2~) , (19)
where IGI is the cardinality of the set G of all commodities considered. For arbitrarily
given t > 0, the mesh spacings of the price axes pg may be chosen to be so fine that
IGI(A +2~) < t holds (under suitable continuity conditions for the original utility
functions u~' and possibly only after a suitable refinement of the mesh spacings of the
quantity axes, too). We shall express this more briefly by saying that in case the p.h.
equilibriwn~ is only negligibly rationed, any alternative b, of some popUlation n, that is
actually being chosen in state~ is a/most optimal.
Remark 5: In Remark 4 we started to discuss spatial substitution in regard to the
example of multizonal shopping. Let us now assume the following very simple type of
original utility function:
A A
u&:, (pgr + tr, qgT) := u~(qgT) - do (20)
where dooo equals 00 or 0 depending on whether the budget constraint (pgr + tf}qgr ~ YisA A
violated or not. The fact that the functions u& all coincide with a single function u~ is to
express that the various shopping zones all offer the same composite good. As common
A
in neoclassical microeconomic theory, we asswne u~ to be a strictly increasing function
of qg. We proceed to consider some negligibly rationed p.h. equilibrium~, and make the
following natural assumptions:
(i) There is at least one shopping zone r with its marlc:et gr nonempty.
(ii) The income y of population yfl is sufficiently high in order to allow for shopping
A
to occur in at least one shopping zone, Le. there exists beAyr such that
~y~(b) > O.
For beAY~, active at some market gr, let r(b) denote that shopping zone where
shopping takes place when alternative b is being exercised. Let p(b) and q(b) then denote
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1\
related price and quantity levels, respectively. Furthennore, for any beAyr with q(b) > 0,
1\
let bb denote that alternative AYr, active at the same market as b at the same price level as
b, the quantity component of which, however, is maximal without violating the budget
constraint [p(b)+tr(b)] q(bb) ~ y. As a consequence of the particular type (20) of original
utility functions we have adopted here, the following inequality holds:
ub~(bb) ~ ub~(b). (21)
Thus, as for ~y~(b) > 0, b is almost optimal (cf. 19», bb is almost optimal, too. - We are
now going to show that any two almost optimal alternatives b and c have quantity
components that are almost equal (in a sense to be specified presently by some
inequality). Our P9int of departure is inequalities (19), with An&> consisting of all those
1\
alternatives beAyr that do not involve shopping activity at any non-p.h. equilibrium price
level (An&> containing thus, e.g., the no shopping at all alternative). As (19) holds for b,
and also for c when inserted in place of b,
IUb~(b) - ub~(C)1 ~ IGI(K +2~), i.e.
Iu~(q(b» - u~(q(C»1 ~ IGI(K +2~).
1\
If1. > 0 is a lower bound to average slopes ofu~, then the last inequality yields
Iq(b) - q(c)1 ~ 1. -1IGI(K+2~).
This is the above-mentioned inequality specifying what is meant by "q(b) '" q(c)". Notice,
as 1. and G are independent of the mesh spacings chosen for price and quantity axes, the
difference between q(b) and q(c) is made arbitrarily small by rendering K+2~ sufficiently
small. - To sum u~ the arguments of this Remark: If ~ is a negligibly ~ationed p.h.
equilibrium and ~y (b) > 0, ~y~(c) > 0, then q(b) '" q(c), whether r(b) = r(c) or not:
individual demand by economic agents from y~ is almost the same in every shopping
zone where shopping by population y~ actually occurs.
Remark 6: Aggregate (satisfied) demand, in some arbitrary shopping zone r', by
1\
population yt is almost equal to q(b)~y,r if b is any alternative with r(b) = r', ~y~(b) >
0, and if ~y~ := 2: ~y~(a) where su~ation extends over all alternatives aeAY~ with
r(a) =r' (an~ ~y~(a) > 0). Notice, ~~~ is only known after~ has been calculated. This is
not necessarily alike for overall aggregate demand by propulation ~, i.e. for
~ q(b) ~~~ =q(b) 2: ~rY~'
r r'
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If the no shopping at all alternative bo has low original utility (which is nonnal to posit),
then ~y~(bo) = 0, and, thus
~ ~y~ =~y~L r' ,
r'
~y~ designating the total number of economic agents in population y~. In some models
~y~ is dealt with as an exogenous parameter and, thus, known from the outset. If,
however, in some bilevel model of an economy choice of location is part of the modelling
exercise (see the end of Section 2), then ~y~ is an endogenous variable and only known
after determination of the p.h. equilibrium ~.
Remark 7: As a final point in connection with the preceding simple shopping model-
treated here as part of a more comprehensive general equilibrium model - we shall discuss
full price incurred by population y~ when shopping in zone r'. We already know that in
any negligibly rationed p.h. equilibrium~, for any bEAY~ with ~y~(b) > 0, q(b) and
q(bb) are almost equal (see Remark 5). In addition, for sufficiently fine mesh spacings of
the quantity axes, Qg, q(bb)[p(b) + tr(b)] "" y. By use of q(b) "" q(bb), one deduces
q(b)[p(b) + tr(b)] "" y. A similar approximate equality holds for any other alternative a
with ~y~(a) > 0: q(a)[p(a) + tr(a)] "" y. As q(a) "" q(b), one finally obtains p(b) + t~(b) ::=
"" p(a) + tr(a). Thus, with the particular type (20) of original utility functions, uK:, the
full cost incurred when economic agents from y~ shop in different wnes is almost the
same everywhere. - Unit transport cost, tr, by the way, is not necessarily fixed and may
be an endogenous variable.
Besides quantity optimization with respect to original utility, market clearing is a
second Walrasian postulate to discuss. The natural defmition of market clearing appears to
be equality of current supply, on one hand, and the sum of purchases (i.e. total demand in
tenns of the above developed terminology) and depreciation (in physical units) of stock,
on the other. The latter tenn only comes to bear when the commodity considered is
storable. In that case market clearing is a stationarity requirement because the stock of a
storable good, the market of which is cleared in the preceding sense, has a vanishing time
derivative. Thus, if one wants equilibrium to exhibit market clearing for storable
commodities, the dynamics of the economic system modelled ought to be such that
equilibrium states are obtained as stationary states. This touches upon the topic of
passiveness of the system dynamics, briefly discussed by Dejon and Graef (1983), by
Gilldner (1984), by Dejon (1986), and in a more abstract setting by Wenzel (1982). We
shall not elaborate on this point.
For labor and services (nonstorable commodities with pennanent zero stock), in direct
and in p.h. equilibrium. overall current supply (totalled over all price levels) is typically
larger than overall purchases. The quotient of overall purchases by overall supply at any
single market g of labor or services is so-called average relative demand ig, at that market,
and may be obtained as some weighted average of the relative demand values rg(~) at the
various price levels pg. In case of p.h. equilibrium, at the p.h. equilibrium price levels
relative demand is almost equal to ag (see Assumption (A5) and Theorem 9) and,
therefore ig "" ago It appears expedient to declare equilibrium state markets to be cleared
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markets, thus introducing implicitly a 'natural' rate of unemployment of labor or service
resources, respectively. The fact that the value of equilibrium average relative demand, rg,
depends rather strongly on the choice of disutility functions zng (in the p.h. limit it is
essentially only~ that matters) underlines once more the importance of these functions.
50 CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Because of its conceptual structure, direct equilibrium modelling is comparatively easy to
implement by computer. One of the helpful features is a rather extensive modularity,
which one expects to detect by simply examining the listing of the main constitutive
elements of any weak Nash equilibrium system, (N, (An), (un(ol·», (dn(ol·»). However,
one of the major drawbacks of direct equilibrium modelling lies in the large number of
unknowns. To each market g, e.g., there are IPgHQgl unknowns (Ipgl and IQgl denoting
the cardinalities of pg and Qg, respectively). Yet, to add another positive feature, there is
no need to devise market supply or demand functions. Instead, naturally, one has to set
up (strict) utility functions. A pertinent characteristic feature is that market clearing - even
in equilibria delicate enough to define at markets of nonstorable commodities like labor,
capital services, and services in general (cf. end of Section 4) - is only introduced
indirectly by way of penalty functions, which can be interpreted as search costs on the
demand side of markets and as costs of uncertainty of demand on the supply side.
Weak Nash equilibrium problems are fixed point problems by their very definition.
One may solve them iteratively, yet on the assumption that the economic system to be
modelled is frequently enough out of equilibrium it appears preferable to try to emulate
not only economic equilibrium states, but also disequilibrium time paths of the system -
with the obvious prerequisite of adequate dynamic laws. Quite a broad class of such
dynamic laws has been described by Dejon (1983) as 'attraction-regulated dynamic
equilibrium' laws. These provide for a general setting of ideas which have been
expounded in more specific contexts by, e.g., Allen and Sanglier (1979) and Dejon and
Graef (1983).
Guldner (1984) described the first exploratory simulation experiments utilizing direct
equilibrium modelling of a highly aggregated nonspatial economy, with a focus on
aggregate output, purchases, price and wage inflation as well as rate of unemployment.
He also reported about simulation in connection with location and land use modelling.
Here the idea was to check whether direct equilibrium modelling would lead to the type of
results expected on the basis of Alonso's (1964) analyses. The outcome was positive,
confirming, e.g., numerically that the economic activity with the steepest bid rent curve
locates closest to the CBD. Note that the related theory refers to p.h. equilibrium while the
numerical calculations are for approximating direct equilibria which still exhibit the
phenomenon under scrutiny. Dejon (1986) contains a very brief account of a simulation
experiment conducted by H. Korner, which was designed to study the reaction of a direct
equilibrium model to a change of the parameter ag (see assumption (AS» at one of the
commodity markets.
Existence proofs for weak Nash equilibria, based on Brouwer's fixed point theorem,
have been provided in particular applications; see, e.g., Muller (1980) for the traffic
assignment problem. For direct equilibria, the existence proof appears to be less trivial as
relative demand no longer depends continuously on the state vector.£ whenever.£ implies
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vanishing supply at some price level (cf. Remark 1). For the time being, one simply trusts
in the existence of direct equilibria, as well as in their approximate computability, by
tracing time paths of systems under study until these have ostensibly settled down to an
(approximate) stationary state. Until now, numerous such time paths have been calculated
and, under reasonable choices of parameters, have always been observed to settle down.
There remains, however, more analytical work to be done on asymptotic stability as well
as on conditions of uniqueness of direct equilibria.
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Rivalrous Consonance: A Theory of Mature
Oligopolistic Behavior in a General Equilibrium
Framework
R.E. Kuenne
1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of rivalrous consonance as a framework within which to analyze the strategies
of mature oligopolistic industries incorporates a body of assumptions that appear to me to
be widely accepted. Indeed, they receive such common acceptance as to seem trite. Yet, in
my view, they have not previously been employed as the formal, postulational basis for
an operational theory of oligopolistic decision making. The following are among the most
important.
Assumption 1. Mature oligopolies, or rivalrous industries with a substantial
industrial history, are communities in important respects. Individual units within such
communities have important competitive interests which make them rivals in their goal
seeking. But as members of an acknowledged community they have common interests
which imply cooperative relations. Their actions, therefore, will be motivated by a blend
of rivalrous and cooperative goals in mutual recognition of a rivalrous consonance of
long-run interests.
Assumption 2. Each such community, in which individual actors are few enough in
number to impact the industry in personally identifiable ways, has a power structure, or a
web of perceptions among ftrms that has an important bearing upon their decisions. The
binary, firm-to-firm, combination of rivalry and cooperation that constitutes an important
component of their decision making is the operational expression of that power structure.
Unless that sociological matrix of power relationships is incorporated in the analysis of
industry decision making little hope exists for useful insights.
Assumption 3. Because these industrial communities and their power structures are
the result of unique historical evolution energized by unique individuals and framed by
unique industry and product characteristics, each is marked by distinguishing patterns of
behaviour. A universal theory of oligopoly is therefore unattainable. Analytical ambitions
must be limited to studies of industries sui generis with the goal of gaining insights into
their functioning and structure, and with cautious generalizations arising. from limited
commonalities such industries may reveal.
Assumption 4. Corporations consistently reveal risk aversion in their attitudes to
uncertain events, and this must project into the conditions of decision stability in their
industries. The role of the cooperative motivation in tempering the rivalrous drive is
thereby strengthened to the extent the latter threatens those stability conditions. Indeed,
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one of the social functions of the power structure is to exercise such restraining
influences.
Assumption 5. Corporations are multiobjective entities making decisions in a
multidimensional target variable space incorporating price, quality, and advertising
dimensions. They consist of sub-bureaucracies with their selfish goals, many of which
clash with like goals of their fellow groups. Corporate policy, therefore, reflects these
goals with different priorities, and is frequently ill-defined or even inconsistent. The
goals, therefore, are distinct to the firm, and must be isolated to approximate the firm's
motivation in a formal model.
Assumption 6. Few market structures are characterized by pure competition or
monopoly. Most mixtures of competition and monopoly reveal themselves to be clusters
of oligopoly. Therefore, if general equilibrium theory is to approach a realistic and
operational form it must incorporate in an extensive manner oligopolistic decision making.
By Assumption 3, such incorporations must have limited aims for generality. The
extensive use of mathematical theorem deduction must give place to simulation analyses
with numerical structure. The goal must no longer be the derivation of universal theorems
from mathematically manipulable but pitifully unrealistic models, but of insights into the
functioning of models provided with parametric scenarios of efficient design to yield
useful insights.
If these assumptions approach the realistic, frameworks must emerge to encompass
them. But oligopoly theory today is dominated by game theory, which only partially and
rather imperfectly captures the essence of this environment. Its primary focus is upon the
rivalrous implications of oligopolistic interdependence, even when it deals with
cooperative aspects of such relationships. It is a single-objective analysis; it neglects
industrial power structures as well as other sociological aspects of the decision making,
and is not well suited to general equilibrium analysis.
The rivalrous consonance framework is an attempt to move analysis in the indicated
directions and, unfortunately, given the almost exclusive attachment of present analysis to
it, away from game theory in vital ways. It is experimental, but at least it is designed for
application to realistic oligopolies and is therefore testable. I shall present it in its most
rudimentary form in the present paper, but even at its most complicated it is a "middle-
brow" theory in terms of complexity of structure.
2. THE OLIGOPOLY IN RIVALROUS CONSONANCE
Assume an oligopoly with n rivals producing differentiated brands in a product group.
Suppose their strategy consists of setting price with the primary goal of maximizing
profits subject to (1) industry ties to rivals, (2) groups of subsidiary goals unique to each
firm, and (3) demand and cost functions. If we focus upon rival i's motivation, rivalrous
consonance views its objective function as an "extended profit function", Hi:
n~ E' = l er(Pj - kj)xj ,pi I j=1 J
subject to a set of constraints, where
(1)
Pj
x·J
= price of rival j's product
=a' - h.:: p' + l b'k Pk + B' Q =rival j's demand functionJ -lJ J j¢k J ]q
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Q
k'J
aij
=a vector of unspecified variables (other than industry prices) affecting
demand
=average cost, assumed constant, of product j
=binary consonance factors for finn i relevant to rivals j, all == 1.
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The distinctive terms in the objective function are elements in the binary consonance
matrix, a, which specifies the effective power structure of the industry. Rival i maximizes
his profits and the profits of his rivals when those rival profits are discounted by a
factors. aij e a is the dollar amount rival i values a $1 profit or loss for rival j. Thus, if
aij = $.25 a dollar change in rival j's profit is the equivalent of $.25 ip' rival i's own
profit. The ith row of a defines rival i's attitudes to each of its competitors as those
attitudes impact on its decision making. The ith column of a, of course, defines rivals'
power structure attitudes to rival i. Hence, rival i's perception of rival j's ability to retaliate
against it should rival i's price decisions impact too severely rival j's profits is included in
rival i's decision making. But it also includes rival i's concern for rival j's welfare on
more altruistic grounds as well, perhaps with some concern for the peaceful stability of
the industry. Of course aij need not equal ajio since rivals' perceptions of each other's
position in the power structure can be quite disparate.
The subsidiary goals of rival i are incorporated into the model as constraints. To
illustrate, let us use a set of common goals exhibited by firms in oligopoly.
First, output must be within the firm's capacity to produce, qj:
c1 : Xi -qj ~ O. (2)
Second, the frrm insists upon attaining a minimum level of sales, mi, set perhaps by an
expected target share proportion:
C2 : mi -Xi ~ O. (3)
Third, the firm sets upper and lower bounds, ttand ti respectively, on price changes in
the period, specified as proportions of previous period price Pi:
C3 : Pi/Pi - tt ~ 0, (4)
C4 : ti - Pi/Pi ~ O. (5)
Lastly, price is bounded away from a specific lower limit which we will assume to be
zero but may not be:
c5 : ui - Pi ~ O. (6)
The rivalrous consonance framework includes such "crippled optimization" submodels
that consist of nonlinear programming models. Each is solved sequentially assuming all
rivals' prices are temporarily fixed so that if each rival submodel is convex in own price
the sufficient condition for a global constrained maximum will be achieved. Since all
constraints are linear they are convex. The objective function yields
d2EJdPI =-2bji < 0, (7)
and hence it is (strictly) concave in Pi. Hence, each submodel is a convex nonlinear
programming model.
(9)
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It should be noted that such fInn models may not be convex and this must be accepted
as a possible reflection of the real oligopolistic world. Local maxima may therefore be all
that can be attained realistically. Convexity is convenient, to be sure, but is has no claim
upon exclusive consideration by the theorist. I have solved rivalrous consonance models
which were not convex for 5 and 11 fInns using the FiaccolMcCormick Sequential
Unconstrained Minimization Technique (SUM!) with no problems.
For this paper I will remain with the simple profIt maximization model limited to one
industry given in (1)-(6) above. However, let me indicate the flexibility and extendability
of the approach briefly. First, different objective functions may be adopted to
accommodate fInns' differing goal sets. For example, a fInn's major objective may be to
attain a target rate of return, or to maximize market share, and different rivals in the same
industry may have different major objectives as well as subsidiary objectives. This causes
no problem to the modelling. Price leadership and followership are easily included for
relevant fInns as major objectives.
Second, general equilibrium is attained by linking an industry to its suppliers and its
customers. Rival i's industrial customers as well as its rivals are given consonance factors
and included in the extended profIt function. In this manner patterns of price behavior
among client industries can be studied given parametric shocks (see Kuenne, 1986, for an
extended presentation).
3. A GRAPHIC PRESENTATION
In order to depict some important characteristics of the pricing let us simplify by assuming
a duopoly under rivalrous consonance and let us ignore constraints. Then reaction
function depictions of some limiting cases are possible that serve to unify certain aspects
of classic oligopoly theory by revealing them to be limiting cases of rivalrous consonance.
Figure 1 illustrates some basic concepts and implications of rivalrous consonance for
the case of duopoly.
For rival i, fIrst order necessary conditions for a crippled optimization price solution,
given the price for rival j, Pjo are
aGlapi =(Xi - bn(Pi - ki» + eij bjj(Pj - kj), i =1,2; j~, (8)
and, solving the pair of equations for PI and P2, we obtain
e
e -(2bjjMi + (bij + eijbji)Mj) Ni. . .p. = =-, 1 = 1,2; J:;1!:l,
1 4b··b·· (b" + e"boo)(b" + e"b") De11 JJ - IJ IJ Jl Jl Jl IJ
where Mi = eijbjikj - ai - bnki. Solving in tenns of price interactions, we get
p? =(0.5/bii)[ai + bjiki - eijbjikj + (bij+ eijbji)Pj], i =1,2; j~i (10)
These are the reaction functions for the two fInns given the consonance factor vector
e =[eijoeji]' Their values yield pe = [p~, p~], the joint extended profIt equilibrium.
For the mature oligopoly we hypothes1ze fuat eij e [0,1] and eji e [0,1]. If a e-value
becomes negative the rival adopting it is waging price war, valuing his rival's loss at a
positive own profIt value. At eij =1, rival i values rival j's profIt as equal to his own. It is
difficult to imagine conditions in which he might value his rival's profIt at a greater value
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than his own. Hence the lower and upper bounds adopted, although no conceptual
problem arises if the consonance factors are allowed to broach these limits.
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Figure 1 Isoprofit contours, reaction functions, and solution regions in duopoly
If 9ij = 9ji = 0, we have the case where each rival makes his pricing decision in
myopic ilisregard of its impact upon his rival. I have called the resulting po vector the
Cournot point, in the extended sense that each rival ignores the impact of his actions upon
his competitor's objective function. The fact that Cournot used quantity instead of price as
the firm's target variables is unimportant. The truly interesting fact is that we can
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reinterpret Cournot behavior to be equivalent to ignoring the impacts of one's decisions
upon the welfare of one's competitor. This behavior is a more credible interpretation than
the standard one of assuming one's rival's price (or quantity) will remain unchanged as
one alters one's own.
If we go to the other extreme and assume eij = eji = 1, we have pI which I have
called the Chamberlin point, in honor of that economist's suggestion that mutual
interdependence recognized leads to a joint profit maximization. Rivalrous consonance
also permits a reinterpretation of Chamberlin behavior: it is not mutual interdependence
recognized that distinguishes this limiting case from the Cournot case. System (8) makes
it quite clear that both cases force the rival's parameters into the decision making of the
finns. The true distinction is the degree of valuation placed by each finn upon its rival's
profit welfare. In this sense, rivalrous consonance is at once a unifier of classic oligopoly
theory and an extension of it.
Figure 1 graphs the price space for duopoly and the pO and pI limiting solutions. The
dashed lines depict the constant average costs, ki and ~j, of the rivals. The straight lines
that start at the axes and terminate at C are the loci olprice vectors at which Xi and Xj
become zero. Hence, the relevant price space for decisions is found in the polygon
ABeD, since we assume that neither fum will operate in the long-run where profits are
negative.
Isoprofit functions for the fums, of which we have drawn only two, II and JI, are
ellipses in the relevant region and become horizontal or vertical lines beyond that region.
Consider now the straight line reaction functions (defined in (8)) when eij = eji = 0,
labelled ei and ej to simplify notation in the figure. These intersect the fums' isoprofit
contours at their minimum points, i.e., where they are tangent to horizontal or vertical
lines for fum i and j respectively. Their intersection at pO yields the Cournot solution. At
the other extreme, consider the reaction functions where eij =eji =1: if we draw the joint
profit isocontours (which we have not in Figure 1) these reactions functions would
intersect them where dpjldPi or dPi/dpj are zero. The intersection of these reaction
functions yields pI, the jomt profit maximum
Consider the set of points MiMi on which P I lies. Mi is the monopoly profit point for
rival i, or the P at which rival j is eliminated from the market and rival i is maximizing its
profit. It is the point upon which successively higher I isoprofit contours converge. Mj is
the monopoly point for rival j with similar interpretation. The line MiMj is the locus of
tangencies of I and J contours, or all points such that rival i cannot be bettered in profit
receipts without harming rival j, and vice versa. pI lies on this locus at the point where
the sum of such tangent contours is a maximum. If collusion were allowed, we would
expect a negotiated bargain to be struck somewhere on this "negotiation set" between the
exclusive beneficiary limiting points Mi and Mj- We will narrow the expected limits of
negiotiated solutions further below.
The important potential of rivalrous consonance, however, lies in its ability to permit
e-factors to assume intennediate values between 0 and 1, and thereby depict the pricing
results of less extreme power structures. In Figure 1 the dashed reaction function for
os;e j s; 1 has been drawn to illustrate the new flexibility. Where collusion is ruled out
of consideration, so the negotiation set (other than pI) can be ignored, we can set tighter
bounds on the feasible solution region. When rival i acts myopically and rival j
altruistically the P-solution occurs at T, and when roles are reversed at Y. Hence, the
region pOn>ly is the region of feasible solutions for the mature oligopoly as we have
interpreted it
Let us now suppose that in the very long-run the consonance factors are variable and
will come to reflect more accurately the egoistic profit drives of the rivals tempered by
their competitors' power and acumen in the competitive process. One of the important
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desires of each opponent will be to assess the a-factor that governs his competitor's
strategy and to use such knowledge to improve his profit position. For example, let us
start with a = [0,1] with consequent P = T. Suppose rival j surmises that rival i has
ai = 0 and that it will for long periods retain that perception of its role in the industry
power structure. Then it will pay rival j to find his Stacke/berg point on ai =0 where he
reaches the innermost J contour he can attain - say at Sj where his effective aj = at That
J profit contour is the minimum profit that rival j need accept as long as rival i adopts ai,
and, since ai = 0 is by our assumption the lowest value rival i can adopt, this is the
minimum profit rival j need accept under any condition. Hence, if we move along that J
contour to its intersection with the MiMj negotiation set (say at Lj) this places a lower
bound on the negotiated distribution of Joint profit to rival j. Also, if the I contour that
goes through Sj is followed to its intersection with MiMj (say at Ui) we have the
maximum amount of joint profit that rival i can obtain by negotIation.
Symmetrically, if we start with ai = 1 and aj =0, and P =Y, and rival i seeks its
Stackelberg point (say at Si), we can locate 4 and Uj on the negotiation set. It would then
benefit both parties to arrive at a P on MiMj between Ui and Uj by collusion, and were
such action admissible this segment of MiMj would hold strong interest for us. But we
have ruled out the possibility of collusion and must return to the rivals' Stackelberg
points.
Arbitrarily, suppose that is Sj- If rival i surmises that rival j will move along the
reaction function aj, it will fmd that p'oint on aj that is its new Stackelberg solution,
different from Si. TIiat implies a new a: (not drawn) and rival j will use it to obtain yet
another Stackelberg point. If we plot the loci of each rival's Stackelberg points we obtain
their Stacke/berg functions, plotted on Figure 1 as Sj~ and sisi. These may be viewed
as their long run reaction functions, and their intersection at the point S I have termed the
generalized Staekelberg point. It is a Nash equilibrium.
The point S within the feasible solution region pO'fply has a strong appeal because
from any point in the subset pOSjSSi it is possible for both firms to improve their profits
by moves toward S, until S is achieved. For any P in the subset S~Pl~ it will always
benefit one of the noncolluding rivals to move toward S at the expense of the other - a
one-sided benefit game that ends at S. Hence, in the very long run, when power
structures alter under the motivating force of profit maximization, we should expect P to
lie in the subset S~P1~ with S as the point of gravitational pull.
In the short run, however, a is fixed and we return to the short-run reaction functions.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS PROPOSITIONS
Trivially, dPi/dai > 0 if Pi Ski and dpy'daj > 0 iff Pi> ki. Consider now the impact of
cost increases with fixed a. Let us rewrite the reaction function (10) as
p~ =AI· + BiP~, (11)
1 J
where Ai =0.5(ai + biiki - aijbjikj)lbii and Bi =0.5(bij + aijbji)lbi. Then, for the
intercept terms
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1. dAi = O.5dk:i
2. dAj = -(O.5bijejilbjj)dk:i. (12)
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Figure 2 Comparative statics of a cost change
For an own-cost change the reaction function Ri on Figure 2 shifts to the right by one
half the rise in cost; however, Rj shifts down, reducing the rise in Pi that would occur if
Rj remained fixed. The adjustments are shown in Figure 2, and it will be useful to work
through the adjustment process in achieving the new equilibrium.
Ri shifts by one half the cost increase to Ri and firm i, assuming Pj constant at p]
moves the price vector to P2 from Pl. For the moment Rj remains fixed, and with Pi
changed induces ftrm j to move to P3, further inducing fmn i to move the solution to P4.
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Obviously, the amount of price movement to this point depends upon the slope ofRj. The
rise is greater the less sensitive Xj is to Pj (Le. the smaller is bjj), the more sensitive It is to
Pi (i.e., the larger is bji), and the larger is eji' Rivalrous consonance boosts prices,
holding an umbrella over rival its head. Phase I ends with P4, which implies Pi and Pj
higher than in Pl'
At the start of Phl\se II fIrm j perceives the reason for fum i's initiating move to P2 and
includes the larger ki. in its fIrst-order condition (8). Every sale ,fIrm j takes from fIrm i
causes firm i to lose less profIt than before, so Rj shifts to ~ - a shift due solely to
rivalrous consonance and varying directly with the size of eji' ~lso, the more sensitive
fIrm i's sales to a reduction in Pj (Le., the larger bij) and the more sensitive its own sales
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Figure 3 The shift-and-slope analysis of price change
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are to Pj, the less will Pj have to be reduced to compensate for the fall in extended profits.
Firm j, therefore, moves P from P4 to Ps, and interactions along the new reaction
functions will carry the new equilibrium price to P7'
Rivalrous consonance then has two opposing price tendencies. Because of the
increased slope it gives reaction functions, prices tend to increase with rivals' cost
increases. But a shift component which is similar to a change in e ji caused by a decline in
rival profits exens downward pressure on prices.
On Fi~ 3 we analyze the net resultant of these two components. For Pi, the change
from pI to pI is equal to the amount of the shift in Ri (PIM) less MN, which is simply the
slope of Ri. times the change in Pj(P1n. The same reasoning holds for pJ-- pI- That is,
or
1. dpi = shift of Ri + slope of Ri x dpj
2. dpj =shift of Rj + slope of Rj x dPi
From (12)
1. dPi = O.5dlq + [0.5(bij + eiibji)/bii]dpj
2 dp' - (0 5e"b"/b")dk' + (0 5(b" + e··h··)/b")dp·
. ] - -. Jl]l]J 1 . ]1 lJ"lJ]J 1
1. dpi/dki = (2bubii - ejibij(bjj + eijbji))/Oe
2. dpjldki =(bn(bjj - ejibij)/De).
(13)
(14)
Can rivalvous consonance lead to the perverse case where dPi/dki < O? Because
De > 0 by the strict concavity of the objective functions, the sign of (14.1) depends upon
the sign of the numerator. It is negative if and only if
e ..h.. fh.. + e"b") > 2h..b..Jl"lJ\"lJ lJ ]1 "l1 lJ'
From strict concavity the additional necessary condition is that
2biibjj > O.5(bjj + eijbji)(bji + ejibij]
Together (15) and (16) imply that in the perverse case,
ejibij> bji '
(15)
(16)
(17)
which in tum implies, because eji is in the unit interval, that bij > bii.
We will show that the perverse case is possible but unlikely. t5efine the other-price
coefficients as multiples of own-price coefficients:
bij = mibii, bji = mjbii'
Then (15) reduces to
2biilbjj > (2 - eijejiIIlimj)/ejilllj ,
(18)
(19)
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and by substituting (18) into (17), the condiion of (19) can be tightened to
bii/bij > 2/rnf·
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(20)
Perversity can occur in a duopoly where one rival controls a much larger share of the
market than the other; if mi < I, as we expect for a dominant rival, that necessary
predominance may be a larger multiple of 2. Moreover, for the perverse result the weak
rival's position is reflected in a very high rival's profit component (i.e., 9jibjj) which
leads to a large shift downward in Rj- Also, the small absolute cross-price sensltivity of
the weak rival to the strong rival's pnce actions insures that the slope of Ri is steep.
The improbability of these conditions in a closed duopoly hinges upon the notion that
if a rival with very large sales lost a large quantity through a rise in its price, a sole small
rival will fail to benefit from the action by experiencing a large increase in sales. A great
leakage from the system is implied. Therefore, the possibility seems most likely when the
primary competition of a strong duopolist exists abroad among exogenous exporters and a
weak domestic rival acts under strong consonance motivation to exploit a large rise in
rival cost.
The improbability of its occurrence for rivals of approximately equal size can be
investigated for the case where bii =bji =b and ki =kj =k. Perversity has the best chance
of occurring when (from (15)) ~ii =eji = I, and wt adopt that value. Then, from (15)
and (16), we obtain the contradiction
c > b > c. (21)
Hence, the perverse case cannot arise under the best conditions. Even the condition
derived from (15) alone implies the realistically unacceptable proposition that cross-price
sensitivity is larger than own-price sensitivity.
On the other hand, a rise in ki may move Pj up or down depending on the numerator of
(14.2). Specifically, Pj will fall if
bij < 9jibij- (22)
The downward shift of Rj to~ in Figure 2 outweighs the upward pull exerted by the
slope of Ri. Note from (17) that it the perverse case of dpi/dki occurs, Pj must also fall,
but the converse is not true.
The negative net impact upon prices that rivalrous consonance can inspire is not as
paradoxical as might appear at first sight. A fall in the profit margin of a rival can be
viewed as a reduction of his power base and will lead a rival to lower the price protection
previously afforded. This will be tempered, and in the normal case outweighed, by the
rightward shift of firm j's sales function set off by the initial rise in Pi. But where cross-
price sensitivities are weak, the net effect of a fall in Pj may occur.
S. CONCLUSION
Rivalrous consonance, with or without constraints, is one path toward a necessary
integration of rivalry and cooperation in oligopoly theory. The theory isolates an
interesting Nash equilibrium at the generalized Staekelberg point And it casts light on the
contradictory impulses that a unilateral cost increase inspires among oligopolists. On the
one hand the unfortunate rival's attempt to pass through the increase by a price rise leads
rivals to increase their own prices as demand strengthens.But the decline in the initiating
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fInn's profIt margin leads rivals to reduce the price protection fonnerly afforded it. Net
price changes in the industry are the net resultants of these two forces.
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Hotelling (1921) in an early work fonnulated a model for population growth and
dispersal, assuming a logistic growth combined with linear diffusion from locations of
higher to locations of lower population density. This interesting work left no trace in
economics, where researchers seem to prefer linear to logistic growth processes, and
where the interest in phenomena in the geographical plane has constantly decreased. The
same model was reinvented by Fischer (1937) and elaborated by Skellam (1951) in order
to deal with nonhuman populations, a context in which it became a great success.
Hotelling's work was republished as late as 1978, but obviously it still holds little appeal
for the economics profession.
The logistic growth function assumes that there is a given saturation population that
nature can support. For a human population, however, the total means of subsistence are
not merely provided by nature: to a very large extent they are produced by the population
itself. More people in general produce more goods and only eventually do diminishing
returns force per capita output down. Moreover, man himself, unlike other animals,
decides the per capita living standard at which the population stays stationary. Finally, all
these conditions are subject to change over time due to technological developments and
changing attitudes.
In a recent publication, Puu (1985), the author tried to cope with these problems by
introducing an explicit production function with increasing-decreasing returns. In line
with the modem theory of structural change (see Gilmore,1981; or Poston and Stewart,
1978), where truncated Taylor series universally represent qualitative phenomena, the
production function was fonnulated as the lowest-order polynomial that could represent a
technology with the characteristics mentioned. It contained two arbitrary constants,
representing technological efficiency and optimal scale of operations. Together with the
stationary population living standard as a third parameter, they could change over time
and thus trigger off sudden growth processes.
Similarly, the spatial movement of population was related to differences in living
standards rather than to differences in population density per se. It was then possible to
study the character of spatially non-homogeneous (agglomerative) steady states, and it
was shown that they became a possibility once technological efficiency had passed a
certain threshold.
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All the changes in the relation of output to labour input were, however, assumed to be
exogenous to the system. The next step of development is natural: to include the
accumulation of capital as an explicit process in the model, thus explaining one of the
forces for change in the productivity of labour.
Accordingly, a two-input production function is needed. Again we will formulate it as
a polynomial of a sufficiently high degree to account for a transition from increasing to
decreasing returns. The inputs, labour and capital, have to enter the production function in
such a way as to produce a positive synergetic effect, and this can be achieved by a third
degree polynomial. As only the qualitative phenomena are of interest it is legitimate to
work with such a truncated Taylor series of low order.
The formation process for capital is modelled as follows. The single output is assumed
malleable so that it can either be consumed or invested as capital. Expectations of capital
income are assumed to be determined, like labour incomes, by marginal productivity and
are reinvested. Net additions to capital stock are obtained after deduction of depreciation,
assumed proportionate to capital stock. This leads to steady state capital stock when
marginal productivity equals the rate of depreciation.
For labour, a supply process of higher order is assumed. The reason for this is that the
model must be able to account for population growth at early stages of development when
mankind is supported by the yields of Nature without any additional output from
organized production.
2. DYNAMICS
Write the production function as
q = a(~(k+.l)2 - k3 - .l3) (1)
where k denotes capital, .l denotes labour, and q denotes output. This is the simplest
possible way of formulating a production function with increasing-decreasing returns to
scale as a truncated power series. We note that the term 2k.l accounts for a synergetic
effect. In order that decreasing returns should eventually dominate the negative terms
must be of the third order.
We note that output has a unique maximum when both marginal productivities are
zero. This happens for k =.l =4/3 ~. The transition from increasing to decreasing returns
to scale occurs when k and.l satisfy the implicit equation (k3 + .l3)/(k + .l)2 = ~/2. When
the right hand side constant is doubled the same impliCit equation represents the points for
which output becomes zero. The general features of this production function are shown in
Figure 1.
The output shares of capital and labour evaluated at the current marginal productivities
are
£9. k = 2a~(k+.l)k - 3a.k3
c3k
(2)
(3)~.l = 2a~(k+.l).l - 3a.l3
c3.l
If the production function were linearly homogeneous these input shares would exhaust
output, but given (1) they sum up to more or less, depending on whether production is in
the region of increasing or decreasing returns. This makes it problematic to take (2)-(3) as
measures of factor incomes. If capital accumulation or population increase is based on
factor income the model yields different results depending on which input is assumed to
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be remunerated according to the marginal conditions and which takes the residual.
Another possibility is to assume, as is done in most of the economics of growth, that a
given proportion of output is saved (and invested) and the remaining fraction consumed.
Figure 1 The production function
We shall evade these difficulties by assuming that both capital and labour do estimate
their incomes by (2) and (3) respectively. As the estimates are used for formulating a
dynamic process involving marginal change it does not matter that the expectations are
inconsistent; indeed, h may even seem reasonable to base the estimates on marginal
productivities.
Accordingly, the growth of capital stock is assumed to be
k= 2al3(k+.l)k - 3ak3 - Kk (4)
where Ie denotes the rate of capital depreciation. It is easy to interpret (4). Estimated
capital income is invested and results in an increase of capital stock to the extent that gross
investment exceeds depreciation. Capital stock is in equilibrium when marginal
productivity equals the rate of depreciation; i.e., when the "golden rule" is satisfied.
For the dynamics of the labour force we assume a growth rate equal to its estimated
income share, plus the natural supply of means of subsistence, normalized to unity,
minus the subjective "need" for goods y.l.
.l = .l(l+ 2al3(k+.l).l - 3a.l3 - y.l) (5)
Our first objective is to investigate the dynamics of (4)-(5) before space and diffusion
are introduced. Obviously, (4) is zero when k =0, and (5) is zero when.l =O. But there
are more interesting possibilities. In addition (4) is zero whenever k and.l satisfy the
relation.l =&K/2(13) - k + (3/2I3)k2, whereas (5) is zero when k =(y/2al3) - (l/2al3)1.l -
- .l + (3/213).l . The curves for zero growth of capital and labour are easily sketched as in
each case one of the variables can be solved as an explicit function of the other. The zero
curve for capital is simply a quadratic with a minimum, whereas that for labour has a
more complex character, possibly having a point of inflection and a backward-bending
section. As indicated in Figure 2, the pair of zero curves may have up to four
intersections. These, of course, are the critical (or equilibrium) points of the system. The
corresponding flow portrait is shown in Figure 3. Two of the intersection points are
stable nodes and two are saddles. Together with the stable node on the vertical axis this
makes up three different zones of attraction in the phase space.
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Figure 3 Flow portrait with three attraction zones
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By various parameter changes - for instance, by the variation of the depreciation
constant 1C - a saddle point may fuse with a neighbouring node. If this occurs, the latter
disappears as a possibility for stable equilibrium, and its fonner zone of attraction fuses
with the one on the side of the saddle point. In Figure 4 three different fusions are
illustrated for three different positions of the parabola, and the corresponding phase
portraits are displayed in Figures 5 a-c. By studying these diagrams it is easy to
understand how new equilibria emerge and old ones are destroyed as a result of smooth
parameter changes, which thus may trigger off sudden growth or decline in population
and capital stock in an otherwise smooth development
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Figure 4 Zero lines in degenerate cases
3. COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS
Analytically, we may study the behaviour in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium by
lineariza!i0!1. Linearization of (4)-(5) in the neighbourhood of some equilibrium with
nonzero k, 1., produced the system:
ic = (2cxl3k - 6cxk2) (k-k) + 2cx13k (1.-i)
L =2cx13i2 (k-k) + (2cxl3i2 - 6cxi3 - 1) (1.-i)
where we have used (4)-(5) to eliminate the constants 1C and 'Y.
(6)
(7)
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Denoting the eigenvalues of this system by III and 112 we have for the trace and
determinant
Tr = III + 112 = 2a«13-3k)k + (13-3.l).l2 - 1
Det = 1l11l2 = - 2a«.l+6a.l 3)(13-3k) + 6a13k .l2)k
(8)
(9)
The discriminant can then be computed:
f!. = (Tr)2 - 4 Det = (2a13k - 6a i(2 - 2a13.l2+6a.l3+1)2 + 16a2132k.l2 > O. (10)
From (10) we see that the eigenvalues are always real, Le., nodes and saddles if they
are not degenerate. Degeneracy implies a zero determinant. We see that the determinant is
always negative if k < 13/3. In that case the eigenvalues have opposite signs and the
equilibrium is a saddle point For k > l3f3 the determinant can become positive, so that the
critical point is a node. In that case there is a tendency for the trace to be negative, and this
explains the appearance of stable nodes along with the saddles in the illustrations.
To illustrate the computational aspects suppose we have a=1/6, 13=2. Then (4)-(5)
obviously has an equilibrium point in k=.l=l. Implicitly the remaining constants are
K=5/6, and "(=11/6. If we insert these numbers in the linearized equations (6)-(7) we get
the coefficient matrix
T.Puu 127
t
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Its detenninant is zero, so the critical point is degenerate. The eigenvalues are -S/3 and
orespectively, and the corresponding right hand eigenvectors can easily be computed as
(-INS, 2l..JS) and (2/...JS, 1/...JS). Also, the left hand eigenvectors tum out to be identical
with the right hand ones. Accordingly the matrix (A - Ill) happens to be self-adjoint in our
example.
The linearized equations (6)-(7) with the numerical matrix elements from our example
inserted form a linear system with constant coefficients, whose solution
k = 1 - a exp(-St/3)/...JS + 2b exp(Ot)/...JS
1. = 1 + 2a exp(-St/3)NS + b exp(Ot)/...JS
(11)
(12)
is trivial from the elementary theory of differential equations. Instead of paying further
attention to this we defme the new variables ~(t) =a exp(-St/3) and 11(t) =b exp(Ot) =b.
Using the method suggested by Haken (1977,1983) we set
k = 1 - ~...JS + 211/...JS
1. = 1 +2~S + 11/...JS
(13)
(14)
where we now regard the amplitudes a and b as time-dependent Thus (13)-(14) is a linear
change of coordinates from k, 1. to ~, 11, where capital and labour start out from their
equilibrium position (1,1) in the characteristic directions as ~ or 11 start to change from
zero. The expressions (13)-(14) are now inserted into the original nonlinear pair of
differential equations (4)-(S), where the numerical v~lues 9f the constants from the
example are substituted. These equations then express k and 1. as functions of the new
variables ~, 11 involving terms up to cubic or quartic respectively. It should be observed
that these new differential equations are exact, since they only retain information
concerning the characteristic directions from the linear approximation.
Now, differentiating (13)-(14) we get
i: = - f,J...JS + 21,/...JS
i = 2fJ...JS + 1,/...JS
(1S)
(16)
which can be di~gon~zedby using the left hand eigenvectors. Making use of the derived
expressions for k and 1. we finally obtain
9~4_192~~+144~~2+48~113+6114
IS()\/S
~ = _~~ _ 123~2+86~11-9TJ2 IS7~3+132~~+I~112_24113
ISO (17)
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150'15
129
(18)
Observe once again that these differential equations are exact. They follow from the
nonlinear system using the transformation of coordinates. The new equations look rather
awkward, but they have the advantage that they are diagonalized in the linear terms.
Moreover, the coefficients of the linear terms are the eigenvalues, -5(3 and O.
As there is linear damping in (17) we may assume that the system is stable in the
variable ;, i.e., we can equate (17) to zero, thus obtaining an implicit equation relating ~
and 11. This relation can be interpreted to provide the value of the former as dependent on
the latter, so that; might be eliminated from (18) which turns into a differential equation
for the slowly changing mode 11 alone. We shall not follow this use of the "slaving
principle" or "adiabatic elimination" any further. Details can be found in Haken (1977,
1983).
The value of the example is that it illuminates the manner in which computations are
carried out in systems like this. Because of the nonlinearities the arithmetic labour can
become formidable. The value of the slaving principle lies in the fact that in the study of
instabilities the stable modes can be neglected and treated as instantaneously damped. In
order to find out which modes are stable and which are unstable the Haken method of
diagonalization of nonlinear systems is needed, because the original variables seldom fall
into stable or unstable categories as they appear.
4. DIFFUSION
Let us now introduce space and diffusion. Suppose there is a tendency for the marginal
productivity of capital and labour to be equalized over space. If there are spatial
differences in marginal factor productivities, factors are assumed to flow from locations
of low to locations of high marginal productivity.
Using the commonplace symbol V 2 =(a2/ax2+a2/a y2) for the Laplacian measure of
spatial differences, x and y denoting the space coordinates, we introduce the diffusion
terms
- ~ V2(2Cl~(k+.L) - 3ak2)
- ~ V2(2Cl~(k+.L) - 3a.L2)
(19)
(20)
in the right hand sides of equations (4) and (5) respectively. Next, assume that the
functions to which the Laplacian operator is applied solve the eigenvalue problem
v 2 Si(X,y) =- Ai Si(x,y) (21)
where the Si(x,y) are the eigenfunctions associated with the shape of the region in space.
When the marginal productivities of capital and labour vary over space according to any
of the eigenfunctions, then (19)-(20) can be replaced by
~ Ai(2Cl~(k+.L) - 3ak2)
~ A.j(2Cl~(k+.L) - 3a.L2)
(22)
(23)
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where the spatial operators are no longer present We have chosen different indices for the
two eigenvalues in order to stress that the marginal productivities of capital and labour
need not vary in accordance with the same eigenfunction.
We now want to study the linear stability of a spatially homogeneous stationary
solution. In the case of spatial homogeneity the diffusion terms vanish and we are left
with the original system (4)-(5). Accordingly, the same stationary solutions k and 1 apply
as before. In order to investigate stability in the neighbourhood of this solution we
introduce the linearization (6)-(7), but now we have to add linearizations of the diffusion
terms (22)-(23). This transforms (6)-(7) into
k=(k+BAi)(2a~-6ak)(k-k) + (k + BAi)2a~(L-L)
L =(L2+ BAj)2a~(k-k) + «L2+ BAj)(2a~-6aL) -l)(L-L).
(24)
(25)
Let us find out how the determinant and trace of this new system differ from those of
the system (6)-(7). In order to distinguish the new ones we denote them Tr* and Det*.
Some computation shows that
and
Tr* =Tr + BAi 2a(~-3k) + BAj 2a(~-3L)
Det* = (1+ BAi/k)« BAjlL2)2ak(~-3k) + Det).
(26)
(27)
The diffusion constant Bis positive as before, and so are the eigenvalues Ai and A.; as
can be demonstrated by applying Green's first identity to (21) multiplied by Si. See
Courant and Hilbert (1953). Finally, the equilibrium values k and L are also positive. We
see that the determin.!'-nt is increased or decreased with ascending eigenvalues Aj
depending on whether k is smaller or larger than the critical value ~3.
Thus, if capital stock in a spatially homogeneous stationary equilibrium is larger than a
certain critical value, then the determinant of (24)-(25) decreases for increasingly
nonhomogeneous modes of spatial variation. Put succinctly, the spatially homogeneous
solution is unstable if capital stock exceeds a certain critical value. This is in line with the
conclusion in Puu (1985) that exceeding a threshold of technological efficiency conditions
agglomerative patterns. Obviously the same role is played by a sufficiently large
accumulation of capital.
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CHAPTER 10
Finite Spectral Analysis of Multiregional
Time Series
T.E. Smith
1 . INTRODUCTION
133
Applications of spectral analysis to multiregional time series now abound in the literature,
and have been well summarized by Bennett (1979) and others. But unlike more traditional
multivariate techniques, such as regression and correlation analysis, the techniques
employed in multivariate spectral analysis are relatively sophisticated in nature. Moreover,
while many systematic developments of this theory exist in the literature (including
Jenkins and Watts (1968), Hannan (1970), Dhrymes (1970), Brillinger (1975), and
Fuller (1976), among others), the underlying mathematical theory of stochastic (Fourier)
integrals is unfamiliar to most potential users. In fact, the fundamental spectral
representation theorem for stationary processes, which forms the corner stone of the
entire theory, can only be proved by methods which are beyond the scope of most
standard texts on the subject (see for example the proofs in Hannan (1970; Theorem
2.3.2") and in Cramer and Leadbetter (1967; sections 7.5 and 8.1». With this in mind,
the central objective of this paper is to develop a conceptually simpler and more heuristic
approach to multivariate spectral analysis.
This approach, which we designate asfinite spectral analysis, essentially reduces the
classical inf'mite-dimensional formulation of spectral analysis to a finite-dimensional
version of principal components analysis. Within this fmite-dimensional framework, the
spectral representation theorem together with its analytical consequences can be derived in
an elementary manner (requiring only matrix algebra). The mathematical possibility of
such a reduction is by no means new to the literature. In particular, it has long been
known that the principle components generated by finite segments of (absolutely
summable) stationary processes converge to the spectral representation of the entire
process as the segment becomes arbitrarily large (see for example Brillinger (1975;
section 4.7) and Fuller (1976; sections 4.2 and 7.4». The standard proof of this result
employs an approximation of stationary covariance matrices by 'circulant' matrices which
can be spectrally decomposed in a simple way. Moreover, it is also well known that such
matrices correspond to the covariance structures of stationary periodic processes (see for
example Jenkins and Watts (1968; section 11.1.2), Anderson (1971; section 6.5.2), and
Streitberg (1979; section 6.2.3.3». These stochastic processes, which we designate as
finitely-stationary processes, are of central importance in the present approach. In
particular, it will be argued that such processes constitute the simplest stationary
processes which can capture all the statistical covariation within a given finite stationary
sample sequence, or stationary segment. Moreover, since all actual observations on
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stationary processes are restricted to such segments, it is appropriate to seek the simplest
model of the unknown process which is consistent with this observed information. Thus,
our approach is to model an infmite stationary process in terms of the finitely-stationary
process which 'best' represents its observable stationary segment.
Given this objective, our central theoretical result is to show that there exists a unique
(normalized) finitely-stationary process which best represents a given stationary segment
in terms of the 'max-min correlation' between their corresponding components. This
process, designated here as the circular smoothing of a stationary segment, is essentially a
periodic moving average of the underlying segment. The spectral representation of this
process is readily derivable in closed form, and is shown to yield a simple geometric
model for studying the possible cyclical behavior implied by the observed segment.
Moreover, the statistical 'spectrum' of this process is shown to correspond precisely to
the periodogram of the original segment. Since the sample form of this periodogram
constitutes the basic set of statistics upon which all standard spectral estimators are based,
these results yield a new and direct theoretical interpretation of classical spectral analysis.
Hence, this finitely-stationary model of infinite processes provides all the theory needed
for actual calculations - in a simple and easily intelligible form. In addition, these results
provide a new theoretical underpinning for the many practical applications of finite
Fourier transforms to the approximation of stationary covariance structures, as in the
methods of 'spectral regression' studied by Duncan and Jones (1966), Engle (1974), and
Harvey (1978).
In order to motivate the basic rationale for this finite approach, it is convenient to begin
in the next section with an informal development and discussion of the main results. The
formal development will begin in Section 3 with a general analysis of finitely-stationary
processes, including both the real and complex spectral representations of such processes.
These representations are interpreted in geometric terms, and are compared to the ordinary
principle components for such processes. The main results of the paper are developed in
Section 4, where circular-smoothing processes are developed formally and shown to be
optimal representatives of stationary segments. The results of Section 3 are then applied to
these processes to show that their spectra correspond to the periodograms of the segments
which they represent.
2. MOTIVATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Consider a sequence of random variables Ytj describing the behavior of a given regional
attribute (employment level, per capita income level, etc.) within a system of regions
j=l,..,n over time periods t e T = {...,-I,O,I,... }. If Y~ = (Ytl,.. ,Ytj,.. ,Ytn) denotes the
associated random vector of regional variates at time t, l then the resulting sequence of
random vectors {Yt I t e T } over time defines an n-dimensional stochastic process, or n-
process. Next, letting m(t) = E(Yt> denote the mean of Yt and Xt =Yt - m(t) denote the
residual of YI about its mean, we may express Yt as the sum of two components:
Yt =m(t) +Xt te T (2.1)
Hence, the n-process {Yt It e T} is seen to be decomposable into a deterministic trend
sequence (m(t) I t e T} and a stochastic residual process X = {Xt It e T}. In terms of
this decomposition our present interest focuses exclusively on the stochastic structure of
the residual process X.
lSince the present analysis is meaningful for any random vector of attributes. one may easily consid17
multiple regional attnbutes by letting each Ytj denote a vector of regional attributes Ytjk' However, for
notational simplicity, we shall treat each regional component as a single random variable.
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To analyze this process directly, it is convenient to assume that the trend term m(t) is
either known or can be determined explicitly, and hence that the residuals Xt =Yt - m(t)
can be treated as obseIVable quantities. As a next step in the analysis of X, obseIVe that
by definition the sequence of residual variates {Xl. I t eT} is zero - mean stationary in the
sense that E(Xt) = E(YJ -m(t) = 0 for all t E T. Uur major statistical hypothesis about X
is that its covariance structure also remains stationary over time. More precisely, it is
hypothesized that the covariance between any residuals Xt and Xt+t depends only on the
time lag t between them, i.e. that for all t, v, t', v' e T with t-v =t'-v' =t.
cov(Xt, Xy ) =cov(Xt" Xy ') =K(t) . (2.2)
Under this hypothesis, X is said to be stationary (i.e. covariance stationary and zero-
mean stationary) withcovariancekernelK =(K(t) I t e T}.
2.1 The Finite-Sample Problem
Even assuming that each residual variate Xt is potentially obseIVable, it is clear that the
process X can never be obseIVed in its entirety. In particular, for each sample sequence
Xt"",Xt+T which can actually be obseIVed, the unknown process X can only be viewed
through the fmite sample window [t,..,t+T] shown below:
X = {..., Xt-I' [Xt,··,Xt+T] , Xt+T+I,'''}
\. /
(?) ~ sample'window 4 (?)
Thus, from a practical viewpoint, the most basic problem to be addressed is how to treat
the rest of the process X outside this sample window. Our approach to this problem
marks a fundamental point of departure from more standard methods of analyzing
stationary processes. The essence of this approach is to discard the unobseIVable portion
of X and to construct a simpler stationary model of X which involves only the
information contained in the obseIVable portion of X.
2.2 Finitely-Stationary Processes
To motivate this approach, we begin by considering the possible covariance information
which is contained in a given finite segment of X. If XT =[Xo""XT] denotes a given
stationary segment from X, then obseIVing that cov(Xr,Xo) =K(t) and cov(Xo,X,:> =
K(-t) for each t =O,l,.. ,T, we may conclude that XT yields information about the finite
segment [K(-T),.. ,K(O),..,K(T)] of the covariance kernel K for X. This in tum implies
from the definition of stationarity that for any time period t e T, the segment XT yields
information about the covariance relationships between Xt and those variates within T
time periods of t, i.e. within a covariance window [t-T,.. ,t,..t+T] about t, as shown
below:
X ={..., Xt-T-I' [Xt-T,,,,Xt,,,,Xt+T] , Xt+T+I''''}
(?) ~ ~ovarian;e windo~ 4 (?)
On the other hand, the joint distribution of the random vectors in XT can never yield
information about the statistical relations between Xt and any variates outside this
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covariance window. Thus, to capture all the covariance information contained in XT, it
suffices to consider a representative covariance window in X.
With this in mind, we now consider stationary models of X in which all relevant
stochastic behavior can be represented by an arbitrary covariance window, i.e. by an
arbitrary segment of 2T + 1 time periods. To do so, observe ftrst that the only stochastic
processes Z = {Zt I t e T} which can possibly be represented by a ftnite
segment [Zt-T,.. ,Zt,.. ,Zt+Tl are those 'periodic' processes which amount simply to
repetitions of this segment, i.e. in which all random variates 2T + 1 time periods apart are
identical. To make this notion precise, it is convenient to introduce the following
equivalence relation over time periods. Ifwe now denote the particular interval of 2T + 1
time periods centered about the origin by [T] =[-T,..,O,.. ,T] then for each time period
t e T we may defme the T-equivalent <t> of t to be the unique element of [T] which
differs from t by an integral multiple of 2T + 1.
In these terms, an n-process Z = {Zt It e T } is said to be T-periodic if and only if
Xt =X<t> for all t e T. Hence each T-perlodic process Z is completely representable by
any segment of 2T + I time periods, and in particular, by the centered segment Z[T] =
[Z_T,,,,Zo,,,,ZTl. With this definition, it follows that the models we seek for the
unknown stationary process X consist precisely of those stationary processes which are
also T-periodic. We now designate such processes as T-stationary processes,2 and
denote the class of such processes by PT' When the speciftcation of T is not relevant, we
speak simply ofjinitely-stationary processes.
To clarify this notion of fmite-stationarity further, it is instructive to observe that even
if a T-periodic process Z is generated by a stationary segment Z[T] =[Z_T,,,,Zo,,,ZTl,
the process Z itself need not to be stationary. For if Z[T] is a segment from a stationary
process with covariance kernel K, then observing that <T+l> =-T, we set that Z can
only be stationary if K(2T) =coV(q,Z_T) =cov(q,ZT+l) =cov(Zo,Zl) =K(-l). But
since this identity fails to hold for arbitrary covariance kernels K, we may conclude that
something more is implied by ftnite-stationarity. The additional conditions which will
ensure T-stationarity of Z may be clarifted in geometric terms by wrapping the interval
[T] around the circle, as shown in Figure 2.1.
This ftgure shows that adjacencies among the random vectors in aT-periodic process
Z correspond precisely to adjacencies on the circle. For example, the random vectors q
and q+2 in Z are two time periods apart, and their corresponding positions T and l-T =
<T+2> are two positions apart on the circle in Figure 2.1. Hence, we see that T-
stationarity of Z corresponds to 'circular' stationarity of its ftnite representation Z[T] =
[Z_T,,,,Zo,,,ZTl. In view of this circularity property, ftnitely-stationary processes are
often referred to as 'circular processes' in the literature (see for example Anderson (1971)
and Streitberg (1979».
2.3 Circular-Smoothing Processes
From among all possible T-stationary processes Z e PT which could be employed to
model X, we seek to identify a unique process which in some sense 'best' represents the
observable portion XT of X. To do so, let us first recall that since the desired T-stationary
process Z is intended to model an arbitrary covariance window [t-T,..,t.".t+T], the actual
position of the time interval [O,..,T] in Z is completely arbitrary. This means that in order
to determine how well a given process Z represents XT =[Xo,..,xTl, we must take into
account all possible positions which XT could occupy in Z. As can be seen from the
2Note that since the actual pmod of repetition in aT-periodic process is the full length of the intezval [TJ,
it would be more precise to refer to [TJ-periodic and [TJ-stationary processes. However, for notational
simplicity, we choose to drop the brackets.
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circular representation of Z in Figure 2.1, there are only 2T + 1 distinct positions which
the sequence [Xo,..,XT] could occupy in Z, namely one for each possible location of Xo
a
T-l
-T
Figure 2.1 Circular Adjacencies
T
on the circle.3 In order to compare Z with each of these positional possibilities for XT, it
is convenient to construct a set of independent positional replicates X~ =[x:,..,X~] of
XT, one for each position as shown in Figure 2.2. By correlating each replicate
[~, .. ,X;J with its corresponding segment [Z('t>,..,Z('t+T>] in Z, we will then be able to
measure how well Z agrees with XT over all possible positions. Hence for each random
variable~. in the component vectors ~ of X't
T
, we now designate the correlation
~ tp(~., Z(Ht>j') between X't. and its corresponding representation Z(Ht>j' in Z(Ht> as the
tj tj
(t,tj)-positional correlation between XT and Z.
3To see this. recall that T-periodicity implies that lZt,..-Zt+T] = [Z<t>...,z<t+T>] for all t e T, and that
each interval [<t>,..•<t+T>] is by definition on the circle in Figure 2.1. 1
·
·
·
·
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Figure 2.2 Positional Replications
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Given these positional correlation measures, we seek finally to determine a T-
stationary process Z'" e PT which in some sense best represents XT with respect to this
entire set of criteria. To identify such a process Z"', observe first that it is naturally
desirable for all these correlations with Z'" to be positive. Hence, if we now denote the
minimum positional correlation between XT and Z e PT by
p(XT,Z) = min p(Xt., Z('t+t>j)
('t,tj) tJ
then it is appropriate to focus our attention on the set
P; =(Z e PT I p(XT,Z) > O}
(2.3)
(2.4)
of T-stationary processes which are uniformly positively correlated with XT. Moreover, it
is evident from the definition of P; that if there exists a process Z'" e P; for which this
minimum positional correlation is maximized, i.e. for which
p(XT,Z"') = max P(XT'Z)
ZePt
(2.5)
then from among all T-stationary processes, Z'" may be said to exhibit maximal uniform
agreement with XT over all possible positions which this segment could occupy. Hence
we now designate such a process Z'" as a best uniform representative of XT in P;.
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In this context, our main result (Theorem 4.1 below) is to show that there exists an
essentially unique best uniform representative of XT in PT' Moreover, this T-stationary
process C ={Ct It E T}, which we now designate as a circular-smoothing process, is
constructable from XT by simply averaging the contributions of all positional replicates of
XT to each location on the circle in Figure 2.2. To be more ~xplicit,observe from Figure
2.2 that the vector components of each positional replicate XC which correspond to any
given location t on the circle are precisely those in the t-th colJmn of the matrix in Figure
2.3. Hence the finite representation C[T] = [C-T,.. ,Co,.. ,CT] of the desired T-periodic
process C is constructable by simply averaging the random vectors in each column of this
matrix. The resulting circular smoothing C = {Ct I t E T} of XT is thus detined formally
for all t E T by:
T <t-'t>
__1_ L X't
Ct - ThJ. 't=O (2.6)
The choice of scaling factor (l...JT+1 ) is designed to ensure that each random vector Ct in
C has precisely the same aUlocovariance structure K(O) as the original random vectors Xt
in X (as shown in expression (4.9) below).
-T I-T • -I o 1 • • T-I T
XiT
Xt-T
XiI
xoT X- T X-T X-TI • • T-I T
xJ-T • • • • Xt:.T Xt-T
xol XII... • • XiI
X~
Xt
•
Xt
X8 X~·
xJ·
• X~_I X~
• Xt-I
Xt-l
Xt
xl-l
xi xl . Xt
xl-I xi- I
xl
Figure 2.3 Contributions of Positional Replications
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2.4 Spectral Representations of Circular-Smoothing Processes
From an analytical viewpoint, the central feature of circular-smoothing processes is the
simplicity of their spectral representation. First of all, this representation is expressible in
terms of ordinary random vectors, and is derivable from elementary considerations.
Second, and even more important, the covariance 'spectrum' of this representation
corresponds precisely to the periodogram of the original sample segment XT =
[Xo,.. ,XTl, and thus provides a new and simple theoretical interpretation of standard
spectral estimators.
To state these results more precisely, we first consider the spectral representation of a
general T-stationary process Z. For simplicity, here we only consider the real-valued
spectral representation of Z (the complex-valued spectral representation is derived in
Section 3.1 below and compared both statistically and geometrically with the real-valued
representation in Section 3.2 below). For this case, the appropriate spectral representation
theorem (Theorem 3.1 below) shows that each random vector Zt ofZ can be decomposed
into a trigonometric sum
T
Zt = W°+ I. + [cos(2n:tt/2T+1) Wt + sin(2n:tt/2T+1)Vtl
t=1
(2.7)
of random spectral-weight vectors (Wo,W1,.. ,WT,vl,"'VT), Moreover, these random
vectors are 'linearly uncorrelated' in the sense that for every linear function a'Zt of Zt. the
corresponding random variables (a'Wo,..,a'WT,a'Vl,..,a'VT) are mutually uncorrelated
(see Corollary 3.1 below). As mentioned in the introduction, this representation closely
resembles the orthogonal decomposition of the finite representation [Z-T,..,Zo,...z.rl of Z
into principle components. The relation between these two orthogonal decompositions is
examined in Section 3.3 below, where it is shown that the spectral-weight vectors are
proportional to an orthonormal transformation of the principle components. Hence they
may be viewed in geometric terms as essentially a rotation of the principle components.
The primary advantage of this spectral representation over the more general principle
components representation is the simple form of the trigonometric coefficients in (2.7). In
particular, if for each t =1,..,T we now let~ =t/2T+1, then cos(2n:COtt) and sin(2n:wt t)
are both seen to be periodic functions of time with the same frequency COt Hence, in the
spectral representation of Z, each random vector Zt is decomposed into a sum of
uncorrelated cyclical components which may serve to reveal hidden periodicities in the
stochastic structure of Z. The geometric interpretation of these cyclical components is
considered in more detail in Section 3.2 below.
Finally, it may be observed that this spectral representation is precisely the finite
analogue of the more general infinite-dimensional representation of stationary processes
by stochastic Fourier integrals (see the Remark following the statement of Theorem 3.1).
In the present representation, the abstract notion of a stochastic integral is replaced by a
simple sum of random variables, which is much more readily interpretable. A number of
consequences of this interpretation are developed in detail in Smith (1981). For our
present purposes, the single most important consequence of this fmite representation is
that the abstract 'cospectral' and 'quadrature spectral' moment-density matrices
(associated, respectively, with the real and imaginary parts of the stochastic-integral
representation) are here interpretable directly in terms of the covariances among spectral-
weight vectors. In particular, it is shown in Section 4.3 below that the appropriate
cospectrum ~ and quadrature spectrum 11 for Z are expressible as scaled covariance
matrices defined, respectively, for each frequency ~ (t =1,..,T) as follows:
T.E. Smith
~ 2T+l 2T+l
1 Z(Cllr) =-- cov(Wt,Wt) =-- cov(Vt,Vt)
4n 4n
....<I 2T+l 2T+l
1 i(Cllr) =-- cov(Wt,Vt ) =- -- cov(Vt,Wt)·4n 4n
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(2.9)
The pair of functions ~. I1) is designed simply as the Z-specfrUm.
Finally, turning to the specific case of circular-smoothing processes C ={Ct It e T},
it is shown in Section 4.3 below that the C-spectrum corresponds precisely to the
periodogram of the original sample segment XT. More fonnally, if for a given sample
segment XT = ["o""XT] we now derme the coperiodogram P~ and quadrature
periodogram pi (corresponding to the real and imaginary parts of the complex-valued
periodogram for XT), respectively, for each frequency Cllr (t=I,..,T) by:
c 1 0+1 - Ihl)PT(Cllr) = - L T+l cos(2n Cllr h) K(h)
2n hem
...0 1 0+1 - Ihl) .rt(Cllr) =-- L T+l sm(2n Cllr h) K(h)
2n hem
then our central result is to show that
(2.10)
(2.11)
~(Cllr)=P~(rot)
rt(Cllr) =pi(rot)
t=I,..,T
t=I,..,T.
(2.12)
(2.13)
In other words, if the pair of functions (P~pll-cl. is now designated as the XT-
periodogram, then (2.12) and (2.13) show that the X1 periodogram is equivalent to the
C-spectrum for the circular smoothing C ofXT. In view of this equivalence, the standard
sample periodogram
AI: 1 0+1 - Ihl) A1";'<Cllr) =- L T+1 cos(2n Cllr h) K(h)
2n hem
(2.14)
(2.15)tin 1 0+1 - Ihl) . AytfCllr) =- - L T+l sm(2n Cllr h) K(h)
2n hem
constructed in terms of the sample covariance kernel (i(h) I he e [T]} for a given set of
observations [Xo,..,XT] is now seen to yield a direct (unbiased) estimate of the C-
spectrum.4 Hence the standard periodogram techniques for estimating the infmite spectra
40rhe sample covariance kernel t. for a stationary segment XT =[Xo,..,xT) is defmed by t.(h) =
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of stationary processes X can now be given a new theoretical interpretation. In particular,
the correspondence above shows that use of sample Xrperiodograms to approximate the
infinite spectrum for X is theoretically equivalent to direct estimation of the finite C-
spectrum for XT.5
3. SPECTRAL REPRESENTATION OF FINITELY·STATIONARY
PROCESSES
The spectral representation offmitely-stationary (circular) processes is well known for the
univariate case (see for example Anderson (1971), Brillinger (1975), Fuller (1976), and
Streitberg (1979». However, the multivariate extensions of these results are far less well
known (see Wahba (1968) and Fuller (1976; sector 7.4) for treatments of the bivariate
case). Moreover, since these results are of central importance for finite spectral analysis, it
is appropriate to present a self-contained development of the multivariate spectral
representation theorem at this time.
To do so, let us begin by observing that if a given n-process Z = (Zt I t E T}is T-
stationary, then the covariance matrix K for the finite representation Z[T] =
[Z.T,",Zo..,Zr] of Z must have the patterned structure shown in Figure 3.1.
This matrix is referred to as 'block circulant' because the individual covariance
matrices [K(-T),..,K(O),.K(T)] are seen to be rotated by one position in each adjacent
column (or row) block. Hence, if we observe that these column rotations can be
accomplished by the permutation matrix P shown below,
010"'0 I
r -T1 1-T
P = I
. . 0 1 => p I ~ = 1 I (3.1)o 1
10' "·0 -T
then it is clear that K can be written as an appropriate sum of successive permutations of
the basic covariance matrices [K(-T),..K(O),.. ,K(T)]. To do so in a simple way, it is
convenient to introduce tensor-product notation. For if we now define the tensor product
A~B of any two matrices A and B by
(f+1-h)-1~ Xt+h Xi for h=O•...•T and t(h) = (f+l-h)-l ~-h Xt X~+h for h=-I,..•-T. These statistics
are easily seen to yield unbiased estimates of the covariance kernel K (see for example Fuller(1976;
section 6.5», so that (2.14) and (2.15) in turn yield unbiased estimates of the XT-periodogram.
5This theoretical equivalence also shows that the classical problem ofconstructing consistent estimates of
infmite spectra has a fmite interpretation which is directly analogous to the 'heteroscedasticity problem'
for ordinary regression residuals (as observed by Duncan and lones (1966) for example). For as in the case
of variance estimation under general heteroscedasticity. the numbec of spectral moments to be estimated in
the C -spectrum grows as fast as the sample size. Hence there is no hope of obtaining consistent
estimators without furthu struclUra1 assumptions. As one possibility. if the C-spectrum is assumed to be
'sufficiently constant' over small frequency bands, then following Duncan and lones (1966), one may
construct consistent spectral estimates by pooling XT-periodogram values over these frequency bands.
Alternatively, if the covariances between sample Xrperiodogram matrices at different frequencies are
assumed to be 'sufficiently small', then consistent estimators can also be constructed in terms of
appropriate moving averages of these periodogmm values (see for example Theorem 7.2.2. and Corollary
7.2.2. in Fullez (1976».
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al~B .. a1:Bj
aml B .. amnB
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(3.2)
then the circulant structure of the column blocks in K can be displayed explicitly as
K = P-T~K(-T) + ... + pT~K(T) = l; pt~K('t)
tE[11
(3.3)
where each 't-th power pt of P corresponds to a column rotation by't positions. The
general class of block-circulant matrices representable by (3.3) is fully analyzed in Davis
(1979; section 5.6). By applying these general results to the special case of covariance
matrices (i.e. symmetric positive semidefinite matrices) we shall obtain a 'block
diagonalization' of K which is the core of the spectral representation.
Z-T Zl-T 0 oZ_l Zo Zl 0 o ZT-l ZT
Z-T
Zl-T
K(O)
K(-l)
K(l) 0 oK(T-l) K(T) K(-T) 0 0 K(-2) K(-l)
K(-2)
Z_l
Zo
K(l-T)
K(-T)
K(O)
K(-l)
K(l)
K(O) K(l)
K(-T)
K(T)
Zl
ZT-l
K(T)
K(2)
K(-l) K(O) K(T-l)
K(l)
ZT K(l) K(2) 0 oK(T) K(-T) K(l-T) 0 0 K(-l) K(O)
Figure 3.1 Block Circulant Covariance Matrix
The key to this construction is the observation that all powers pt of the permutation
matrix can be simultaneously diagonalized by a simple 'Fourier' matrix as follows. For
each 't E [T] let
rt =exp(i21t't/2T+1) =cos(21t't/2T+1) + i sin(21t't/2T+1) (3.4)
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where i =..r:r and observe that r;T+1 =cos(2x't) + i sin(2x't) =I for all 'to Hence (3.4)
defines the distinct (2T + I)-th roots ofunity. If for each power v E [T] of the 't-th root we
designate
I v
---= rfn = ...J2T+1 't 'to v e [T] (3.5)
as the (v.'t)-th Fourier coefficient. then these coefficients define the following symmetric
Fourier matrix:
F [
LT•.T ..
fT._T .
LTT]
. fT.~ = I...J2T+1 [ -T -T ]r ..r:r.T ... rT (3.6)
Finally. recalling the definition ofT-equivalents <t> for each integer t e T. and observing
that r 't rv = r v-I =r <v.I> holds identically for all veT. it follows that multiplication of
-'t't't
the 't-th column of F by r_'t effectively rotates all elements up by one position. Hence
letting
A = diag(rT....rO....rT)
denote the diagonal matrix of roots of unity. we may conclude that
PF = FA.
(3.7)
(3.8)
In other words. each root r't is a (complex) eigen value of the permutation matrix P with
associated eigen vector equal to the (-'t)-th column of F. Moreover. if for each complex
number c = a+ib we letc = a-ib denote the conjugate of c. and for each complex matrix C
=(Cjk) let C= (Cjk) and C* = C' denote the conjugate and conjugate transpose of C.
respectively. then by employing the identity
L rv = { 2T + I • 't = 0 (3.9)
vern 't 0 . 't *" 0
one may readily verify that F*F = FF* = I. and hence that F·1 = F*. Thus F is a unitary
matrix (the complex generalization of an orthonormal matrix). and (3.8) may be written
as6
P = FAF* .
lbis diagonalization of P implies at once that
(3.10)
6This result is easily seen to be equivalent to Theorem 3.2.1 in Davis (1979) with appropriate relabeling
of the elements of F and 6.
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(3.11)
so that all powers of P are, indeed, simultaneously diagonalized by F. This means that K
may be further decomposed in terms of F by employing the tensor-product identities
AB~CD=(A~C)(B~D) and L A~B't =A~LB't to write K as
't 't
K = L (F.1'tF*)~(IK(t)I)
'tE[T]
= L (F~I) [.1't~K(t)](F*~I)
'tE[T]
= (F~I)[ L .1't~K(t)](F*~I).
'tE[T]
(3.12)
This is in fact the block-diagonalization of K which we seek, as can be seen more clearly
by noting that
L .1't~K(t) =
'tE[T]
where for each tE[T]
L r't K(t)
'tE[T] T
'. L r't K(t)
-T
'tE[T]
=
H_T
'HT (3.13)
~ = L rV K(v) = L r V K(v) .
-'t 't
vE[T] vE[T]
(3.14)
Hence, employing this notation, and observing that (F*~I) =(F~I)*, we may rewrite
(3.12) as
K = (FI8>I) [ "-T.
'HT
] (FI8>I)·_ (3.15)
Finally, observing that (F~I) is itself unitary (since (F~I)(F~I)* =FF*~I =I) we arrive
at the fundamental result that: every finitely-stationary covariance matrix is block-
diagonalized by the same unitary matrix (F~1).7
7This result is a special case of Theorem 5.6.4 in Davis (1979), as may be seen by writing expression
(3.12) in the following alternative fonn:
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3. 1 Complex Spectral Representation
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To utilize this decomposition, it is convenient to express the finite representation
[Z_T""Zo•.. ,ZT] of Z as a single vector
[
Z_T]
Z = ~ => cov(Z) =K .
With this notation, the following linear transfonnation
'2~+1 ~@l)'Z = S = [:: ]
(3.16)
(3.17)
yields a complex-valued random vector S which we designate as the complex spectra/-
weight vector. If we express this random vector in tenns of real and imaginary parts as S
=X + iY, then the covariance matrix for S may be defined as
cov(S) =E(SS*) =E[(X + iY)(X'-iY')]
= [E(XX')+E(YY')] + i[E(YX') -E(XY')]
(3.18)
where E(XX'), E(YY'), E(XY'), and E(YX') are ordinary covariance matrices for the
real random vectors X and Y (see for example Fuller (1976; section 1.5». With this
definition, it follows at once from (3.15) through (3.17) that
1 1 [cov(S) =2T+1 (F~I)* K (F~I) = 2T+1
RT
H T 1. (3.19)
K = (F®I) [L (L:\'tI)®(FF*ArFF*)](F®I)*
't
= (F®I)(I®F) [L .1.'t®F*ArFl (I®F*)(F"®I)
't
= (F®F) [L .1.'t®F*ArFl (F®F)* .
't
Hence, the appropriate relabeling of elements in F and .1. (mentioned in footnote 6 above) is easily seen to
yield the special case of Theorem 5.6.4 in which n =m.
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Hence the n-vector components (S.T""So,,,,ST) of S are seen to be mutually
uncorrelated random vectors with respective covariance matrices
1
cov(St) = 2T+l ~ , tE[T] . (3.20)
Finally, observe from (3.17) together with the definition of Fourier coefficients in (3.5)
that Z can be expressed as[r] ~ '2T+! (F0QS = [r:l. .. r!I] [~.T]
r_TI .. rTI ST
(3.21)
Thus, from (3.4) it follows that each random vector Zt in Z can be written explicitly in
terms of (S_T""So""ST) as
Zt = E ~ St = E St exp(i A.-rt)
tE[T] tE[T]
tET (3.22)
where At = 21tt/2T+l for each tE[T]. This representation of Z in terms of the
uncorrelated complex random vectors (S.T""So""ST) is designated as the complex
spectral representation of Z.
Each term in this representation is designated as the complex cosinusoidal component
Ct(t) = St exp(iAtt) of Z with angular frequency At. In order to interpret these
components in geometric terms, it is convenient to focus on a selected individual
(univariate) process Zj = {Ztj It E T} within the n-process Z. If we express the
corresponding spectral weights Stj = Xrj + iYtj in polar-coordinate form as Stj =
IStjl exp(iPtj), where IStjl = (X~j + Y~l/2 and Ptj = tan- 1(ytjlXtj), then each
cosinusoidal component in the spectral representation of Zj can be written as
~it) = IStjl exp [i(A..rt + Ptj)]
= IStjl cos(A.-rt + Ptj) + i IStjl sin(A.-rt + Ptj)' (3.23)
Hence, if for any realization of the (real) random variables IStjl and Ptj we plot out the
resulting function ~j(t) in the complex plane, as in Figure 3.2 (where each complex
number c = x+iy is represented by the pair (x,y», then in geometric terms this function is
seen to wrap the real-time line around a circle of radius IStjl about the origin. In other
words, the passage of time is here represented geometrically by (counter-clockwise)
rotation around this circle. In particular, the time coefficient A.-r determines the arc angle
(in radians) swept per unit of time, and is indeed seen to be the angular frequency of
rotation. Similarly the time translation term Ptj is seen to determine the position of time t =
oon the circle, i.e. the initial phase angle of rotation, and the radius IStjl is seen to
determine the amplitude of rotation. For further discussion of these complex cosinusoidal
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functions see. for example. Dhrymes (1970; sect. 10.1). Brillinger (1975; sect. 1.2), and
Fuller (1976; sect. 3.2).
y
x
Figure 3.2 Complex Cosinusoidal Functions
3.2 Real Spectral Representation
The final step in our analysis of finitely-stationary processes is to transform the complex
spectral representation above into real terms. To do so. we first observe that this
representation can in fact be constructed entirely in terms of the subset of spectral-weight
vectors (So,SI ....ST). In particular, the argument of (3.21) and (3.22) applied to (3.17)
shows that
St = -.L.. :E f 7 _ 1 "'-v
V2T+I v V't LJy - ffif ~ r t Zv
1 v -
=~:Er 7 - S
.Ll+l v -t --v - -t
(3.24)
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and hence that each random vector S_1: is the conjugate of S1: for 't = 1,...,T. Employing
this result, we may now transform the complex spectral representation of (3.22) into real
terms as follows. If 0)1: =A,J21C denotes the time frequency associated with each angular
frequency A.c, then in terms of these real-time frequencies, we have the following real
spectral representation of Z (where 0 denotes the zero matrix):
Theorem 3.1 (Spectral Representation Theorem) For any real T-stationary n-
process Z ={Zt I te T} there exist real random (spectral-weight) vectors
(Wo,Wlo..,WT,Vlo..,vT) such thatfor all teT,
T
Zr = W0 + It [COS(21C OO-rt)W1: + sin(21C OO-rt) V1:].
1:=1
In addition these random vectors satisfy
cov(W1:' Ws) = cov(V1:' Vs) = cov(W1:' Vs> =0
for all 't =O,l,.. ,T and s =1,..,T with s ~ 't, and satisfy
cov(W1:'W1:) = cov(V1:,v1:)
cov(W1:'V1:) = - cov(V1:'W1:)
for all 't =O,l,..,T .
(3.25)
(3.26)
(3.27)
(3.28)
Remark: The statement of this theorem is seen to be exactly parallel to the more general
infinite spectral representations of stationary vector processes. For example, expressions
(3.25), (3.26), (3.27), and (3.28) are precisely the finite analogues of expressions
(10.2.68), (10.2.69), (10.2.84), and (10.2.85) in Dhrymes (1970).
fmQf: First, writing each complex spectral-weight vector as S1: =X-r + i Y1:' it follows
from (3.5), (3.6) and (3.21) that each Zr can be expressed as
T t T .t _
Zr = So + It r S1: + It r S1:
1:=1 1: 1:=1 1:
T
= (Xo + i Yo) + It [COS(21C OO-rt) + i Sin(21C OO-rt)] <X-r + i Y1:)
1:=1
T
+ It [COS(21C OO-rt) - i sin(21C OO-rt)] (X-r - i Y1:)
1:=1
T T
=[Xo + 2 It COS(21C OO-rt) X-r -2 It Sin(21C OO-rt) Y1:] + i Yo.
1:=1 1:=1
(3.29)
But since Zr is real, we may conclude that Yo = O. Hence, if we now define the real
spectral-weight vectors (Wo,Wt,..,WT,Vl,..,vT) by
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Wo =Xo
W't = 2X't
V't = - 2Y't
t = 1,..,T
t = 1,.. ,T
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(3.30)
(3.31)
(3.32)
it follows at once from (3.29) that (3.25) must hold for this choice of random vectors.
Thus it remains only to verify that conditions (3.26) through (3.28) hold for these
vectors. To do so, observe first from (3.18) and (3.19) that for all t '¢ S,
E(S'tS:) = E(X'tX's + Y'tY's) + i E(Y~'s -~Y's) = 0
which in turn implies that
E(X'tX's) = - E(Y'tY's)
E(XtY's) = E(Y'tX's)
(3.33)
(3.34)
(3.35)
must both hold for all t '¢ s. Next recall from (3.24) that S-'t = S't ~ X_'t + i Y-'t = ~­
i Y't' and hence that both X.'t =~ and Y-'t =-Y't must hold identically for all t. Thus it
follows from (3.34) and (3.35) that for all t '¢ S,
E(X'tX's) =E(X.'tX's) =-E(Y_'tY's) =E(Y'tY's)
E(X'tY's) =E(X.'tY's) =E(Y_'tX'J = - E(Y'tX'J
(3.36)
(3.37)
But (3.34) and (3.36) can only both hold if E(~X's) = 0 = E(~Y's) for all t '¢ s, and
similarly, (3.35) and (3.37) can only both hold if E(~Y's) = 0 for all t '¢ s. Hence
E(~) = E(Y't) = 0 for all t implies that
cov(~,xs) =cov(Y't'Ys) =cov(~'Ys) =0 , t'¢ S (3.38)
and (3.26) follows at once from (3.38) together with Yo = 0 and the definitions in (3.30)
through (3.32). Finally, to establish (3.27) and (3.28), observe that since - t '¢ t for
all t = 1,.. ,T, the arguments of (3.36) and (3.37) also imply, respectively, that
E(X'tX''t) =E(X.'tX''t) =-E(Y.'tY''t) =E(Y'tY''t)
E(X'tY''t) = E(X.'tY''t) = E(Y-'tX''t) = - E(Y'tX''t)
(3.39)
(3.40)
for all t = 1,..,T. Hence by again employing the argument above (3.38) , we may
conclude that (3.27) and (3.28) follow directly from (3.39) and (3.40) together with
(3.31) and (3.32). End of proof.
Thus the real spectral representation of Z in (3.25) decomposes Zt into a sum of
uncorrelated real cosinusoidal components R.r(t) = W't cos(2n IDrt) + V't sin{2n IDrt). As
with the complex spectral representation in (3.22), these components may be interpreted
geometrically by focusing on an individual univariate process Zj within Z and writing the
corresponding pairs of spectral weights (W'tj'V'tj) in polar-coordinate form as W'tj =
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A.cj cos(21t COt Ttj) and Vtj = A.cj sin(21t COt Ttj), where A.cj = (W~ + V~) In. and Ttj =
(1/21t COt) tan-1(VtjWtj). In these terms, each real cosinusoidal component Rej(t) can be
written as
Rej(t) = A.cj [cos(21t COt Ttj) cos(21t COtt) + sin(21t COt Ttj)sin(21t COtt)]
=A.cj cos[21t COt (t-Ttj)] .
(3.41)
Hence, if for any realization of the random variables Atj and Ttj we plot the resulting
cyclical function Rej(t) as in Figure 3.3, then the parameters are seen to have a clear
geometrical interpretation. First, since the duration or period of each cycle is given by
1/rot , it follows at once that rot is indeed the time frequency of each cycle (Le. cycles per
unit of time). Similarly, A.cj denotes the amplitude of each cycle, and Ttj denotes the
phase shift relative to the origin (Le. the time interval from t =°to the nearest cycle peak).
Hence, as in the complex case, each individual process Zj in Z is seen to be representable
in geometric terms as a sum of uncorrelated real cosinusoidal components Reit) with
fixed time frequencies rot but random amplitudes A.cj and phase shifts Ttj. For further
discussion of this representation see, for example, Fuller (1976; sect. 1.6) and Smith
(1981; sects. 4.3 and 5.4).
Finally, to see the geometric equivalence between the real and complex spectral
representation, observe first that~ = 21t COt by definition, and moreover from (3.31) and
(3.32), that -Ptj = 21t rot Ttj = At Ttj . Hence At and Ptj are simply the angular
equivalents of rot and Ttj, respectively. (For example, the time lapse Ttj from ReiO) to
the first peak Re/Ttj) in Figure 3.3 corresponds precisely to the counter-clockwise
rotation of Ptj radians from Ctj(O) to ~j(Ttj) on the circle in Figure 3.2). In addition,
(3.31) and (3.32) also imply that 21Stjl = A tj , and hence that the amplitude of ~j(t) is
always proportional to the amplitude of Reit).
R
A'L
t/""-T rj
I
A rj
Figure 3.3 Real Cosinusoidal Functions
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However, there remains one statistical difference between these two representations.
For while the complex spectral-weight vectors (S-T""So""ST) are always uncorrelated,
it follows from expression (3.28) of Theorem 3.1 that the pairs of real spectral-weight
vectors (W't'V't) may indeed be correlated. With this in mind, it is of interest to observe
that real spectral-weight vectors (Wo,W1""WT,V1""VT) may nonetheless be regarded
as linearly uncorrelated in the following sense:
Corollary 3.1 The spectral-weight vectors (Wo,W b"'WT,V b ..,VT) in (3.25)
satisfy the condition that for all fued n-vectors a = (ab .. ,an) the corresponding
random variables (a'Wo,a'W l>••,a'WT,a'V l>•• ,a'VT) are mutually uncorrelated.
Proof: In view of (3.26) we need only consider the pairs of random variables
(a'W't,a'V't) for each 't = 1,..,T. But since cov (X,Y) =cov(Y,X) holds identically for all
random variables X and Y, and since (3.28) implies
cov(a'W't,a'V't) =a'cov(W't,v't) a =- a'cov(V't,W't) a
= - cov(a'V't,a'W't)
(3.42)
it follows that cov(a'W't,a'V't) = 0 must hold identically for all linear compounds a and all
't = 1,u,T. End of proof.
Hence, each univariate process Za = {a'~ I teT} defined as a linear function of a
frnitely-stationary process Z must have a spectral representation consisting of uncorrelated
random spectral-weight variables. In particular, each individual component process Zj of
Z thus satisfies this condition.
3.3 Relation of Spectral Weights to Principle Components
Before leaving the general analysis of finitely-stationary processes, it is of interest to
observe that each such process has a natural principle-eomponent representation as well.
In particular, if we employ the vector representation Z of such processes, as defined in
expression (3.16), then we may construct such a representation by simply diagonalizing
the covariance matrix K for Z. To do so, recall that every covariance matrix K can be
written as K = UAU', where A is the nonnegative diagonal matrix of eigen values for K
and U is the associated orthonormal matrix of eigen vectors (Le. with U'U =UO' =I).
The random vector of principle components P for Z is then defined by the linear
transformation
P = O'Z. (3.43)
By construction, P consists of mutually uncorrelated random variables since cov(P) =
O'KU = A ( for a more detailed analysis of these principle components, see for example
Dhrymes (1970; sect. 2.2».
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The relation between these principle components and the complex spectral weights S
defined in (3.17) is seen immediately by premultiplying (3.43) by U and substituting into
(3.17) to obtain
S =_b (F®I)*UP . (3.44)
"V 2T+l
Since (F®I)* is unitary and U is orthonormal, it then follows at once that (F®I)*U is
also unitary, Le. it is a rigid motion in geometric terms.8 Thus, to construct the complex
spectral weights S from the principle components P, one simply rotates P into the
complex plane by (F®I)*U, and scales the resulting vector by IN2T+1.
A similar interpretation holds for the real spectral weights. To see this, observe that if
we now let W = (Wo,Wlo",WT,vl,"'VT) denote the vector of all real spectral weights
and express the set of trigonometric coefficients in (3.25) in matrix form as
R =[: cosl2nc>l,(-Tl] .. cos[2xCOf{-T)]
1 cos[21tCO1(T)] .. cos[21tffiT{T)]
then (3.28) can be written simply as
z= (R®I)W.
sin[21tCOI(-T)]
sin[21tcOl(T)]
.. sin[21tro:(-T)]]
. (3.45)
.. sin[21tCOT(T)]
(3.46)
Next, defming the positive diagonal matrix D = (-v2T+1, -..}2T+I/2,.. ,v2T+1/2) and
setting M =RD-l, we may rewrite (3.46) as
Z =(MD®I)W =(M®I)(D®I)W . (3.47)
Finally, since M is by construction orthonormal,9 it follows from (3.43) together with the
tensor-product identity (A®B)-l = (A-l)®(B-l) that W can be expressed in terms ofP as
W = (D-l®I)(M'®I)UP . (3.48)
Hence, observing that (M'®I)U is an orthonormal matrix and that (D-l®I) is a positive
diagonal matrix, it again follows that the spectral weights W may be constructed from the
principle components P by first rotating P with (M'®I)U and then scaling the resulting
vector by (D-l®I).
For the univariate case, it is worth noting that the rotation operation is unnecessary. To
see this, observe simply that (3.47) reduces to Z = MDW in the univariate case.
Moreover, since the spectral weights are in this case mutually uncorrelated (by Corollary
3.1), we must have K =cov(Z) =MD cov(W)DM' =MAM', where A=D cov(W)D is a
8Since IIUxll =(x*U*Ux)l/2 =(x*x)l/2 =1"'11 for every complex vector x under a unitary lransformation
U, it follows that all lengths of vectors and angles between vectors are preserved, and hence that U is the
matrix representation of a rigid motion in the given vector space.
9With appropriate relabeling of the elements in the vector W and re-indexing of time, the matrix M is
seen to be precisely the orthonormal matrix in expression (4.2.11) of Fuller (1976).
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nonnegative diagonal matrix. Hence K is diagonalized by the orthonormal matrix M, and
we may choose U = M in (3.43) without loss of generality. This means that (3.48) is
reduced to W = D-lP, and thus that the spectral weights in the univariate case are simply a
scaled version of the principle components.
4. CIRCULAR·SMOOTUING PROCESSES
In this final section, the circular smoothing C of a stationary segment XT = [Xo""XT] is
developed formally, and is shown to yield the best uniform representative of XT from
among all finitely-stationary processes. The results of Section 2 above are then employed
to show that the spectral representation of C yields a new interpretation of the sample
periodogram for XT.
To do so, it is necessary to begin by developing the probabilistic underpinnings for
such processes in more detail. Given a set a together with a probability measure p over a
a-field F of subsets of a, the triple <a,F,p> defines a fixed probability space over a.
If U denotes the linear (Hilbert) space of random variables over <a,F,p> with E(X) = 0
and E(X2) < 00, then each element X = (Xl, .. ,xn) of the n-fold product space un defines
a random n-vector over <a,F,p>, and each sequence X = (Xt I tET) in un defines a n-
process on un . If P denotes the class of n-processes on un, then each finite segment
[Xt""Xt+T] of a stationary n-process X E P (i.e. satisfying (2.2) above) is designated as
a stationary segment on un. Our only assumption regarding the underlying probability
space <a,F,p> is that it is rich enough to allow the construction in un of independently
and identically distributed replicates Xt = [X1, .. ,Xt], 'tE[T], of any given stationary
segment XT = [Xo''''XT] on Un.10 In terms of such replicates, we may then construct
the circular smoothing C = (Ct I tET) of XT to be the n-process defmed for all tET by
T
Ct=_l- r. X.<t-.> (4.1)
...JT+l .=0
4.1 Finite Stationarity of Circular·Smoothing Processes
If, as in Section 2.2, we let PT denote the class of T-stationary processes Z = (Zrl tET)
in P (i.e. satisfying (2.2) and Zr = Z<t> for all tET), then our present objective is to
show that for any stationary segment XT on un, the associated circular smoothing C of
XT is T-stationary, i.e. that C E PT' To do so, it is useful to record the following
properties of T-equivalents. First, observe that by definition <t> = t <=> It! :s; T. In
addition,
<t+'t> = <t+<'t» = «t> + <'t»
<t+'t> = <s+'t> ~ <t> = <s>
(4.2)
(4.3)
1000is may always be accomplished. for example. by replacing <Q,F,p> with the cartesian product space
1T.ern<Q,F,p>. constructed from replicates <a,F,p>. of <a,F,p>. as for example in Halmos (1950;
sec. 49).
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hold for all t, s, tET. Finally, for all t,sE[T],l1
<t+s> = 0 ~ t+s = 0 .
With these identities, it can now be shown that:
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Lemma 4.1 The circular smoothing C = (Ct I tET) of a stationary segment XT
= [Xo,.. ,XT] is T-stationary.
Proof: First observe from (4.2) that since <t-t>= «t> - t> holds identically for all t,
tET, it follows at once from the definition of C in (4.1) that Ct = C<t> for all t E T, and
hence that Cis T-periodic. To verify that C is also stationary, it suffices to show that the
covariances cov(Ct+'t,Ct) can be written solely as a function of t. To do so, observe first
that for any two replicates ~, .. ,X1] and [X~, ..,X~] of a stationary segment [Xo,,,,XT]
from a process with covariance kernel K, it follows from the independence of replicates
that for all t,s = O,I,.. ,T,
cov(X1.x~) = {K(t-s)
o
t = v
t~v
(4.5)
Hence if we expand cov(Ct+t,CJ in terms of (4.1) as
1 T T
cov(r' r" = - ~ ~ COy (X<t+t-v> X<t-s» (4 6)
'-"t+t''VtJ T+l ~ ~ v' s .
v=O s=O
then it follows from (4.5) that the only nonzero terms in (4.6) will be those with
<t+t-v> = <t-s>. Moreover, since v,s E[O,.. ,T] implies It-vi ~ T, it also follows from
(4.2) through (4.4) that
<t+t-v> = <t-s> ~ <t-v> = <-s>
~ 0 = <0> = «t-v> - <-s» = «t>+ s-v>
~ v-s = <t> .
Hence, letting S<t> = (s I s,s+<t> E [O,.. ,T]), we can write (4.6) as
r' C 1 <t-s> <t-s>
coy ('-"t+t' t) = T+l It cov(X < >,X )
seS<t> s+ t s
1
= T+l It K(s + <t> -s)
seS<t>
1
= T+l (# S<t» K «t»
(4.7)
(4.8)
l1To see this, observe that t+s - <t+s> =n(2T+l) for some neT, and hence that <t+s> =0::::) n (2T+l)
=t+s ::::) Inl (2T+l) = It+sl ~ ItI + lsi =2T. Thus, n =0 is the only possible solution for n, and (4.4)
follows.
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where # S<t> denotes the cardinality of S<t>. Finally, to evaluate # S<t> explicitly,
observe that since s,s+<t> e [O,..T] ~ max(O,<t» :s; s:S; min(T,T+<t», it follows on
the one hand that <t> :s; 0 => O:S; s:S; T -1<t>1 => # S<t> = T + 1 -1<t>I, and on the other
hand, that <t> ~ 0 => <t> :s; s:S; T => # S<t> = T + 1 - l<t>1. Hence in all cases we
obtain # S<t> =T + 1 - l<t>I, and (4.8) becomes
( T + 1 - l<t>l)cov(CWt,Ct) = T4-1 K«t». (4.9)
Thus cov(CWt,CJ is seen to depend only on the time lag t, and C is therefore T-
stationary. End of proof.
Notice also that (4.9) yields an explicit relationship between the covariance kernels of
C and XT. This relation will playa fundamental role in interpreting the spectral
representation of C in section 4.3 below.
4.2 Best Uniform Representatives
Having established that C is finitely-stationary, we next show that C is uniformly
positively correlated with XT, as defined in (2.3) and (2.4) above by
0< p(XT,C) = min p(X~, C<'t+t>j) .('t,tj)
(4.10)
To do so, observe first that if ej denotes the j-th column in the n-square identity matrix I,
then (4.9) implies that var(C<Ht>j) =var(ejC<'t+t» =e jcov(C<'t+t»ej =e jK(O)ej =
var(X~) = crr, so that by (4.1)
p(X~, C<'t+t>j) 1=2
cr.
J
1
=2
cr.
J
cov(ej' Xi, e j C<'t+t»
[
1 T
...JT+l ~ cov(Xi, x<;+t-s» ] .
(4.11)
But from (4.6), these covariance matrices are all identically zero, except for the term with
t =<t+t-s>; and for this term it follows that 0 =<t-<t+t-s» = <t-(t+t-s» =<s-t> ~ s
= t. Hence
1 ,[ 1 ] . __1_ 5K (0)ej = _1_
p(XJ, C<'t+t>j) =""2 ej ...JT+l K(O) eJ - ...JT+l cr~ ...JT+l
cr. JJ
holds identically for all (t,tj), and we may conclude that
(4.12)
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_1_ >0 .p(XT,C) = VT+I
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(4.13)
Thus C is seen to be an element of the class P=F of finitely-stationary processes which are
uniformly positively correlated with XT (as defined in (2.4».
To establish that C is a best uniform representative of XT within this class, it remains
to show that
p(XT,C) = max P(XT'Z),
zeP+T
(4.14)
(4.15)
With this objective in mind, we first require a number of preliminary results. For any
finite set of random variables S = {Xo,..,XT} in the Hilbert space H of zero-mean finite-
variance random variables over <n,F,p>, let
T
span(S) = {X = I. at Xt I ao,.. ,aT e R}
t:=O
denote the linear span of SinH, and for any random variable Z e H let
p(Z,S) = min p(Z,X)
xeS
(4.16)
denote the minimum correlation between Z and S. Our first result is then to show that
p(Z,S) can only achieve a positive maximum among the random variables Z in the linear
span of S. To establish this result, observe that the appropriate inner product between
pairs of elements X and Y in the Hilbert space H is defined by their covariance cov(X,Y)
=E(XY) as random variables. Hence, if we now let comp(S) = (Y e H I X e span(S)
=> E(XY) = O} denote the orthogonal complement of the finite-dimensional subspace in
span (S) in H, then it is well known (see for example Bachman and Narici (1966;
theorem 1.8) that for each Z e H there exist unique random variables X e span(S) and Y
e comp(S) such that Z = X + Y. Moreover, ifE(z2) > 0, then Z ~ span(S) => E(y2) > O.
Hence, if we now designate this pair of random variables (X,Y) as the S-representation
ofZthen:
Lemma 4.2 For any finite subsetS = {Xo,..,XT } cHand any Z e H with S-
representation (X,Y), ifZ ~ span (S) then
p(Z,S) > 0 ~ p(Z,S) < p(X,S). (4.17)
Proof: First observe that Y e comp(S) and (X,Xo,..,XT}C span(S) imply E(XY) =
E(XtY) = 0 for all t = O,oo,T. Moreover, since Z ~ span(S) => E(Y2) > 0, it then follows
that for all t = O,oo,T, p(Z,S) > 0 implies
0< p(Z,Xt) = p(X+Y,Xt)
= E(XXt + YXt>/<J(Xt><J(X+Y)
= E(XXt>/<J(Xt> [E(X2) + E(y2)]I/l
< E(XXt>/<J(Xt><J(X)
= p(X,Xt>.
(4.18)
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Hence (4.17) follows at once from (4.18) together with the finiteness ofS. End of proof.
In addition we require the following elementary inequality for positive numbers
Lemma 4.3 For all positive nwnbers ao,.. ,aT '
min
t
at 1
-- <
-W -VT+l
-'J ~"s
(4.19)
with equality holding if ao =... =aT'
By employing these results, we can now establish the fundamental lemma upon which
our main theorem depends. If each random variable X with E(X) =°and E(X2) = ('J2 is
now designated as a (0,('J2)-random variable, then:
Lemma 4.4 For any finite set of uncorrelated (0,('J2)-random variables S =
{Xo""XT) C H, the unique (0,('J2)-random variable x* e H satisfying
p(X*,s) = max p(x,s)
xeS
is given by
X* _ 1 T
-- LX
VT+l l=O T·
(4.20)
(4.21)
Proof: First observe that since the Xt'S are uncorrelated by hypothesis, it follows that
('J2(X*) =(T+l)-1 LtE(Xr) =('J2 and p(X*,Xt) = INT+l for all t =O,oo,T. Hence X* is
by construction a (0,('J2)-random variable in span (S) with p(X*,S) = IN T+1 > 0. Thus,
it suffices to show that X* is the unique (0,('J2)-random variable in span (S) satisfying
p(X*,s) = max p(X,S) .
x E span(S)
(4.22)
For if (X,Y) denotes the S-representation of any other random variable Z e H satisfying
p(Z,s) > 0, then by Lemma 4.2 it will follow from (4.22) that p(X* ,S) ~ p(X,S) >
p(Z,s) > 0. To establish (4.22), suppose to the contrary that p(X,S) ~ p(X* ,S) for
some X e span(S) with X *" X*. Then X e span(S) implies that X =:EtatXt for some
coefficients ao,.. ,aT, and hence that for all t =O""T.
p(X,XJ = E(:EsasXs?9('J(Xt)('J(:EsasXs)
= at ('J2
" ('J~ ('J2:Esa;
~.=-~
'I :Esai
(4.23)
Moreover, p(X,S) ~ p(X*,S) > °implies that at > °for all t. Thus we may conclude
from Lemma 4.3 that
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p(X,s) ~ p(X* ,S) => min _a_t_ > _I_
t ~r. a2 - "T+I
s s
=> (ao = ... = aT) => X = aX*
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with a = aa"T+I > 0. Finally, since X is also a (0,02)-random variable, then 0 2 =
E(X2) = a20 2(X*) = a20 2 => a = 1, so that X* is the unique (0,02)-random variable
satisfying (4.20). End of proof.
Employing this result, it is now a simple matter to establish (4.14). However, to
guarantee uniqueness of this maximum, it is convenient to introduce the following
normalization. Let r. = K(O) denote the autocovariance matrix for each random vector in
the stationary segment XT = [Xo""XT], and let each process Z = {Zt I tET} in P with
cov(Zt) = r. for all tET be designated as I.-process. Since the original process X from
which XT is drawn is necessarily a I.-process by definition, it is appropriate to require
that our finitely-stationary model of X also be a I.-process. Hence we now restrict our
attention to such processes, and begin by observing from (4.9) that the circular smoothing
C of XT is itself a I.-process. Moreover, from among all such processes in Pi:, we now
have the following characterization of C:
Theorem 4.1 For any stationary segment XT =[Xo, ..,XT]from a I.-process in
P, the circular smoothing C of XT is the unique best uniform representative ofXT
from among all I.-processes in Pi:.
fmQf: First recall from (2.3) that for all Z = {ZT ItET} E Pi:,
p(XT,Z) = min{p(Jqj' Z<s+t>j) I t = O,..,T; lsi ~ T; j = I,.. ,n} . (4.25)
Moreover, if we now set t = <s+t> and observe from (4.2) through (4.4) that 0=
<s+t> - t = <t+s-t> = <s-<t-t» => s = <tot>, it follows that the indices in (4.25) may
be relabeled as
p(XT,Z) = min{p(X<~t, Ztj) I t = O,..,T; It! ~ T; j = I,.. ,n}
= min [min p(X<t-:r>, Zt·)] .
(tj) t 'tj J
(4.26)
Hence, observing that for each (t,j) the finite set {X<t~f I t = O,.. ,T} consists of
uncoITelated (O'OT)-random variables (where 0T is the j-th diagonal element of I.), it
follows at once from Lemma 4.4 and (4.1) that for all I.-processes Z = {Zt ItET} E Pi:,
(which in particular satisfy E(Zij) = 0T for all t andj) we must have
min p(X<t-:r> C·) > min p(X<t-:r> Z .)
'tj'tj- 'tj,tj
't 't
(4.27)
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with equality holding only if Ctj = Ztj for all t and j. Thus, for all :I:-processes, Z E Pi:
with Z :F- C, we may conclude from (4.27), together with the finiteness of the set of
indices (t,j), that
. (X <t-'t> C .) . (X <t-'t> 7) . I I ~ T . . - Imm p 'tj' tJ > mm p 'tj '''tj , t ~ , J - ,.• ,n
't 't
~ min [minp(x<t-:t>,Cc)] > min [minp(X<t-:t>,Zt·)](tJ) 't 'tJ J (tj) 't 'tJ J
~ P(XT'C) > P(XT'Z)
and the result is established. End of proof.
4.3 Relation between Spectra and Periodograms
For any T-stationary process Z = {Zr I tET} in P with complex spectral representation
given by (3.22), each scaled covariance matrix [recall (3.20)]
1 (2T+l)rz (~) = - ~ = -- E(S'tSc*) ; t E [T]21t 21t (4.29)
is now designated as the spectral matrix for Z at angular frequency ~, and the full set of
such matrices {rz ~) I t E [T]} is designated as the Z-spectrwn. Each spectral matrix
r z (A't) summarizes the covariation among the A't-frequency components of the
individual processes Zj in Z. This covariation may be expressed directly in terms of the
covariance kernel K for Z by simply substituting the definition of ~ in (3.14) into
(4.29). However, a more instructive derivation is made possible by observing from
(3.24) that each Sc* can be expressed in terms of the Zt's as
~* _ 1 ~ t I
'"t - 2T+l '" r'tZt
tE[T)
(4.30)
Next, post-multiplying (3.22) by S: and recalling that E(S't~*) = 0 for all t :F- t, it follows
that E(Zt,S:) = rt E(St S~), and hence that for all t E [T],
E(S'tSc*) =r""i E(~S;) =r-i [Th:r L r~E(~z..')]
te[T]
= ~ ~ rt-'t K('t-t) =~ ~ r:<H> K('t-t)
.LT+l t 't .LT+l t 't
1 h
= 2T+l L r't K(h)
he[T]
(4.31)
where h = <t-t>. Thus recalling (3.4) and (4.9), it follows in particular that for the
circular smoothing C of a stationary segment XT, the associated C-spectrum is given by
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1 0+1 - Ihl) .rc ("-t) =- L T+ 1 K(h) exp(-l "-t h) ; t E [1'] .
21t he[1]
On the other hand, if we consider the finite Fourier transform
T
FT(A.) = L X t exp(-i A. t) ; -1t:S; A.:s; 1t
t=O
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(4.33)
of a stationary segment XT = [XO,..,XT] with covariance kernel (K(h) I hE[T]} then,
following Brillinger (1975; sects. 5.2 and 7.3), we may define the X1periodogram for
all angular frequencies "-t = 21t t/2T+1 by
PT("-t) = 1 E[FT ("-t)FT ("-t)*]21t(T+1)
1 T T
= L L K(t-s) exp[-i "-t (t-s)]
21t(T+ 1) t=O s=O
1 0+1 - Ihl) .
=- L T+1 K(h) exp(-l "-t h) .
21t he[1]
Finally, comparing (4.32) and (4.34), we may conclude that
rc ("-t) = PT ("-t) ; t E [1']
(4.34)
(4.35)
holds identically for all angular frequencies, and hence that: the C-spectrum is precisely
the X1periodogram. 12
Moreover, if we recall from (3.31) and (3.32) that for all t =1,..,T,
rc ("-t) =(2~:1)E(S't~*) =C~:l)E[<X-c + i Y't )(~ - i Y~)]
=C~:l)(~)E[(W't - i V't)(W~ + i V~)]
(
2T+1) I I. I I
= g;- [E(W't W't + V't V't) + 1 E[W't V't - V't W't)]
(4.36)
12This identity is made possible by evaluating the XT-periodogram at the angular frequencies A.r of the
C-spectrum. Observe. however. from (4.33) that this periodogram is well dermed for any frequency in the
range on: to n:. Moreover, since the sample XT"periodogram is typically evaluated at the sample-luJrmonic
frequencies 9't =2mrr+l, 't =1,•.,.mT in this range (where mT =T{l for Teven and mT =(T+l){l for T
odd, as in Fuller (1976; sect. 7.1», it is also of interest to interpret the sample XT-periodogram at these
frequencies. To do so, observe simply that for all 't =1,..,ffiT, 9't =2m/T+I .. 2n:(2't){lT+I =~'t. Hence.
the sample XT-periodogram evaluated at the sample-harmonic frequencies 9't may be interpreted as
approximate estimates of the C-spectrum at the corresponding angular frequencies A.2't. 't = 1•.. ,ffiT.
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then it follows from the identities in (3.27) and (3.28) that the real and imaginary parts of
r c (A-r) are given respectively by:
and,
r C ( ) - 2T+1 E(W W' V V')c COt - 8x 't 't + 't 't
2T+1 2T+1
=-- cov(W't'W't) =-- cov(V't,V't)
4x 4x
r~(co't) =C~;1) E(W't V~ - V't W~)
2T+1 2T+1
=-- cov(W't,V't) =--- cov(V't'W't)
4x 4x
(4.37)
(4.38)
where co't = A.'t/2x is the time frequency for ~. The sets of matrices {r~ (co't) I 't =
1,.. ,T} and {r~ (COt» I 't =1,..,T} are designated, respectively, as the C-cospectrum and
C-quadrature spectrum. Finally, observing that exp(- i 2xcoh) =cos(2xcoh) - i sin(2xcoh),
it follows that (4.34) can be written in terms of (2.10) and (2.11) for each time frequency
COt as
PT (A-r) =P~ (co't) + i Pf (co't) ; 't = 1,..,T . (4.39)
Hence the real form of the complex identity in (4.35) is easily seen from (4.37) through
(4.39) to be given by (2.12) and (2.13).
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CHAPTER 11
Spatial Interaction Models and Their Micro-
Foundation
G. Haag
1. INTRODUCTION
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During the last decade many efforts have been made to introduce dynamic models into
urban regional analysis.
Allen and Sanglier (1978, 1979) developed a spatial interaction model in which jobs
and populations of different kinds follow a logistic evolution path in each region and
compete with each other via corresponding "capacities". The model includes concepts like
"capacities", distance-effects and some economic aspects. Of course, such a logistic
model structure could be derived from a stochastic background theory assuming a
birth/death structure in the transition rates. But not all processes which are important in
spatial dynamics can be fitted into this restrictive frame, since migration or flow-processes
are important as well.
The spatial interaction model of Harris and Wilson (1978) is also of a logistic type.
The imbalance between revenue attracted to a region and the cost of supply to maintain a
certain level of the facility stock leads to changes in the level of the facility stock. Contrary
to the above-mentioned model, however, Harris and Wilson take into account expenditure
flows, but on the other hand they neglect some important economic factors which are
included in the first model. The expenditure flows are directly linked to the facility stock
which takes into account an interaction which decreases with distance.
Due to these two important papers geographers and economists became increasingly
interested in applying these models to practical situations and comparing the empirical
trajectories with the different model outputs. However, three main problems became
obvious:
(i) difficulties in calibration,
(ii) the restriction to supply-side orientation,
(iii) the lack of a microeconomic foundation.
(i) The first problem is caused by the nonlinear structure of both models (see Pumain et
aI., 1986; Lombardo and Rabino, 1983). Considerable difficulties in calibration exist,
since the number of trajectories which can be compared with empirical data is less than the
number of fitting parameters. Therefore, in a simple application of the models there is no
general procedure to guarantee a unique choice of the parameters which have to be
estimated. Unfortunately, uncertainty in the model parameters may yield unacceptable
differences in the trajectories - even in a short-term simulation.
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(ii) Both models focus primarily on the supply side. There are no dynamic equations
for the demand-side, which could describe reactions of the expenditure flow to changes in
the facility stock.
(iii) The dynamic equations of motion of the models discussed so far are not derived
from micro-economic foundations - they originate from the decision behaviour of the
different decision makers.
In this paper, we attempt to improve the construction of a spatial-interaction model by
using a master equation approach. We generally follow the line of argument in Haag and
Wilson (1986). We begin with the decision processes of those individuals who decide to
use the facilities of different regions, as well as those of the developers, retailers and land
owners who decide about changes in the facility stock, the prices of goods and services
and the land rent. We shall not use any equilibrium assumption to derive the fundamental
dynamic equations of motion for the relevant macrovariables of the system.
The different decision processes are modelled using a master equation (see Weidlich
and Haag, 1983). Fluctuations (uncertainties in the decision process) are introduced via
the master equation approach. As a result, we obtain the time-dependent probability that a
certain decision configuration (socio-configuration) is realized. The framework also
provides the link between micro-economic considerations (socio-economic aspects taken
into account in the decision process) and the macro-economic equations of motion for
aggregate mean values. These mean values are obtained from the master equation by
aggregation with the probability distribution as a weighting factor. This broader overall
framework, with full probabilistic dynamic underpinning, also facilitates extensions in a
number of directions. For instance, it offers a simple way of introducing saturation
effects. The way in which conventional spatial interaction models can be generalized
becomes obvious, especially the means of introducing fundamental economic aspects.
The master equation offers a new approach to parameter estimation (Haag and Weidlich,
1983; Dendrinos and Haag, 1984; Haag and Dendrinos, 1983); and the known
bifurcation properties of spatial interaction models can be used to see how these properties
manifest themselves in master equations.
In Section 2, we describe a service system using a notation which is suitable for the
master equation approach. In Section 3, the model is formulated. Some concluding
comments are offered in Section 4.
2. A SERVICE SYSTEM AS THE BASIS OF THE MODEL
We consider four kinds of "agents" (see Table 1), namely; consumers in region i
spending their expenditures Tij(t) in region j, developers controlling facility size Zj(t) in j,
retailers determining the prices Pj(t) of goods or services in region j, and land owners
deciding about the land rent rj(t) in region j. For the purpose of this paper, we shall
assume residential location to be fixed, though this assumption can easily be relaxed (as in
Haag, 1985).
We shall consider an urban system consisting of L zones with a given transportation
network. The transportation costs between zone i and zone j are denoted by cij- The
expenditure configuration is described by the array (Tij(t)} = I(t) at time t. We will
assume that this array is determined by utility functions Vij(t) through a mechanism to be
described later. The Tij(t) describe expenditure flows from zone i (consumers' residences)
to zone j (where the consumer is using facilities) at time t. Moreover, the utility functions
G.Haag
Table 1: The different 'agents' of the model
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'agent'
consumers
developers
retailers
land owners
decision concerning
destination choice
facility size
price of goods or services
price of one unit of land
variable to be controlled via the
decision process
TijCt)
Zj(t)
PjCt)
rp)
VijCt) have two subscripts since they relate to both housing and service sectors. The utility
functions, VijCt) are assumed to depend on the supply side variables. Let Zj(t) be the scale
of provision of facilities in zone j at time t and let Pj(t) be the unit price of the service
(assuming one type of good or service for simplicity). Let rjCt) be the land rent to be paid
per unit of facilities provided at j.
The modelling task therefore is to determine the expenditure flows (Tij(t)} at time t,
the spatial and temporal pattern of provision, (Zj(t)}, prices (PjCt)} and rents (rj(t)} for
given initial conditions (TijCO) , Zj(O) , pjCO) and rj(O)}.
2.1 The Master Equation
Decision processes are stochastic processes, since we are interested in the probability
P~;t) that a configuration ~ =P{I,z,p,r} is realized at time t. The master equation is the
equation of motion for this probability distribution.
with
dP(£;t) =L w~; ~+k)P~+k ; t) - L w~+k ; ~)P~ ; t)
dt k k
(1)
(2)L P(£; t) = 1.
~
The transition rate from one state ~ + 19 to another state (£) is described by w~;£+19.
The modelling of the transition rate w{£;~+19 in tenns of socio-economic processes is the
main task of the application of the master equation framework to socio-economic
processes. This will be done in the next section. Let us now consider how to obtain the
macro-economic equations of motion if the micro-economic decision processes are
specified.
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2 . 2 The Macro-economic Equation of Motion
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Equations of motion for the means values (denoted by a bar) of the expenditure flows
l'ij<t), the facility stock ~(t), the prices p·(t) and land rents rW) can be obtained from the
master equation by multiplying (1) wi~ Tij> Zj> Pj> rj' respectively and by summation
over all possible configurations ~ =cr, Z,:e, I> (cf. Weldlich and Haag, 1983).
2 . 3 The Total Transition Rate
(3)
for 1. = 2, 3, 4
The total transition rate w(£+k; £) is obtained as the sum over contributions of different
socio-economic processes.
L
w(~+k; £) =LWik,ij cr+kl,z,E.,r; I,Z,E.,[)
ij,k
L
+ L [w:<L)~+k;£) + wJ:(L)~+k; £)]
j,l J
The wik ijIT+kl,Z,p,r; I,Z,p.r) refer to changes in the expenditure flow configuration
I, due to decisions byconsumers to change from a state which implies residence in i and
using facilities in j, to a state with residence in i but now using facilities in k. Thus
changes of residential location are not taken into account, since it is reasonable to assume
that housing mobility will be considerably slower than the shopping mobility of the
population. Indeed, decisions to buy in another zone can be taken much more easily than
those to change an apartment (Leonardi, 1985).
The Wj+(L),wr(L) describe decisions of entrepreneurs (1. =2), retailers (1. =3) and
land owners (1. = 4) to add or to remove one unit of the facility stock Zj> the prices Pj and
the rents rj, respectively.
The crucial task is now to specify these transition rates. Our socio-economic experience
must be used to model these decision processes.
2.4 Decisions of consumers
The actual expenditure flow array
I(t) = (Tl1 (t), T12(t),...,T1dt), T21(t),...TLdt)} (4)
will change in the course of time due to decisions by consumers to use facilities in another
zone.
The total revenue, Dj(t), attracted to each zone j is obtained by
L
Dj(t) =L Tij(t) ;
i=1
(5)
the total expenditure Ei(t) of consumers living in zone i is
G. Hoog
L
Ej(t) = 2: Tij(t).
j=1
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(6)
The transition rate Pik ijIT,Z,E,r) of an individual living in i, for changing their
shopping area j -+k, is now assumed to depend on the expected utility gain (Vik-Vij)
*Pik,ij ITZ,E..v = &1(t)exp[vik(t) - Vij(t)] > 0 (7)
where &;(t) is a time scaling parameter.
Let nii~t) be the number of individuals having residence in zone i, i=1,2,... ,L, and
using facIlities in j. Then
L
ni(t) = 2: nij(t)
j=l
(8)
is the number of consumers living in i, and the total number of all consumers in the city
areas is
L
N(t) = 2: ni(t).
i=l
(9)
Then we obtain for the total transition rate per unit of time (changes in the shopping
trips of the population per time interval)
Wik "(~+k- c' =n··(t) Pik "(~.,IJ~ -, ~ IJ ,IJ (10)
In many applications it may be reasonable to assume that the expenditure flows Tij(t)
are related to the consumers' activities nij(t) by
Tij(t) =g(t)nij(t) (11)
where g(t) can be seen as the average of individual needs. By comparing the total stocks,
g(t) can be easily determined.
Thus the contribution of the consumers to the total transition rate per unit of time
(changes in the expenditure flows) finally reads
{
Tij& l(t) exp[vik(t) - vilt)]
Wik,ijIT+kl,Z,E,r;I,Z,E,r) = for kl = {O,...,lik,··O, ...-lij-·}·
ofor all other ~1'
(12)
2.5 The Decision Processes of Developers, Retailers and Land Owners
The dynamics of the provision of facilities, Zj(t), prices, Pj(t), and rents, rj(t), can be
considered as an analogy to birth-death processes.
Let X'- =(X~ , X~ ,...., X'-)' be the facility stock configuration (I, = 2; X<j) = Zj); the
price configuration (1,=3; X~) = Pj), or the rent configuration (1,= 4; X(1) = rj), which
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(l5a)
respectively describe one possible realization of a socio-economic distribution of facilities,
prices or rents, at time t. Due to changing decisions by the corresponding decision maker,
the configuration X(~) will change over the course of time. We shall now introduce the
J
rates corresponding to these processes in the same manner as above.
Let w·+(L)'X+k{L). X\ w·-(L)'X+k(L). X\ be the 'growth' rate and 'death' rate perJ \A - ,~, J \A - , ~ ,
unit of time of the stock variable X(L). Then a rather general formulation for these rates
may be the following (cf. Haag and Wilson, 1986)
Wj+(L) = ~r<1)(X) exp ~(1)(Z,e,r) > 0 (13a)
w-~L) = ~r<1)(X) exp [-~(1)(Z,e,r)] > 0, (13b)
for L =2, 3, 4 and for rather general functions r<~\Xl > 0 and ~ (~)(X). Of course, an
immigration term could be included in the transiti6n rates Wj+(L)<X~k(L); X) to describe
the possible settlement of facilities in initially empty zones. The functions can be modelled
to include saturation effects of the various parameters. The factor r<~)(X) describes the
speed of adjustment. Since the birth-death rates must not be negJtive, the condition
t'~)(X) > 0 has to be fulfilled. Here we assume for simplicity that the speed of adjustment
d~pends on the scale of the stock X(L) in a linear way, with time scaling parameters t;L(t)
such that
r<~)(X) = t;L(t) X(~) . (14)
J J
The function ~(~)(X) takes into account the imbalance between the cost of supply and
the revenue attract&:t to facilities in the zone under consideration. If there is an economic
surplus, ~(~)(X) > 0, it is more likely that the facility stock will expand, the prices and
the land ren~s will increase; and vice versa. Reasonable assumptions are:
~(~) = AL [Dj(t) - Cj(t)]
J
or alternatively
~(1) = AL [Dj(t) - Cj(t)]!Zj(t), (15b)
where AL describes the intensity of response of an 'agent' to an economic surplus. The
total revenue attracted to j is Dj- The cost of supplying facilities of size Zj(t) at zone j,
when land rent is rj(t), is denotea by Ci.(t). We assume that if there is an economic surplus
Dj{t) > Cj(t), in J, the probability 01 an extension of the facility stock exceeds the
probability of a reduction due to the experience of the decision-makers.
The difference between (15a) and (15b) is that in (15a) the decision function ~(~)(X)
is assumed to be proportional to the economic surplus in the zone j whereas in «(5b) a
proportionality to the economic surplus of the facility stock is considered. We assume
further that the cost of supply is proportional to the number of units of the facility stock
G.Haag
Cj(t) = [kj + rlt)] Zj(t)
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wher~ kj is a fixed constant and rj is a measure for the rent of one unit of facilities in
zoneJ.
3 . THE MEAN VALUE EQUATIONS OF THE DYNAMIC SERVICE
SECTOR MODEL
By substitution of the transition rates (12), (13), with (3) into the master equation (1), we
obtain the evolution over time of the probability distribution P(£; t) from a .given initial
distribution P(~; 0). Since it is difficult to handle this problem in practice - even
numerically - we derive the more aggregate set of mean value equations for our service
sector model from the master equation (1) assuming a unimodal and sharply peaked
distribution function:
L L
Tij(t) = &1(t) {LTik (t) exp [Vij(t) - vik(t)] -LTij (t) exp [vik(t) - Vij(t)] }, (17)
k=1 k=1
L
Zj(t) = &2(t) Zj<t) sinh[A,2 (?: Tilt) - (kj+rit) Zj(t)1 Z~], (18)
1=1 J
L
~j(t) = &3(t) Pj(t) sinh [A,3 (.L Tij(t) - (kj+fj(t)) Zj(t))1 Z~], (19)
1=1 J
L
fj(t)= &3(t) fj(t) sinh [~(4: Tij(t) - (kj+fj(t)) Zj(t)1 Z~], (20)
1=1 J
for i, j = l,2, ...L, 8 = 0 or 1.
Equations (17)-(20) together with (5), (15) and (16) complete our model (the utility
functions Vij will be specified in the next subsection). For given initial conditions (Tij(O),
Zj(O), plO), rj(O)) the trajectories for t > 0 can be computed. The hyperbolic sine function
leads to an amplification of the reactions of the decision makers on economic
disequilibrium. Near equilibrium (18), the Harris and Wilson hypothesis is yielded.
However, the estimation of the model parameters from empirical data can now be
performed by directly linking the transition rates (12), (13) to the corresponding empirical
results, eg.by applying a generalized least square procedure (Haag, 1985; a detailed
description of the estimation procedure is given in Weidlich and Haag, 1987). This
interesting problem of parameter estimation will not, however, be discussed in this paper.
The dynamic service sector model (17)-(20) exhibits many different time scales. For
example, the time scale for shopping trips &1(t), is really quite different from those
changing the facility stock &2(t), the price dynamics &3(t), and the rental dynamics &4(t).
Customers have no long-term commitments to the shops, and can easily change their
choices every day. This very fast process can therefore be reasonably described by its
steady state. This may lead to analytical simplifications of the model and is called adiabatic
elimination.
Using this adiabatic elimination procedure, the Tij(t) are driven by the dynamics of
Zj(t), rj(t) and Pj(t).
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3.1 The Stationary Solution of the Service Sector Model
Considering the stationary version of (17), we find for the stationary expenditure flows,
which we denote by i'ij. that:
L
'fij = [~exp (2¢ij)] / [L exp (2¢ik)]. (21)
k=1
Equation (21) can easily be proved by inspection. By comparing (21) with the special
form of the flow pattern assumed by Harris and Wilson (1985), the corresponding utility
functions can be derived
(w) 1 1 1
v ij = 2 a Ln Zj(t) - 21 Ln Pj(t) - 2 ~ Cij(t). (22)
(23b)
Near equilibrium I~(~)(X)I « 1, with (15a) and assuming that the expenditure flows
have reached their equih-hrlum pattern (21), and that the utility functions (22) are adequate,
the Harris and Wilson model is obtained (prices and rents are not considered).
L
Tij(t) = (Ej(t) Z~(t) exp[-~Cij(t)])/(L Z~(t) exp[-~ik(t)]) (23a)
J k=1
L
~(t) = e;(t)Zj(t) [?Tij(t) - kj Zj(t)].
1=1
From an economic point of view, however, the prices of goods Pi and transportation
costs Cij should not be separated as they are defined in the utility function (22). Therefore,
another reasonable assumption (Haag, 1985) is proposed for the utility function.
v(W(t) = i a Zj(t) [1-Zj(t) / Zj satl- i1 Pj(t) - i ~ Cij(t). (24a)
This assumption corresponds to a Taylor expansion of the utility function Vij in the
state variables. Such an expansion has proved to be powerful in migration theory (Haag
and Weidlich, 1984; Weidlich and Haag, 1987). A possible saturation of a zone j with
respect to the facility stock Zj is also taken into account. The saturation level of the facility
stock is called ~ sat. Since both Pj. cij. are prices it is reasonable to assume 1 = ~. Then
the utility function reads
(A) 1 1
v ij (t) =2 a Zj(t) [l-Zj(t)/Zj satl-2~ (Pj(t) + Cij(t». (24b)
Therefore, in the utility function v(t) of consumers having residence in zone i and
using facilities in zone j, the perceived prices of goods (Pj + Cij) appear.
Assuming that the shopping attitude of individuals livmg in any other residential area k
should not have an important influence on the shopping decisions of individuals living in
zone j (j :F- k) and thus could be neglected in a fust approximation, Frankhauser (1986)
proposed another plausible assumption for the utilities
G.Haag
(F) 1 1 1
v ij (t) =! Ln [kj+rj) Zj(t)] - ! 13 Cij(t) - ! Ln 11(t)
with
L
'tj(t) =L exp [-13Cij(t)].
i=1
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(25a)
(25b)
By insertion of (25) in (21) we obtain a set of decoupled stationary expenditure flows
t~F) = (kj+~j) ~ ~j>-1 exp [-13 eij]. (26)
The effect on an improvement of the infrastructure between two zones due to a
reduction in the transportation costs between these zones and/or the effect of a sudden
increase of the scale of provision of facilities in one particular zone for different values of
the deterrence parameter 13 are simulated and discussed in Haag and Frankhauser (1987).
The facility stock, the prices and the rents have reached their simultaneous equilibrium
values, namely the stationary solution of (17)-(20), if the condition
bj=~j (27)
is fulfilled. This assumption seems to be reasonable for the facility stock but is is not so
obvious for the prices and the rents. Hence, further investigations should deal with these
economic effects in particular.
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The application of this model to practical situations and its possible use as a planning
instrument will be amongst the next steps in our research program. Here we have stressed
the embedding of the conventional spatial interaction model into a stochastic framework.
A probabilistic description of the decision processes of 'agents' was introduced. The
master equation provided the link between the microeconomic level of the individual
decision processes to the aggregated dynamic equations of motion for observable mean
values. It became obvious that such spatial interaction models can be extended and, even
more importantly, linked to socio-economic data. But much work still has to be done to
improve the economic aspects of the price and rent adjustment process.
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Modelling Non-linear Processes in Time and Space
W. Barentsen and P. Nijkamp
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing interest in non-linear dynamic systems among
economists. Several factors lie behind this 'upswing' in attention.
First, the path-breaking methodological contributions to (in)stability and (dis)equilib-
rium analysis in the natural science field - made, among others, by Thom (1975) and
Nicolis and Prigogine (1977) - stimulated a thorough investigation into the nature of non-
linear dynamics in the social sciences (see e.g., Weidlich and Haag, 1983). It was
increasingly acknowledged that dynamic interactions between the components of a
complex system marked by dissipative structures affecting inter alia the homogeneity of
time and space may lead to a large spectrum of evolutionary patterns of such a system
(ranging from inert and stable behaviour to fluctuating and unstable behaviour).
Also, structural changes in the economic conditions of western societies have led to
increased interest in non-linear evolutionary patterns. Long-wave patterns in macro-
economic and regional systems, long-tenn drastic shifts in economic activities, and
differential dynamic trajectories of various subsystems of the economy have demonstrated
the relevance of non-linear approaches in economics. In fact, as soon as parameters of an
otherwise linear system are time-dependent with respect to endogenous variables of this
system, one faces a situation of endogenously detennined structural change leading to
non-linear dynamic models. In a space-time context such structural changes may lead to
interesting situations related to the spatio-temporal (ir)reversible trajectories (including
catastrophic behaviour) of a dynamic system.
Finally, for many years the mathematical-statistical difficulties inherent in non-linear
dynamic systems have precluded many researchers from applying such approaches to the
social sciences. However, the rapid computational advances in this field (including
operational computer software) and the availability ofan appropriate mathematicalframe-
work (notably the analysis of the qualitative behaviour of a dynamic system) have led to
an increased use of non-linear dynamic models in economics.
Examples of such applications can be found in various fields of economics, such as
macro-economics (e.g., long waves analysis), consumer economics (e.g., shopping
behaviour), regional economics (e.g., urban life cycle analysis) and business economics
(e.g. , technology innovation behaviour). In this respect the relationship between the
micro behaviour of the system's components and their macro consequences for the
system as a whole is intriguing: changes at a micro level may - beyond a certain critical
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threshold level - exert structural influences at an aggregate level. Clearly, linear models
are in general unable to generate structural or sometimes discontinuous changes.
The class of non-linear dynamic models has specific features which distinguish them
from conventional linear dynamic models. The main characteristic is that such models are
able to describe qualitative system changes, as a non-linear dynamic model may contain
certain ranges of parameter values for which the system can be in multiple equilibrium
states. Such ambiguity, which in any case does exist in a formal sense, can only be
eliminated if either the theory underlying the non-linear dynamic model specification is
made more specific (i.e., more oriented toward the behaviour of the system under these
parameter values) and hence more aligned to the phenomena to be studied (to diminish the
semantic insufficiency), or ifmore insight is gained into the long-term historical evolution
of the phenomenon at hand (requiring full and non-trivial information about past
behaviour). In general, however, economic theories are semantically insufficient to avoid
a priori the possibility of multiple equilibrium states. The existence of various types of
feedback mechanisms in economic systems may lead to non-linear trajectories and even
discontinuous changes. Such discontinuous changes are often time-irreversible; Le., by
reversing the direction of the initial stimulus that has caused the discontinuous movement
(e.g., bifurcation, catastrophe, or shock), the system does not necessarily move back to
its original state. Such asymmetric behaviour implies an unstable evolutionary pattern, as
the discontinuities which may then be triggered by marginal changes in initial conditions
or in parameter values make the system's evolution time-irreversible. Consequently, the
past state of a system plays a dominant and non-trivial role in non-linear dynamic
systems.
It is worth noting that non-linear dynamics plays a crucial role in explaining the spatio-
temporal evolution of a spatial system (e.g., city, region), as the question of isotropy of
space and time is at stake here. The analysis of the development of geographical structures
requires an investigation into the existence of reversibility of space-time systems. An
abstract representation of a geographical structure can be given by the Cartesian
coordinates (x, y) of the successive phenomena to be modelled in order to position them
in a two-dimensional surface. Additional dimensions (e.g., z) may of course be added to
account for other attributes of such a phenomenon: for instance, its size or magnitude, its
degree of spatial interaction with respect to other phenomena in space and time, etc. In a
general sense geographical structure refers to the interrelatedness between locational
aspects (Xi, Yi) and other dimensions Zi of a phenomenon L Clearly, such structures are
the results of a historical process (e.g., investment and locational decisions). This might
inter alia be described by means of event-history analysis (see Hannan and Tuna, 1985) in
a discrete sense, or by means of continuous space-time models (see Beckmann and Puu,
1985) in a continuous sense. In all these cases the structure and evolution of geographical
systems may be analyzed by means of non-linear dynamic models exhibiting
discontinuities and irreversibilities. To illustrate the relevance of such approaches, one
may quote Griffith and Lea (1983) who remark: "Geographical systems, such as school
systems, and geographical networks such as grain elevator and gas station networks,
experiencing rationalization, growth or concentration and decline, have demonstrated
empirically the asymmetry of life-cycle trajectories".
Section 2 contains some remarks about dynamic systems. Different forms of
bifurcation are treated briefly in Section 3. In Section 4 we distinguish three levels on
which dynamic processes can be modelled. These three levels are then used in Section 5
to classify some models which have been developed by economists and geographers.
Finally, Section 6 contains some conclusions.
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2 . DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
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Following Samuelson (1948, p. 314) and Frisch (1935-36) we may define a dynamical
system as a system whose behaviour over time is determined by functional equations in
which variables are involved in an essential way at different points of time. This defmition
becomes more precise when applied to economics due to the requirement that the variables
should be economically significant. Otherwise, every variable can be written as the
derivative of its own integral, which in itself may not be a variable of interest, although it
would make the system dynamic. In respect to this qualification, we regard systems of
difference and differential equations as dynamic systems. In the rest of this paper we shall
restrict attention to these two classes of dynamic equations.,.
There are various ways of classifying dynamic models. For instance, Samuelson
subdivided them into complete causally-determined systems, historical systems, and
stochastic (historical and non-historical) systems (for details see Samuelson, 1948).
The analytical knowledge of systems of differential equations is better developed than
that of systems of difference equations. However, several results for systems of
differential equations hold in an analogous way for systems of difference equations.
Sometimes, however, unexpected results may take place; viz., if differential equations are
discretely approximated by means of difference equations. The problem here is caused by
the fact that empirical economic data are usually only available at discrete time intervals,
so that in economic research one is forced to use difference equations for dynamic
systems. This problem can be clarified as follows. Assume the following dynamic
system:
X=F(x) (2.1)
where x E X C IRn, x== d~\t) and F: X -+ IRn. X is called the state space and F
defines a vector field on X, while (2.1) is a general formulation of a system of differential
equations.
In applications where numerical solutions are required, the distinction between
differential and difference equations becomes blurred, as the computer solution of (2.1)
usually requires a discrete approximation:
x(t+.1) - x(t) = F(xt), (2.2)
where t = 0,.1,2.1,... with .1 a small positive number. Let n = 1; local stability of the
corresponding equilibrium x· of (2.1) requires:
(:) 1x=x. < 0,
while local stability of the corresponding fixed point x· of (2.2) requires:
dF 1<1.11 + ~dx x=x.
(2.3)
(2.4)
This illustrates that a discrete numerical solution procedure for a differential equation
system evokes problems of stability: if .1 is taken too large, the fixed point x· of the
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approximated system (2.2) may exhibit unstable behaviour, although it may be a stable
equilibrium point for system (2.1).
A glaring example of such a situation can be found in models of the type developed by
May (1974), which are frequently used in population dynamics (see also Pimm, 1982; Li
and Yorke, 1982; and Brouwer and Nijkamp, 1985).
The prototype of the May model has the following form:
x(t+1) = '!fx(t)[1 - x(t)]. (2.5)
This simple non-linear dynamic system in difference equation form may exhibit a
remarkable spectrum of dynamic behaviour ranging from stability to fluctuating and even
chaotic patterns, depending on the parameter values and on the initial conditions. This
unusual and unexpected behaviour of a non-linear dynamic model does not, however,
hold for its continuous counterpart in differential equation form. Consequently, one may
conclude that the May model mainly derives its unusual results from its specification in
difference equation form. Although such models may generate a wide spectrum of
dynamic behaviour, there is a priori no reason to believe that simple models of this type
are able to provide a more realistic and reliable representation of a dynamic complex world
than other models.
With regard to models of type (2.1) it is interesting to note 7 fundamental questions
raised inter alia by Varian (1981):
(i) Do solutions exist?
(ii) Do equilibria exist?
(iii) What is the number of equilibria?
(iv) Which equilibria are locally stable?
(v) Which equilibria are globally stable?
(vi) Do cycles exist?
(vii) Is the system structurally stable?
We shall treat these questions concisely in order to clarify some relevant aspects of
(non-linear) dynamic models.
A solution to (2.1) - with initial conditions x(O) = Xo - is a differentiable function
x: I -+ X, where I is an interval in IR, such that:
dx(t) =F(x(t)), and x(O) =Xo .dt (2.6)
If F is continuously differentiable on the open subset X, a unique solution does exist.
This solution is continuous (as a function of xo). However, an explicit analytical solution
to (2.1) is usually difficult to find, so attention is normally focussed on the qualitative
properties of this system. In this framework, the issue of the existence and the stability of
equilibria of the system emerges.
An equilibrium is defined as a point x* e X such that F(x*) =O. Various theorems
dealing with the existence and number of equilibria - especially in case of non-linear
dynamic models - may be relevant in concrete situations (see, for instance, Rijk and
Vorst, 1982). The notion of local stability is particularly important in this context. An
equilibrium point x* is called locally (asymptotically) stable, if there is some &> 0 such
that for all Xo for which I Xo -x*1 < &it follows that~ <Pt(xo) =x*, where Cj)t(xo) is the
flow of the differential equation (2.1) that corresponds to the initial condition x(O) =xo.
Usually, only locally stable equilibrium points are regarded as relevant from an economic
point of view. Stable equilibria act as attractors of the trajectory of a dynamic system and
thus determine a specific solution. The case of unstable equilibria is also interesting, as
such points may act as repel/ors of the trajectories. Finally, a third type of equilibrium is
the saddle point, which reflects a special kind of instability: a saddle point implies that
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there are two trajectories leading to different equilibrium points; such a point divides the
state space into two areas, while each trajectory in each area is directed towards a different
stable equilibrium. The nature of an equilibrium point x* can in principle be evaluated by
analyzing the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix DF(x*) (see Annex 1).
An equilibrium point x* is globally stable if ~x(t) = x* for any initial condition xo'
Further contributions to the analysis of global stability in economics can be found in
Arrow and Hahn (1971).
A special type of equilibrium is a cyclical pattern: a point set X is in a cycle (closed
orbit), if F(x) -:F- 0 and CPt(x) = x for some t-:F-O. Casti (1985) indicates why cycles are
relevant in modelling real-world phenomena. In his view, empirical evidence indicates
that for many phenomena periodicity is the rule and static equilibrium the exception.
Besides, he states that a system that can respond more swiftly to the environment than its
neighbours has a competitive advantage. That real-world systems do not always exhibit
truly periodic behaviour is due to perturbations which continually push the system from
one cycle toward another.
It is worth noting that the equations of a model always have an approximate character,
so that structural stability is a desirable property; i.e., a small change (perturbation) in
F(·) should not change the qualitative nature of the vector field. Structural stability is thus
directly related to the 'behaviour' (in terms of location, existence and character) of the
equilibrium points. Clearly, under specific circumstances with dramatic or discontinuous
changes in a real-world system one may use modelling experiments based on structural
instability. In the latter case, linear models with endogenous changes cannot be employed.
3 . NON-LINEARITY AND BIFURCATIONS
Linear model specifications have become very popular in economics, although there are a
priori no strong theoretical arguments in favour of linear models. Clearly, practical
reasons may be relevant in this context (for instance, data availability, econometric
estimation and test procedures, first-order Taylor approximations, computer software like
linear programming etc.) but, as noted above, linear models are often inadequate when
used in relation to various real-world phenomena.
Non-linear models are able to generate non-trivial changes in a dynamic system (not
just growth or decline), and consequently the (event) history of phenomena plays a crucial
role in dynamic modelling efforts for such a system. The capability of non-linear models
to describe and/or to endogenously generate bifurcations is their major discriminating
feature. For instance, by means of bifurcation analysis one may try to model structural
change processes: the qualitative nature of the change caused by a bifurcation reveals the
evolution of the system concerned.
Consider system (2.1) in a slightly modified form:
x= F(x;a.), (3.1)
where a. is a parameter vector. Let F be non-linear. Assume now that Xi (x=I, ...,I) are I
distinct equilibrium points. The number I may then be co-determined by the numerical
value of a.. Since x= 0 for any point Xi, there exists an internal consistency within the
system for these values of x. A state is internally consistent, if it is self-sustaining. The
nonlinearity of F may thus lead to a number of distinct self-sustaining states. Existence of
cycles reveals that there may also be an internal consistency between moving variables. If
one takes for granted that a social system can be decomposed into individuals whose
behaviour influences the system's environment and is in turn influenced by this environ-
ment, it is easily seen that multiple self-sustaining states may exist.
Each individual action or each local intervention in a complex system may lead to an
aggregate impact at the system level that - after a bifurcation - may result in global
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changes. Various forms of bifurcation may be distinguished, some of which will be
discussed here. Assume for instance the following partition of (2.1)
(a) xl = fI(XbX2;~)
(b) x2 = f2(X2;Y)
(3.2)
where X 1 and x2 are vectors of fast respectively slow moving varibles, and ~ and y
parameter vectors. The functions fl and f2 are assumed to be non-linear.
Since f l is non-linear, there may be some ranges of x2 and ~ for which (3.2.a) has
multiple equilibria, and there may be some bifurcation points (x~, ~b) at which this
number of equilibria may even change. If the system is situated near such a point, the
equilibrium point which will be reached depends on infinitesimal changes in x2 and/or ~
(note that xl is assumed to be a fast moving variable). Consequently, at such points
(x~, ~b) the self-sustaining nature of the equilibrium points becomes unstable: a small
change in X2 and/or ~ may trigger a fast development whereby Xl takes on an entirely
different equilibrium value. In such cases, the predictability with regard to xl will be low,
even if the functional form fl were exactly known.
Another example of bifurcation concerns the nature of the equilibrium points, which
may alter in response to a small parameter change.
Both types of bifurcation (Le., those related to the number and nature of equilibria)
essentially reflect situations of structural instability; they may even occur simultaneously.
A [mal and different form of bifurcation is related to small changes in the initial
conditions. A small shift in the initial conditions may force the system to move to a
completely different trajectory. This divergence is caused by the shift in the influence of
either attracting points (in case of stable equilibria) or repelling points (in case of unstable
equilibria). The treatment of unstable system behaviour often requires a probabilistic
approach, as we shall demonstrate below.
4. THREE LEVELS OF MODELLING DYNAMICS
Models can be designed and estimated at different levels of aggregation, ranging from
macro to micro levels. Each aggregation level imposes certain constraints on model
specification and validation, as well as on the conclusions to be inferred from the model's
results (see also Blommestein and Nijkamp, 1985). For instance, when a model is
specified and estimated as a macro model, one has to be extremely cautious in drawing
conclusions about the micro behaviour of economic agents (the so-called problem of
'ecological fallacy').
Each scale of aggregation implies that certain aspects are omitted or are assumed to be
constant. For instance, for certain modelling purposes (e.g., short-term forecasts) one
may abstract from the explanation of slow moving variables (by using a ceteris paribus
clause). In other cases one may be willing to neglect the impact of fast moving processes.
For instance, if these processes are assumed to be so fast that the analysis is not distorted,
the trajectory of these variables from one equilibrium to another need not be studied
precisely (e.g., in a comparative static framework). Clearly, the validity of these
simplifying assumptions depends on the differences in time scales and the order of
magnitude of the variables involved. However, in a dynamic model fast and slow
dynamics may occur simultaneously.
One should note, however, that the rate of change of a variable in a model also usually
depends on the variables which are omitted. The behaviour of such variables depends in
tum on other variables (whether included in the model or omitted) etc. Consequently,
from the viewpoint of specification analysis, it should be observed that a closed set of
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equations (Le., a finite set of equations specified only in tenns of agreed-upon variables)
only exists in an approximative sense.
There are, however, phenomena for which the distinction according to time scale and
size does not provide a useful way of demarcating a closed set of equations. For instance,
in the case of structural change processes, we can imagine that a small change at the micro
level of a system (e.g., the construction of a road or the introduction of a new production
process) may have substantial impacts on the macro level. In these cases "... the difficulty
comes from the fact that couplings may exist at all scales from the smallest initial ones to
those of the macroscopic level when a system is about to topple over from one stable
mode of operating to another" and thus "... a model or theory for describing systems near
these critical points must therefore take all these correlations into account in one way or
another" (see Courtois, 1985, p. 593).
IT the above-mentioned new mode of operation is qualitatively different from the
original one, one can speak of an evolutionary event (see also Johansson and Nijkamp,
1986): sometimes a small change at the micro level may change the structure of the
system. For instance, due to a new road the transportation cost matrix for a whole spatial
system may change, or in the case of a new production process new firms, competing
with better products, may enter the market. Of course, such new macroscopic structures
emerging from microscopic events would in tum have an impact on the structure and the
functioning of microscopic mechanisms.
We shall now discuss three levels of change in physical systems as distinguished by
Prigogine (1981):
(i) a macro-phenomenologicallevel
(ii) a micro-stochastic level (usually based on Markov processes)
(iii) an approach based on the dynamic laws corresponding to a basic (micro or
meso) level.
The fact that we can distinguish a micro level and a macro level (structure) in both
physical and social systems may provide a useful analogy. Therefore we will use this
distinction to classify types of non-linear dynamic models that have been applied in
(regional) economics. Thus, the aim is not to propose unambiguous design and specifica-
tion principles for such models; such questions are co-determined by the nature of the
phenomenon under consideration, the specific research questions posed etc.
(i) Macro-phenomenological level
The variables in the macro-phenomenological approach are (weighted) average values
of micro variables whose fluctuations are supposed to have little impact on the first-
mentioned variables. Clearly, this assumption is not always warranted; witness the
occurrence of bifurcation in real world systems deteriorating the macroscopic description.
In case of a bifurcation (which ultimately always stems from the micro level), it is clear
that complementary theoretical considerations - not included in the macroscopic viewpoint
- are needed in order to adequately analyze the bifurcation process and the way the system
reorganizes itself.
(ii) Micro-stochastic level
In the microstochastic approach the micro variables underlying the macro behaviour are
explicitly modelled. The factual knowledge regarding their behaviour is limited, so that a
probabilistic approach is often followed (e.g., by describing the state transitions of micro
variables by Markov processes). By assuming an initial probability distribution for the
state of the system, it is then possible to trace the consequences of the micro behaviour
and to derive a stationary distribution function. This distribution reflects the fact that the
multitude of individual events taking place simultaneously at the micro level of the system
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compensate each other statistically, so that they may create a certain macro order which is
called a structure (cf. als the notion of entropy in a spatial interaction system; see Wilson,
1970).
Under certain conditions the stationary distribution may be multimodal; viz. if - given
an initial unimodal distribution and its ensuing trajectory - certain points emerge over time
so that the distribution shifts from a unimodal to a multimodal one. Such a transition is
accompanied by large fluctuations in the micro variables. It is, in principle, possible to
derive approximate mathematical expressions for the growth of such fluctuations
proceeding the occurrence of a bifurcation. These fluctuations reflect the existence of a
certain ambiguity in the system, as the system may 'choose' between various regimes.
Beyond such a bifurcation point the average value of the variables is no longer directly
relatd to the extreme points. Then a multimodal stationary probability distribution results,
which indicates that there may be various macro structures that are consistent with the
stochastic behaviour of the micro variables. If this micro behaviour is represented by
means of a parametrized model, the form of the stationary distribution function may
change drastically due to a (small) shift in one of the parameters. As a description of a
relatively large system in terms of a probability distribution is often not very meaningful,
one usually utilizes mean value equations. It should be noted, however, that in
multimodal stationary distributions the relationships between extreme points and mean
values become blurred. Fortunately, it can be demonstrated that the stable equilibrium
points of the mean value equations correspond to the extreme points of the stationary
distribution. When the behaviour of the micro variables depends on the micro state of the
system, the mean value equations will be non-linear and there may be multiple stable
modes of operation.
(iii) Dynamic laws at a basic level
The third approach provides a description in terms of the dynamic laws operating at a
basic level (e.g., the individual trajectories of molecules in a physical system, or the
dynamic behaviour of individuals or firms in an economic system). Clearly, the precise
demarcation of a basic level implies some arbitrariness. Instead of providing a sharp
demarcation criterion for cases (i) and (iii), it is more meaningful to spell out the
consequences of not using a phenomenological approach; i.e., in what sense does the
analysis change if, in one way or another, one takes into account the fluctuation,
diversities and feedbacks at the micro level?
Let us assume that the exact dynamic laws governing the behaviour of basic variables
are known. Such laws may express stable behaviour, so that neighbouring points are
transformed into neighbouring points. Then we may use these laws to analyze the
behaviour of the system. However, if these laws reflect unstable behaviour, a problem
arises, as then any region in the state space, whatever its size, always contains different
trajectories that diverge over time. In such cases, even small differences in initial
conditions may be amplified. Since a specific limit transition in which processes of a
region in the state space are restricted to a point (and hence to a well defmed trajectory) is
not possible, the description in terms of trajectories breaks down. Then a description in
terms of bundles of trajectories becomes relevant. It can be modelled by representing the
dynamic equation in stochastic form. This approach, called in the natural sciences the
ensemble standpoint. is based on a probability aggregate, which is composed of an
ensemble of copies of the original system that are consistent with the information assumed
about the original system.
The above-mentioned classification of dynamic models is not only relevant for the
natural sciences, but also for the social sciences. Various kinds of non-linearities are
particularly likely to exist in disaggregate models. Such non-linearities can make the
dynamic behaviour of the pertaining model unstable.
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In the next section, it shall be demonstrated that various models which in the past years
have been developed to describe non-linear evolutions, especially of spatial (urban and
regional) socio-economic systems, can be classified by means of these three categories.
5. A CLASSIFICATION OF MAJOR TYPES OF NON-LINEAR
DYNAMIC SPATIAL MODELS
Various models have been developed by economists and geographers to describe non-
linear dynamic (sometimes irreversible) socio-economic developments in time and space.
Instead of providing an exhaustive survey of the literature, we shall present one or two
prototype models, which may be regarded as representative for a broad class of models
for each class of non-linear dynamic models, discussed in Section 4.
(i) Macro-phenomenological models
Various models in this class are directly or indirectly based on the so-called Volterra-
Lotka approach in population dynamics. An example of the macro-phenomenological
approach to urban growth and form can be found in Dendrinos (1984) and Dendrinos and
Mullally (1985). The central point in this approach is that - despite the complexity of a
system at the micro-level - it is possible to gain basic insights into the nature of urban
evolution by means of analysing a limited number of strategic macro-level variables.
Dendrinos refers to May (1971), who has shown that - in case of random connectance - a
system is more likely to be stable when it is small, the elements of the system are weakly
connected and the average strength of interaction is low. Although he admits that inter-city
linkages are highly non-random, he nevertheless uses this argument (together with the
analytical intractability of large non-linear dynamic models) to reject the use of large-scale
models for describing urban evolution in the U.S., which has shown remarkable stability
over the time-span of a century.
He then introduces the concept of an effective environment, which allows him to
design a small model for analyzing the income-population dynamics relative to that of the
environment of the SMSA's in the U.S. An effective environment is a system's
environment, which implies such a normalization of variables that their dynamics can be
described by means of the Volterra-Lotka dynamics (or any other non-random dynamic
model) which provides theoretical insights and makes empirical verification possible (see
Dendrinos, 1985, p. 68).
The standard form of this model is as follows:
• A 2~t = a(Yt - l)Xt - pX t
Yt = y(x - Xt)Yt
(5.1)
where Xt is the relative population size of a metropolitan area (normalized with respect to
the total national population size) at time period t, Yt the ratio of urban real per capita
income to the prevailing national average during each time period t, and xthe carrying
capacity (in terms of population size) of the metropolitan area concerned.
It has been claimed that this model structure is supported by empirical evidence. The
model has to be regarded as a specimen of the macro-phenomenological type, as relative
income and population dynamics of an urban area could, in principle, equally well be
modelled in terms of disaggregated variables (such as employment in specific industries,
the presence of housing, infrastructure etc.).
The insight which the model may provide is rather limited. The behaviour of an urban
system can not realistically be explained without consideration of its environment. Despite
the normalization used, no functional relationships of the city and its environment are
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considered. One of the more interesting issues in regional and urban economics is the
question: what are the determinants of the relative carrying capacity of an urban area and
what are the driving forces of urban dynamics? The previous analysis, however, provides
no answer to these questions. The relative carrying capacity level of population is not an
endogenously determined variable in this approach, but is treated as a parameter for which
it is claimed that robust estimates are obtainable. The robustness of these estimates is
explained by means of the metropolitan areas having sticky ties to their environment. A
dynamic theory should be able to explain why this is the case.
One may claim that the above-mentioned model is obtained by implicitly simplifying a
more comprehensive model. The validity of explaining a complex phenomenon by means
of a few strategically placed macro observations is directly related to the existence of an
effective environment, which itself is a somewhat vague concept. It is questionable
whether there are many phenomena for which this is possible. In fact, low dimensional
models may be useful within a more comprehensive, disaggregated analysis. In the words
of Casti (1985, p. 213): " it has been empirically observed in many modelling exercises
that the essential behavioral properties of a system which involves interactions of many
variables can be captured by centering attention upon a small number of macro-level
variables formed, generally, as some (usually non-linear) combination of micro-variables.
Usually, the observed macro-variables exhibit the characteristic oscillations, bifurcations,
etc., and what is needed is some sort of meso-level theory enabling us to translate back-
and-forth between the micro-variables, which we cannot see or know, and the macro-
patterns".
(ii) Micro-stochastic models
An example of this type of model can be found in the work of Haag and Weidlich
(1984) on interregional migration. They employ synergetic concepts to analyse the
dynamics and possible stable modes of operation of a system that describes the distribu-
tion of a given population (N) over a number of regions (L). Within their approach the
behaviour of the micro variables of the system (i.e., individuals who mayor may not
migrate to another region) is explicitly considered. It is argued that the heterogeneity of
their behaviour impedes a fully deterministic model. Instead, they make a plea for a
probabilistic treatment in terms of transition probabilities for well defined states. These
transition probabilities provide a Markov chain. They may be modelled by means of a
parametrized model. The parameters in such a model are called trend parameters. The
resulting stochastic theory describes the system in terms of a probability distribution
defined over the possible states of the system.
By means of the transition probabilities it is possible to link (static) theoretical
considerations to dynamics, and by means of the so-called master equation - which
describes the evolution of the probability distribution over time - a link is provided
between the micro- and macro-level. Thus an elegant framework for analysing the
dynamics of complex systems results. Once the initial conditions and the specification of
the transition probabilities are given, the behaviour of the system is completely determined
by the numerical values of the trend parameters. These trend parameters are then estimated
on the basis of empirical data. In a more extensive analysis they may be explained by
socio-economic factors and in this way the model becomes more appropriate for
prediction purposes (see Annex 2 for more details).
In the case that the transition probabilities are functions of the macro-state of the
system, there exists a feedback from the macro- to the micro-level. This feedback may
lead to a multimodal stationary distribution function, the shape of which may change
drastically under certain critical changes of the trend parameters (bifurcation). The states
of the system corresponding to the maxima of the stationary distribution are to be
interpreted as stationary end-states in which the spatial interaction system has attained a
stable mode of operation. In the case of a multimodal distribution there are several
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stationary end-states depending on the initial conditions under which it was attained.
Under the condition of 'detailed balance' - that is, local balance of all probability fluxes -
it is possible to derive explicitly the stationary distribution function. An often analytically
more tractable but less informative representation is obtained by means of value
equations. These detenninistic equations describe how the mean values of the number of
people living in the different regions change as the probability distribution evolves over
time. In formula:
diii _" . dp(n;t)
--Lnl ddt ni t
where:
(5.2)
n' == (nI ,..ni,..njo...nL), a vector consisting of the number of people living in
the various regions.
ni = the mean value of the number of people living in region i.
dP~~;t) =the time derivation ofthe distribution function concerned.
By an approximation which is valid as long as the distribution remains narrow and
unimodal, a closed (self contained) set of L differential equations is obtained. l These
equations are non-linear if the individual transition probabilities are functions of n. The
stationary points of the mean value equations correspond to the states at which the
stationary distribution attains its maxima. Possible bifurcation phenomena are also
reflected in these mean value equations. The stationary points which are finally attained by
the mean value equation are dependent on the initial conditions.
(iii) Models based on dynamic laws at a basic level
An example of the disaggregated approach belonging to the third class is the work of
Allen and Sanglier (1981). Their work is part of the investigation of 'self-organizing'
phenomena in natural and social systems. In this approach the interactions or
geographically distributed sites can be analysed. This leads to dynamic equations in which
various types of non-linearities are present, and consequently the dynamics expressed in
these models may reflect an unstable behaviour.
A typical example of these equations reads:
dxd
i
=bXi(J? + 2 I~ - xd - rnxi + T [2 {x~ exp (-~diJ')-X~eXP(-~iJ')}] (5.3)
t 1 kl .. J 1J*J.
where
Xi - population of site i
.J¥ -basic 'carrying capacity' of site i
If -number of jobs in activity k at site i
dij - distance between site i and site j
The parameters b and m reflect the demographic change (birth and death rates) as well
as the immobility of the population in residential relocation under pressure from the
distribution of available employment The last term, consisting of a weighted sum of the
lThe possible development in case of non-linearity into a multimodal distribution is an extremely slow
process which takes place after the distribution has been centred around one oftbe (ultimate) maxima.
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squared number of people living in the different site, expresses the influence of
congestion effects.
The specification of (5.3), which consists of an equilibrium condition and a dynamic
adjustment process, is hardly motivated. The dynamics employed is inter alia used in
biology (Volterra-Lotka). There it is reasonable to assume, under certain circumstances,
that xl.x2 is a suitable proxy (model) for the number of prey-predator interactions
between species 1 and 2. It is questionable whether these types of dynamics are
appropriate for modelling socio-economic processes. In any case, they imply a type of
behaviour that is not motivated.
Allen et al. consider spatial structures as being far from equilibrium in a thermo-
dynamic sense and consequently they presuppose that flows of matter, persons and
energy lead to a maintenance of this disequilibrium situation. The fact that a social system
is open is incorporated in the model by two types of stochastic processes which may
influence the simulation results in a non-trivial way. One is the random introduction of
economic activity at various time intervals at all locations; if certain exogenous boundary
conditions are met, the activity will develop, otherwise it will not survive. The second
type concerns the perturbation of exogenous parameters and the deviations of behaviour
of an individual agent from an average aggregate performance level. The authors are not
so interested in making exact predictions, but rather in illustrating the consequences of
fluctuations and non-linearities. Their explanation is not as 'strong' as the usual 'causal'
explanations of classical physics. "It is through the action of elements not explicitly
contained in the equations (fluctuations or historical 'accidents') that the choices are in fact
made at the various bifurcation points that occur during the evolution of any particular
system" and "the spatial organization of a system does not result uniquely and necessarily
from the 'economic and social laws' enshrined in the equations, but also represents a
'memory' of particular specific deviations from these average behaviours" (Allen and
Sanglier, p. 168).
Another example of the approach based on 'basic' dynamic laws is the type of models
employed by Wilson et al. (see for example Wilson, 1981). They have used their models
to analyse among other things the urban retail structure and the residential structure. Here
we shall take the urban retail structure model as an example. In this model two types of
agents are distinguished: there are consumers who respond via their buying behaviour to a
given spatial distribution of shopping centres and there are entrepreneurs who determine
their investments and consequently the urban retail structure in response to revenue
generated in the different shopping centres. The buying behaviour of the consumers is
modelled by means of a measure of the attractiveness of the different centres and the costs
of travel. The attractiveness of the centre is assumed to be a function of the size of the
centre. This size itself is determined by the investment behaviour of the entrepreneurs.
The total revenue (expenditure on consumption goods) attracted to centre j is:
~c"I"~p'~e - IJ
D' = L: -1 1 J
J i -L:-w....Jat.....-e.....,-~-Cl-·j
. J
where: J
~
Pi
W·JcOOIJ
a,~
= the average per capita expanditure on shopping goods by the residents of
zonei
= the population of zone i
=the size of centre j
= the cost of travel from i to j
= parameters
Further, it is postulated that the cost of employing a centre is proportional to its size:
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where k is a suitable constant. To analyse the development of the retail structure it is
assumed that the entrepreneurs will expand their facility if there are positive profits and
that the facility will be reduced if they make a loss.
So the following equilibrium condition is postulated:
..w?- e -\3cijL ewl j kW' (5.6)
. ~ -\3cij' j
1 4- wC!- e
j j
Wj = F[~ ~Piwj e -\3Cij
1 ~ a -\3C" - kWj']
4- W· e Ij
j j
(5.7)
where F is a function such that F[O] = 0 and F'[x] > 0, 'V x. It is worth noting that the
specification of the F-function - in principle to be based on theoretical considerations -
influences the nature of the equilibrium points and hence the dynamic trajectory. The
model is highly non-linear in the Wj variables. (5.6) models the distribution of the
expenditure over the different centres. The denominator in (5.6) serves to make this
distribution consistent It leads to non-linearities and the possibility of multiple equilibria.
The dynamic behaviour of the model may exhibit bifurcation properties that are not easily
investigated analytically. This will be even more likely when the model is disaggregated
and the attractiveness factors themselves become non-linear functions.
After having briefly considered the various prototypes of models belonging to the three
above-mentioned classes, we shall draw some more specific conclusions regarding the
modelling of non-linear dynamic (spatial) systems in the final section.
6. CONCLUSION
Non-linear dynamic systems are appropriate tools for modelling discontinuous and
structural changes in real-world systems.
A non-linear dynamic system may, for ranges of numerical values of its parameters,
have multiple equilibrium points. So the equilibrium which is finally attained may be path-
dependent. Non-linearity therefore requires a dynamic analysis and often also a
disequilibrium approach. This poses problems. As Koopmans (1957) observed 'until we
succeed in specifying fruitful assumptions for the behaviour in an uncertain and changing
economic environment, we shall continue to be groping for the proper tools of
reasoning'. We still lack such a fruitful theory of behaviour in disequilibrium
The non-linearity may have its origin in non-linear individual behavioural relationships
or it maybe-caused by aggregation of linear ones. However, theoretical knowledge and
empirical information concerning functional forms in economics is very limited and the
class of non-linear functions is very wide. Conscientious econometric research may be
helpful, but this still requires basic assumptions which may be hard to motivate and will
require an enormous effort to test empirically. Comparing different empirical models of a
certain phenomenon that are based on different functional forms is far from easy and is
not guaranteed to lead to conclusive results. It therefore seems an exacting endeavour to
describe specific non-linear phenomena by means of a complete set of well-motivated
non-linear dynamic laws.
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Thereby arises a dilemma. On the one hand there are empirical phenomena that cannot
be explained by linear models, while on the other hand the knowledge related to
behaviour in disequilibrium and functional fonns is often too limited to warrant the
specification of a set of non-linear dynamic laws.
A completely different and in our view promising way of arriving at a non-linear
system is the synergetic approach. Synergetics is defined as the science of collective static
or dynamic phenomena in closed or open multi-component systems with "cooperative"
interactions occurring between the units of the system (Weidlich and Haag, 1983, p. 1).
The non-linearity follows from the assumption that the behaviour of the micro-units (the
components) of the system is dependent on its macro-state. The macro-state of the system
is at the same time influenced by the individual behaviour. There exists a cyclic coupling
between causes and effects which may lead to multiple self-sustaining states (structures).
The non-linearity enters in a 'natural' way and not by means of an often arbitrary
functional fonn. Since in the synergetic approach the micro- and macro-level are modelled
simultaneously it is suited for the analysis of structural change.
The behaviour of the micro-units is modelled by means of transition probabilities
which define a Markov process. Therefore a specific functional fonn has to be chosen.
Modelling the transition probabilities, however, poses a rather well ordered problem,
relatively easily accessible to empirical investigation, as opposed to the all embracing
nature of the specification of dynamic laws. Within the synergetic approach it is not
necessary to postulate equilibrium conditions and disequilibrium behaviour. Once the
transition probabilities are modelled, the dynamics and equilibria follow in a logical way.
The synergetic approach leads to a description in tenns of a distribution function over
the state space. This description can be shown to be consistent with a description in tenns
of stochastic dynamic equations for the relevant variables (see Weidlich and Haag, 1983).
If the deterministic part of these equations exhibits unstable behaviour the latter
description is rather limited. Simulations of the dynamic trajectories will lead to a wide
spectrum of results. These results reflect the above-mentioned distribution function. The
description in tenns of the distribution function is to be preferred since it is more
complete. The intractability of the distribution function of somewhat larger systems is,
however, a serious handicap. One should then resort to the mean value equations as these
provide (often adequate) infonnation about the distribution function in an elegant and
concise way.
In retrospect: the foregoing observations lead us to the conclusion that the strength of
the master equation is its ability to account for synergetic effects in social systems in an
appropriate manner. Further empirical research, including an examination of the actual
properties of the mean value equations for real-world systems, is no doubt warranted.
Annex 10 Stability Analysis by Means of Eigenvalues
In this Annex, the way in which equilibrium points x* can be dealt with on the basis of an
eigenvalue approach of the matrix DF(x*) will be outlined.
The linearized vector field that is close enough to the equilibrium point x* describes its
stability properties. If at least one of the eigenvalues has a non-zero imaginary part, the
convergence or divergence will exhibit an oscillatory pattern. Clearly, when F(o) is a
linear function, there is at most one equilibrium point. In the latter case, DF(o) is constant,
so that the local behaviour and the global behaviour of the system coincide; besides, the
qualitative characteristics of a solution will be independent of the initial conditions. As the
linear case implies that DF(x*) will generally be a function of the parameters, the
equilibrium will change due to a shift in parameters. However, the location of the
equilibrium point will not change dramatically in response to a small parameter shift.
On the other hand, if F(o) is a non-linear function, several equilibrium points may
occur; their number depends inter alia on the numerical values of the parameters. DF(o) is
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then in general a function of the parameters and of x. Such a case of multiple equilibria of
non-linear models implies that sometimes the location, existence and character of
equilibrium points may drastically change in response to a small change in one of the
parameters.
Various examples of non-linear dynamic models can be found in regional economics
(see also Section 5). Several of these models incorporate a static equilibrium condition in
a dynamic framework. This equilibrium condition detennines the location of the
equilibrium points, while their character is also dependent on the dynamic framework.
This approach bears a similarity to Samuelson's correspondence principle stating that a
fruitful application of comparative static methods often presupposes a theory of dynamics
(see Samuelson, 1948).
In conclusion, instead of specifying a priori and in an uncritical way a specific type of
dynamics (e.g., Volterra-Lotka dynamics, May dynamics) for economic systems, it is
preferable to give sufficient attention to the design of models for dynamic adjustment
processes of the dynamic system at hand.
Annex 2. The Master Equation Approach
In this Annex synergetic concepts employed by Haag and Weidlich (1984) will be
described. The behaviour of the (migrating) individuals is modelled by means of
individual transition probabilities Pji which describe the probability that an individual will
migrate from region i to region J (i;f:j). With respect to these probabilities the Markov
assumption is made. Thus the probability than an individual migrates from i to j in a
given time interval is independent of its behaviour preceeding that time interval. The
probabilities, which link static concepts to dynamics, are modelled as follows:
Pji(nj,ni) = v exp[fj(nj+1) - fi(ni)] i;t:j
where:
(I)
Pji
v
nk
fk(nk)
=individual transition probability for a transition from region i to region j
=global mobility parameter detennining the time scale of the migration
process
=number of people living in region k
=utility of an individual living in region k which has a population nk; the
trend parameter which enters this function may be explained by socio-
economic factors within the context of a regression model.
These individual transition probabilities enter into the expression for transition 'proba-
bilities' between so-called socio-configurations. These socio-configurations are the
possible distributions of the given N individuals over the given L regions. A typical
socio-configuration can be described by the vector n containing a given number of
individuals living in each region. The following model for the transition
n. (nJ,... ,nj....ni,...nL> .... n.ii • (nJ,... ,nj+l,... ,(ni-1), ... ,nL> results:
Wji[n] =niPji(nj.ni). (II)
All the ni members contribute to the probability P·i. (II) enters into the master equation,w~ch describes. the evolution of the probability ~at the system is in one of the (~)
soclo-configurabons.
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(III)
L
dP(not) "" 0 0 • 0~=.? (Wji[n1J]P([n1J;t) - Wji[n]P(n,t)}.
I,J=l
The fIrst and second tenn within the summation express a probability flux that goes
into, respectively out of, the socio-confIguration n. Summation gives the net result. Since
there are (~) socio-confIgurations the master equation is a system of (~) coupled
linear differential equations. It can be proved that the distribution function P(n;t) fInally
becomes time independent. In the case of 'detailed balance' (Le. Wji[nij]P(nij;t) =
Wji[n]P(n;t)'v'i,j,i¢j) the stationary distribution can be obtained. A less informative, but
often more tractible description is obtained in terms of mean value equations (see page
181). The exact equations of motion for the mean values, which may be derived using
(III), read:
L L
§ = L W'i[n;t] - L Wij[n;t] j=l,.... ,L
dt i=l J i=l
where Wji[n;t] = L Wji[n;t]P(n;t).
n
(IV)
Employing the approximation Wji[n,t] = Wji[ii;t], which is valid as long as the
probability distribution remains narrow and ummodal (see footnote 1, page 181), we
arrive at the self-contained set of coupled-differential equations:
L L
§ =L Wji[ii;t] -.L Wiiii;t]
dt i=l 1=1
j=l,... ,L. (V)
Since Pji is a function of n, (V) is non-linear and may have distinct stationary points. For
the relation between these mean value equations and the distribution function see page
181.
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CHAPTER 13
Dynamics of County Growth
E.S. Mills and G. Carlino
1. INTRODUCTION
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The 1970's witnessed continuing and, in some respects, accelerating movements of
people and jobs within the U.S. The movement from metropolitan central cities to
suburbs continued unabated while there was also evidence of movement of both people
and jobs from metropolitan to non-metropolitan areas, reversing a long standing trend.
Regionally, people and jobs moved from the eastern, northeastern and north central to
southern and western parts of the country. (For documentation of these trends see Carlino
(1985) and Mills (1986». This regional movement is known popularly and inadequately
as movement from the frostbelt to the sunbelt.
Why have these movements occurred? Have metropolitan areas become inherently
unattractive or has migration from them resulted from controllable phenomena? Are
climate and other amenities mainly responsible for the move to the sunbelt? Do people
follow jobs or vice versa? How have federal, state and local government actions affected
the movements? Carlino (1985) analyzes the demetropolitanization of manufacturing
employment in terms of the decreasing importance of agglomeration economies. Mills
(1986) analyzes the determinants of relative growth of metropolitan central cities and
suburbs.
This paper presents an analysis of growth in a small area during the 1970's,
employing an explicit model and a large comprehensive data set. We believe the approach
adopted here has the potential to shed light on all the questions posed in the previous
paragraph.
2 • THEORETICAL MODEL
We envisage a conventional general equilibrium model in which both producers and
consumers are geographically mobile. Consumers maximize utility which depends on
purchased goods and services, on location relative to work places and on spatially varying
non-market amenities. A conventional budget constraint equates income to the sum of
spending on goods and services. Local taxes reduce consumption expenditures and
government services and other amenities appear in utility functions.
Firms produce goods and services, buying inputs and selling outputs in competitive
markets. Production costs vary by location because of regional comparative advantage,
regional variation in labor supply (amenities affect labor supplied at given wage rates),
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and perhaps because of spatial variation in other government actions - land use controls,
state and local taxes, right-to-work laws, etc.
Among the endogenous variables in such a general equilibrium model are prices and
quantities of inputs and outputs by location. No data exist for most such variables for
small geographical areas. Data exist by county for population and most employment, and
these related variables are of great government and private concern. We assume that other
endogenous variables have been solved out of the general equilibrium model and analyze
joint determination of population and employment in small areas.
Specifically, we assume that the model just outlined can be solved to give
and
E'" =f(P,S)
P'" = g(E,S)
(1)
(2)
where E and P are employment and population, S is a vector of exogenous variables
that affect E and P, and the asterisks indicate equilibrium values. All variables refer to
counties, but subscripts are suppressed. (1) and (2) assume that equilibrium employment
and population depend on actual population and employment and on the variables
included in S.
County population and employment are assumed to adjust to equilibrium with
distributed lags:
and
E = E.I + AE(E'" - E_I)
P =P-I + Ap(P'" - P_I)
(3)
(4)
where subscript ·1 refers to the value of the indicated variable lagged one period - a decade
in our data - and AE and Ap are speed of adjustment coefficients.
Substituting (1) and (2) for E'" and P'" in (3) and (4), and rearranging tenns, gives
l\E = AEf(P,S) - AEE.I
and
l\P = Apg(E,S) - ApP-1.
(5)
(6)
(5) and (6) contain only observable variables. Those forms were chosen in preference to
alternatives with l\E1E.I and l\P/P.I as dependent variables on statistical grounds and
after some experimentation.
Having estimated (5) and (6), long run or steady state effects of changes in exogenous
variables can be calculated by setting E =E_I and P =Pol in the estimated equations and
solving the resulting simultaneous equations to obtain long run equilibrium values E and
P of E and P, where
and
E=F(S)
P = O(S).
(7)
(8)
Derivatives of (7) and (8) show estimated long run effects of components of S on
employment and population.
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3. DATA
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The basic data set employed in this study is the tape for County Business Patterns. The
tape contains the 1970 and 1980 census of population counts for each county. It also
contains counts of 1969 and 1979 employment by place of employment.1 The tape also
contains a variety of other census variables that are candidates for inclusion in the S
vector. We added several variables from other sources.
Inevitably, judgment and experimentation are entailed in specifying the S vector.
Previous studies have analyzed effects of such variables as taxes, crime, racial
composition, and the adequacy of the transportation system on the location of either
population or employment, but rarely both. We used earlier studies to attempt to
distinguish the variables which are likely to be important components of S. All the
experiments we tried are reported in the following section. We were inevitably limited by
the set of variables available by county. To make allowance for the effects of unavailable
variables, we included dummy variables for the 9 census regions. We also included
dummy variables for counties which include metropolitan central cities, for counties that
are adjacent to metropolitan areas and for counties that are neither metropolitan nor
adjacent to metropolitan areas.
In the U.S. context, racial mix of county population is a natural candidate for inclusion
in the S vectors. We have included the percentage of the population that is black. We
experimented with several measures of transportation adequacy within counties. By far
the most important variable turned out to be miles of interstate highway. Taxes vary by
state and county in the United States, because of the autonomy of state and local
governments. Total local taxes per capita is a natural variable to include. The difficulty is
that we lack adequate measures of the quality and quantity of government services
produced. Total income is an important variable. High incomes attract both people and
businesses, so we included income per family within each county. A high crime rate
presumably deters people and businesses from locating in an area, so we included the
value of the index of major crimes for the county. Unionization may deter businesses
from locating in a county, but should not affect population. The percentage of the labor
force that belongs to unions is available only by State, and we included it at that level.
State and local governments vary as to their willingness to issue tax free development
bonds. In some states, it is a major development policy, so we included the total of such
bonds outstanding in the state in which each county is located.
Counties vary greatly in size. Most of the variables just discussed are normalized by
county population, but E and P should be normalized by the county's land area.
Therefore, E and P are expressed as employment and population per square mile of land
area in the county in all the estimates reported in the next section.
Almost any candidate variable for inclusion in S is likely not only to affect E and P
but also to be affected by E and P to some extent. It would require a large simultaneous
equation model to take account of all likely interactions. No such model is available. To
minimize such interactions, we have chosen S variables for 1970, where L\E and L\P
lCounty Business Patterns employment data consistently covered nearly 90 percent of total employment
during the years included in this study. Population data reflect residents in a county and employment data
reflects jobs in a county, but it is not known how many employees work: in their county of residence,
except for those in large metropolitan areas.
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reflect the changes in 1969-79 and 1970-1980 respectively. The only exception is that the
development bond variable is available only for 1981. However, the included variable is
the stock of outstanding bonds in 1981, and they were mostly issued during the 1970's,
so the stock should show effects on the dependent variable, if effects exists.
Finally, we separated out manufacturing employment for separate estimation. Thus,
(5) and (6) were estimated once for total employment included in the County Business
Patterns tape and a second time for manufacturing employment. Thus, two sets of two
equations each are reported in the next section.
4 • STATISTICAL ESTIMATES
Our preferred estimates of (5) and (6) for total employment and population are provided in
Table 1. Not surprisingly, population and employment are highly interactive, a large
population stimulating employment growth and numerous employment opportunities
stimulating population growth. Also, not surprisingly, the effect of initial employment on
employment growth and the effect of initial population on population growth is large and
significant. Our estimates indicate that employment adjusts to disequilibrium somewhat
more slowly than population. Estimated adjustment coefficients of .14 and .16 per decade
indicate the importance of disequilibrium adjustments in the data and the danger of
assuming that population and employment are in equilibrium in any given year.
The estimates indicate a mild deterrent effect of a high percentage of black residents on
population growth. The coefficient is not significant at usual significance levels. The
indication may be that racial tensions have lessened during the 1970's. Alternatively, it
may indicate that blacks represented a large propotion of the migrants during the 1970's
and they are not deterred from migrating to counties with large racial minorities. The
coefficient representing the percentage of blacks in the employment growth equation is
equally small and insignificant, but positive. A large percentage of black residents
probably correlates with low wages, which may attract employment.
A high density of interstate highways attracts both population and employment
growth. The indication here is that location of the interstate highway system has had a
large effect on population and employment movements. Other highway variables, such as
the density of limited access highways, showed much less effect than the interstate
highway variable. High local taxes per capita deter population growth suggesting that, at
the margin, people attach little value to any additional local government services that
higher taxes may fmance. Again, the significance level is low. The coefficient of taxes in
the employment growth equation was even smaller and less significant, and the variable
has been omitted from the employment growth regression reported in Table 1. The
insignificance of local taxes in affecting employment location confirms fmdings in large
numbers of previous studies by public finance specialists.
Family income has a large and highly significant positive coefficient in both equations.
In the population growth equation, high family income presumably stands for prestigious
residential neighborhoods. In the employment growth equation, high family income
presumably indicates high demand for locally produced commodities and services. There
is no indication in our analysis that stringent wning in high income counties deters
employment growth. The reason probably is that stringent zoning mostly pertains to local
government jurisdictions, which cover smaller areas than counties.
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Unionization deters employment growth, but the coefficient is not significant at usual
significance levels. As should be expected, our analysis showed that unionization has no
effect on population growth, for given employment levels.
A high crime rate has a small and insignificant deterrent effect on population growth.
The analysis suggested no measurable direct effect of crime on employment, so the
variable is excluded from the regression reported in Table 1. These results are surprising
and we have no explanation for them. In our sample, the crime rate has a small negative
correlation with the percentage of black residents (r =-.05).
Our estimates indicate a strong preference by the population for central city over
suburban and for suburban over nonmetropolitan counties of residence. But there is little
to distinguish preferences between adjacent and non-adjacent counties. The strong
suggestion in these results is that population movements from central cities and, to a
lesser extent, from metropolitan areas result from values of variables captured in our
analysis, not from disamenities such as high population density, pollution or congestion
that characterize central cities and metropolitan areas. Perhaps even more surprising,
employment shows a preference for central cities over other locations. The dummy
coefficients do not suggest significant differences among suburbs, adjacent counties and
non-adjacent counties in attracting employment.
Table 1 Structural Equations for Total Employment and Population Growth
Intercept
Population
Employment
Lagged Population
Lagged Employment
Percent Black
Interstate Highway Density
Local Taxes per Capita
Family Income
Crime Rate
Percent Union
Employment Growth
-0.541(10)-1
(-4.334)
0.111(10)"1
(6.424)
-0.135
(60.224)
0.414(10)-4
(0.342)
0.246
(6.568)
0.834(10)"5
(7.165)
-0.165(10)"3
(-0.716)
Po.pulation Growth
-0.521(10)"1
(-4.339)
0.693(10)"1
(25.160)
-0.164
(-104.807)
-0.449(10)-4
(-0.362)
0.111
(2.752)
-0.266(10)-4
(-1.393)
0.148(10)-4
(11.087)
-0.383(10)-6
(-0.402)
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Development Bonds 0.850(10)-8
(0.230)
Central City Dummy 0.450(10)-1
(7.556)
Ajacent Dummy 0.143(10)-2
(0.284)
Non-adjacent Dummy 0.586(lOr2
(1.120)
New England '().583(10>-2
(0.537)
Mid-Atlantic -0.225(10)-1
(-2.457)
Eastern Plains -0.135(10)-1
(1.962)
Western Plains .().887(10r2
(-1.684)
Eastern South Central 0.423(lOr2
(0.791)
Western South Central .().704(lOr3
(-0.139)
Rocky Mountain -0.119(10)-1
(-1.837)
Pacific +0.119(10)-1
(1.367)
R2 0.887
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.325(10r1
(4.839)
.().223(lOr1
(-4.170)
.().I64(10r1
(-2.938)
.().194(10>-1
(-1.661)
.().720(1Or3
('().087)
.().366(10>-1
(-6.033)
-o.305(lOrl
(-5.157)
0.883(10)-4
(0.016)
'().823(lOr2
(-1.541)
-0.352(10>-1
(-4.991)
.().192(1O>-1
(-2.152)
0.858
The regional dummies in the population growth equation do not support the notion that
climate and other amenities are the causes of migration to sunbelt counties. The eastern
and western plains regional dummies have large negative coefficients and these are
frostbelt regions. But New England and themid-Atlantic dummies have insignificantly
negative coefficients. Surprisingly, the Rocky Mountain and Pacific regions, both
destinations of net migration, have significant negative coefficients. The employment
growth regression shows somewhat stronger frostbelt-sunbelt effects. The mid-Atlantic
and two plains regions all have negative coefficients that are significant at the 95 percent
level. If the reason were fuel costs, New England should also have a significantly
negative coefficient. Our guess is that it represents stronger anti-business attitudes of
governments in these regions than elsewhere. The significantly negative coefficient of the
Rocky Mountain dummy could represent the same phenomenon or, more likely, adverse
topography.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the R2's are extremely large for such cross-
sectional regressions.
Table 2 presents estimates of (5) and (6), employing the same S vector as in Table 1,
but interpreting E to be manufacturing employment. Because of disclosure rules,
manufacturing employment is available for fewer counties than is total employment, so
the sample size is about 2600 in Table 2, whereas it is about 3000 in Table 1.
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In Table 2, the population growth regression coefficients are remarkably similar to
corresponding coefficients in Table 1. The greatest difference is that the small deterrent
effect of high local taxes found in Table 1 disappears in Table 2.
Table 2 Structural Equations for Manufacturing Employment and Population Growth
Manufacturing
Employment Growth Population Growth
Intercept -0.021 -o.570(1Otl
(-7.'lSJ) (-4.040)
Population -0.121(lOt2
(-3.143)
Manufacturing Employment - -0.355
(19.916)
Lagged Population - -0.165
(-89.577)
Lagged Manufacturing
Employment -0.323
(-153.683)
Percent Black 0.634(10)-4 -o.109(lOt3
(2.354) (-0.760)
Interstate Highway Density 0.728(10)"1 0.201
(9.474) (4.526)
Local Taxes Per Capita
-
0.395(10)-6
(-0.146)
Family Income 0.293(lOt5 0.149(10)-4
(11.085) (9.478)
Crime Rate
-
-0.221(10)-6
(-0.200)
Percent Union -0.211(10)-4
(-0.407)
Development Bonds -0.711(10)-6
(-0.891)
Central City Dummy 0.122(10)"1 0.221(10)"1
(9.913) (2.988)
Ajacent Dummy 0.130(10)"2
-o.205(lOt1
(1.195) (-3.343)
Non-adjacent Dummy 0.258(10)"2 -o.148(lOtl
(2.253) (2.309)
New England -o.669(lOt3 -o.274(lOt1
(-0.298) (-2.082)
Mid-Atlantic -0.192(lOt2 -14.075(lOt1
(-0.988) (-1.515)
Eastern Plains -0. 140(1Ot2 -o.453(10t1
(-0.935) (-6.534)
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Western Plains -0.203(10)"2 -0.381(10)"1
(-1.710) (-5.472)
East South Central 0.272(10)"2 -0.111(10)"2
(2.365) (-0.176)
West South Central -0.149(10)"3 -0.767(10)"2
(-0.134) (-1.229)
Rocky Mountain -0.506(10)"2 -0.399(10)"1
(-3.410) (-4.735)
Pacific -0.225(10)"2 -0.195(10)"1
(-1.208) (-1.902)
R2 0.989 0.853
In the manufacturing employment regression in Table 2, the most surprising finding is
that population has a significantly negative sign. Presumably high population density
implies land use controls or high land values, both of which deter manufacturing firms.
Probably more important, manufacturing production often has only small and specialized
labor requirements, and sells little of its output to the local population, so high population
density provides no attractions and considerable deterrence. Adjustment speed is faster in
manufacturing than in total employment, which is surprising. A large percentage of black
residents provides stronger attraction to manufacturing than to total employment. Not
surprisingly, a dense interstate highway system is an even greater attraction to
manufacturing than to total employment. We were surprised that high union membership
is less of a deterrent to manufacturing than to total employment growth. Development
bonds are a deterrent, at a low significance level, to manufacturing employment growth,
their primary target
Locational dummy coefficients are remarkably similar between the manufacturing and
total employment growth regressions. Central cities attract manufacturing employment
growth. Suburban and adjacent counties have similar attractions. A strong attraction of
non-adjacent counties is apparent, which is consistent with the recent migration of
manufacturing employment to counties distant from metropolitan areas. Regional
dummies display mild deterrence of frostbelts manufacturing employment and stronger
deterrence of locations to the Rocky Mountain region.
Surprisingly, R2's are as high for regressions in Table 2 as for those in Table 1.
For most purposes, estimates of (7) and (8) are more interesting than those of (5) and
(6). Table 3 shows coefficients of (7) and (8) calculated from estimates in Table 1, that is
for population and total employment. Coefficients in Table 3 are estimates of long run,
steady state effects of the S variables shown in the left column on the endogenous
variables shown at the top of the second and third columns.
Not surprisingly, long run effects are large relative to short run effects. Most
coefficients in Table 3 are ten or more times as large as corresponding coefficients in
Table 1. This indicates that short run movements are misleading indicators of the
magnitudes of long run effects. If a given exogenous variable has short run coefficients of
opposite signs in the population and employment equations, even the direction of the long
run effect may be the opposite from that of the short run effect
Coefficients in Table 3 depend on units in which variables are measured. Table 4
presents elasticities of the two dependent variables with respect to exogenous variables
that could be affected by government and private actions. The elasticities in Table 4 are
long run effects calculated at sample means.
In both columns, elasticities with respect to family income are the largest. The
calculations indicate that a one percent increase in median family income causes a long run
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increase of 7 percent in the county's employment and a 5 percent increase in its
population. These are strong effects indeed. As has been indicated, family income is
correlated with educational attainment. Calculations not shown indicate similarly large
elasticities of population and employment with respect to educational attainment.
The second largest elasticities in both columns are those with respect to the interstate
highway density. Many counties have only one interstate highway. The calculated
elasticities indicate that a second interstate highway which doubles the density might
increase employment by 54 percent and populations by 17 percent. These are also large
effects.
Table 3 Long Run and Reduced Form Equations for Total Employment and P"opulation
Total Employment Population
Intercept -0.442 -0.505
Percent Black 0.249(1Ot3 -O.150(1Ot3
Interstate Highway Density 0.195(10) 0.150(10)
Local Taxes per Capita -0.139(10)-4 -O.168(1Ot3
Crime -0.200(10)-6 -O.243(10t5
Family Income 0.716(10)-4 0.121(1Ot3
Percent Union -0.127(1Ot2 -O.536(1Ot3
Development Bonds 0.651(1Ot5 0.276(1Ot5
Central City Dummy 0.362 0.351
Adjacent Dummy -0.662(1Ot3 -0.137
Non-adjacent Dummy O.364(1Ot l -O.849(1Ot1
NewEngIand -0.548(10t1- 0.142
Mid-Atlantic -0.173 -O.775(1Otl
Eastern Plains -0.122 -0.275
Western Plains -0.839(10t1 -0.222
East South Central 0.325(1Ot l 0.143(1Otl
West South Central -0.967(1Ot2 0.543(1Otl
Rocky Mountain -0.109 -0.261
Pacific 0.812(1Ot l -O.831(10t1
The elasticities of population with respect to local taxes and of employment with
respect to union membership are also large enough to suggest relevance for government
policies. However, the estimated coefficients on which these elasticities are based did not
have high significance levels. Other elasticities are both small and based on coefficient
estimates with low significance levels.
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Table 4 Elasticity Estimates
Total Employment
DyMmics of County Growth
Population
Pt7Cellt Black
Interstate Highway Density
Local Taxes per Capita
Crime
Family Income
Percent Union
Development Bonds
5. CONCLUSIONS
0.341(lOt l
0.537
-0.300(10t1
-0.601(lOt2
0.681(10)
-0.375
0.356(lOt l
-0.730(IOt2
0.174
-0.154
-0.307(lOt1
0.482(10)
-o.666(lOtl
0.643(lOt2
The calculations reported in this paper provide some insights and leave some mysteries.
First, the regressions indicate that population and employment are highly interactive,
with each influencing the other strongly. Second, the regressions provide support for the
notion that sunbelt amenities have had some effect in attracting people from the frostbelt.
Generally, the regressions indicate little regional effect on employment.
Surprisingly, the regressions indicate that unmeasured characteristics make central
cities attractive to residents and to employment Residents, but not employment levels, are
deterred by nonmetropolitan locations. The regressions indicate that residents are deterred
by high local taxes, high crime rates and the presence of a large percentage of black
residents. However, none of these effects is large or highly significant. High family
income is a powerful attraction to both population and employment, and the low incomes
typical in central cities must have been major causes of the migration of people and
employment from them to other places. The analysis also suggests that the interstate
highway system has had a significant effect on the location of both residents and jobs.
Development bonds, the other direct government policy variable included in the
regressions, appears to have had almost no effect in stimulating employment.
An overall impression left from the calculations is that migration of both population
and employment from central cities to suburbs and, to a lesser extent. out of metropolitan
areas is still something of a mystery. These movements are not accounted for by
locational dummies, yet the effect of crime, taxes and racial mix appears to be relatively
slight Family income and the closely correlated educational attainment of the population
have certainly been important. but may be as much consequences as causes of the overall
process that has taken place.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research and writing of this paper were carried out at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. We are indebted to Barbara Lipman, Mark Siegel and Linda Heckert for
computing and other assistance with the research. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
E.S. Mills and G. Carlino
REFERENCES
205
Carlino, G., 1985, "Declining City Productivity and the Growth of Rural Regions",
Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 18, pp. 11-27.
Mills, E.S., 1986, "Metropolitan Central City Population apd Employment Growth
During the 1970's" in M.H. Peston and R.E. Quandt, (eds.), Prices, Competition and
Equilibrium, Philip Allan Publishers Limited,Oxford, pp.268-288.

Advances in Spatial Theory and Dynamics
..tE. Andersson et al. (editors)
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
© IlASA/CERUM, 1989
CHAPTER 14
Some Theoretical Aspects of Spatial Equilibria
with Public Goods
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1. INTRODUCTION
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In some recent papers Andersson and Karlqvist (1976), Andersson and Ferraro (1983)
and Ferraro (1984) have proposed and tested for Stockholm a simple model of
accessibility and density distributions in a metropolitan area. The general idea behind the
model, which departs a little from classic new urban economics, is that the city is
essentially viewed as a set of public goods. The feature of public goods is due
substantially to spatial interdependencies between decision makers.
Every locational decision is determined by the spatial allocation of public goods. If a
person enters some small spatial unit he automatically becomes an input for agents besides
himself. In this way, it comes close to the basic assumption of game theory, which
explicitly assumes that the decision of a given decision maker is contingent upon
simultaneous decisions by the other decision makers. In order to transform the
Andersson-Ferraro framework into a more general one, some concepts of spatial gaming
must be introduced, preferably with regard to the network and the technology of
transportation. The next step in this analysis is thus the explicit introduction of some
concepts from spatial gaming.
We can imagine a situation where all local public goods have already been allocated to
nodes (zones). Every decision maker is assumed to be free to search for an optimal
location, and will go for the most accessible node. Doing so, the agent will observe that
the others do the same and thus recognizes that the second-best accessible node actually
becomes advantageous, because of lower density, or in other words a higher local
standard. There will, of course, sooner or later be an overflow of people in the node of
secondary accessibility and thus a further spread of the population until nobody can enjoy
higher utility by moving to a new location. In such a situation, a spatial equilibrium of
population has been achieved. As can be induced from this description of a possible
pattern of reactions of agents, free to search for their optimal location in an uncoordinated
way, the criterion generating the equilibrium solution is that the level of individual utility
should be the same in every location.
Our objectives in this paper are three-fold: (1) to study the spatial equilibrium of a
population distribution, (2) to provide an alternative interpretation of the basic model of
Andersson and Ferraro by viewing it as a mathematical programming model, (3) to give a
more general framework, based on random utility theory, in which the basic model can be
explained as a special case of a general spatial equilibrium model.
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2. A RANDOM UTILITY MODEL WITH ACCESSIBILITY AND
DENSITY AUGMENTATION
The basic feature of the Karlqvist-Andersson-Ferraro model is a principle of inter-
dependencies between decision makers. which assumes that the decision of a given
decision maker is contingent upon simultaneous decisions by other decision makers.
Externalities will. in this context. be looked upon as not necessarily from distinct but
rather as a subclass of public goods phenomena. Private goods are the goods such that the
usage of them by one agent implies a proportional reduction in consumption by some
other agents. Goods not fulfilling this property are called public goods. It should be noted
that this definition of public goods is oriented to the commodity as an input to a house-
hold. a fInn. an organization or any other economical unit. In this definition. we assume
that the input of the commodity would have a noticable influence on the agent receiving it.
To simplify matters to the extreme. our study concerns a situation in which a fIxed
number of people is to be located on a transportation network with predetermined
characteristics of nodes (zones) of the area. Let us assume that a utility function of an
individual in the area is described in an additively separable form consisting of two parts:
(1) one utility function common to the society and (2) one specific to the individual. The
common utility function is assumed to include the accessibility and density measures as
discussed in the Andersson-Ferraro model. Subscripts i (i=I •...•n) indicate nodes in the
fInite set of nodes. A general utility function is thus:
s . y Sz. - - . - T)- -~Vi = V1(ai' i' zl·····zl·····zn· + u1•
where
Vf = utility of individuals in node i.
ai = accessibility to public good y from node i.
S~ = local standard of the node i with respect to characteristic z.
~ = predetermined characteristics of the node i.
T = predetermined transportation system. and
uf = deviation of utility of individual s from the common utility.
(1)
A description of interdependencies in a spatial public good analysis is most
conveniently handled with an accessibility representation. Accessibility measures can be
looked upon as the spatial counterpart of discounting. It thus represents the distribution of
public goods in a simple way that imposes a very clear structure on the relation between
people and their environment. In general. our accessibility measure has the following
form:
aI = qi(yl.···,yi.· ..yn; T); (i=I •...•n) (2)
where Yi = the amount of public goods y in the node i. Yi could be f(zi) or g(Xi), where
Xi is the population of zone i. and f and g are monotonously nondecreasing with ~
and Xi, respectively. For the simplicity of the mathematical discussion, let us assume that
y takes the form f(zi).
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The next step is to include the density of population in a node and its inverse, Le.
spatial standard. The density, which is also an input for all members of the node,
increases with the increase of population in the node. Thus the amount of the public good
"availability of space" automatically decreases with increases ~f the population. Let us
now introduce a spatial standard measure S~ which is an inverse counterpart measure of
density and decreases with the increase of population.
S~ = hi (Xi, zi); (i=l,... ,n) (3)
where hi is 2-differentiable with Xi and zi, and monotonously increasing with Xi and
nondecreasing with zi. It seems to be a reasonable hypothesis that the increase of density
with respect to local public goods will decrease the common utility of an individual in the
node. Thus the utility of an individual can be assumed to be monotonously increasing
with an increase of the local standard. If we only consider accessibility to public goods
but not to public "bads" it is furthermore reasonable that the increase of accessibility will
be accompanied by an increase of the utility of individuals.
We can now fill the utility function (1) with a structural content. We have already
included the positive benefits of agglomeration of individuals within the node by the
accessibility measure, and the negative effect of congestion with individuals by the
inverse measure of population, the local standard measure, in the common utility
function. The measure of accessibility to local public goods can be represented as a
function of predetermined transportation system t and local public goods of nodes Zi
(i=l,... ,n). In the same way, we can introduce a local standard measure in the common
utility function, which should be looked upon as a function of population and local public
goods of the node. In this line, a general form of utility function (1) can be rewritten to
take the form
Vf = Vi (Qi (zlo···,zi"",zn; 1), hi (Xi, Zj» + iif. (4)
A brief explanation must be attached to the specification of the utility function. Such a
specification as given by expression (4) reflects two spatial features. The first is that the
utility function of an individual in the society can be written in an additively separable
form of two parts: the utility function common to the society and those specific to an
individual. The function Vi in equation (4) reflects the representatives taste of the society
and its value depends on the levels of accessibility and the local standard of the node. It is
assumed that a common utility function Vi is differentiable and aVi/dqj~ 0, aVifclhi ~ 0,
aVif<}Xi ~ 0 and aVifc)zi ~ O. On the other hand, iif is a scalar and represents deviation
of taste of an individual i from common utility. The second feature is that the stage for
the location game is set by the predetermined characteristics zi (i=l, ... ,n) and
transportation system t, which is the regulator of interactions. If the values of these
exogenous variables, Zj and t are fixed, the common utility function Vi can be simplified
so as to be a function of Xi, only.
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3. THE SPATIAL CHOICE MODEL FOR POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
We now represent a spatial distribution model which describes the choice behavior of an
individual choosing a node, given local public goods of nodes and the transportation
system. The most commonly used spatial choice model to such individual behavior
asserts that the conditional probability that a potential node is chosen by an individual
varies directly with the measure of attractiveness of nodes. More recently, economists
have also widely used variants of the "random utility model" (McFadden, 1975). In the
random utility model it is assumed that a measure of attractiveness, attached to each
alternative, completely determines the choice process of an individual.
It is important to note that the spatial choice model with random utility is an equilibrium
model of spatial distribution in the sense that it describes an equilibrium state given the
current values of the exogenous variables. In our demand situation of population
distribution, some of the attributes of attractiveness of the nodes, i.e., the local standard
measure of a node, depend upon the number of individuals in the same node, which is
influenced by the relative attractiveness of other aspects of the nodes. If some of the
parameters of the system affecting the local standard change, it is likely that the spatial
equilibrium will also change. The resulting change in population distribution determines a
new level of local standard of each node, which in tum affects its relative attractiveness.
The spatial choice model can predict the new equilibrium situation that results from such a
change in the following way: if a population distribution is in disequilibrium as a result of
changes in the exogenous variables, each individual modifies hislher probability to select
the node according to the random utility model until a new equilibrium state is reached at
which the levels of local standard and spatial distribution of population equilibrate.
In this section we describe the spatial choice model briefly. In the next section we
formally prove the existence of the equilibrium for population distribution, and
demonstrate that under fairly general conditions the equilibrium is unique.
The common random utility model asserts that Pi, i.e. the probability that an individual
will select node i, is given by the probability that the actual utility is maximized at node i,
with
Pi == Prob{Uf ~ uj ;for all j==l,...,n}
Uf == Ui + iif ; (i==l,...,n)
(5)
(6)
where Uf and uj represent the utility of an individual s obtained by selecting nodes i
and j, respectively. Different assumptions on the distribution of an individual deviation of
the utility iif result in different types of spatial choice models. It is well known that the
multinomiallogit model,
n
Pi == exp(aUi) / I exp(aUj),
j==1
(7)
is generated if the random component iif varies according to an extreme value (Gumbell,
Weibull or Gnedenko) distribution.
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G(iif.a) = a exp[-exp(-aiif)]
which has standard deviation 0 2• given by
0 2 =7t2/6a2.
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(8)
(9)
The total population in the area is subdivided into node subsets. These subsets of the
population are called Xi. Xi is given by
n
Xi = X exp(aUi)1 2 exp(aUj);(i=I •...•n)
j=1
(10)
where X is the total population of the area.
Now we move to the discussion concerned with the measurement of individual
utilities. By putting
- sUs = m!1x(Ui + iii}'
1
(11)
since iif is distributed according to a Gumbell function. we see that Us also has a Gumbell
function whose mean value is represented by:
n
E(US) =.!.. 1.n 2 exp(aUi) + Y.
a i=1
(12)
where Y is the Euler constant. Expression (12) represents the expected value of an
individual net utility. when the individual is randomly drawn from the population and
provided that he will choose the optimal node that brings him the largest net utility. Any
change in the predetermined public goods of nodes and the transportation system. t. will
directly affect the levels of Us.
4. THE EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section. we prove that the spatial distribution of the population has a unique
equilibrium. Let us ftrst consider an onto mapping F defined on an n-dimensional closed
convex set 0 by the vector F(X)=(Fl(X)"", Fn(X»), whose components are given by
n
Fi(X) = X exp(aUi(Xi») I .2 exp(aUj(Xj»)'
J=1
Let 0 be a compact convex set of Rn,
(13)
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n
D = {X: LXi = X, Xi ~ 0 for all i=I,... ,n}.
i=1
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(14)
Clearly, if the spatial distribution of population has an equilibrium with the spatial
choice model, then there exists a fixed point X* such that
F(X*) = X*. (15)
Theorem 1 There exists a fixed point for equation (15).
£mQf: It is obvious that F is mapping from D onto itself. We can observe that F is
continuous in X, since Ui is assumed to be continuous in Xi. Here let us introduce a
function cp defined on DxD by
cp(X,Y) = <F(X) - X, Y - X> . (16)
This function clearly satisfies the following assumptions of the Ky Fan inequality:
(1) 'r;f Y eD, X --+ cp(X,Y) is lower semi-continuous, (2) 'r;f XeD, Y--+ cp (X,Y) is
concave. The Ky Fan Theorem (Aubin and Ekeland, 1984, Chapter 6) shows that there
exists X* e D such that sup cp(X*, Y) S sup cp(Y, Y). That is, there exists X* e D
YeD YeD
such that
sup < F(X*) - X*, Y - x* > S sup < F(Y) - Y, Y - Y > = O.
YeTI YeTI
(17)
By taking Y = F(X*) e D, we get (F(X*)-X*)2 S 0, that is X*, is a fixed point of F.
We make use of a property of any Hicksian matrix in order to consider uniqueness of
the equilibrium. We, in particular, show that the Jacobian of [F(X)-X] is Hicksian and
hence the fixed point of F would be unique. Let us define the possible
fi (X) = Fi(X) - Xi, (i=I,... ,n). (18)
We now let the Jacobian off(X) = (fI(X)"", fn(X)) be F(X) = {fij (X)} for (i, j =
1,...,n) so that
fij (X) = afi (X) / ax} (19)
Lemma 1 Let F = {fijI be an n'n matrix satisfying fij ~ 0 for all!. ~ j. Then F is
Hicksian if and only if there exists a Y = {VI'"'' Vn} ~ 0 satisfying F'Y' < O.
The proof of this Lemma can be found in Takayama (1974, Chapter 4).
Lemma 2 The matrix F(X) = {fij (X)} is Hicksian for all X ~ O.
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(20)
aX- P P aUj fi . .
- i jax" Ort~;
_ { J
fij (X) =
aX Pi (1-Pi) ~~: - 1, for i = j;
where Pi = exp(aUi (Xi» I Lj exp(aUj (Xj» ~ 0, (i=I,...,n). Since we assume
aUi (Xi)fc)Xi ~ 0, FOO satisfies fij (X) ~ 0 for all i *' j. Let V = (1,...,1) and define r(X)
= ('YI(X)"", 'Yn(X)} where r(X) = F(X)'V'. Then
n
'Yj(X) = .L fij (X)
1=1
_ au· au·
= aX { ? PiPj (~-~)}-1
I*'J J J
=-1. (21)
Thus 'Yj(X) < 0 for all X ~ 0 and a > O. Hence, by Lemma 1, we understand that F(X)
is Hicksian for all X ~ O.
Theorem 2 There exists a unique fixed point for equation (15) for arbitrary a > O.
Proof: Let us defme a rectangular region G in Rn by
G = {(Xl,"" Xn): 0 ~ Xi ~X; (i=I,... ,n)}. (22)
Consider the mapping f(X) from G. If F(X) is Hicksian for all X e G, then the mapping
fOO is one to one for all XeG (Nikaido, 1968, Chapter 7). Needless to say, an equilib-
rium point x* satisfies f(X*) = 0 and X* e D. Since 0 is obviously a subset of G, f(X)
must also be one to one in D. Hence, there is only one X*eD satisfying f(X*) = o.
5 • A MATHEMATI(lAL PROGRAMMING FORMULATION OF THE
RANDOM UTILITY MODEL
Before investigating the property of a fixed point of equation (15), it is important to
consider an alternative interpretation of the random utility model by reformulating it as a
mathematical programming model. Denote the size of the population in the area as a whole
by X. Then total expected utility T(U) is given by
- n
T(U) = X ..tn L exp (aUi).
a i=1
(23)
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Here, we consider T(V) as a function of the utility levels of nodes in the area. By
making a conjugate function of (23), we can construct a mathematical programming
model.
Lemma 3 For arbitrary (X > 0, the function T(U): Rn -+ R is proper convex, and
its conjugate function T*(X): Rn -+ [-00,+00] is given by
In _.n _ .
{
- L Xi L.n(Xil X) ; if L Xi = X, Xi ~ 0; (1=1,... ,n);
(X i=l i=l
T*(X) =
+ 00 ; otherwise (24)
Note that 0 . log 0 = O.
Proof: For X = 0, lemma 3 holds trivially. Let us suppose that X :F- O. Clearly, T(V) is
a proper convex function. In general, a conjugate function f*(X) to a certain proper
convex function f(V) is defined as follows:
f*(X) = sup (< VJ{ > - f(U)} for all X e ~;
VeS
where S is the region, where a function f is defmed, and
g= (X: sup [< V,X > - f(V) ] < 00 } .
VeS
Let us now consider the conjugate function T*(X) to the total expected utility function
(23). Since the function T(U) is proper convex, the value of T*(X) is equivalent to the
optimal value of the following convex programming problem:
n
minimize 1'**(U) = L Xi (Vi _1 L.n(XVX)};
i=l (X
n
subject to L Xi = X; Xi ~ 0; (i=l,...,n).
i=l
If Xi> O. i = 1,....n. the Lagrange function of (25) is
n 1 n
L(X,A) = L Xi (Vi - - L.n(Xit'X)} + A(X - LXi) .
i=l (X i=l
(25)
Let us consider the dual problem of (25). The optimal value function of the dual
problem (25). G(A): R-+ R is
G(A) = max ( L(X,A): X e Rn}
X
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n -
= AX + I X exp(aUi - aA - 1) .
i=1 a
From the duality theorem of the convex programming problem, we get
T**(U) =min (G(A): A E R)
A
- n
=X Ln I exp(a Ui).
a i=1
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(26)
(27)
Thus the hi-conjugate function T**(U) is equivalent to T(U), since the optimal solution of
(25) is
n
Xi = Xexp (aUi) I I exp(a Uk) > 0,
k=1
the assumption, Xi > 0, i = 1,... ,n, is automatically satisfied.
From Lemma 3, we can now get an equivalent mathematical reformulation of the total
expected utility function (23). Hence we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal value function of the problem P-I is equivalent to the
total expected utility measure (23).
1 n n
(P-l) T(U) = max {- - I Xi Ln (XiIX) + I Ui Xi };
X a i=1 i=1
subject to
nI Xi = x; Xi ~ 0; (i=I,...,n) .
i=1
(28)
6. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we prove an equivalent formulation of the spatial equilibrium of population
distribution with local public goods, and provide an alternative interpretation of the basic
model of Andersson and Ferraro by viewing it as a mathematical programming model. We
now inquire about the kind of program equation (15) has as the first-order necessary
conditions for its optimal solution.
Proposition 2 The first-order necessary conditions for the optimality of the
problem P-2:
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n n X·1 1
(P-2) max {- - L Xi Ln (XiIX) + L JUi(Xi)dXi};
X a i=l i=l 0
n
subject to LXi = x; Xi ~ 0; (i=l,...,n)
i=l
are equivalent to equation (15).
Proof: The optimal conditions of the problem P-2 can be given by
1 - .
- - (Ln (XilX)+1) + Ui(Xi) - A. = 0; (l=l,...,n),
a
(29)
(30)
where A. is a Lagrange multiplier. By eliminating A. from (30), we can see that the optimal
solution of the problem P-2 satisfies
Xi=
Xexp(aUi (Xi»
n
L exp(aUk (Xk»
k=l
(31)
It must be emphasized that parameter a in (31) is related to the standard deviation of
the probabilistic disnibution representing the dispersion of utility over individuals. It is
interesting to briefly explore the a --+ 00 limit, which implies a situation where every
individual has the same utility function. It is easy to use our formulation of the problem to
show that the maximization of the second term within our overall objective function
should then coincide with that given by the Andersson-Ferraro model. In fact, when
a --+ 00, the first term disappears from the objective function. In the a --+ 00 limit, the
optimal condition can be given by
U1(X1) = U2(X2) = ... = Un(Xn), (32)
which is equivalent to the equilibrium condition of the Andersson-Ferraro model. The
objective function of (29) is a linear combination of an entropy function and a description
of a spatial gaming situation, presumed in the Andersson-Ferraro model. The parameter
a describes the trade-off relation between a spatial randomization and a spatial gaming
situation. The value of a would typically be inferred from a calibration of the spatial
choice model.
Let us now investigate the uniqueness of the optimal solution of the problem P-2. It is
obvious from Proposition 2 that the problem P-2 has a unique global optimal solution.
Then this problem gives a unique fixed point of (15).
Proposition 3 There exists a global optimal solution of problems P-2 for
arbitrary a > O.
Proof: The sufficient condition for the global minimum of the problem P-2 is that the
Hessian manix of second derivatives of the objective function (29) is negative definite for
all XED. Each element of the Hessian matrix can be directly calculated from (29), V.z.,
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hij =
o ; ifi * j;
{ I au· (X·)
___ + 1 1
aXi aXi
if i = j. (33)
Since we assume aUi(Xi)/dXi ~ 0, hii for all Xi E D. From Proposition 2 and 3, we
get the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The mathematical programming problem P-2 gives a fixed point of
equation 15.
7. THE SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM AND DUALITY
Let us first consider the Lagrange function of (29), L:Rn x R ~ [-00, +00]:
n
{
f(X) + A(X - .L Xi) ; if A~ 0;
L(X,A) = 1=1
+ 00 ; if A < 0; (34)
n n Xi
where f(x) = _.!. L Xi In(XitX) + L f Ui(Xi)dXi, and introduce two functions,
a i=1 i=1 0
e: Rn ~ [-00, +00] and 00: R~[-oo, +00] defined by
e(x) = inf L(X,A),
AER
and
OO(A) = sup L(X,A).
XERn
Then the problem (29) is equivalent to the problem P-3:
(P-3) maximize e(X),
and the Lagrangean dual problem of (37) is
(0-3) minimize OO(A) .
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
Let us here define the constraint mapping, S:R ~ R(Rn), and the optimal value
function, <!l(u): R ~ [-00, +00] of (29) by
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and
n
S(u) = (X eRn: L Xi = X+ u, Xi ~ OJ,
i=1
<I>(u) = sup (f(X): X e S(u)}
XeRn
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(39)
(40)
where u e R is a parameter. <I>(u) is a nondecreasing and proper concave function, since
f(x) and S(u) are proper concave (Rockafellar, 1970). Moreover, we define the function
H: Rn+1 4 [-00, +00] by
H(X,u) = f(X) + Os(u)(X) (41)
where Os(u)(X): R 4 [_00, 0] is the indicator function of the constraint mapping S(u):
Os(u)(X) = { 0
- 00
; if X e S(u);
; if X~S(u)
(42)
H(X,u) is closed concave since f(X) and S(u) are concave. Then we get
<I>(u) = sup H(X,u).
XeRn
From equations (34), (41) and (42), we get the following lemmas:
Lemma 4 There exist the following relations between the Lagrange function (34),
L:Rn+1 4 [-00, +00], and the function (41), H:Rn+1 4 [-00, +00]:
L(X,A) = sup (H(X,u) - < A, u > };
ueR
H(X,u) = inf (L(X,A) + < A, u > }.
AeR
Proof: Trivial from definitions of (34) and (41).
Lemma 5 For arbitrary A e R, we get the relation
ro(A) =- <I>*(A),
where <1>*0 is the conjugate function ofthe objective value function <I>(u).
Proof: By Lemma 4 and equation (41), we get
ro(A) = sup L(X,A)
XeRn
(43)
(44)
(45)
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= sup sup (H(X,u) - < A,U >}
XERn uER
= sup {~(u) - < A,U >}
uER
= - ~*(A).
Lemma 6 For the dual problem (D-3),
inf ro(A) = ~**(O).
AER
Proof: From Lemma 5, we have
inf ro(A) = inf {<A, 0 > - ~(A)}
AER A
= ~**(O)
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(46)
where ~**(O) is the bi-eonjugate function of ~(u) evaluated at u = O. Since the optimal
value function ~(u) is proper concave,
~**(O) = ~(O).
From the above Lemma, we get the duality theorem.
Theorem 4 For the primal problem (P-3) and the dual problem (D-3),
sup 9(X) = inf ro(A).
XERn AER
Proof: Obvious from Lemma 6.
Now let us consider dual problem D-3. From Lemma 5, the dual problem D-3
inf ro(A) = inf (~*(A)}
AER AER
= inf sup {~(u) - <A,U >}
AER uER
n
= inf sup (f(X) - A( LXi - X)}
AER XERn i=l
= inf (AX +,¥(X,A)},
AER
n
where ,¥(X,A) = sup (f(X) - A LXi }. From the defmition of f(X)
XERn i=l
(47)
(48)
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n n 1
'P(X,A.) = max (-A. L Xi - L - Xi .tn(XiIX)
X i=1 i=1 a
X'n 1
+ ~ JU' (X')dX')Lo 1 1 1
i=1
n 1
= max ( L Xi(- A. - -.tn(XiIX) + Ui)
X i=1 a
n Ui(A.,X)
- L J gi(ui)dui }
i=1 Ui(O)
Spatial Equilibria with Public Goods
(49)
which is obtained by integrating the third term by parts and where gi(ui) is the inverse
function of the utility function, which exists since the utility function is assumed to be
monotone and nondecreasing. From the first-order optimality condition of (49), we get,
1 - 1
-A. - - .tn(Xi/X) + Ui - - = O.
a a
By substituting (50) into (49), we get the dual problem:
n n Ui(A.,X)
min {A. X+!. L Xi - L J gi(ui)dui }.
A. a i=1 i=1 Ui(O)
The first-order optimality condition of the dual problem is
n n
X= L gi(Ui(A.,X» = L Xi .
i=1 i=1
From (50) and (52), we get
n 1
1..* = !'.tn L exp(aU(Xj*» - - ,
a i=1 a
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
where 1..*, Xi* are the optimal solutions of the dual problem. By substituting (53) to (51),
the optimal value of the dual problem is
1 n n
roQ.*) = -.tn L exp(aUi(Xi*» - L
a i=1 i=1
Ui(Xi*)
uJO) gi(ui)dui
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1 n
= -.tn L exp(aUi(Xi*» +
a i=1
X'*_ 1
where Ui(Xi*) = I Ui(XOdXi/Xi*·
o
n _L (Ui(Xi*) - Ui(Xi*» Xi*
i=1
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(54)
From theorem 4, it is guaranteed that the value of ro(A*) is equal to the optimal value of
9(X*). Equation (54) suggests that th,e optimal value of the problem P-3 can be
interpreted as a linear combination of a social cost caused by the congestion in local public
goods of the nodes and a total group expected utility evaluated at the equilibrium point
Xi*, i=I,... ,n.
CONCLUSION
This paper develops an equilibrium theory for the analysis of accessibility and density
distributions. We analyze the issue of congestion of nodes and impacts on the resulting
spatial equilibrium of population. The key results of this paper are (1) to provide an
alternative interpretation of the basic model of Andersson and Ferraro by viewing it as a
mathematical programming model, and (2) to give a more general framework, based upon
the random utility model, in which the basic model can be regarded as a special case of a
general spatial equilibrium model.
Although still remote from a comprehensive theory of accessibility and density
distributions, this paper describes some initial elements which may serve as a model
spatial equilibrium model of a single type of agents in the design of such a theoretical
framework. We believe that structural fonns for the interrelationships between different
types of agents can be constructed along with some mathematical programming
fonnulation of the spatial equilibrium as discussed in this paper. Further research is still
needed, however, with respect to the linking mechanism which describes the spatial
interdependences between multi-type agents in the region into a unified analytical
framework of general spatial equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 15
A General Dynamic Spatial Price Equilibrium
Model with Gains and Losses
A. Nagurney
1 . INTRODUCTION
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The central issue in the study of dynamic spatial price equilibrium problems is the
computation of equilibrium regional production and consumption, as well as,
interregional and intertemporal commodity flow patterns. In a prescribed manner, the
supplies and demands for the commodity depend on the prices, the inventory costs on the
quantities stored, and the transportation costs on the shipment pattern. Applications of
such models arise in a variety of fields such as agriculture, regional science, and energy.
Samuelson (1957) and Takayama and Judge (1964, 1971) introduced temporal spatial
price equilibrium models and proposed algorithms for the computation of the equilibrium,
but these models could not handle situations in which, for example, the transportation and
inventory costs were no longer constant, but rather, functions of the entire interregional
and intertemporal flow pattern. Moreover, the supply and demand functions were usually
assumed to be linear and integrable. Inventorying at supply and demand markets was not
distinguished in such models until more recently by Guise (1979), and the case of
backordering was also ignored. Finally, there was no treatment of such phenomena as
shrinkage/accretion of commodities over space and time due to pilferage, perishability,
losses or, respectively, amplification in value or volume.
Takayama and Uri (1983) and Takayama et al. (1984) relaxed the symmetry
assumption on the functions, but retained the linearity and formulated temporal models as
linear complementarity problems. However, the computational experience, so important
for the operationalism of the models, was limited. Thore (1986), on the other hand,
introduced multipliers in a symmetric model and assumed that the inventory costs were
fixed and identical between time periods.
Nagumey and Aronson (1988), in an effort to circumvent some of the afore-mentioned
restrictive assumptions, proposed a dynamic spatial price equilibrium model over a finite
time horizon and provided alternative variational inequality formulations of the
equilibrium conditions. In the special case of only a single time period, this model is the
well-known static spatial price equilibrium problem (s.p.e.p.) studied by Florian and Los
(1982), Friesz, et al. (1983), Friesz et al. (1984), Pang (1984, 1985), Dafermos and
Nagumey (1984, 1987), Jones et al. (1984a,b), and Nagumey (1987). Their formulation
is based crucially on the visualization of the dynamic s.p.e.p. as a multiperiod network.
The computational experience with Gauss-Seidel type serial linearization decomposition
schemes by supply markets in time and by demand markets in time suggested that
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problems with as many as twenty supply markets and twenty demand markets over ten
time periods can be effectively solved in the order of minutes.
In Section 2 of this paper we introduce a general dynamic spatial price equilibrium
model to handle gains and losses through the use of multipliers. This framework extends
the dynamic model of Nagurney and Aronson (1988) and allows for a more realistic
representation of, for example, agricultural markets for perishable commodities and
financial markets with the characteristic credit multipliers. This model generalizes both the
static and dynamic deterministic models given in Thore (1986). We then define the
governing equilibrium conditions with the incorporation of multipliers and give alternative
variational inequality formulations of the problem over Cartesian products of sets (see
also, e.g., Nagurney (1987), Pang (1985». The structures of the variational inequalities
are very similar to those given in Nagurney and Aronson (1988).
In Section 3 we consider the solution of the general model and outline the Gauss-
Seidel serial linearization decomposition method by demand markets in time for the case
of gains and losses. In Section 4 we outline the adaptation of the equilibration scheme by
demand markets in time to handle gains and losses, as well.
In Section 5 we present computational experience for the adaptation of the equilibration
scheme by demand markets in time for randomly generated examples. In Section 6 we
then provide computational experience for the Gauss-Seidel type decomposition method
by demand markets in time for the solution of the general model with gains and losses for
a variety of scenarios.
2. A GENERAL DYNAMIC SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
WITH GAINS AND LOSSES
In this section we present a generalized version of the dynamic spatial price equilibrium
model introduced by Nagurney and Aronson (1988). We consider a finite time horizon
and partition the horizon into discrete time periods, t, t=I,...,T. We assume that a certain
commodity is produced at m supply markets and is consumed at n demand markets.
We denote a typical supply market by i and a typical demand market by j. We number
the supply markets from 1 through m and the demand markets from m+1 through m+n.
Let sit denote the quantity of the commodity produced at supply market i in the t-th
period and let djt denote the demand associated with the demand market j at the t-th
period. We arrange the supplies into T-tuples of vectors (sl,...,sT) in Rm. Then we
incorporate the above T-tuples into a single vector s in RmT. Similarly, we arrange the
demands into T-tuples of vectors {dl>... ,dT} in RO. Then we incorporate the T-tuples
into a single vector d in RoT.
We now discuss the commodity shipments, the inventoried and backordered
quantities, and the associated finite positive multipliers to allow for gains and losses.
Let Xitjt denote the amount of the commodity shipped from supply market i to
demand market j in period t and let ai~t denote the associated multiplier. Hence, if at the
beginning of time period t an amount Xitjt is shipped from i to j, the amount that will
arrive is given by aitjt Xitjt. Let xitit+ I denote the amount of the commodity inventoried at
supply market i from time period t to t+1 and let Xjtjt+1 denote the amount inventoried
at demand market j from t to t+I, where aitit+ 1 and ajtjt+ I denote the respective
multipliers. The amounts of the commodity that remain in inventory at markets i and j at
the beginning of time period t+1 are given, respectively by aitit+1 xitit+l and ajtjt+1
Xjtjt+1' Finally, we denote the amount backordered at demand market j from time period
t to t-l by Xjtjt-l and its corresponding multiplier by ajtjt+ We group the commodity
shipments lXitjtl into a vector Xl in RmoT, the quantities inventoried at the supply
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markets, (xitit+1), into a vector x2 in Rm(T-l), the quantities inventoried at the demand
markets, (Xjtjt+1), into a vector x3 in Rn(T-l), and the quantities backordered (xjtjt-d
into a vector x4 in Rn(T-l). We then group the vectors xlox2,x3,X4 into a vector x in
RmnT+m(T-l)+2n(T-l).
Similarly we group the shipment multipliers {aitjtl into a vector al in RmnT, the
inventory multipliers {aitit+d and (ajtjt+d into vectors (a2) and (a3) in Rm(T-l) and
Rn(T-l), respectively, and the backorder multipliers (ajtjt-l) into a vector a4 in Rn(T-l).
We then group the vectors alo a2, a3, ~ into a vector a in RmnT+m(T-l)+2n(T-l). Note that
in most applications of interest a multiplier will lie in the range (0,2); in the case of
perishability, pilferage, or loss in the range (0,1); in the case of credit multipliers as in
financial applications typically in the range (1,2). Usually the multipliers associated with
the backorder quantities will be set equal to one. In the case that all the multipliers are
equal to one, the model is that of Nagumey and Aronson (1988).
We associate with each supply market i at each time period t a supply price 7t:it and
with each demand market j at each time period t a demand price Pjt. We arrange the
supply prices into T-tuples of vectors (1tl,... ,1tT) in Rm. Then, we incorporate this T-
tuple into a vector 1t in RmT. Similarly, we arrange the demand prices into T-tuples of
vectors (Plo... ,PT) in Rn. Then we incorporate this T-tuple into a single vector p in
RnT.
We denote the transportation cost of the commodity from supply market i to demand
market j at period t by Ci~t. We let Citit+1 denote the inventorying cost at supply market
i from t to t+1, and we let Cj~t+1 denote the inventorying cost at demand market j from
t to t+1. We denote the backordering cost at demand market j from t to t-l by Cjtjt+
We group the transportation costs (Citjtl into a vector cl in RmnT, the supply market
inventorying costs, (Citit+l) into a vector c2 in Rm(T-l), the demand market inventorying
costs (cjtjt+d into a vector c3 in Rn(T-l), and the backordering costs (cj~t-d into a vector
c4 in Rn(T-l). We then group cl, c2,c3, c4 into a single vector c in RmnT+m(T-l)+2n(T-l).
We assume that the transportation, inventorying, and backordering costs are nonnegative.
We now review the construction of the dynamic price equilibrium network of
Nagumey and Aronson (1988). (For a graphical representation see Figure 1.) For each
period t, t=I,...,T we construct m supply market nodes, denoted by the pairs it,... ,mt
representing the supply markets at period t, and n demand market nodes, denoted by
the pairs (m+l)t,...,(m+n)t, representing the demand market at period 1. For each time
period 1, we construct mn transportation links, a typical one originating at a node it and
terminating at a node jt. We denote such a link by itjt. Hence, the total number of
transportation links in G is mnT. From each supply market node it, we then construct a
supply market inventory link, denoted by itit+l, terminating in supply market node it+l;
and from each demand market node jt we construct a demand market inventory link,
denoted by jtjt+1, terminating in demand market node jt+1. There are a total of m(T-1)
supply market inventory links and n(T-l) demand market inventory links. From each
demand market node jt, we further construct a demand market backorder link, denoted by
jtjt-l, terminating in demand market node jt-l, yielding a total of n(T-l) backorder links.
The total number of links in G is therefore mnT+m(T-l)+2n(T-l).
A sequence of links originating in supply market node it and tenninating in demand
market node jt' induces a path. We refer to a typical path from a supply market node to a
demand market node by r. We consider only paths without cycles.
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In this network representation, we now associate with each defined link itjt', an x.. ,
llJt
and a finite, positive multiplier aitjt'. We denote then the flow on a path r by Xr which
represents the quantity of the commodity utilizing path r and the effective cost on path r
by c;.. We let P denote the setof paths in the network, pil the set of paths originating in
supply market node it, Pjt' the set of paths terminating in demand market node jt', and
Piljl, the set of paths origmating in supply market node it and terminating in demand
market node jt'. Let np, npit, nPif' and nPitjt' denote, respectively, the number of paths
in the network, the number of paThs originatmg in supply market it, the number of paths
terminating in demand market node jt', and the number of paths originating in supply
market node it and terminating in demand marlcet node jt'. ,.
We group the c;.'s into a vector C in Rnp and the xr's into a vector y in RnP.
Note that in applications, inventorying may be allowed only at the supply markets or at
the demand markets or at certain supply and certain demand markets in certain time
periods. Moreover, in certain time periods, due for example, to seasonalities, certain
supply or demand markets may not exist. For such reasons the number of links and the
number of paths in the network representation will be application dependent and, we
expect that in most cases will be of a dimension lower than that in the general graphical
representation in Figure 1. For the same reasons, the dimensionality of the various
vectors will also be application dependent
In this model, unlike the one given in Nagurney and Aronson (1988), the case of
restrictions on inventorying to allow for perishability and losses is no longer handled via
constraints imposed a priori, but, rather, instrinsically through the use of multipliers and
the equilibrium conditions.
Towards this end we define the chain and path multipliers, a(itjt')r and ar, for path r,
respectively by
n
a'tjt'
a(itjt')r = itjt' ~ Hjt' aUjt' a(itjt')r,a(itjt')r ar = . .IT ahjt'H]t'er (1)
where itjt' < itjt' denotes a link itjt' which precedes link hjt', in a path containing itjt'
and a(itjt')r = 1 if link itjt' is contained in path r and 0 otherwise. If itjt' is the first link
in a path we defme a(itjt')r to be equal to one.
The quantities produced and consumed must satisfy the following conditions:
Sit =re~it xr d' t' = L arxr] rePjt' (2)
xitjt' =L a(itjt')r Xr =L xr(itjt')
r r
(3)
where xr(itjt') represents the effective contribution of the flow on path r on the quantity
X(itjt')'
The effective cost on path r is given by
c;. = L a(itJ't')r citjt'·
itjt' (4)
(5)
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A spatial price equilibrium with gains and losses consisting of prices. shipments. and
quantities inventoried and backordered is established if the value of the resultant quantity
of the commodity arriving at a demand market does not exceed the price of the quantity
produced at the supply market plus the effective cost of inventorying. shipping.
backordering. etc.• if there is to be a positive commodity flow between the pair of supply
and demand markets.
Following Takayama and Judge (1971) and Nagurney and Aronson (1988). the
temporal and spatial price equilibrium conditions here take the form: for all pairs of supply
market nodes and demand market nodes it. jt'. i=l •...•m; j=l •...•n; t=I •...•T; t'=I •...•T.
and all paths r joining market nodes it. jt'
{
= arPjt'. if arxr > 0
1tit + Cr .~ arPjt'. if arxr = O.
In the special case where all of the multipliers are equal to one. equilibrium conditions
(5) are those governing the dynamic model in Nagumey and Aronson (1988). In the
special case where we have a single time period t. equilibrium conditions (5) are those
given in Thore (1986). If we then further assume that all of the aitjt' are equal to one. then
equilibrium conditions (5) reduce to the static spatial price equilibrium conditions. in
which Cr consists of only the transportation cost (see. e.g. Dafermos and Nagurney
(1985). Nagumey (1987».
We shall now discuss the supply. demand. transportation. inventorying. and back-
ordering cost structure. We consider here the general situation where the supply price
associated with a supply market in any time period t may depend. in general. upon the
quantity produced at every supply market in every time period. Similarly. the demand
price associated with a demand market at any time period may depend upon. in general.
the demand for the commodity at every demand market in every time period, that is.
and
1t = ~(s)
P = ~(d)
(6)
(7)
where ~ and ~ are known smooth functions.
We consider here also the general situation where the cost of transportation.
inventorying. and backordering may depend. in general. upon the quantities shipped
between every pair of supply and demand markets within every time period. the quantities
inventoried at the supply and the demand markets between every pair of successive time
periods. and the quantities backordered at every demand market between every pair of
time periods. that is.
c = e(x) (8)
where eis a known smooth function.
The dynamic spatial price equilibrium conditions have been formulated as a variational
inequality in Nagumey and Aronson (1988). following Dafermos (1980). Florian and
Los (1982). and Friesz. et.al. (1981). In the framework with gains and losses we can
write down immediately the variational inequality fonnulation.
Theorem: A commodity pattern (s.d.x) satisfying (I), (2) and (3) is in
equilibrium if and only if
~(s) (s'-s) + e(x) (x'-x) - ~(d) (d'-d) ~ 0 (9)
for all (s'.d'.x') satisfying (I). (2). and (3).
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Hence, the structure of the variational inequality (9) is identical to that in Nagumey and
Aronson (1988), but the feasible set defined by constraints (1), (2), and (3) is distinctly
different and more complex.
When the supply and demand price and cost functions satisfy the strong monotonicy
property
[~(s') - ~(s")][s'-s"] + [e(x') - e(x")][x'-x"] - [~(d') - ~(d")][d'-d"]
~ a ( II s'-s"112 + II x'-x"112 + II d'-d"1I2) (10)
for all (s',d',x'), (s",d",x") satisfying (1), (2), and (3) where a is a positive constant,
there exists a unique equilibrium which can be computed by a general iterative scheme
devised by Dafennos (1983).
In the special case where the Jacobian matrices[~~J [~J and - [~J are symmetric
it is easy to see that (s,d,x) satisfies (9) if and only if it minimizes the functional
F(s,d,x) = J'ft(s)ds + e(x)dx - ~(d)dd (11)
1t- . ~ Rnpjt' -jt, u -
) ~ nP11°t' }~ npmTjt' - ~ np .((1t11,... ,1t11) u R j ,...{(1tmT,... ,1tmt) u R , and the vector puR WIth
th -. ' ~ RnPJ't'=( (a )} ~ RnP11j"t'e component vectors Pjt u IP11jtP11,...anPlljt'P11jt'Pll u ,... ,
~T'" .{(alPmTjt'PmT,...anPmTjt'PmTjt'PmT)} e R m jt, where IPnjt' denotes the I-th path
in the set P~t'.
Using(I), (2), (3), (4), (6), and (8), we deduce that inequality (9) can be written as
for (s,d,x) satisfying (1), (2), and (3). In the symmetric case then there exists a unique
equilibrium which can be constructed, at least in principle, by standard convex
programming algorithms. For computational comparisons of the Frank-Wolfe (1956)
algorithm and computationally efficient equilibration schemes in the framework of the
static s.p.e.p. without gains and losses see Nagurney (1987). For computational
experience with equilibration schemes by demand markets in time and by supply markets
in time in the framework of the dynamic s.p.e.p. without multipliers see Nagurney and
Aronson (1988).
We now present three alternative variational inequality formulations of equilibrium
conditions (5) equivalent to (9), but defmed over Cartesian products of sets, in a manner
similar to that given in Nagurney and Aronson (1988) for the dynamic spatial price
equilibrium problem without gains and losses. We will then suggest a Gauss-Seidel
decomposition procedure for the computation of the equilibrium. Finally, we will give an
adaptation of an equilibration scheme for the case of multipliers for the solution of the
embedded quadratic programming problems.
We define the vector it e Rnp with component vectors
it(y)(y'-y) + C(y)(y'-y) - ~(d)(d'-d) ~ 0 for all (y',d') e K1, (12)
h Kl - nm+n T K~ h h K~' . bw ere = j=m+1 t=1 jt' w ere eac jt IS given y
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KJt ={(xr, rePjt, djt) eRnPjt XR Ix~ 0, djt = L. arXr} . (13)
rePJt
We let yjt denote the vector of path flows for paths contained in Pjt.
Similarly, using (1), (2), (3), (4) , and (7), and (8) we deduce that inequality (9) can
be written as
~(S)(S'_s) + C(y)(y'-y) - p(y)(y'-y) ~ 0 for all (s',y') e K2, (14)
where K2 == I\~i t~l Kft, where Kft is given by
{(sit' (xr, re pit)), e RxRnpit I xr ~ 0 and sit = L. xr}.
repn
(15)
Finally, using (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7) we deduce that inequality (9) can be
written as
it(y)(y'-y) + C(y)(y'-y) - p(y)(y'-y) ~ 0
where K3 == II Kr and each Kr is given by
reP
{xr I xr ~ O} .
for all y'e K3, (16)
(17)
3. AN ALGORITHM FOR THE DYNAMIC SPATIAL PRICE
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM WITH GAINS AND LOSSES
In a recent paper Nagurney and Aronson (1988) outlined Gauss-Seidel type serial
linearization decomposition methods for the solution of the dynamic s.p.e.p without gains
and losses. They presented decomposition schemes by demand markets in time and by
supply markets in time, which were based on similar methods proposed for the static
problem in Nagurney (1987). These methods, in combination with equilibration schemes,
computed efficiently the equilibrium for problems with more than 10,000 variables. Since
the structures of the variational inequalities (12), (14), and (16) governing the equilibrium
for the dynamic problem with gains and losses are very closely related to those governing
the equilibrium for the problem without (cf. Nagurney and Aronson (1988)), those same
methods may be applied with minor appropriate modifications, in view of equations (1)
through (4), to solve the more general model.
We first present a decomposition method by demand markets in time and then the
equilibration method. Subsequently we provide computational experience on randomly
generated large-scale problems with gains and losses.
This algorithm proceeds in a serial manner from time period to time period, solving the
demand market subproblem for each demand market in a given time period until
variational inequality (12) is solved.
Given a fixed demand,21arket j at time period t, we construct new functions 1tjt, new
cost functions Cit'jt' and Cjt, and a new demand price function Pjt, which are linear and
are defined as follows:
1ijt (Yjt) =Ditjt (y')Yjt + (itjt (y') - Ditjt (y')(yjt)) (18)
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where Dftjt denotes the diagonal of the Jacobian of the ftjt functions with respect to Yjt,
and y' denotes the latest y, that is, from the previously solved subproblem,
Cr = . ~ a(it'J"t")r Cit'J"t" 8(it'J"t")r, for rf;PJ't
It'J't"
(19)
where
Cit'j't" = DCit'j't" (x') Xit'j't" + (Cit'j't" (x'it'j't") - DCit'j't"(x) x'it'j't") (20)
where DCit'j't" denotes the diagonal of the Jacobian of the cost function Cit'j't" with
respect to xit'j't", where xit'j't" is given by (3), and
Pjt (djU = Dpjt (d')djt + (Pjt (d') - Dpjt (d') djt) (21)
where Dp't denotes the t-th diagonal element of the Jacobian of the demand price function
Pjt and d' ~enotes the vector of the latest available demands.
One then solves the decomposed variational inequality subproblem
"I 1tit'jt(xr)(xr - xr) + I Cr(Yjt)(x'r - xr) - Pjt (djt) (d'jt - djt) ~ 0
It ,rf;Pit'jt rf;Pjt
1for all (Yjt, djU f; Kjt (22)
where ~t'jt denotes the it'-element of the vector 1tjt.
But due to the construction of 1tjt, Cjt, Pjt, (22) is equivalent to the solution of the
quadratic programming problem
djt
Cit'j't"(z)dz - f Pjt(Y)dY (23)
o
I xr(it'j't")
Xr rf;Pjt
Min I JXit"t (x)dx + I J
it' rf;P' ,. J it'J"t'
, ItJt 0 0
over K~t which can be effectively solved by a demand market in time equilibration scheme
for muitipliers we present in Section 4. Note that this quadratic programming problem
differs from the one that is solved when the multipliers in (1) are equal to one.
We initiate the algorithm with a (y',d')f;K I, We then fonn the functions xlI,
Cr,rf;Pll , and Pll and solve (23) for j=t=l. We continue in this manner through demand'
market m in period T. This is tenned an iteration.
In a similar manner, one may construct a decomposition method by supply markets in
time for the solution of variational inequality (14).
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4. A DEMAND MARKET EQUILIBRATION OPERATOR FOR GAINS
AND LOSSES
In this section we describe an algorithm for the solution of the dynamic spatial price
equilibrium problem with gains and losses in which the supply price, demand price, and
cost functions are linear. The supply price at a supply market in a period t depends only
upon the quantity of the commodity produced at the supply market in the period 1. The
demand price at a demand market in a period t depends only upon the quantity of the
commodity demanded at the demand market in the period 1. The inventorying cost
between two periods t and t+1 at a supply (demand) market depends only upon the
quantity of the commodity inventoried at the supply (demand) market between the two
successive time periods. The backordering cost at a demand market between two time
periods depends only upon the quantity of the commodity backordered between the two
time periods. The transportation cost, in tum, between a pair of supply and demand
markets within a time period depends only upon the quantity of the commodity shipped
between that pair of supply and demand markets within that time period.
Hence, we assume that the supply price functions (6) and the demand price functions
(7) are of the form
and
1tit = ftit(SiV = I'itsit + Uit; i=I,...,m; t=I,... ,T
Pjt = ~jt(djt) = -mjtdjt + qjt; j=I,... ,n; t=I,... ,T
(24)
(25)
where rit, mjt, uit, qit > 0 for all i, j and 1. The cost functions (8) are also linear and of
the form
citjt' = eitjt'(Xitjt') = gitjt' Xitjt' + hitjt'; i=I, ,m; t=I, ...,T,
j=I, ,n; t·=I,...•T (26)
with gitjt' and hitjt' > 0 where Xitjt' satisfies (I) and (2).
Following Samuelson (1952), Takayama and Judge (1971), and Florian and Los
(1982), this model has an equivalent optimization formulation with objective function
. ~xr(itjt')Sit r
Min ~J1l:it(x)dx+.~ J Citjt'(z)dz - ~
it ItJt' Jt
djt'J Pjt'(y)dy (27)
subject to constraints (1), (2), and (3) or equivalently,
~. xr
rt;Plt xitjt'
Min ~ r~t(x)dx + .~ Jeitjt'(z)dz - ~,
it cI ItJt' Jt
~ arxr
rt;Pjt'JPjt'(y)dy. (28)
We now present an adaptation of an equilibration operator proposed in Nagumey and
Aronson (1988) for the solution of the dynamics s.p.e.p. without multipliers and
conceived by Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) for the traffic network equilibrium problem
with fixed demands. As in that dynamic s.p.e.p., in the case of linear supply price,
demand price, and cost functions, this operator induces an algorithm which takes on a
simple and elegant form for computational purposes. The operator is associated with the
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demand markets. Starting from an initial commodity flow pattern satisfying (1). (2), and
(3) we construct a sequence of feasible flow patterns which reduce the value of the
objective function OF given by (28). For convergence results see Dafennos and Sparrow
(1969) and Nagurney (1987).
This algorithm proceeds from time period to time period and from demand market to
demand market within a time period. equilibrating the sum of the supply price and the
effective cost of the path with the value of the commodity at the demand market if there is
positive flow from the supply market to the demand market until equilibrium conditions
(5) hold for each demand market
We seek an operator Mjt to demand market j in period t.
Let yeRnp = {xr Ixr ~ OJ. We define y' = Mjt as follows:
We define rmax and rmin and (it')max and (it')min by
1t(I't') . + Cr ' - p't = min {1t't' + ,.. - a p" i-I m' t'-I Tmm ffiln J 1 '"'T r Jt . -."'.. -..... •
repit'jt} (29)
1t(it')max + Crmax - Pjt = max{1tit' + Cr - arPjt: i = I .....m; t'=I .....T.
repit'jt. Xr > O} , (30)
The calculation then of y'=MjtY consists of the calculation of two new commodity
flows x'r and x'r . while holding all other commodity flows fixed. Let Axrmaxmax ffiln
denote x'r
max -xrmax and AXrmin = x'rmin-xrmin' Equating then (1t(it')k+Cfk-afkPjt)
for k=max and k=min at the new commodity flow y' to zero we obtain the 2x2 system of
equations
<.~ ,gitjt' O(itjt')rmax a2(itJ't')rmax mjt a;max+r(it)max)Axrmax
ItJt
+ <.~, gitjt' O(itjt')rmax O(itjt)rmin a(itjt')rmin a(itjt')rmax
ItJt
+ mjtarmin armax +r(it)max O(it)max 0(it)min)Axrmin = bI (31)
<.~ gitjt' O(itjt')rmax O(itjt')rmin a(itjt')rmax a(itjt')rmin + mjtarmaxarmin
ItJt' 2
+ r(it)min O(it)max O(it)min)Axrmax + <.~, gitjt' O(itjt')rmin a(itJ't')rminItJt
+ mjta;min + r(it)min)Axrmin =~ (32)
where O(it)max O(it)min = I. if (it)max = (it)min. and 0 otherwise. and
bI = <.-~ gitjt' xitjt' O(itjt')rmax -hitjt' O(itjt')rmax) a(itjt')rmax
ItJt'
+ (-mjtdjt + qjt)armax -r(it)max S(it)max - U(it)max • (33)
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+ (-mjtdjt + qjVarmax -r(it)max s(it)max - U(it)max '
b2 = (~~ gitjt' Xitjt' ~(itjt')rmin -hitjt' ~(itjt')rmin) a(itjt')rmin
11Jt'
+ (-mjtdjt + qjt)armin -r(it)min S(it)min - U(it)min
(33)
(34)
where equations (1), (2), and (3) have been used for simplicity.
Under our assumptions,
A == [all
0.21
0.12 ]
0.22
where all and 0.12 denote the coefficients of ~xrmax and ~xrmin in (31), and 0.21 and
0.22 denote the coefficients of ~xrmax and ~xrmin in (32), respectively. A is nonsingular
because A. = det (A) is greater than zero. Hence, an application of Cramer's rule to (31)
and (32) yields:
det bl 0.12b2 0.22~Xrmax A.
det 0.11 .bl
~Xrmin = 0.21 b2
A.
Since both x'r and x'r . must be ~ 0, we must assure feasibility and, at the same
max mIll
time, improve the value of OF. If the computed values of ~xrmax t;[-xrmax' 00) and
~xrmin t; [-xrmin' 00), feasibility of the improved solution is assured. If ~rmax
t;(-oo, -xrmax) and ~xrmin (-00, -xr), we set ~xrmax = -xrmax and ~xrmin = -xrmin.
On the other hand, if the computed ~xrmax t;[-xrmax' 00), but ~xrmin t;(-oo, -xrmin)'
then set ~rmin =-xrmin and retain the computed ~rmax' It is easy to verify that since
b1 < b2' in this case ~xrmaxt;[-xrmax ,0). Finally, if ~xrmaxt;(-oo, -xrmax), but
~xrmint;[-xrmin' 00), we proceed as follows: If ~rmint;[-xrmin'0], we set ~rmax =
-xrmax and retain ~xrmin' If ~xrmin t;(O, 00), we compute the solution to equation (32)
for ~xrmin' with ~xrmax = -xrmax ' If the value of -b1 at this proposed x' is ~ 0, we
retain these values. Otherwise, set ~xrmin = 0, and solve for ~xrmax using (31). If
~xrmax < -xrmax' set ~rmax =-xrmax'
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Note that by construction, MjtY=y if and only if for rmax and rmin and jt equilibrium
conditions (5) hold. In particular, 1t(it')max + Crmax-armax Pjt = 1t(it')min + Crmin-
-armin Pjt = 0, where xrmax > 0 and rmax and rmin have been chosen so that for any i
and t and r&Pjt
1t(it')min + Crmin - armin Pjt ;5; 1tit + Cr - arPjt ;5; 1t(it')max + Crmax - armax Pjt. (37)
Therefore, if MjtY=y, then all supply markets at all time periods, with xr > 0 satisfy (5).
Also, it is clear that Mjt is a continuous mapping from Rnp to RnP. Finally, Mjt
decreases OF and OF(MjtY) = OF(y) for some y&Rnp implies that MjtY=Y.
We thus define the operator M(1) as the composition of the operators Mll ... MnT.
Hence M(1) has the same properties as Mjt. In the case of all multipliers being identically
one this operator collapses to the demand market equilibration operator given in Nagurney
and Aronson (1988).
5. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH AN EQUILIBRATION
OPERATOR FOR GAINS AND LOSSES
Here we consider the dynamic spatial price equilibrium problem where the supply price
functions are given by (24), the demand price functions are given by (25), and the
inventorying, backordering, and transportation cost functions are given by (26) and we
give computational results for the algorithms outlined in Section 4 for the solution of such
dynamic s.p.e.p.'s.
All of the examples in this section were generated as follows. (See Nagurney and
Aronson (1988)) The supply price, demand price, and transportation cost function slopes
and intercepts (cf, (24), (25), (26», were generated randomly and uniformly as whole
numbers within the following ranges: rit&[3,1O], Uit&[1O,15], -mjt&[-1,-5],
qjt&[150,650], gitjt&[1,15], and hitjt&[10,25], i=l,... ,m; j=m+l,... ,m+n; t=l,...,T.
The supply price inventorying cost slopes gitit+1and the intercepts hitit+1 were generated
within the ranges defined by .075 times the lower and upper limits of the supply price
cost function ranges, respectively. The demand inventorying cost slopes gjtjt+1 and the
backordering slopes gitjt-}. were generated in the range defined by .075 times the sum of
the lower limits for the supply price and transportation cost function slopes as the lower
limit and .075 times the sum of the upper limits of the slopes for the supply price and
transportation cost functions as the upper limit. The intercepts hjtjt+l and hjtjt-l were
generated in a similar fashion, utilizing the sum of the supply price and transportation cost
intercept limits. The multipliers aitjt' were generated in the range [.95,.99], the
backordering multipliers were set equal to 1.
The initial commodity flow y(1) was generated as follows. The flow on paths
corresponding to transportation links were generated whole numbers in the range 1
through 5, and identical for a given example; all other flows were set equal to zero.
The equilibration operator M(1) proposed here was coded in FORTRAN and all
examples were run on the ffiM 3084QX under the VM operating system at the Cornell
University Production Supercomputer Facility, except where noted. The termination
criterion was:
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11tit + Cr - arPjt' I S; 10 for all supply and demand market pairs and time periods, and
for all paths r&Pitjt', such that xr> 0, and I min(1tit + Cr - arPjt') I S; 10 otherwise. The
number of iterations and CPU time were measured (exclusive of data generation, input,
setup and output times) and reported for all the ex~les.
We first considered examples in which only mventorying at supply markets is
allowed. In this case (cf. Figure 1), the number of links in the network representation is
moT + m(T-l). For these examples, reported in Table 1, we fixed the number of supply
and demand markets and increased the number of time periods incrementally by two
periods, starting with two time periods and continuing through ten time periods. The
examples are identical, except for the multipliers, to the examples ofTable 1 in Nagurney
and Aronson (1988).
For the purpose of comparison we also reported in Table 1 the CPU times and the
number of iterations for the examples on the CDC CYBER 830 at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst which was the system used for the computation of the
equilibrium in Nagumey and Aronson (1988). As can be seen from Table 1 the new
system is faster by an order of magnitude. The examples with multipliers required no
more iterations (in most cases several fewer) than the number required to solve the
problem without gains and losses (see Nagurney and Aronson (1988) Table 1). This may
be due, in part, to the initialization procedure.
The data demonstrate that given the state-of-the-art in computer technology, problems
with as many as 10,000 variables can now be solved in CPU seconds, rather than
minutes. We note that the number of iterations required to solve a given problem on the
ffiM machine would differ, in some cases, from the number required on the CDC
machine; this is due to different word sizes on the two machines.
We then considered a series of examples in which inventorying at both supply and
demand markets is permitted and backordering is also allowed and we varied the time
periods from two through five. This is the network model given in Figure 1. Our results
are reported in Table 2. These examples, with the exception of the multipliers, are
identical to those in Table 3 in Nagumey and Aronson (1988).
Table 1: Computational Experience for the Equilibration Method M(l) for Randomly
Generated Dynamic S.P.E. Problems with Gains and Losses
CPU time in seconds (# of iterations)*
m n T= 2 4 6
10 10 M(l) 0.91(8)[1.1(8)] .416(9)[5.1(11)] 1.02(10)[12.5(11)]
10 20 M<1) .266(11)[3.1(10)] 1.31(14)[15.6(14)] 3.26(15)[35.9(14)]
20 20 M<1) .761(9)[8.9(11)] 4.35(13)[46.6(14)] 11.65(13)[114.7(14)]
m n T= 8 10
10 10 M<1) 2.11(10)[25.4(11)] 3.72(11)[37.4(10)]
10 20 M<1) 6.31(14)[71.4(14)] 10.86(15)[109.5(14)]
20 20 M<1) 23.16(14)[220.9(15)] 90.5(16)[351.4(14)]
*Note the CPU time and the number of iterations required on the CDC CYBER 830 is
given in [].
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Table 2: Computational Experience for the Equilibration Method M(1) for Randomly
Generated Dynamic S.P.E. Problems with Gains and Losses Inventorying
at Supply Markets, at Demand Markets, and Backordering
CPU time in seconds (# of iterations)
m n T= 2 ~ 4 5
10 10 M(1) .3(12) 1.1(15) 2.7(15) 6.1(14)
10 15 M(1) .5(13) 1.5(13) 4.0(14) 9.5(15)
15 15 M(1) .9(11) 3.6(16) 8.1(14) 18.3(14)
15 20 M(1) 1.5(14) 5.0(15) 14.1(19) 31.8(20)
2020 M(1) 2.5(13) 8.8(14) 23.3(19) 50.4(19)
6. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH A DECOMPOSITION
SCHEME FOR GAINS AND LOSSES
In this section we consider the general dynamic spatial price equilibrium model outlined in
Section 2. Our computational experience is for examples with linear asymmetric
functions. Hence, we assume here that the supply price functions (6) are given by
1tit =fqt(s) = ~ ritjt'sjt' + Uit ,
Jt'
the demand price functions (7) are given by
Pjt =~jt(d) =-~ mjtit'dit, + qjt ,
and the cost functions (8) are given by
(38)
(39)
(40)Citjt' = eitjt'(x) = ~ gitjt'Xitjt' + hitjt'
where the not necessarily symmetric Jacobians of the supply price, demand price, and
cost functions are positive definite. We refer, henceforth, to the Gauss-Seidel
decomposition by demand markets in time GS(1). We refer to the GS(l) method with the
embedded M(1) method as GS(1)M(1).
All the examples were generated as follows. The number of cross-terms for any
supply price, demand price or cost function (cf. (38), (39), (40» ranged from 1 to 5 and
were generated to ensure that the Jacobian matrices of these functions were strictly
diagonally dominant and, hence, positive definite. The diagonal terms, the intercepts and
the initial commodity pattern were generated in the manner outlined in Section 5 as were
the multipliers.
These algorithms were also coded in FORTRAN and all examples run on the mM
3084QX at the Cornell University Production Supercomputer Facility. The termination
criterion used was that the condition for termination of the equilibration operators given in
Section 5 had to hold for two consecutive iterations of the Gauss-Seidel scheme.
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Parallel to the computational tests of Section 5, we again considered ftrst examples in
which inventorying only at the supply markets is allowed. These examples, with the
exception of the multipliers, are identical to those in Table 4 in Nagurney and Aronson
(1988). The results are reported in Table 3.
Finally, we considered a series of examples, in which inventorying is permitted at both
supply and demand markets and backordering is also allowed and varied the time periods
from two through ftve. These experiments are given in Table 4. These examples are
identical to those in Table 6 in Nagurney and Aronsson (1988), except here we also have
the multipliers.
Table 3: Computational Experience for the Decomposition Method GS(1)M(I) for
Randomly Generated Dynamic S.P.E. Problems with Gains and Losses
Inventorying at Supply Markets
CPU time in seconds (# of iterations)
m n T= 2 4 6 8 10
10 10 GS(1)M(1) .1(7) .7(9) 1.6(9) 3.1(9) 6.0(10)
10 20 GS(1)M(1)
.3(9) 1.9(13) 4.3(12) 8.2(12) 14.9(12)
20 20 GS(1)M(1)
.8(10) 4.8(12) 12.0(12) 25.9(15) 52.2(15)
Table 4: Computational Experience for the Decomposition Method GS(1)M(1) for
Randomly Generated Dynamic S.P.E. Problems with Gains and Losses
Inventorying at Supply Markets, at Demand Markets, and Backordering
CPU time in seconds (# of iterations)
m n T= 2 3 4 5
10 10 GS(1)M(1) .4.(10) 2.3(14) 4.8(12) 9.1(10)
10 15 GS(1)M(I) .7(11) 3.9(18) 8.6(14) 17.2(14)
15 15 GS(1)M(1) 1.2(10) 4.4(11) 14.3(15) 27.8(13)
15 20 GS(1)M(I) 1.7(10) 6.3(11) 22.6(17) 43.6(14)
20 20 GS(1)M(1) 2.8(12) 12.0(14) 35.0(18) 56.3(13)
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a general dynamic [mite horizon spatial price equilibrium model with
gains and losses which supersedes both earlier dynamic and static models. We gave the
governing equilibrium conditions and provided alternative variational inequality
formulations. We applied a Gauss-Seidel type decomposition method by demand markets
in time, in which we embedded an equilibration multiplier method, for the solution of a
variety of problem scenarios. Our computational experience demonstrates that given the
state-of-the-art of computer technology, problems on the order of thousands of variables
can be solved in only several seconds of CPU time.
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CHAPTER 16
Infrastructure and Economic Transformation
T.R. Lakshmanan
1. INTRODUCTION
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Since World War II the extensive literature on economic growth and development has
emphasiZed the key role of 'infrastructure' or 'economic and social overhead capital' in
national and regional development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurske, 1953; Hirschman,
1963; Nadiri, 1970). This literature attributes a two-fold return to the nation or the region
from the provision of social overhead capital. First, the delivery of improved education,
health care, and recreation directly augments the welfare of human resources or
individuals in the form of better skills, reduced absenteeism, etc. Second, the provision of
roads, airports, utilities, etc., improves the productivity of producer capital (machinery,
equipment, livestock, etc.) and of consumer capital (housing and residential structures).
In the long run the impact of infrastructure creation will be such as to lead to extensive
modification in the relative prices both of factors of production and final products. The
expectation is that there will emerge a new general equilibrium of costs and prices at a
higher level of income and employment.
There has been much discussion of this nature of the crucial role of infrastructure and
the temporal order in which infrastructure and other forms of capital should be provided
so as to stimulate economic development. However, what infrastructure consists of is
rarely explored, and its attributes and composition are largely left to be defined in an ad
hoc fashion. Further, while there is a variety of ideas and suggestions about the origins
and the processes of economic change and development, there is no coherent theory of
economic development into which infrastructure can be incorporated. This makes the
analysis of infrastructure more difficult, particularly since countries in different stages of
technological evolution are interested in the scope and limitations of infrastructure
investment policy in furthering economic development
In developing countries and in lagging regions of industrialized societies, the level and
quality of services flowing from existing infrastructure are often low; in many cases they
fall below the 'threshold' levels where their effects on economic output are negligible (a
type of low level equilibrium trap). The thrust of development policy in such areas is to
promote the transition from a predominantly agricultural and natural resource-based
economy to a goods-producing economy. It is in the management of this technical change
towards industrialization that infrastructure investments are viewed as playing an
important role. Since infrastructure investments are osually large and lumpy, it is
important to understand the nature of the contribution that such investments make to
national or regional income in countries with scarce resources. The critical analytical
questions regarding the promotion of economic development are: Where and when should
infrastructure investments be made, and in what fonn and quantity?
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In the affluent industrialized economies, on the other hand, there is a different
structural transformation underway: a transformation from a goods producing economy
towards a dominant service economy - a transformation relating to both what is produced,
how it is produced and where (Gershuny, 1978; Stanbeck et.al., 1981). Not only is there
a trend towards a greater variety of services but increasingly services are produced jointly
with goods. There is a significant growth in producer services and producer service-like
functions and an expanding emphasis on investments in human capital. The
transformation in the way in which production is organized reflects at once the shift in
technology, in labor and consumer markets, and in the organizational basis - the process
of service delivery itself becoming increasingly routinized, standardized and
'industrialized' (Levitt, 1976; Gershuny, 1978). As a consequence of the above changes,
different types of services are locating at different levels of the urban hierarchy and thus
transforming the urban system (Daniels, 1985).
The key attribute of these growing service sector industries is that they are information
intensive. They depend on various telecommunications systems not only to solicit
business but also to deliver their products. Communication systems are to service
industries what roads, railways and canals are to (goods producing) manufacturing. A
major effect of the emerging innovations in telecommunications, electronics and
computing is to increase the sizes of the service markets by breaking down the market
barriers, integrating dispersed markets and facilitating the creation of new markets.
Further, these innovations increase the speed, density, and quality of information flows,
which in tum augment the potential pace of technological change and the diffusion of
innovations. Further, since these developments in the telecommunications sector are
taking place in a period of increasing internationalization of the service sector, the facilities
and networks extend beyond national boundaries (Undersea Cables, Geostationary
Satellites, etc.). Currently the impacts of these telecommunications developments are
keenly felt in many information-rich producer services, whose range and quality are being
transformed. When the potential of these developments is realized by consumer services
as well, major impacts on the range and quality of services, on labor utilization, and work
organization are likely.
The key analytical questions here are: What role does this increase in capacity and
lowered unit costs in telecommunications and information technology have on future
economic growth and in facilitating the transition to a dominant service economy? Given
the rapid technological innovation and the growing deregulation of the telecommunica-
tions industry, public policy choices on types, sizes and locations of communications
infrastructure investments become important to future economic growth in an increasingly
international production system.
The objective of this paper is to make a case for a broader and deeper approach to the
study of the role of infrastructure in facilitating the economic transformations taking place
both in newly industrializing regions and in industrialized societies. The paper begins
with a clarification of the term 'infrastructure', a term somewhat loosely used in the
literature concerning economic growth and development. The paper then proceeds to a
review of the available frameworks for an analysis of the role of infrastructure in
facilitating the economic changes noted above. The scope and adequacy of the various
recent analyses of the contributions of infrastructure to industrial growth in developing
nations and lagging regions in affluent societies are assessed in this regard.
We then proceed to a brief delineation of the scope and dimensions of the change in
affluent societies towards a dominant service economy and the concomittant growth of
information activities. This rapid evolution of information activities and their
incorporation as crucial inputs to production has been facilitated by the spectacular growth
of the communications infrastructure.
In Section 5 we attempt to relate the growth of information infrastructure to the
economic transformation underway. For this purpose, we review various existing
analytical frameworks for specifying the production and consumption of goods and
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services and note the inadequacy of models of service production - which involve
processing of materials as well as information - many of which display "Coproduction"
(producers and consumers jointly producing services).
The need for an interdisciplinary systems approach in order to relate information and
communication infrastructures to the broader socioeconomic system is deemed necessary.
We present the outline of such a framework, which is amenable to further development
and analysis in both static and dynamic modes.
Our objective in calling for a broad perspective and a theoretical reconceptualization of
the ongoing economic transformation and the role of infrastructure in such a process is
not to take the stance of a theorist and soar off into a visionary state of abstraction,
accompanied by formalisms presented in the Greek alphabet. Since existing analytical
structures are unequal to the task of representing the ongoing organizational and spatial
structural change in the service sector, even an avowed novice in theorizing cannot resist
the temptation to identify some basic elements of such a reconceptualization of the
industrialized economies.
2. WHAT IS INFRASTRUCTURE?
The concept of infrastructure or overhead capital has been in use since the second World
War - often employed in a loose impressionistic manner. Youngson (1967) surveys the
evolution of this concept in the hands of early development theorists such as Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943), Nurske (1952), and Hirschman (1958). He notes that in Nurske's original
statements about infrastructure, (which many other authors have since used as a basis for
their own work), the list of overhead capital items is neither consistent nor compatible
with his criteria about them. For instance, the characteristics of infrastructure Nurske
specified ("Cannot be imported from abroad", "large and costly installations", "provide
services basic to any production capacity") are more casual than precise. Other scholars
have worked with the same criteria while adding more items to the list of infrastructure
investments.
Youngson (1967) rescues the concept of infrastructure from the somewhat woolly
thinking of the early scholars through a clarification of the relationships between the
economic theory of external (technological and pecuniary) economies and the desired
attributes of infrastructure. He concludes that infrastructure is not a set ofthings but a set
ofattributes. Some or all or none of these attributes may reside in the capital instruments.
To the degree the latter possess the attributes, they could be regarded as infrastructure.
Two such attributes - both of which accord with the notions of Rosenstein-Rodan and
Nurske - can be recognized. First, capital can be viewed as infrastructure to the extent
(a) it is a source of external economies and (b) it has to be provided in large units, "ahead
of demand". Capital expenditures satisfying either of these attributes should be viewed as
infrastructure. Both imply the desirability of a certain amount of public investment (since
the pattern of investment in a private enterprise economy, given the external effects, tends
not to be socially ideal). The second criterion of provision ahead of demand is truly an
expost argument (satisfactory when the outcome is known). On the other hand, there is
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge in an economy undergoing transformation and faith
in the future is an important factor, according to Nurske (Youngson, 1967).
The argument for such infrastructure is particularly strong in the case of those
investments which may be thought of as somewhat nonspecific in character - that is, those
which can be utilized in the production of a wide variety of final outputs such as overhead
capital investment in education. The ultimate return to society from education may be out
of all proportion to the costs. The indirect benefits which are derived from public and
private spending on education extend far beyond the direct benefits (e.g., the economic
returns from a major new idea). It is indeed a matter of facilitating the evolution of new
ideas, of new combinations of the factors of production, and generally promoting
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innovation. As Youngson (1967) notes, it is here that the idea of external economies
meets the Schumpeterian notion of innovation. Innovation is the key to economic
development. Infrastructure facilitates investment that promotes innovation. An apprecia-
tion of the role of infrastructure in facilitating the emergence of new combinations of
factors of production is important. The analysis of infrastructure inevitably includes the
study of economic development - which we shall examine next.
3. INFRASTRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
Many regions directly provide capital goods - designed both to supplement and to induce
a favorable response from the productive enteyprises - in order to take advantage of the
beneficial effects of infrastructure. It would appear that the stock of infrastructure has
several effects on the level and mix of directly productive activities. First, investments in
physical and social ovemead capital will increase the efficiency and reduce the prices of
production inputs. Not only do costs such as those of material assembly and skilled labor
become lower, but increases in the capacity of infrastructure very often lead to an
improved quality of service. A six lane limited-access highway not only has a greater
capacity than a two-lane road, it is also faster and safer - thereby generating new demands
(such as labor and capital).
Figure 1 reflects how traditional theory would conceptualize these effects for a market
economy with perfect competition.
Cost
($)
Price
MCl MC2
I I I .. Output
01 02
MCl = marginal cost With Infrastructure defiCienCies
MC2 = marginal cost With adequate Infrastructure
Figure 1 Infrastructure Provision and the Efficiency of Production
In a situation of inadequate availability of infrastructure, the firms are confronted with
higher marginal costs (Me I) at every level of production, and given the market price of
their output produce at a level Qt. With an improvement in infrastructure services or
relocation to areas of higher infrastructure quality (and/or quantity), the marginal cost
curve shifts to a lower level (MC2) resulting in total cost savings of abed for the earlier
level of output Qt, an increase in the output (<a-Qt).
These cost reduction and output expansion effects of infrastructure investments are
empirically captured through the fonnulation and estimations of cost functions and
production functions. Since social overhead capital is available to all firms in a region, it
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is viewed as entering the production functions of regional firms. However, wbile
available to all, total use must be equal to or less than the physical capacity (e.g. traffic
lane capacity, sewage pipe diameter, etc.). Infrastructure is viewed as a stock variable in
physical terms.
A number of such empirical assessments are available (CONSAD, 1968; Lakshmanan
and Lo, 1970; Mera, 1973; EEC, 1982; Saxonhouse, 1977; Antle, 1983; Fogerty et al.,
1983; Wigren, 1985). Essentially, these formulations use a Cobb-Douglas specification
of a regional production unit (obtained by aggregating firm level data) with market inputs
of labor and capital combined with infrastructure. Output elasticities of various types of
infrastructural investments are estimated and interpreted. Further, the complementarities
and substitutions between input factors are assessed. In variations of this approach, the
efficiency parameters of the production functions are related to the infrastructure
investments.
How useful are results derived from a such largely static, equilibrial, short term
framework in a context where infrastructure is viewed as providing a new structure of
costs and prices? These studies rely on conventional economic concepts and a framework
of production functions, output and Allen elasticities of substitution - while they are not
necessarily static they have been used in a static way. Yet infrastructure investments are
viewed as facilitating economic transformation, in other words as a developmental
mechanism. There is a crucial difference between "being" industrial units and "becoming"
industrial units. The key notions are dynamic change, and disequilibrium behavior. An
appropriate analytical framework would integrate production and investment behavior,
describe intertemporal patterns of industrial organization, and describe general dynamic
response patterns to change and expansion.
The notion of "adjustment costs" provides a vehicle for such a theoretical formulation.
Adjustment costs are those associated with increasing the supply of those resources
whose production requires significant periods of time: resources such as sophisticated
machines, transport capacity, skilled human capital, etc. These adjustment costs, (while
initially analyzed as rationalizing distributed lag models) have been generalized by
Treadway (1968 pp. 71, 74). Treadway views the firm as producing two types of
outputs: (1) the marketable output and (2) relatively fixed, firm specific productive assets
(capacity). The cost of the production of the latter is foregone output. The argument here
is that the analytical treatment of the role of infrastructure in industrial transformation
requires an extension of the traditional cost minimization behavior of the firm to
incorporate adjustment costs and endogenized dynamics related to infrastructure
accumulation. Exogenously determined, arbitrary and ad hoc treatments of adjustments
are inadequate.
A promising effort in this direction has been made in assessing the infrastructure
contributions to Indian development (Elhance, 1986; Elhance and Lakshmanan,1986).
This study attempts to integrate a variety of theoretical and conceptual strands.
(1) Neoclassical Theory of Production
(2) Flexible Accelerator Literature
(3) Dynamic and endogenized adjustment processes for infrastructure stocks
Variable (market inputs) and quasi-fixed (infrastructure) inputs enter into the
production and cost functions. Market inputs can be varied instantaneously while
adjustments to infrastructure stocks involve time lags and a process involving
economic choice variables and optimizing behavior. Since infrastructure
adjustments are made in the public sector the firm does not face a Treadway type
"internal cost of adjustment", hence the use of (Lucas, 1976) "an external cost of
adjustment".
(4) Flexible Functional Forms
Quadratic functional specifications of normalized variable costs and costs of
adjustment for infrastructure stocks were estimated econometrically.
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The resulting model has been econometrically estimated in order to interpret the role of
infrastructure in regional and national industrial production in India (Elhance, 1986).
Some key findings of this study reported in Elhance and Lakshmanan (1986) may
illustrate the scope of the approach. For example Capital (k) and overall infrastructure (s)
are substitutes at the national level; however at the regional level, k and economic infra-
structure (SI) (SI: transportation, power, irrigation, sewage, water, etc.) are substitutes
while k and social infrastructure (sv (S2: education, health, housing, recreation etc.) are
complements. Increases in output lead to less than proportional increases in the demand
for economic infrastructure. Again, there is some support for the view that production
cost reductions result from infrastructure investments. Based on cost considerations, there
is also some support for Hansen's (1965) hypothesis of the relative importance of
economic and social infrastructure at different stages of development. Finally, estimates
of the stock adjustment coefficients suggest that in India economic infrastructure adjusts
almost twice as fast as social infrastructure.
The scope of this study could be generalized by relaxing a major assumption that holds
that the regional or national "firm" is a simple aggregation of all production units. Yet we
know that complete firms (that perform all functions in the production process) react
differently to infrastructure than incomplete firms (Wigren, 1985). Firm size (as a
qualitative, multidimensional concept) may affect the contributions of infrastructure.
Some infrastructure services may be demanded primarily to deal with the consequences of
size. Others may be used to reach a large size. Consequently, the use of firm level data on
production inputs and outputs in a region along with infrastructure stocks may greatly
augment our understanding of how firms and industries of different sizes are stimulated
by infrastructure investments.
4. SERVICES, INFORMATION ACTIVITIES, AND COMMUNICA-
TION INFRASTRUCTURE
The widely documented transformation occurring in the industrialized countries is the
structural shift towards services. The provision of services has displaced the production
of goods as the dominant economic activity. In the sixteen OECD countries the proportion
of total employment in the service sector had increased from 24% in 1870 to 60% by the
early 1980's. The more recent historical expansion of services in six of these countries is
evident in Table 1.
Table 1: Long-term Shifts in the Employment Share of Service Sector (1920-1980)
Country 1920 1950 1970 1982
U.S.A. 38.4% 51.7% 61.5% 68.0%
UK 43.7% 45.8% 51.9% 62.6%
France 26.9% 33.9% 43.7% 57.2%
W. Germany 27.7% 36.5% 45.9% 51.8%
Italy 18.6% 25.1% 30.4% 50.6%
Japan 22.4% 27.0% 40.0%
Source: Singelmann (1978), Saxonhouse (1985)
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Three hypotheses have been advanced for this relative growth of the service sector
(Fuchs, 1968; Stanbeck, et al., 1981). First, given that the services have an income
elasticity of demand higher than 1, as real incomes rise, real services per capita grow
faster than the proportional rise in income. lbis factor combined with the complementarity
of consumption of goods and services for a range of goods, leads to services accounting
for an increasing proportion of income and national employment. S~ond, as automation
and the division of labor increase with technical change, transacti(;m costs and adjustment
costs increase. The transaction costs - which represent the costs of bringing the supply
and demand sides of increasingly larger and more complex markets together (e.g.
uncertainty, asymmetrical distribution of information, risk, coordination, and control) -
generate the demand for new dynamic producer services. Adjustment costs incurred in the
supply of resources that have long gestation periods (e.g. sophisticated capital goods,
highly skilled labor, special organizational resources, etc.) give rise to a variety of human
capital and special producer services. Third, given the slower relative growth of
productivity in some services, as the economy expands, the share of the services in total
employment increases.
The major growth segments of the service sector are:
-Final services: such as education and health - reflecting the greater need for
investments in human capital in an increasingly sophisticated, internationalized area
of production of goods and services.
-Producer services: These result from an increasing division of labor; the growth in
size and importance of large corporations; the rising importance of planning,
developmental and complex managerial functions; the growth of markets; and
changes in the organizational and institutional arrangements of the private sector,
and
-The producer-service-like functions in the public sector: (Stanbeck et al., 1981).
These functions reflect the need to protect consumer interests and worker rights, to
further equal opportunity; to regulate markets as necessary, to promote national
economic interests in a rapidly expanding international system of production,
service delivery and exchange.
The growth of these types of services reflects the increasing global nature of business
(resulting from dramatic reductions in unit transportation and communication costs). With
expanding markets and an increasing division of labor, there is a greater need for
coordination, for integration and binding together the increasingly differentiated,
specialized parts and functions of the global market system. The greater the number of
participants and the finer the division of labor, the more complex the technological
process and the greater the range of goods and services an economic system generates,
the more "economic intelligence" or "technological and scientific information" the
economic process requires. The economic system becomes more information intensive.
Such changes in the information environment accompanying broad structural changes
have been noted for over two decades. Machlup's (1962) pioneering analysis of the
'knowledge industries' (including education, research, publishing and broadcasting)
suggested that in 1962 over 31 percent of the U.S. labor force was working in such
occupations. Bell (1973), using a narrower definition of knowledge workers as only
information producers, estimated the core of a knowledge society at 12.2% of U.S.
employment in 1963. The concept of the "information sector" as the segment of the
workforce that primarily produces, processes, or distributes information goods and
services was elaborated by Porat (1975). Porat's broad definition includes not only
Machlup's knowledge workers, but also all workers who use information as a productive
input irrespective of the industrial sector to which their job belongs. Figure 2, drawn from
Katz (1985), reflects some of the different definitions of information workers.
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Porat (1976)
Figure 2 Different Definitions of Information Activities
The longtenn trend of the infonnation workforce (Table 2) shows a steady growth in
the U.S. and other developed countries (Lamberton, 1982; Katz, 1985). One must note
that many information occupations have appeared for the first time in the last few decades
and there should be a distinction between the expansion of the information sector from
economic growth and the increase in demand for infonnation occupations resulting from
increasing division of labor and specialization (Lamberton, 1982).
This new information, communication or knowledge sector concerned with the
production of infonnation goods and services and the use of infonnation as a resource
includes two components: the information and communication infrastructure and the
content and flows of information over that infrastructure.
Table 2: Information Workforce Trends 1840-1980 (% of total workforce)l
Country 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
U.S. 5.8 4.8 6.5 12.4 12.8 14.9 17.7 24.5 24.9 30.8 42.0 46.4 46.6
UK 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.8 7.9 10.2 12.4 13.3 19.8 20.9 24.4 27.8 33.1 36.6
Germany 18.3 24.6 30.7 33.2
Australia 8.5 11.5 15.6 16.3 17.0 22.5 27.5 30.2
Source: Lamberton (1982), Katz (1985)
The communication infrastructure is technical in nature and includes telegraph,
telephone, radio, television, etc. It provides the highway along which information travels.
Recent developments in telecommunications and data processing technologies have
reduced structural differences between those two technologies, permitting the connection
1 The Defmition of Infonnation Worlcforce used is Porat's (1976)
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of computers to the telecommunications network and shared service markets and
customers. Thus the telecommunications sector is not limited to the traditional
transmission of basic voice and message communications, but due to the convergence of
market and technology structure, it now provides a variety of voice, text, data, and video
transmission services: electronic mail, wide area telephone services (WATS), voice
message services, teleconferencing, computerized data transmission, videotex and data
base access soft-ware defined 'virtual' networks, environmental. control etc. Currently,
voice telephone communications and data traffic account for 85% and 10% respectively of
the U.S. network. However, the other components are growing very rapidly. Table 3
outlines the rapid growth of the telecommunications services sector in the U.S.
Table 3: The U.S. Telecommunications Sector
1973 1976 1979 1982 1986
1. Revenues ($ Bllllon-1982 $) 41.8 51.6 66.5 78.89 97.02
2. Capltal Expenditures 11.8 12.9 20.18 22.53 24.9
($ Billion)
3. Cumulative Gross Plant 94.8 121.6 155.2 202.35 251.0
Investment ($ Billion)
4. Total Employment (,000) 1,007 961 1070 1100 884
5. Production Workers (,000) 780 730 789 790 659
Source: U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1987
In 1973 and 1983 revenues and capital investment in the telecommunications sector grew
at a compounded annual growth rate of 7.9% and 6.6% respectively. Telecommunications
infrastructure investments currently account for about one tenth of gross fixed capital
formation in the U.S. and Western Europe (Sheferin and Shea, 1987).
As communications activities have grown in importance, interest has also grown in
their role in economic growth and development. As Jonscher (1982) has pointed out,
there has been an uneasiness in the economic literature about the way in which
information viewed as a commodity does not fit into traditional neoclassical economic
analysis. Information is not just another commodity, since it has more bearing on both
ends and means than other commodities and it is more difficult to handle in a production
function when viewed as a resource (Jusswalla and Lamberton, 1982). The structural
changes now taking place in various domestic and international economies not only reflect
information intensity, but also a great complexity of relationships that are not reflected in
the stylized version of the production functions used today.
Furthermore, how does one assess the economic worth of such infrastructure
investments in service transformation? The process of producing service outputs is
fundamentally different in many aspects from the production of goods. Some scholars
have not treated these distinctions as being analytically important or have treated the
distinctions as residing solely in the type of output. A survey of the contemporary
literature on the service sector persuades us that these differences are important and that a
straight-forward transfer of models used to analyze goods production to service
production is inappropriate. Before we pursue this matter in the next part of the paper, a
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brief summary of the analytically relevant aspects of the ongoing service transfonnation is
in order.
S. THE SERVICE TRANSFORMATION: SOME HIGHLIGHTS
The oft-noted shift to a service economy does not represent a major movement to
freestanding services purchased on the market as much as a joint provision of goods and
services. Rising real income and increasing diversity of consumer demand lead to greater
product differentiation which is followed by joint provision of goods and services. The
consumption of services turns out to be strongly complementary to the consumption of
goods (Gershuny, 1978; Hirschhorn, 1981; Stanbeck et aI., 1981; Daniels, 1985).
Furthennore, the reorganization of the production system with the functional
differentiation between production and service delivery on the one hand, and central
research, administration and control offices on the other, has stimulated a variety of
intennediate producer services. We draw attention to three aspects of the service
transformation that may help clarify the role of infrastructure in such a transformation.
1. As noted earlier, the growth and diversity of markets, the increasing importance
of strategic, developmental and administrative functions and the inter-
nationalization of production and service deliveries lead to increases in
transaction costs (the costs of bringing different sides of a market together) and
in adjustment costs. The variety of producer services that has arisen in response
to these costs, is infonnation intensive. The technical advances in computing
and telecommunications have vastly increased the potential for cheap
infonnation supply. The effect of the vastly increased density, speed, and
quality of information flows has been to "transport" a variety of services. The
old adage that services cannot be 'stored or transported' is no longer true for
many classes of producer and consumer services. At the moment, the larger
firms have the resources to take advantage of this telecommunications infra-
structure.
2. As Baumol (1967) pointed out, many final (consumer) services with a large
labor input, have a 'cost disease', so that longitudinally the price effect acts
against the income effect in a manner which reduces the demand for such
services. To the degree that some of these services are amenable to some form
of 'industrialization', growth is brisk. The cost-reducing innovations involve the
elements of subdivision of tasks, capital intensification, familiar economies of
scale and the displacement of an important part of the service production from
the market - usually to the household. Manufactured consumer products (autos,
gasoline, T.V. sets, washing machines) are combined with intermediate services
(e.g., repair services, T.V. programs), physical infrastructure (roads, broadcast
networks, power networks) and unpaid 'informal' (household) labor to produce
transportation and entertainment services. Such service innovations that have
transfonned some consumer services are combinations of industrial goods,
intermediate services, infrastructure, and time.
3. The distinction between the production of goods (tangible assets) and service
outputs noted earlier is clearly drawn in the social indicator literature (Gam,
1973; Gam et al., 1976). Resources - labor, capital energy, materials, land etc. -
are combined to produce goods (Figure 3). A production unit is subject to a
variety of opportunities to act and constraints on its action. However, the
transaction between the producer and consumer will not directly affect the level
of output. The asset positions of the seller and buyer are altered during sales but
the output is not affected by the attitude or behavior of the seller or buyer. This
enables the analyst, without serious distortion, to view goods producing units as
self-constrained units for analysis of efficiency.
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This is not the case with production of services (Figure 4). The consumer of services is
part of the process of the production of services. There is coproduction of services. In
other words, the efficiency of the service production process cannot be attributed solely to
the activities of the service provider. The consumer's activities bear upon the efficiency
and efficacy of the service.
Further, service activities involve a change in the asset structure of the client or
consumer. Indeed, Gam et al. (1976) have argued that there are three major types of
services bearing upon such changes. They are:
a) Services in which there is change in the tangible asset structure of both the client
and provider, e.g., retail services, repair and maintenance services for durable
goods, economic development activities.
b) Services which result in changes in the human capital of the client, e.g.,
education and training; counseling and health care services.
c) Primarily brokerage activities (e.g., referral progress and real estate brokerage)
where the output appears as changes in the personal assets of clients who are
providers and clients who are consumers of the service.
6. RELATING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
What are the analytical implications of these trends (noted above) in technical change,
market structure, and organizational form of the rapidly evolving information
infrastructure, of the changing perspectives of the production and consumption processes,
of the emerging distinction between production of goods and services, and of the
complementarity of goods and service consumption? How do we distill all this mass of
descriptive-analytical material into an appropriate framework for analyzing the economy in
an information-rich age?
Our objective here is the narrower one of relating information infrastructure to
economic changes underway. One way to structure the relevant analytical issues raised
above is to relate the major economic categories: consumption of goods, consumption of
services, production of goods, and production of services (Figure 5).
Ouadrant 1. The production of goods is a technical problem concerned with handling
and processing material resources. The usual fonnulation of this process is by a highly
stylized version that functionally relates a variety of material inputs - capital (K), labor
(L), energy (E), and materials (M) - to goods output (X) via the production function:
x =X(K,L,E,M). (1)
In Section 3 of this paper, we argued that this framework should be broadened to
incorporate a vector of infrastructure stock as an additional factor input in order to capture
the cost reductions and output expansion effects of infrastructure investments. Or:
x = X(K,L,E,M,I). (2)
Since infrastructure investments do lead to a new structure of input costs and prices
thereby facilitating economic transformation, a short-tenn static equilibrium framework is
not very appropriate. Dynamic change and disequilibrium behavior need to be
represented. As noted earlier, the appropriate analytical framework would integrate
production and investment behavior and describe general dynamic responses to change
and expansion. Consequently, I, can be incorporated as a factor input, where market
inputs (K,L,E,M) and I are endogenized in a dynamic framework of adjustment
(Elhance and Lakshmanan, 1986). In such a framework, the contribution of infrastructure
to goods production can be assessed in a satisfactory manner.
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Figure 5 Analytical Frameworks for Production and Consumption
Quadrant II deals with the consumption of goods. Traditional consumer theory
assumes that the consumer maximizes utility, a function of goods, subject to a budget
constraint. When the system is solved for quantities of goods demanded, demand turns
out to be a function of prices of goods and the consumer's income.
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Quadrant TIl focuses on the consumption of services. Theoretical developments in this
area in the last three decades have been extensions of the traditional theory of goods
consumption. The central insight is the notion of a household production and the input of
time (t), the ultimate resource in consumption. The seminal contributions are those of
Becker (1965), Muth (1966) and Lancaster (1966).
Becker recognizes a two-part process of consumption of services. Utility is derived
from time and services (Z) that a household produces by processing a vector of goods X
that are purchased from the market and time (t). In other words:
U = U(Z,t)
Z = Z(X,t) (4)
In the Lancaster approach, consumption is an activity in which goods, singly or in
combination, are inputs generating an output that is a collection of characteristics. Utility
or preference orderings are viewed as rankings of characteristics and rankings of goods
only indirectly through their characteristics.
Maximize U(Z)
Z=BX
subject to pX ~ Y
Z,X ~O
where
Z = vector of characteristics
X = vector of goods
p = vector of prices
B = matrix of consumption technology
y = income.
In our formulation here, we suggest two alternative ways of modifying the Becker
formulation. In the fIrst, we recognize the evolving nature of service consumption. In
Section 4 we noted that the generation of services (that confer consumer utility) requires
inputs not only of goods and time, but also a variety of infrastructure elements (e.g. roads
for driving, broadcast networks for entertainment, telecommunication networks for
information processing and retrieval, etc.). Consequently,
z = z(x,t,I)
u = u(z,t).
In addition, from our reading of the changing nature of consumption in the new service
economy, following Scitovsky (1976) we argue for a distinction between different kinds
of time: time associated with unpleasant or boring tasks ("bad time") and time associated
with stimulating and rewarding tasks ("good time"). We would suggest that t in both the
production and utility functions in (6) could be distinguished in this manner so as to
enrich our understanding of service consumption.
Another formulation of the theory is that of household consumption of goods, time,
and location (Lakshmanan and Hua, 1983). At the heart of this formulation lies the
recognition of the role of locomotion in consumption and locomotion as a household
choice variable. Locomotion is undertaken partly to accomplish consumption and partly to
enable the household to obtain a lower goods price. Thus travel distance is differentiated
into a mandatory component and a discretionary component. Given this role of
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locomotion in consumption and the endowed nature of household time, the average
household locomotion speed- the linkage between household time and travel distance -
becomes a crucial decision variable governing the spatial yield of time. Indeed the notion
of average speed as a decision variable to be optimized by the household is a salient
feature of our formulaation. Following this, goods prices also become endogenized as
household specific prices. Several aspects of consumer behavior can be better understood
in the framework of our formulation. For example, a rise in income would shift the
consumption pattern for reasons other than just the matter of taste. Some goods will be
substituted for more expensive time and extra locomotion speed will be demanded to
increase the spatial yield of time. Both substitutions lead to less time to be used in
consumption and permit more to be used at work or leisure. Thus decisions on goods
consumption, time use, and average household speed become intimately related.
Quadrant IV, concerned with the production of services, has received little analytical
attention. We believe there is a need to conceptualize the production of services in the light
of our emerging understanding of information activities, and the processes of handling
and processing information as inputs into service production.
7. TOWARDS A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SERVICE PRODUCTION
Product flows and infonnation flows are characteristic of the operation of the economy.
Product flows are handled in economic theory by Leontief input-output models and linear
programming models. Information flows among economic actors, institutions, and
between these institutions and the larger economy on the other hand, resist easy
measurement.
Further, information viewed as a commodity does not fit into the conventional or
neoclassical framework of economic analysis. An economy is an organization for linking
individuals by interaction through technical processes of production and distribution on
the one hand, and by communication networks of information flows necessary for
coordination and control among the individuals on the other. Consequently, an economy
must be viewed as constrained not only by its limited capability for obtaining and
processing materials, but also by its limited ability to process the information which is
required to organize and coordinate these activities. As Jonscher (1982) points out, it may
be necessary to develop a framework in which the role of infonnation and the problem of
organization are treated as comparable in importance to the role of conventional input
factors and the problem of production.
In recent years, there have been a number of attempts to modify the 'perfect
information' assumption of the neoclassical model by making the acquisition and transfer
of infonnation necessary. Such attempts to analyze the behavior of market actors began
with the work of Stigler (1961) and have since been extended by many others. As
Jonscher (1982) points out, these efforts provide an ad hoc approach to information
acquisition and use. Commonly, one factor (i.e. the price of a product. the level of risk in
an insurance contract, or worker productivity, etc.) is the object of uncertainty, while the
rest of the economy operates in the perfect-information mode. Thus, such extensions of
the neoclassical theory are unable to capture the central role of information in the
economy.
Since communications involve the transfer of information, this has consequences for
the analysis of the communications sector. The latter sector consumes a very significant
portion of the resources in the economy and operates in a context broader than the
framework and variables of economic analyses. Communicating behavior is important in
decision processes and decisonmaking, organization development, demand for
information goods and services, technology change (and the component elements of
incurring transaction costs and adjustment costs). These behaviorally sensitive processes
cannot be handled by traditional microeconomic analysis that ignores noneconomic
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aspects of the relationships between the infonnation and communications sector and the
economic system.
As a consequence, we favour an interdisciplinary systems approach to relating
infonnation and communications infrastructure to the broader socioeconomic system. The
level of interdependence in the system and the need to draw relevant concepts and
methods from several disciplines makes this approach attractive (Streeten, 1982).
An interdisciplinary framework for relating the communications infrastructure to that of
the broader social system is proposed in Figure 6. This framework builds on
Lakshmanan's (1982) model of a socioeconomic system and the work of Porat (1982),
Iusswalla and Lamberton (1982), and Streeten (1982) relating infonnation to national
development.
We present a simplified model of the role of communications infrastructure in a
socioeconomic system in Figure 6 in two parts. First we identify the four systemic
components of a socioeconomic structure: the structure of assets, organizations,
incentives, and external links. Second, we describe the production of goods, services and
the generation and distribution of income in such a socioeconomic system, as guided by
sociopolitical decisions that are aided by an infonnation and communication infrastructure
- in both static and dynamic modes.
Following Lakshmanan (1982) we initially identify four structural elements of a
socioeconomic system:
• Structure of assets (level and distribution of all types of assets - physical, human,
status, etc. - that generate income and sociopolitical participation).
• Structure of organizations (the nature of markets and other social-political
institutions and the associated manifestations of markets complexity and the
division of labor).
• Structure of incentives (that provide a particular matrix of opportunity for
individual, collective, or sectoral behavior at one time, and
• Structure of links to the outside world (manifest in the two way flows between
the socioeconomic system and the rest of the world in tenns of labor, capital,
infonnation, physical resources, organizational styles, standards of development,
development styles, ideologies, etc.).
The interactions between these four structural elements define the context for growth
and development in social systems. Societies differ from one another in their structure of
assets, organizations, and incentives, and hence, in their potentials for growth or equity.
Some structural elements may change faster over time than others, thereby altering the
matrix of opportunities. For our purposes here, structural elements can be viewed as
providing a particular context for growth and change.
We shall proceed now to a description of the production of goods and services, which
in turn leads to income growth in such a systemic context. Resources are allocated to
various production activities by policy decisions made by various social and political
organizations and the market place. The production sector also receives critical inputs
from two other sources: the organizational environment and the infonnation and
communications infrastructure.
At any point in time, the efficiency of production and the flow of goods and services is
influenced greatly by the organizational environment as defined by the division of labor
and the complexity of the exchange system. The degree of the division of labor and the
level of market complexity detennine the level of transaction costs. As noted earlier,
transaction costs represent the costs of bringing together demand or supply sides of a
market and include:
• transportation and communication costs
• measurement costs (to detennine the quality, quantity and dimensions of the
services exchanged)
• insurance costs (hedge against unforeseen circumstances) and
• enforcement costs.
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Such costs relating to spatial and temporal coordination, distribution of information,
uncertainty, risk and control are minimized when the relevant information and
communication processes operate effectively. Consequently, productive enterprises invest
heavily in communications infrastructure that promote cheap information flows in the
form of voice, video, data, and text. More generally, as Porat (1982) suggests, the private
costs of information and communication and coordination are reduced by a social
externality that is generated by social investment in information and communication
infrastructure.
As noted above, communication infrastructure includes a variety of information capital
(e.g. telephones, satellite communications, integrated digital networks, etc.) and
information labor. Such capital reduces the temporal and spatial costs of coordination and
over time increases the division of labor and productivity. All of this in tum increases the
output of goods and services, income, assets, reinvestment in infrastructure, and
institutional complexity.
Thus the information communication infrastructure is viewed as a key sector, receiving
resource inputs and imposing transaction costs and making claims on production output
as well as providing production inputs. This sector influences the nature and level of
social or political participation and the structure of incentives and organizations in society.
However, in the contemporary period of quickening technical change, one must
distinguish between states of system maintenence and of system change and development
(see Stanbeck et al. (1981). By affecting the division of labor and market complexity
technical change not only changes the structure of transaction costs, but imposes, in
addition, a variety of adjustment costs. The latter include the cost of producing more
skilled labor, sophisticated capital goods and newer organizations, etc.
In the competitive game of international economic growth, societies that have vigor and
adaptability in their social and political institutional structure incur these adjustment costs
more effectively and hence speed up their technical change and development. The private
and public organizations in such societies adopt a dynamic strategic perspective (in
addition to their ongoing system maintenance) and engage in future scanning, goal
setting, strategic decision making and programming, that lead in tum to modification of
the incentive and organization structures. In such adjustment activities the communication
infrastructure also plays a key role.
What we have outlined here is a highly abbreviated version of the model and many
more linkages need to be identified. However, it concentrates on the relationship between
communication infrastructure and the production of goods and services in a social system
both in the short and long run.
Even this is a tall order for theoretical development and our state of knowledge permits
no more than an identification of some major elements of such a reconceptualization of
economic transformation. We have presented some of the 'building blocks' of theory
which deserve further attention from researchers. The central ideas are a
reconceptualization of service production, the organizational, spatial and incentive
structure of production and the role of information infrastructure in transforming
economic activities in a systemic context
Some key notions (that need to be developed further) pertaining to organizational
structure relate to the increasing specialization and the greater need for consequent
integration in our society. A major step is to conceptualize the transaction costs and
adjustment costs developing in both private and public sector units in a diverse
international economy. The role of knowledge and the interrelationship between the
private and public sector need to be analytically treated in this regard.
The notions behind spatial structure pertain to a) urbanization and b) the infrastructure
facilities and networks. As in the earlier transformation in the 19th century to
industrialization, urban structure appears to playa key role in the service transformation.
Different types of services appear to be developing in urban areas of different sizes,
reflecting the links between new service development and the locational matrix.
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Computing and telecommunications infrastructure are behind the infonnation flows that
support the international service economy.Quite clearly these ideas need to be elaborated
so that many rigorous statements can be made and the various system components linked
together. This is a difficult task and it will not be accomplished quickly. But the effort
must begin.
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CHAPTER 17
On the Dynamics of Regulated Markets,
Construction Standards, Energy Standards and
Durable Goods: A Cautionary Tale
J.M. Quigley and P. Varaiya
1. INTRODUCTION
263
Housing is different from many other commodities because of its long life and because it
is quite costly to transform the housing stock once it has been put into place. The
consequences of a decision about the design or configuration of a dwelling are felt by
investors and consumers for forty years or more in the future.
The construction of housing is also affected by the important role of regulatory
authorities in societies of very different market orientations. Many of the regulations
imposed are designed to control market externalities, to protect consumers and producers
from the consequences of their own ignorance, or otherwise to regulate public health and
safety.
Certain other construction regulations are intended to enforce cost minimization or to
promote efficiency in the market. Energy standards are a conspicuous example. These
standards include various regulations specifying the amount of insulation, window
glazing, and other aspects of the dwelling which affect its thermal properties. In contrast
to regulations based upon externalities or information costs, these regulations can be
evaluated by a straightforward benefit-cost test. Such regulations promote efficiency (or at
least do not interfere with cost minimization) as long as the discounted savings arising
from reduced energy utilization (evaluated at the social cost of energy) exceed the
increased capital outlay in construction.
As noted, however, the appropriate time horizon for these calculations is quite long
indeed, and the path of exogenous prices is subject to great uncertainty. Despite this, the
design of such regulations and the existing economic analyses of the standards have been
conducted in a static (or at least stationary) framework.
This paper considers these problems from a dynamic perspective. We analyze the
problem of a consumer-investor who must choose a level of initial investment to produce
a flow of housing services over some time horizon. Given the initial investment, the
housing service flows obtainable from increased variable inputs are deduced. We
characterize the optimal path associated with the solution to this problem.
We then particularize the problem by choosing explicit functional forms and parameters
based upon related empirical research on the effects of standards in the housing market.
We also consider how the motion of the system is affected by regulatory intervention
which specifies or restricts the level of initial capital investment. The results presented
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here extend existing analyses of regulation in the housebuilding and residential
construction industries.1
Finally, we point out some serious limitations of this study. Within the context of the
model, these have to do with the inadequate treatment of uncertainty about future prices,
and the difference in individual and social treatment of time horizons. Beyond the
specifics of this model, the limitations reflect a narrowly defined notion of the objectives
of standards in the housing market
2. THE MODEL
A. The Dynamic Optimization Problem
Consider the dynamic problem of the consumer who must choose at t = 0 the amount of
real estate investment (e.g., insulation, glazing, etc.) to maximize utility over the relevant
time horizon T. Let
U(Ht, Xt) (1)
be the consumer's utility function for housing services (Ht) and other goods (Xt) at time
t.
Assume housing services are produced according to the relationship
Ht=f(R, Vv (2)
where the level of real estate, R, is chosen initially, and operating inputs Vt are adjusted at
each point in time t. Let Ilt be the unit price of operating inputs. For convenience (and
without loss of generality) assume that the unit prices of real estate and other goods are
each equal to unity.
Denote the consumer's income at time t by Yt and stock of savings by Wt. At an
interest rate of 5, the rate of change of savings is
Wt = 5Wt +[Yt -Xt -lltVd·
The consumer must make real estate investment at t = 0 when wealth is
W(O) =O.
Discounted savings over time horizon T must defray the initial investment
Wm=e5TR.
The consumer's problem is thus to maximize utility discounted at rate 0
T T_
max f U(Ht, XVe-Ot dt = max f U(f[W(T)e-OT,Vd, XVe-ot dt.o 0
(3)
(4a)
(4b)
(5)
1 See Colwell and Kau (1982) or Quigley (1982) for an analysis of the effects of the regulatory environ-
ment on housebuilders and final consumezs.
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Utility maximization is subject to the constraints imposed by equations (2), (3), and (4).
Equations (3) and (4) can be combined into a single budget constraint:
T _ T _ T _
y= I Yte-~tdt=R+ 1lltVte-~tdt+ I Xte-~tdt,
o 0 0
(6)
and the income stream Yt can be represented by an initial endowment, Y.To examine the
properties of dynamic equilibrium for the consumer, consider the Hamiltonian
e(W,X,V,R,A,n = U(f[R,Vtl,Xt)e-~t + At [~Wt + (Yt - Xt -lltVt)] . (7)
At the optimum values A*t, W*t, and R*, the values ofX*t and V*t must be chosen to
maximize the Hamiltonian e. At the optimum
ae aud'X=d'X e-~LA*t=O
and
ae au aHdV = dH dV e-~L A*t Ilt = O.
The adjoint equation is
aA* -ae -
T =dW* =-~A*t ' or
A*t = e -~t A*O'
Substitution into equations (8) and (9) yields
au -d'X = e(~ -~)t A*o
and
au/ax 1
(auldH)(aWdv) = Ilt .
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Finally, substituting for Ht in equation (5) and differentiating with respect to WT
yields
a T -
A*T = aWT 01U(f[e-~TWT,vtl, Xt)e-~t dt
or, using (II) and (12)
(14)
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au IT aU(H*t,X*t) aH(R*,V*t) OtdX = \n \... e- dt -
o
Using (12) and (13), this expression can be simplified to
(8-0)t au _ Tau [aH(R*,Vt*)/aR]_o
e dX - 01 dX Ilt [dH(R*,Vt*)/dV] e t dt_
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(15)
(16)
To simplify these calculations, we assume 8 =0; then aU/dx is constant, and we get
T [aH(R*,vt*)/aR] e-Ot dt_I = I Ilt [dH(R*,vt*)/av]o
(17)
Equations (11), (12), (13) and (17) represent the equations of motion of the system_
For a given income stream Y t, interest and discount rate 0, and relative price stream Ilt'
the dynamic pattern of consumption of operating inputs Vt*, other goods Xt*, and the
initial investment in real estate R* are detemrined, along with the adjoint variable At*_
B. The Case of Separable Utility
The solution to this dynamic system can be further simplified if the utility function is
separable in its arguments. Suppose, 0 and Yare given and that the utility function is
U = k (Ht) + g(XV . (1')
Under these circumstances, the dynamic system can be solved by trial and error. First,
pick a trial value of the adjoint variable 1.*0- Solve for X*t from (12)
au ~ ~*
aXt =dXt = '" 0-
Then solve for V*t as a function of the as yet unknown R*, from (13)
au aH ak aH *dfi dV =dfi dV= A. 0 Ilt-
(12')
(13')
Then calculate R* such that equation (17) is satisfied. Finally, check to see that the budget
constraint is satisfied:
T T
Y = R* + I Ilt V*t e-Ot dt + I X*t e-Ot dt
o 0
(6')
If the right hand side (RHS) of (6') exceeds the endowment Y, increase the trial value of
1.*0- If the RHS of (6') is less than the endowment, decrease 1.*0-
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For the separable case, as long as equation (13') can be solved for V*t (as a function
of R*) in closed fonn, then equation (16) can be solved for R*, by numerical methods if
necessary. If utility is not separable in H and X, then the model may be much more
difficult to solve, since (12') and (13') must be solved simultaneously for X*t and V*t,
given a trial value for A.*0'
3. SOME IMPLICATIONS
According to the model presented in Section 2, the investor-consumer chooses the amount
of real estate to purchase initially, assuming technical efficiency in produetion and
knowledge of the time path of the price of operating inputs over the relevant planning
horizon. The consumer makes this choice to maximize the present value of lifetime utility.
In this section, we use this model to analyze the imposition of standards which specify
the amount of real estate R to be used in the production of housing. The analysis is highly
stylized, to be sure, but we utilize empirical functions from a real housing market
characterized by the recent imposition of energy standards. These standards are intended
to increase the real estate component of housing and to economize on the operating costs -
principally energy - associated with the flows of housing services enjoyed in final
consumption.
We assume a separable utility function of the following fonn
Ut = n Ht~ + Xt£ , (1")
where n, ~, and £ are parameters.
We also assume that housing services are produced from real estate and operating
inputs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology
Ht =ARYl VtY2 =RU Vtl-U. (2")
By suitable choice of units of measurement this process can be represented by the single
parameter U.
The parameters of these relations, n, ~, U, £ are estimated from infonnation about
newly constructed single family dwellings and their occupants. These observations were
obtained from U.S. government mortgage applications (under the Federal Housing
Administration) in California during the period 1974-1978, before energy standards were
introduced.
The production function is estimated from infonnation on housing expenditures
(PHH), operating expenditures (PVV), and real estate expenditures (PRR) for this sample
of dwellings. The parameters of the utility function are estimated from the first order
conditions for utility maximization,2 that is from a regression of the price of housing (i.e.,
the marginal cost of housing from the production function) on the quantities of housing
and "other goods" (i.e., income minus housing expenditures) available for each
household. A detailed description of the underlying data is available elsewhere.3
2 From (1'') and the budget constraint
au/aH = aPJitaH = PJi' = apHfi- l
autax E XE- l
3 See Quigley (1985) for a discussion of the underlying data and methdology. For present purposes it is
important to note that the estimation of the production function assumes technical efficiency in the
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Table 1 presents regression estimates of the two equations. In the regression of
housing expenditures on real estate expenditures, constrained so that the intercept is zero,
about three quarters of the variance is explained and the t-ratio is quite large by any
standard. The estimate ofl>, exp (-.1352), is 0.874. The second equation explains about
two thirds of the variance in the dependent variable, the log of the marginal price of
housing, and the three coefficients are highly significant. The results imply values of n, ~,
and E of 5.343,0.974, and 0.910 respectively.
Table 1: Estimates of Utility and Production Function Parameters: 7378 California
Households and Single Family Dwellings (t-ratios in parentheses)
a. Regression Estimates:
1. Production
log PHH = 0 + [log u] log PRR
log PHH = 0 - 0.1352 log PRR
(17.22)
R2 =.766
2. Utility
log P'H = [log a~/£] + [~ - 1] log H + [1 - £] log X
log P'H = 1.7442 - 0.0261 log H + 0.0901 log X
(11.14) (16.73) (3.39)
R2= .677
b. Implied Functions:
1. Production
H=Ruyl-u
H = R·874 y.126
2. Utility
U=aH~+X£
U = 5.343 H·974 + X·910
With these parameters and the assumed functional forms, the dynamic system may be
expressed more simply. Normalize the initial price of operating inputs, Jl(O) = 1, and
assume that the expected price path for operating inputs is exponential
Jlt =eCOt • (18)
Finally, choose the units in which the initial endowment is given so that ).."'0 =1. Under
these circumstances the system simplifies, after some manipulation, to:
audX =.91 Xr09 =).."'0
au aH
aH dV =.66R·85 V(·88 =).."'0 ecot
(19)
(20)
T V
1 =oj 6.93 R e(ro-S)1dt 11.11).."'0-1.14R(.14 co+ S) [1 - e-(·14 co + S)T] . (21)
The equilibrium consumption path is thus
production of housing. The estimation of the fust order conditions for utility maximization exploits
individual variation in housing prices arising from variations in land prices and geographical variation in
energy and captial costs.
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X*t =2.85
V*t =6.68 (1 - e-(·14 CO + 0)T).97 e -1.14 CO t
(.14 CO + 0)
R* = 11.10(1 - e-(·14 CO + O)T)
(.14co+0)
(
1 - e-(·14 CO + O)T) 87H*t = 7.74 . e -0.14 CO t.
(.14 CO + 0)
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(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
Given the planning horizon, T, the interest rate, 0, the expected rate of price increase
for operating inputs, CO, and the endowment Y, the initial investment in real estate R* and
the stream of operating inputs V*t are chosen. These choices defme the stream of housing
H*t and other goods X*t to maximize lifetime utility.
Consider the problem instead from the perspective of the public regulator who chooses
an energy standard for newly constructed dwellings. Based upon expectations about the
rate of price increase 00#, the regulator chooses a standard, R#. If co equals 00#, then the
minimum standard is the same level as would be chosen in the absence of regulation. If
00# is less than co, then the minimum standard is not binding; investors and consumers
choose a level of initial real estate investment that exceeds the mandated minimum. If,
however, 00# exceeds co, then the consumer is forced to consume more "conservation"
than is warranted by expected price increases over the planning horizon. Of course, if the
regulator's forecast of price increases is more accurate than the private market's, then
consumers are better off under the regulatory regime. If the consumer's forecast is more
accurate than the regulator's, then the dynamic losses from regulation may be substantial.
Table 2 uses the theoretical model and the parameter estimates from the California
housing market to investigate the dynamic efficiency of regulation under various
assumptions about increases in the price of operating inputs. For a given planning horizon
(T =40 years) and interest rate, the optimal real estate investment, as well as the resulting
discounted utility level, can be computed for given rates of energy price increase. Given
an arbitrary level of real estate investment, it is also possible to compute the discounted
utility level for the consumer, for various rates of energy price increase. Thus, for
example, for the level of real estate investment which would be optimal with a 10 percent
rate of energy price increase, it is possible to compute the consumer's level of well being
if energy prices increase by only 4 percent.
Each entry in the table represents the discounted utility lost by overly restrictive
standards. The base is the discounted utility computed from the optimal real estate
investment associated with a particular rate of energy price increase. For the same rate of
energy price increase, the discounted utility is also computed using a mandated level of
real estate investment which assumes higher rates of price increase. The table reports the
percentage difference in these levels of well being. The entries in the table thus indicate
the dynamic inefficiency of regulatory standards which are too high relative to the
optimally chosen level of real estate investment.
As the table indicates, the utility losses associated with overly stringent construction
standards may be quite large indeed. Consumer welfare may be reduced by 15-25 percent
if construction standards are based upon expectations of high rates of energy price
increase relative to observed rates of increase.
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Table 2: Consumer Losses from Overly Stringent Construction and Energy Standards
Rate of Increase Assumed by Standard
5% 8% 10% 12% 15%
Interest rate. B
5%
Actual Rate of
Increase. ro
2% 11% 19% 28% 33% 36%
4 8 11 13 29 34
6 0 6 11 20 27
8 0 0 5 13 19
10 0 0 0 4 11
Interest Rate. B
10%
Actual Rate of
Increase. ro
2% 12% 21% 29% 35% 38%
4 9 13 17 30 35
6 0 8 14 24 29
8 0 0 7 16 22
10 0 0 0 7 14
Entries represent discounted lifetime utility lost from overly stringent standards. in
percent: lOO(Uz - Uz)IUZ' Uz is discounted utility at given values of 8 and co in the
absence ofregulation. U2 is discounted utility at the same values. given regulations which
set R equal to the optimal level or each column entry. For example, at a 5% interest rate
and a 2% rate ofprice increase, the total loss ifefficient standards are set in anticipation of
a 5% rate of price increase is 11 percent. Utility is computed from the solution to
equations (6), (22), (23), (24) and (25).
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes a model of housing formulated to make explicit the choice between
increased initial investments in insulation and other energy saving capital. on the one
hand. and increased operating costs on the other hand. Crucial to the optimum level of
investment is the expected increase in future energy prices.
The model is solved for numerical values using functional forms and parameter
estimates for operating expenses and production relationships derived from a sample of
newly constructed dwellings and their occupants in the California housing market during
the period 1974-1978. Using these values. the model analyzes the dynamic efficiency
associated with mandated energy standards. and computes the losses associated with
regulation based upon overly pessimistic assumptions about the future course of energy
prices.
According to the parameters and the solutions to the model. consumer well being could
suffer by 15-30 percent from overly restrictive standards.
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It is, of course, always dangerous to draw finn conclusions from overly simple
models. The specific results and their application to a particular market depend upon a
variety of simplifying assumptions and estimated parameters. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that the mandatory energy standards adopted by the California Energy Commission
(1981) assume a real compound increase in energy prices of almost ten percent. The
course of energy prices in the United States has been quite stable during the recent past;
increases have averaged less than 0.5 percent a year during the past 7 years. If these
trends continue, the losses from these standards may be quite large indeed.
However, one should not draw such a conclusion without appreciating the major
limitations of this analysis. There are two sets of limitations: the first accepts the context
of the model; the second goes beyond it. The crucial features about housing are extreme
durability, the possibility of substituting between increased investment for insulation, etc.
and increased operating expenses for energy, and the fact that the optimum in.vestment
level depends on future energy prices.
The model analyzed in this paper clearly indicates how investment decisions based
upon unrealized forecasts can lead ex post to substantial losses. It would, however, be
incorrect to conclude on this basis alone that the particular California energy standards
adopted in 1981 led to losses due to the pessimistic forecast of price increases. To
substantiate such a conclusion one would have to show that the forecast was unduly
pessimistic given the infonnation available at the time it was made.
There is a rather different reason for higher mandatory construction standards arising if
the time horizon T of the consumer-investor is too small. From equation (24) we observe
that the smaller is T the smaller will be the optimal initial investment R*. If it is costly to
change R* once a building has been completed, then the initial value of R* will be less
than the social optimum.
The second set of limitations goes beyond the context of the model. Energy
conservation measures (including building standards) may be based on considerations that
go well beyond narrow standards of economic efficiency of the kind considered here.
They may be based on concerns of ecology, national security, etc. Even granted,
however, that these broader concerns lead to social decisions to conserve energy, the
kinds of calculations suggested in this paper are important in deciding how much
conservation should be encouraged in different activities.
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CHAPTER 18
Dynamic Energy Complex Analysis for
Metropolitan Regions
H-H. Rogner
1. INTRODUCTION
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Contemporary energy planning for large metropolitan areas calls for a comprehensive
system's approach encompassing both the energy production and consumption aspects of
metropolitan energy systems. Until recently, metropolitan energy planning concentrated
primarily on planning for the timely availability of adequate quantities of energy supplies,
a process which traditionally has been the occupation of utilities. Energy demand was
considered to be closely linked to economic activity. Since it has been desirable for the
latter to grow steadily, so have the projected energy requirements. In this respect,
comprehensive metropolitan energy planning did not present itself as an area for inter-
institutional or interdisciplinary involvement
Although not directly the focus of institutional planning activities, energy-related
planning occurred indirectly within the traditional urban planning framework. The
activities of planning departments, such as housing and residential developments, urban
transportation systems, commerce, health and medical care, etc., all have an energy
component in one way or another and to varying degrees. As long as energy was a
relatively inexpensive commodity, urban planners tended to treat it as a residual.
The high energy cost level of the last decade has unveiled the recognition that urban
planning directly affects energy consumption. In turn, the adverse aspects of energy
production (conversion) and its use in densely populated areas have had an increasing
impact on the thinking processes of urban planners. Consequently, there has been a
growing demand for comprehensive metropolitan energy planning. Given the complex
interaction between energy and all other urban activities, it seems obvious that sector-
specific planning with its dispersed responsibilities does not adequately meet the needs
and challenges of tomorrow's metropolitan areas. Thus, efficient and effective
metropolitan energy planning must encompass all other aspects of urban planning. In
tum, non-energy urban planning processes have to account for the energy relevance of
their eventual implementation.
From the above, we may conclude that integrated or synergistic metropolitan planning
supported by system analysis has become the crucial concept in the development and
design of future metropolitan structures. This is to say that regional planners of all
relevant departments, together with scientists with expertise in a wide range of
interdisciplinary areas, have to be jointly involved in finding a solution rather than
competing against each other, which has often been the case to date.
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The Stockholm County energy study was an attempt to meet the requirements of an
integrated energy study. Although this paper focuses primarily on the energy system's
aspects, the energy deliberations should be seen within the overall context of a
comprehensive metropolitan planning exercise. The results of various studies on the
creation of new residential areas, housing development, demographics and migration
issues, industrial development, urban transportation, service requirements, etc. became
integral parts of the urban energy demand and supply analysis.
The point of departure for the Stockholm study was marked by the turmoil caused by
the second price rise in the international oil market (1979/1980). Apart from the looming
economic impacts of oil prices approaching the 40$/barrellevel, Sweden, as many other
economies, also began to feel the consequences of the rigid energy-economy correlation
of the past. The abruptly changed energy market conditions of the early 1970s have
caused unexpected responses of all economic agents. Though slow initially, the effects of
high energy price levels eventually translated into energy demand reductions. For an
economic sector like energy, where construction periods for capacity expansion run up to
ten years or more, any disturbance of anticipated demand growth rates can have
disastrous effects. For example, by the end of the 1970s the anticipated growth in the
Swedish electricity production capacity exceeded actual demand. However, electricity
production capacities were installed so as to meet forecasted demand comfortably. By the
beginning of the 1980s significant surplus capacity and the threatening risk of huge
economic losses forced the utility sector to search for alternatives to utilize these
capacities.
Similar examples can be found in other energy sectors, e.g. the underutilization of
large parts of the world's oil refming capacities. To a certain extent, such mismatches can
be attributed to the sluggish performance of the economies worldwide. But there are other
factors, long term by nature and not reversible as soon as the world economy recovers or
energy prices decline. These include energy conservation, interfuel substitution, changes
in consumption behavior and structural economic change.
It was the problem of surplus production capacity and, at the same time, the
uncertainties regarding the future evolution of those factors causing the decoupling of
energy use from economic activity which triggered the Stockholm metropolitan energy
study. At the outset, a number of generally applicable guidelines for the performance of
such a study were determined:
• Energy planning for metropolitan regions requires the simultaneous analysis of all
stages of the energy chain, i.e. from resource extraction, energy conservation
and/or energy transport, transmission, distribution, storage, energy end-use
conversion to the determination of energy services.
• The determination of energy services, i.e. the areas heated in privates homes and
office buildings, the quantities of low and high temperature steam for commercial
and industrial processes or the ton-kilometers in freight and passenger
transportation, are the crucial factors determining energy demand.
• The translation of the energy service requirements into energy demand must be
based on information about the age structure of the building stock, the existing and
anticipated insulation standards, the efficiencies of energy consuming equipment in
industries, in the service and transport sectors as well as in private households.
• The longevity of urban structures poses a problem in itself. Survival functions of
the existing infrastructure will have to be specified in order to define market
penetration rates for new and more energy efficient equipment. By the same token,
depreciation functions will be used to determine the speed of interfuel substitution
or the substitution of other factors of production for energy within industries.
• Factors limiting the continued utilization of various technologies or the introduction
of new ones may originate from environmental considerations. For example, the
decentralized combustion of coal in private homes or small block heating plants - as
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part of an oil substituting strategy - certainly conflict with air quality standards in
densely populated metropolitan areas.
• Of particular importance for urban planning is the energy distribution system, i.e.
the link between the locations of energy consumption and the sites of the central
conversion plants. Electricity grids, district heat systems or gas pipeline networks
are deeply embedded in urban infrastructure. The interdependence of grids and
infrastructure must be carefully considered. The economics of grids are usually
highly dependent on energy demand densities and must be weighed against grid
independent energy alternatives in low energy consumption areas.
• The appropriate central conversion technologies must be determined and the siting
question addressed. Environmental consequences must be taken into consideration
as well as the provision of sufficient back-up capacities in cases of unscheduled
down times of large central conversion plants.
• An essential objective in the design of modem energy systems concerns the
question of robustness or resilience against external shocks. Energy systems are
capital intensive and therefore should not collapse upon sudden changes in the
world energy market condition. Hence, a certain degree of flexibility has to be
included. This points to the conflict of achieving flexibility, economic optimality
and high energy efficiency simultaneously.
Today, energy planning for metropolitan regions often means the adaptation of high
energy consumption densities - areas which in the past have been primarily supplied with
grid-independent energy forms - to new, advanced and most likely grid-dependent energy
supplies. This transition is confined by infrastructures which are often centuries old, a
constraint which poses a particular challenge to the urban planner. But high energy
consumption densities offer an opportunity for tackling the energy question where things
matter:
1. Even small efficiency improvements along the entire energy chain result in
considerable reductions in overall energy consumption (and pollution emissions);
2. The embedding of modem energy systems in existing infrastructures favors the
concept of synergism; and
3. The simultaneous analysis and evaluation of all stages of the urban energy system
together with the inclusion of the insights rendered from the traditional urban
planning departments help avoid the implementation of conflicting urban
development policies.1
4. The energy demand in the metropolitan areas of the northern hemisphere to a large
extent concerns the demand for low and medium temperature heat for space and
water heating. This opens the opportunity for the introduction of a synergetic
system design that incorporates the heating technologies in private homes and
commercial buildings as quasi-cooling devices of the large-scale energy production
and conversion plants. Such a configuration would improve the overall energy
efficiency considerably. Similar opportunities can hardly be found in rural areas
which often have large distances between villages. Although technically within
reach, the economics involved lack the scale economies offered by areas with high
energy densities.
2. THE CONCEPT OF NOVEL ENERGY SYSTEMS
The request for robustness of modem energy systems relates directly to the future
prospects for the global energy situation. A comprehensive outlook of the future global
1For example the introduction of stringent energy conservation measures may reduce the energy
consumption density to a level which makes the erection of grid dependent energy supply alternatives
economically infeasible.
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energy resource situation was reported in the IIASA study Energy in a Finite Wor/d
(Hafele, 1981). One of the study's main objectives concerned the transition from the
current global energy system, based on depletable fossil fuels, to a sustainable system
based on nondepletable fuels. Within this analysis, the study also reexamined the
depletion phenomena of fossil fuels as propagated by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al.,
1972) in the early 1970s. The nASA analyses showed that the depletion problem will not
take place nor will the transition towards a sustainable energy system be achieved during
the next 50 years. The transition process will begin gradually at the end of this century,
and its completion will not occur until the end of the 21st century. The study concluded
that although the transition towards a sustainable energy system will not be accomplished
within the next five decades, there will be a transition of a different kind. In contrast to the
anticipated shift away from fossil fuels, the world will utilize fossil fuels at an increasing
rate. This fossil-to-fossil transition is characterized by a growing consumption of low
grade fossil fuels (low hydrogen-to-carbon ratio), but in a different technological frame
from that in the past.
The prospects of utilizing even dirtier fuels than today with today's energy technolo-
gies mean at least a proportional increase in environmentally harmful quantities of hazard-
ous emissions. An increase in pollution emissions is in conflict with current efforts to
minimize the burden to the environment in many regions. An acceptable resolution of this
conflict could be an energy conversion system that is characterized by quasi zero
emissions.
Concepts of energy systems with zero emissions have been advanced by Hafele et al.,
(1982), Sassin (1982), Rogner (1982), and Hafele et al. (1986). Zero emission energy
systems imply a systems configuration where the purification, waste handling, quality
and pollution control is shifted up-front (i.e. from the consumer to the producer of
secondary energy). The secondary energy leaving this front-end conversion stage will be
of high quality and essentially free of impurities. Examples are electricity, district heat or
town gas systems. All these systems have common features - they are grid dependent and
subject to significant economies of scale. However, these examples are not convincing as
prototypes for future zero emission systems, since the conversion stations for these forms
of energy are at present the main sources of C02, S02 and NOx emissions. It is
important to note that the current energy system as sketched in Figure 1 closes the fossil
fuel cycle through the atmosphere and that the costs of fossil fuel combustion are
externalized.
The principal idea behind the novel, zero-emission energy system proposed here and
illustrated in Figure 2 is to avoid closing the fossil fuel cycle through the atmosphere.
Unlike the vertically structured sectors of the existing energy system, the new system
would be composed of a horizontally integrated system consisting of four distinct stages.
Previously independent sectors such as the coal, oil, or gas industries are merged into a
interconnected system.
The principal idea of this proposed integrated energy system (IES) is to decompose
and purify all fossil fuels at the front end of the energy chain. The net result of this
process would be a variety of clean chemical products. These products would then be
stoichiometrically supplemented for conversion or synthesis into energy forms needed to
meet final energy requirements.
Specifically, the system starts with a number of energy and nonenergy inputs.
According to Figure 2, the system's inputs include coal (solids or oil residues), natural
gas, fissionable material, water, and air. Outputs of this decomposition and cleansing
stage are the clean intermediate energy carriers carbon monoxide (CO), hydrogen (H~),
and oxygen (02). The technological processes deployed at this stage would compnse
partial oxidation of solids using pure oxygen from air separation plants to form synthesis
gas (a mixture of CO and H2). High-temperature combustion would help avoid the
generation of complex hydrocarbon compounds, sulfur emissions, etc. The molten iron
bath process is one suitable technology for this pUIpOse.
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Rather than deploy the inefficient operation of the combusting part of the CO to split
water (the net effect of all gasification, liquefaction, and cracking schemes), the strategic
choice in the IES would be different. Natural gas or methane would supply the
stoichiometrically missing amounts of hydrogen for the synthesis of liquid fuels by means
of methane reforming. Another possibility for the provision of additional hydrogen (and
oxygen) foreseen in this configuration is off-peak electrolysis.
Chemical reforming of natural gas with steam yields synthesis gas plus one additional
molecule of hydrogen. Steam reforming is an established technology that operates with
clean substances and is thermodynamically attractive: it provides an inlet for high-
temperature heat in the range of 700 to 900·C, which can split the water molecule at the
expense of decomposing methane. Conceivably, rather than apply natural gas process
heat for the shift reaction (which is both resource consumptive and environmentally
polluting) high-temperature reactors or solar tower plants can be the source of process
heat. In this way, methane reforming can serve as an interface to the non-fossil part of
integrated energy systems.
The second stage of such a system consists of the stoichiometric complementation/
supplementation of the decomposed and purified intermediate energy products. This step
controls the mass flows of CO, H2, and 02 and directs the flows to the different
conversion and synthesis processes (the third stage). The various forms and quantities of
final energy demand determine the mode and operation of the technologies in stage three,
the outputs of which are electricity, synthetic liquid fuel (here considered to be methanol),
and natural gas. Note that stage three also includes "conventional" electricity production
by hydropower, nuclear, and solar sources which are traditionally not associated with
C02, S02, and NOx emissions. Similarly, natural gas is piped through the system to the
sites of end-use conversion in a conventional fashion.
A newly introduced technology to this configuration is the CO turbine. In combining
with pure oxygen, this turbine is ideally suited for peak-load electricity production. The
isothermal expansion of both CO and 02 yields high efficiencies of the order of 60% as
well as a significant reduction in generated C02. This scheme could operate without
emitting any stack gases. The combustion product, C02' would be contained and used,
say, for enhanced recovery in crude oil production, for other chemical needs, or in liquid
form as a convenient solvent to absorb other waste products for storage in depleted gas
fields, etc.
The configuration of the novel energy system, as shown in Figure 2, eliminates the
need for intermediate electricity production by utilizing off peak nuclear or other non-
fossil electricity for specially designed low capital cost electrolysis to contribute sufficient
hydrogen and oxygen to the overall system. The present competition between coal and
nuclear power in electricity generation subsystems would be gradually resolved and coal
would become competitive where it matters: as a substitute for oil. Further, one should
note that all major conversion facilities produce certain amounts of waste heat which can
easily be supplied to district heat systems and hence further improve the overall system
performance.
The conversion of synthesis gas to a liquid fuel is another strategic technology of the
third stage. Methanol appears to be a prime candidate, at least as an intermediate form of
energy for long-distance transportation and as a substance for blending classical hydro-
carbons.
The fourth stage of the novel energy system is the end use conversion part of the
energy chain. Given the configuration of Figure 2, the conversion of the various forms of
fmal energy into energy services is accompanied mainly by carbon dioxide emissions (and
by at least two-thirds of nitrous oxides emissions than in the conventional energy
system).
The full advantage of this novel energy system depends on the establishment of a few
interconnections, namely H2, 02, CO and CH30H-pipelines and storage capacity. These
grids would introduce the necessary flexibility and a certain robustness to the global
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energy system and mobilize erstwhile inaccessible energy opportunities. The most
valuable characteristic of the novel energy system is the decoupling of the production of
liquid fuels from any particular fossil fuel resource. By varying the input ratio of
methane, nuclear and other non-fossil energy, to the input of the carbon rich components,
any changes in the availability or market price of the latter can be compensated for. At the
same time one obtains an environmentally desirable energy system characterized by an
overall reduction in pollution emissions unprecedented to date. This occurs without giving
up any opportunities, be it with respect to energy recources, technologies, or economics.
3. NOVEL ENERGY SYSTEMS AND METROPOLITAN REGIONS
The foregoing paragraphs presented one of many conceivable configurations of a novel
energy system. The implementation of synergistic systems, however, is subject to a
number of conditions, many of which are non-existent today. First of all there is the
question of technological feasibility. Most of the components shown in Figure 2 are
technically feasible and ready for immediate installation. Some technologies will be
available in the foreseeable future. For the time being these could easily be substituted by
existing processes, though at a reduced economic viability. The real obstacles, however,
concern the institutional structure of today's energy industries and current energy policies.
The novel system implies a total restructuring of the energy industries towards one
essentially integrated industrial sector. The coal, oil, and gas industries are vertically
structured (see Figure 1) and are competing against each other for market shares. They are
far from joining forces for the benefit of an environmentally clean energy supply system.
Instead, these industries are more likely to improve their existing vertically structured
business once environmental regulations impose stricter emission standards (e.g. by
installing abatement measures, etc.). Further, there is the complicated question of
financing, benefit distribution, systems control and so forth. To that extent the proposed
system appears to lack economic attractiveness, particularly in the short run and at energy
price patterns prevailing in the mid 1980s.
The economics of a zero-emissions energy system change substantially if one
internalizes all costs associated with fossil fuel combustion. Specifically, the external
damage caused by burning a ton of coal or oil is estimated to be over $100 (Working
Consulting Group, 1986). Since these costs are not part of standard utility accounting
systems, it will take political action to include social and environmental damage costs into
economic comparisons of future energy alternatives. Then the economics of an integrated
energy system appear to be quite favorable compared with conventional alternatives.
Although the stylized integrated energy system shown in Figure 2 is a long-term
concept, some of its basic principles have been implemented already. Electricity, gas or
district heating networks are points in case. Because of environmental and efficiency
considerations, the concept of central co-generation conversion plants has been favored in
many densely populated regions, particularly in the northern hemisphere. To that extent,
the integration of some energy systems has already begun. As already mentioned, the
configuration in Figure 2 is only one of many conceivable integrated systems. Therefore,
there are many alternative options and strategies for their implementation. In the
following, one example of an energy system's integration will be presented. In the early
1980s this system was examined by the planning agencies, utilities and regulatory bodies
of the larger Stockholm metropolitan region.
Apart from the institutional and policy considerations, any implementation of an
integrated energy system within the geographical borders of a metropolitan region must
take into close account the existing urban infrastructure; must recognize regional and
national energy policies and must account for socio-economic constraints.
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The study Long-term Energy Supply Strategies for Stockholm County (Temaplan,
1982) focused on the transition from an urban energy system, primarily based on oil,
towards a non-oil dependent system. Another objective of the study concerned the
reduction of the high energy import dependence of the Stockholm energy system and the
associated risk of vulnerability caused by unexpected events in international energy
markets. Apart from international energy markets, Stockholm County also depends on the
Swedish national energy supply system. In particular, Stockholm County purchases
electricity from indigenous Swedish hydroelectric and other power generation facilities as
well as oil products from Swedish refmeries.
It is the Swedish electricity generation sector which led to controversial deliberations in
the late 1970s. The forecasts of national electricity demand in the 1970s were highly
overestimated and have led to an excess electricity production capacity in Sw¢en. This
abundance of production capacity is expected to prevail until the late 1990s. Th'ereafter, a
serious squeeze on electricity supply is expected: Firstly, by that time the slowly growing
electricity demand will surpass existing production capacities. Secondly, according to the
last referendum on the peaceful utilization of nuclear power, the construction of additional
nuclear power plants is prohibited (except two plants already under construction),
Thirdly, the service time of existing nuclear power plants is limited to 25 years. This
means that nuclear power stations which started production in the early 1970s will have to
go off line during the late 1990s. Furthermore, the traditional source of electricity
generation in Sweden, hydroelectric power, has almost reached its ecologically desirable
limit
Thus, the Swedish electricity sector faces a twofold problem with direct repercussions
on the overall energy supply system of Stockholm County. The fIrst problem is of a
rather short term nature (the next 10 to 15 years or so) and concerns the question of the
most economical use of the current excess electricity production capacity. The second
question relates to the general long-term electricity supply structure.
The dilemma between the short versus the long term problem can be stated as follows:
The excess electricity supply capacity suggests an intensive promotion of electricity usage
so as to enhance sales and to minimize the surplus capacity gap. One promising market
capable of absorbing additional electricity is the heating sector. This market is still oil
dominated in low energy consumption areas, and offers good opportunities for electricity
penetration as part of the national oil diversifIcation strategy. However, given the
constraints mentioned for the post 1990 period, the promotion of electricity sales through
appropriate pricing policies will aggravate the envisaged long term problems of electricity
supply.
One alternative to expanded electricity sales which was strongly promoted by the
owners of underutilized power stations concerned the retro-fItting of power plants for
district heat supply. This alternative has one serious draw-back. By the tum of the century
the so converted capacities would not be available to meet electricity demand. The plan to
switch these power stations back to electricity production (by the end of the 1990s) then
raises the immediate question of future district heat supply alternatives.
The temporary utilization of the Forsmark 3 nuclear power station for district heat
generation has a direct impact on the energy future of Stockholm. Presently the Forsmark
3 power plant is under construction and its completion is scheduled for the year 1984
(situation in 1981, when this study was performed). The current electricity demand
outlook suggests that there will be no need for this power station before the mid-1990s.
One alternative to recoup some of the capital investments before the turn of the century
involves the retro-fItting of the Forsmark 3 power station for co-generation of electricity
(300 MW(el)) to be supplied to the national grid and district heat (2000 MW(th)) for
Stockholm county. This split between electricity and district heat reflects the ownership
structure of the Forsmark 3 power station.
This alternative implies the construction of a heat transmission system (pipe lines) over
a distance of 120 km from the Forsmark 3 location to the Stockholm County area, as well
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as the necessary infrastructure, i.e. pump stations, heat exchangers and a 480 MW(th)
oil-fired heating block back-up capacity. The retro-fitting would be completed by 1988;
the switch back to electricity production is envisaged for the year 1998. This leaves a
service time of roughly 10 years during which the capital investments for the retro-fitting
and the peripheral equipment should have paid off.
After 1998, two 500 MW(el)/lOOO MW(th) coal-fired co-generation blocks located in
the vicinity of the Forsmark site are planned to balance the drop in district heat production
capacity caused by reverting the 2000 MW(th) of Forsmark 3 to electricity generation.
The heat transportation system, therefore, would be utilized beyond the year 1998.
In light of the serious energy import dependence of Sweden and Stockholm County in
particular, it is desirable that the future energy system should be marked by intensified
domestic energy production or at least by a higher import diversification. The Forsmark
scenario implies a strong shift from oil to coal imports, especially for the period after the
temporary nuclear era in Sweden. The target of import diversification has been achieved
to a certain degree, since the potential coal exporting countries are more evenly distributed
globally and belong to politically stable nations.
However, there are alternatives to the Forsmark scenario which, besides economic
advantages, offer an even higher degree of energy import diversification. Such alterna-
tives cannot emerge by analyzing the heat production sector in isolation. Only if the entire
energy system is included in the analysis, will one be able to distil solutions which
optimize metropolitan energy systems subject to the constraints of urban infrastructures.
For example, the fuel needs of the transportation sector in Stockholm County amount
to roughly 20% of the total oil product consumption. An energy supply strategy, which in
principle provides district heat equivalent to the Forsmark scenario, but at the same time
substitutes for oil and oil product imports within the transportation sector, must be
considered superior to the Forsmark scenario. The Nynlishamn Energy Complex
represents such a promising alternative. Essentially, the main output of this complex
would be methanol produced from coal. In the short run, methanol is a suitable synthetic
fuel admixture to eke out traditional gasoline (and thereby oil) imports or to substitute
fully for gasoline in the longer run. The methanol production process requires significant
cooling requirements. The integration of this "waste heat" into the Stockholm County
district heat system would put an otherwise vented by-product to practical use. To that
extent, the Stockholm district heat market serves as the "cooling tower" for the methanol
plant The potential heat deliveries from this complex, however, would not suffice to meet
total demand. Here, another technical feature of the methanol process foreseen at
Nyniishamn offers an interesting solution. Typically, the return water of district heat
systems has a temperature of some 6O·C. The feed water temperature for the methanol
process should be in the order of 20·C. The implementation of electricity driven heat
pumps could utilize the 4O·C temperature difference by extracting the heat and cooling the
return water down to the desirable temperature of 20·C.
Up to the turn of the century, the electricity required to operate these heat pumps could
easily be supplied by the Forsmark 3 power station. In the long run, adequate co-
generation power plants based on coal (or natural gas) would have to replace the nuclear
electricity generation.
The planned technical configuration of the methanol production plant at Nyniishamn
also increases the flexibility of the Stockholm energy supply system. The proposed
methanol production process consists of two major stages. In the first stage, a carbon
source (coal) is converted into a fuel gas (gasified). In the second step, this fuel gas is
further processed and synthesized to methanol. Therefore, it is technically feasible to
divert fuel gas after the gasification step and to use this synthetic fuel gas in a very
conventional way: e.g. for heating or cooking purposes in residential areas, as a boiler
fuel for industries or as a fuel in co-generation plants (e.g. peak-shaving).
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4. THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL FRAME
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The spatial frame of this study was detennined a priori - the Stockholm County. How-
ever, this is only the case as long as the future evolution of energy demand is concerned.
Most energy supply facilities and primary energy resources, such as the Forsmark 3 plant
or hydroelectricity generating plants, are located outside the Stockholm County area. The
model, therefore, has to account for all energy production and conversion facilities which
affect Stockholm County irrespective of their geographical location. This also requires the
inclusion of an adequate model representation of the energy transport system from energy
conversion plants outside the County to the Stockholm area, and the subsequent
distribution inside the Stockholm area. Hence, the spatial frame of the Stockholm energy
study (model) includes the Stockholm County area, the power plants which deliver
secondary forms of energy to Stockholm and the connecting transport grids.
The temporal frame covers 40 years, Le., the period between 1980 and 2020. The
analysis of future energy supply options for Stockholm County requires an extended
study horizon. The service time of energy conversion equipment or energy distribution
equipment ranges from 10 years for residential furnaces to 50 years and more
(hydroelectric power plants etc.). This is to say that quantitative considerations for energy
planning purposes should be based on time horizons which are sufficiently long enough
to include the effects of their implementation. Only then will energy alternatives which are
flexible enough to respond to changes in the world energy situation emerge and which are
therefore characterized by a certain robustness against unexpected events.
5 . THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE ENERGY SUPPLY MODEL
MESSAGE II
MESSAGE II is a dynamic linear programming model which reflects the essential stages
of energy chains from primary energy extraction to end-use conversion (Messner, 1984;
Strubegger, 1984). Given the absolute level and the types of useful energy demand, the
model calculates the cost-optimal energy supply strategy for a predetennined geographical
area (metropolitan areas, regions or national economies, etc.). This cost-optimal strategy
is subject to a number of constraints. These constraints limit the number of conceivable
trajectories towards a future energy supply system and force the model's solutions to
remain within the range of plausibility. The first set of constraints serves the correct
representation of the current status/infrastructure of the energy system under scrutiny.
Other constraints restrict or define the dynamics of change, the time profile for the
availability of new technologies or politically determined energy import ceilings.
In the Stockholm study, special emphasis was given to a detailed representation of
end-use conversion technologies, particularly energy saving technologies. Altogether 38
different heating technologies were implemented to analyze the future options for meeting
the useful energy demand for heating purposes. Furthermore, the model adjusts useful
energy demand levels according to endogenously calculated final energy supply costs.
Technology and/or interfuel substitution are thus a direct consequence of relative fuel
price changes at the bumertip. To that extent, energy price elasticities are explicitly
implemented in MESSAGE II.
MESSAGE II also hosts the possibility of modeling mixed integer problems, which is
of particular importance when analyzing distinct energy production or transport facilities.
For example, the Forsmark-Stockholm heat transport pipeline has only one
technoeconomically feasible configuration. The decision therefore can be either go or no-
go, but not a linear combination such as only using two-thirds of the diameter of that
transport pipeline.
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Figure 3 shows a simplified, schematic representation of the current energy infrastructure
of Stockholm County including all the future options which have entered the recent
energy debate in Stockholm. The Vlirtan co-generation plant, the boxes labelled fossil
power or small-scale heat plants are examples of existing technologies, while Forsmark 3
and the Nynashamn energy complex represent future options. Various transmission and
distribution systems for the different types of secondary energy complete the
representation of Stockholm County's energy system.
6 . SOME PERTINENT RESULTS
The Stockholm energy study focuses on the technoeconomic evaluation of two principal
alternatives viz. the Forsmark district heat supply and the Forsmark electricity/Nynas-
hamn complex scenarios. Some 25 scenario variations were analyzed to account for the
uncertainties associated with future fuel import prices, methanol revenues, district heat
tariffs, the degree of the integration of Stockholm's electricity sector into the national grid,
etc. Despite often large variations regarding basic scenario assumptions, the numerical
results of the model applications show some remarkably consistent, and therefore robust,
results. For example, the heating structure in single and multi family homes turns out to
be almost independent of the primary energy supply configuration. Figures 4 and 5 show
the uniform, Le. scenario independent, phase-out of oil consuming heating systems.
During the initial time period, the implementation of energy savings measures to the pre-
1975 constructed building stock appears to be the economically most attractive response
to the rising (or constant) oil market prices. Clearly, in the short run the end use part of
the energy systems is more flexible in responding to market disruptions than the energy
production system.
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Figure 4 Stockholm County: Single family houses, structure of space heating
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Figure 5 Stockholm County: Multi family houses, structure of space heating
The final energy demand evolution for single-family houses reveals interesting aspects.
The significant plunge of final energy requirements will be partly reversed by the end of
the 1980s. This points to the fact that two components - different in nature and with
diverse implications in the long run - cause the reduction in final energy consumption
during the initial period. The first component concerns the immediate reaction of
households to fuel cost increases by cutting energy consumption - e.g. by turning down
thermostats., etc. - which is essentially price-induced energy conservation. The second
component concerns the substitution of capital for energy, Le. better insulation of homes,
replacement of inefficient furnaces or interfuel-substitution. The latter component bears a
long-term effect on overall energy consumption. Landlords are not likely to reverse their
investment decision because of unexpected lower fuel price developments. The price-
induced reduction in energy use, however, is reversible; and that is exactly what happens
in Figure 4. According to the scenario specification, major electricity and district heat
production capacities will be taken into operation during the period 1984 to 1988. Due to
the surplus capacities in the national electricity sector (and the fact that these additional
capacities involve nuclear power plants primarily), the shadow price for base load
electricity drops sharply as indicated in Table 1. At the same time, large supplies of
district heat become available (either from Forsmark or the Nynashamn energy complex),
at costs lower than oil fired heating systems. Thus, the incentives for price induced
conservation vanishes and demand rises to previously observed levels (minus the savings
achieved through the capital for energy substitution).
In all building types, oil use for heating pUIposes is reduced drastically and by the year
2010 oil disappears from Stockholm's heat supply menu. In low energy consumption
density areas, single family homes substitute electricity based heating systems for oil-fired
furnaces. In the higher density areas, district heat competes successfully against oil and
electricity. Multi-family houses, traditionally the focus of district heat supply systems,
continue to displace oil and switch to a centralized heat supply. In the commercial/small
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Table 1 Total district heat production (MWyr/yr), mixed integer scenario.
Technology 1980- 1984- 1988- 1993- 1998- 2005- 2012-
of Fuel Used 1983 1987 1992 1997 2004 2011 2019 2020
Waste 40.00 70.00 56.55 56.55 48.47 0.00 85.60 85.60
Oil 596.85 557.60 178.32 143.51 25.04 23.62 17.54 18.76
Coal 0.00 296.99 173.09 79.70 79.70 9.11 0.00 0.00
WlXX1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.73 48.00
Electric boilers 20.35 3.84 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total heat
plants 657.20 928.43 407.95 279.79 153.21 32.73 133.87 152.36
Oil 186.30 65.91 13.77 13.77 2.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coal 0.00 88.00 264.51 555.33 1134.48 1337.72 1287.95 1315.02
Gas 0.00 0.00 37.30 43.41 16.37 15.22 4.20 3.81
VliItan 59.01 81.71 59.17 27.58 15.37 4.75 4.75 4.75
Total
cogeneration 245.31 235.62 374.75 640.08 1168.40 1357.69 1296.90 1323.58
Energy complex 0.00 0.00 487.47 472.01 351.34 337.30 291.80 265.72
Heat pumps 0.00 0.00 205.67 204.44 44.23 68.81 99.63 124.15
Total special 0.00 0.00 693.14 676.45 395.58 406.11 391.43 389.88
Total 902.50 1164.05 1475.84 1596.32 1717.19 1796.53 1822.19 1865.82
industry sectors, the share of oil is also replaced primarily by district heat. Some
contributions from electric and solar technologies complement the heat supply in these
sectors.
By the year 2020, district heat accounts for more than 80% (25% in 1980) of the
Stockholm heat market and for 50% of total final energy consumed in Stockholm County
(excluding the transpon sector). The remaining 50% of fmal energy consumption is
electricity. This development means a considerable reliance on grid dependent energy
carriers and - as will be shown - points to a shift toward an integrated energy system.
Alliong-tenn energy supply options for Stockholm County analyzed in this study are
also marked by a supply side commonality. By the end of the study horizon, Le. the year
2020, district heat production and electricity generation is almost identical in all scenarios.
This is cenainly not an entirely unexpected result, given constraints such as the
institutionally enforced restrictions on the use of nuclear power and the poor energy
resource situation of Sweden and Stockholm County in particular. In addition, the
objective of reducing the serious oil impon dependence quasi predetermines the principal
feasible solution space which meets these objectives and constraints.
Table 1 depicts the district heat production structure for the period 1980 to 2020.2 The
data of Table 1 illustrate the dynamic transition from oil heating plants to coal-frred co-
generation plants common to all scenarios calculated. In 1980, almost all district heat
production is based on oil, one-third of which is burnt in co-generation plants. The sharp
increase in district heat demand during the mid-1980s is met by coal fired heating plants.
Due to the existing surplus capacity of the national electricity sector, only a few co-
generation capacities are installed. By and large oil defends the 1980 market share
211le scenario underlying Table 1 is the energy complex scenario which turned out to be the cost-optimal
solution. Forsmark 3 is used for electricity generation exclusively.
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throughout the 1980s. After 1990, oil looses economic attractiveness in both centralized
and decentralized heat markets.
Toward the end of this decade, the energy complex starts operating and supplies one-
third of Stockholm's district heat needs. The rapidly expanding demand for district heat
causes a squeeze in the Stockholm energy system, and co-generation based on coal is
being introduced at an increasing rate. The electricity output of the co-generation plants is
partly used for the operation of large heat pumps. Depending on the load variation
(seasonal and daily), and the capacity utilization structure of the national electricity
production sector, other technologies contribute varying quantities to Stockholm's heat
supply. By the end of the study horizon, the heat supply structure is dominated by coal-
fIred co-generation plants supplying more than 70% of Stockholm's heat consumption.
The remaining 30% are covered by the energy complex, heat pumps and heating plants,
the latter of which primarily supply peak demand. As already mentioned, after the year
2010 the structure of district heat production (and electricity generation) is almost identical
in all scenarios.
The long-term structure of Stockholm County's energy system is quite similar for all
scenarios and shows robustness with regard to considerably diverse short-to-medium
term trajectories. Therefore, it appears reasonable to use the overall cost-effectiveness of
the energy system as decision criteria for selecting the most appropriate trajectory.
Obviously, criteria other than pure cost considerations - in particular, environmental
aspects - supplement this cost-optimal approach.
Among the numerous proposals concerning the utilization of the Forsmark 3 nuclear
power station, the criterion of cost-effectiveness rejects the district heat alternative.
Instead, the energy complex proves to be competitive even under very conservative
assumptions regarding sales revenues from methanol or future oil prices. The objective of
energy import diversifIcation is met in all scenarios analyzed. Again, the largest energy
import diversifIcation occurs in those cases where the energy complex participates in the
cost-optimal solution. In summary, the Stockholm County energy analyses have shown
that the criteria of cost-effectiveness and long-term robustness of the energy system in
regard to unexpected events strongly favors the construction of the energy complex at
Nynashamn.
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CHAPTER 19
Taste Changes and Conservation Laws in the
Housing Market
K. Kobayashi, W.B. Zhang and K. Yoshikawa
1. INTRODUCTION
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Recently, the issue of social and economic structural changes in urban areas has received
considerable attention from researchers in urban economics, regional science, and
geography. Structural changes have generally been considered to result from changes in
technology and the tastes of human beings. Some studies try to explain structural changes
according to variant tastes and other variant factors such as progress in information and
technology. Bifurcation theory has been employed to capture structural changes in socio-
economic systems (see, for example, Wilson, 1981) as well as many other fields in
regional science (Wilson, 1981; Barentsen and Nijkamp, 1986). On the other hand, the
Brussels school employs a different approach to urban structural changes through the use
of dissipative systems theory (e.g., Allen, 1985).
In all of these works, structural changes are described by models in which parameter
shifts are exogenously given. The parameters in the models are assumed, explicitly or
implicitly, to be related to technology, tastes of human beings, and other factors which
have impacts upon variables in the models, but are exogenously determined. However,
parameters in the models are usually measured by observing the behavior of human
beings, which results in difficulties in predicting changes of parameters in the future. Yet,
in some situations, changes in technology and tastes can directly influence "effective"
values of variables in the models. In these situations, the methods mentioned above can
not effectively capture the characteristics of the changes in progress. In order to measure
effects of changes in technology and tastes directly, a different way of coping with
structural changes needs to be developed.
In this paper, a systematic way of dealing with the taste changes of human beings shall
be discussed. Instead of analysing how changes in parameters affect the behavior of
models, our approach shall keep parameters constant, even under the influence of changes
in the tastes of human beings. The effects of exogenous changes in tastes upon the
variables in the model are measured directly by transformations satisfying Lie group
properties. Our approach offers advantages in the sense that taste changes can be
explicitly included in the model. By keeping structures of the model consistent, it is
possible to take account of taste changes in analysing the behavior of human beings in our
approach. We can also determine whether a model is invariant under impacts of taste
changes, Le., whether a model is "permissible" in the presence of taste changes.
Although many forms of functions in existing urban models have been employed, there
are different "permissible" patterns of taste changes for given forms of functions. In
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practical terms, we need models such as these which are invariant under wider patterns of
taste changes, since if a model is not invariant under impacts of taste changes, behavior
derived from the model is very different even for infinitesimal changes in tastes.
In this study we use infinitesimal transformations in Lie group theory to express taste
changes of households. We shall also explicitly define the invariance of dynamic models
under Lie groups. The models which are invariant under taste changes shall be
investigated. It will be noted that although Lie group theory has been applied to theoretical
economics by Sato (1981), to our knowledge there have been few applications of Lie
group theory to regional economics and regional science. In this paper, we try to
investigate the ability of Lie group theory to cope with taste changes of households
through the analysis of the behavior of a developer.
In Section 2 we defme a basic dynamic model for the behavior of developers under the
perfect foresight hypothesis. Section 3 is devoted to economic interpretations of Euler's
equations for the basic model. Taste changes of the households and infinitesimal
transformations to describe the taste changes are explicitly defmed in Section 4. In Section
5, we provide definitions of dynamic and divergent invariance for the basic model. The
necessary conditions for the system to be invariant are derived in Section 6. By use of the
Noether theorem we prove existence of conservation laws in the housing market in
Section 7. Section 8 discusses structures of the housing market under taste changes of the
households. In section 9 we present some concluding remarks about this study.
2. THE DYNAMIC MODEL
This paper is particularly concerned with behavior of a developer in a housing market
undergoing urban change. The developer is assumed to be rational in the sense that he
supplies houses to maximize the discounted sum of the utility (profit) stream in a perfectly
competitive housing market. Although many dynamic models exist for developers in the
housing market, Fujita (1983) has classified these dynamic models into four groups
according to hypotheses about the behavior of the developers included in the models: (1)
static expectation; (2) perfect foresight; (3) rational expectation; and (4) adaptable
expectation. It can be said that most of the research efforts related to dynamic models have
adopted the perfect foresight hypothesis (PF-hypothesis). Our model is an extension of
the dynamic model based upon the PF-hypothesis presented by Diamond et al. (1982),
which explicitly accounts for the developer's investment in housing.
The total profit of the developer at any time t is
F(t) =R(A(t),Q(t» - C(A(t),Q(t»,
where
(1)
F(t)
A(t)
Q(t)
Q<t)
R(A(t),Q(t»
qA(t),Q(t»
= the total profit at time t,
= the level of amenities at time 1, a vector variable,
= service values of houses at time 1, a vector variable,
= investment in service values of houses,
= revenue function at time 1,
= cost function at time 1.
For simplicity we will not express time t explicitly in these variables in the following.
We suppose that the levels of amenities are controlled by the government and are not
affected by the behavior of the developer. Amenities affect the behavior of the developer
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because the revenue and cost of supplying houses depends upon the amenities. It is
assumed that the developer decides the level of amenities by choosing the location of the
houses at the initial stage. Once the developer chooses the housing site, the changes in
amenities occur exogenously. According to the PF-hypothesis, the developer maximizes
the discounted sum of utility stream for profit,
00
Max f U(R(A,Q) - C(A,Q»exp(-kt)dt,
o
where
U =U(F(t» =utility function,
k =discounting rate.
3. EULER'S CONDITIONS FOR THE BASIC MODEL
The Lagrangian for the basic model is defined as
L(A,Q,Q,t) =U(F(t»exp(-kt) .
Euler's conditions for the optimal problem can be expressed as
oUiJA =dldt(o ua A) ,
oUoQ = dldt(o ua Q) .
With eq. (4)
U' of/o A exp(-kt) =0,
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
where U' = dU/dF. From eq. (6), since U' is not equal to zero, the following equation
holds
oR/oA =oC/oA , (7)
which means that the marginal revenue of the amenities is equal to the marginal cost of the
amenities. From eq. (5), we can obtain
U'oR/oQ = kU'oC/oQ - dldt(U'oC/oQ). (8)
Here, for simplicity we consider the situation that the developer is neutral to the profit,
i.e., U(F(t» =F(t). Then, for eq. (8),
oRldQ = k oC/oQ - dldt(oCIOQ).
Here, if we denote oC/oQ as p, eq. (9) can be rewritten as
(9)
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dRJdQ = kp - dp/dt.
Taste Changes and Conservation Laws
(10)
If there is no scale factor in the housing market, Le., dp/dt = 0, from eq. (10) we have
aR/aQ =kp, which means that the marginal revenue of the service values is equal to the
marginal cost of the investment in service values discounted at rate k. In the case of a
scale factor of the housing market, Le., dp/dt < 0, the marginal revenue of the service
values is greater than that without a scale factor. Here, let us denote dR/dQ with r and
take differentials of eq. (10) with respect to time 1. We have
dr/dt = kdp/dt - d2p/dt2 . (11)
In the case with scale factors, d2p/dt2 > 0, from which we get dr/dt < O. Eq. (11) tells us
that if there exists scale factors in the housing market, the marginal revenue of the service
values will decrease as time passes.
4. TASTES OF HOUSEHOLDS AND INFINITESIMAL
TRANSFORMATIONS
The tastes of households for locations and service values of houses are variant. The
developer has to take these changeable factors into account in order to maximize the
utility_ It has been shown by Sato (1981) that Lie groups can express changes of tastes in
"effective values" of variables in the model.
We have to use "units" to measure the values of these variables. The commensurate
values of the variables can be compared with the units which are given a priori. The
absolute values of the units are assumed to be invariant. However, taste changes may
change the absolute values of the units. For example, the value of accessibility may
change if the way in which the household values its time changes. We may say that tastes
of households reflect how the households value variables related to subjective
appreciation. It is reasonable to consider that changes in tastes can be described by
changes in "effective values" of the variables.
We can measure the values of variables of a model in a local coordinate. As the
meanings of "units" become different, the local coordinate is changed. These changes can
be described by mapping between the local coordinates, utilizing the infinitesimal
transformations in Lie group theory. Such transformations create maps that directly reflect
changed measures of the effective variables valued at different points. The taste changes
could be defined as transformations of effective values between different points in time.
These ideas can be described by Lie groups expressing mapping between different local
coordinates as shown in Figure 1.
Defmition (Taste Changes of Households)
When exogenous taste changes are introduced, taste changes are expressed by
transformation of the state space (A,Q,t). The transformation combines the factors before
changes with the factors after changes due to the taste change parameter, which may be
called taste changes of the households, Le.,
TRE: i = Y(A,Q,t,E) ,
A =Xl(A,Q,t E) ,
Q =X2(A,Q,t E) ,
(12)
(13)
(14)
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where t , A, and Q are "subjective time" (Samuelson, 1976), "effective amenities" and
"effective service values" respectively; (Y, X 1,x2) is a vector of taste change functions; €
is a parameter to express the taste changes, and (Y,X],X2) are assumed to have properties
of continuous (Lie) groups with the parameter e.
A A A
Q
---
T£I+£2
_L_
£= £2
Q
£=£1
Q
------------------
Gt:-t---e---
--
£=0
Figure 1 Taste Changes and the Local Coordinate
t can be considered as "subjective" time in the housing system which means a "real
sense" of time. If we consider € as an infinitesimal change in the normal time in our
every-day economic life, 1: = 1. Because of taste changes of the households, causing
value changes in the amenities and the houses, we may consider that the concept of time t
in the housing system is different from that in our everyday economic life. Subjective time
may be decided due to changes in tastes of the households in comparison with other
economic sectors, if we consider the housing system as a sub-system in the national
economy. When t =t+€ the concept of subjective time has no particular implication if we
consider e as an infmitesimal change in general time.
If we define the infinitesimal generators 1:, ~lt and ~2' as
1: = aY(A,Q,t,e)/ae ,
~] = aX1(A,Q,t,e)/a€,
~2 = aX2(A,Q,t,e)/o€ , at e = 0,
(15)
(16)
(17)
the expressions of taste changes in eqs. (12) to (14) are
t = t + 1:€ + 0(€2) ,
A = A + ~1€ + 0(€2) ,
(18)
(19)
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Q =Q+ ~2e+0(e2).
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(20)
Here, if the amenities and service values are (A,Q) at the initial point e=O, the real
values of these variables can be considered as (A,Q) at state e as a result of taste changes
of the households in the housing market. The inverse transformations of eqs. (12) to (14)
are
TR.e: t = Y(A,Q,t, -e) ,
A = Xl(A,Q,t, -e) ,
Q = X2(A,Q,t, -e) ,
or t = t - 'te - 0(e2) ,
A = A - ~le - 0(e2),
Q = Q - ~2e - 0(e2) ,
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
by which the real values of the variables at state e can be convened into those at the
initial state £0. Inverse transformations can be utilized to transform the effective values of
variables at any time into those at the base year. However, changes in taste are nothing
more than changes of measures and there are no guarantees that the basic model will
always remain dynamically consistent even under impacts of changes in effective values
of the variables. Later we will explain that only limited families of the basic model are able
to hold dynamic invariance under taste changes.
S. DEFINITIONS OF INVARIANCE FOR THE BASIC MODEL
In general, there are two concepts of invariance for a dynamic system under infinitesimal
transformations, Le., dynamic invariance and divergent invariance (Ikeda, 1975; Sato,
1982). Based upon these concepts, two concepts of invariance of the basic model can be
defined as follows
L(A,Q,Q,t) - L(A,Q,Q,t) = O(e) ,
or
L(A,Q,Q,t) - L(A,Q,Q,t) = e!l(A,Q,t) + O(e) ,
(27)
(28)
which mean dynamic invariance and divergent invariance under taste changes
respectively.The dynamic and divergent invariance can be interpreted as necessary
conditions for optimality of the problem under taste changes. In (28), n is an arbitrary
function.
The Lagrangian, L(A,Q,Q,t), denotes the discounted utility level at state e. Let us
represent the values of a house at initial state e = 0 as (A,Q), and the values at state e as
(A,Q). (A,Q) are "effective values" after the tastes of households have changed. Since
(A,Q) and (A,Q) characterize the same house, when e is infinitesimal, the discounted
values at the state measured by (A,Q) must be different from those at e = 0 measured by
(A,Q) to a infinitesimal amount O(e). The dynamic invariance denotes that even when taste
changes occur, we can still use the same revenue and cost functions in the model to
explain the behavior of a developer in the housing market. On the other hand, the
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divergent invariance states that when taste changes arise, but the utility function retains the
same fonn, the discounted utility level is shifted. In practice, not only tastes, but also
other factors modify behavior of the developer. The divergent invariance reflects that
when the housing system is affected by exogenous factors, the discounted utility levels
can be modified. However, the fonn of the utility function need not be changed. In any
case, if the basic model is dynamic or divergent invariant for certain classes of taste
changes, the properties deduced from the basic model, e.g., optimal conditions, can
remain invariant
6. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE SYSTEM TO BE
INVARIANT
Above we have defmed dynamic and divergent invariance under impacts of taste changes
for the basic model. Whether the system is invariant depends upon the fonns of taste
changes and rent and cost functions included in the model. That is, fonns of the model on
the basis of the PF-hypothesis are limited if the system is kept invariant under impacts of
taste changes. In the following, we shall investigate necessary conditions for the housing
system to be invariant. If the fundamental integral (2) is invariant under Lie groups, the
corresponding Lagrangian must satisfy the following condition
tauat + ~l aUaA + ~2 aUdQ + aU<Q(d~2"dt - Qdt/dt) + Ld t/dt =d Qldt , (29)
which is called the fundamental invariant identity for the dynamic system (Sato, 1981). In
the dynamic invariant system, the fundamental invariant identity can be written as
U(dt/dt - kt) + U'(~l aR!iJA - ~l aC!aA + ~2 aR!dQ
- ac/aQd ~2"dt+ QiJcrao. dt/dt) = 0 . (30)
The conditions that eq. (30) is held for any U and U' except U =0 and U' =0 are given
by
dt/dt - kt =0, (31)
~l aR!iJA - ~l acraA + ~2 aR!iJQ - aC!aQd ~2"dt+ QiJcrao. dt/dt = 0 . (32)
Since the generator t is a function of A, Q and t, the general solution of eq. (31) can be
written as
t =a exp(k:t) + 'I'(A) ,
where'l'(A) is an arbritrary function of A. Similarly, from eq. (32) we obtain
~l =T1(A,Q,t) ,
acraQiJ ~:z/dt - ~2 aR!dQ =0 ,
~idcrao.=akexp(k:t)QiJcrao. + ~(A,t) ,
(33)
(34)
(35)
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where «1>(A,t) is an arbitrary function of A and t. Now we have
Theorem 1 If the infinitesimal transformations defined in eqs. (18) to (20) satisfy
eqs. (34) and (35), the housing system is dynamically invariant.
Similarly, the necessary conditions for the system to satisfy divergent invariance can
be expressed in the following corollary (Kobayashi et al., 1986).
Corollary 1 If the infinitesimal transformations defined in eqs. (18) to (20)
satisfy eqs. (34) and (35), the housing system is divergently invariant.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 suggest that structures of the housing market with concepts of
dynamic invariance and divergent invariance would be same under impacts of taste
changes if the tastes changes can be described by the infinitesimal transformations
satisfying Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Necessary conditions in Theorem 1 describe the
relations among the cost functions and the infinitesimal generators which must be held in
order that the system is dynamically invariant. If the infinitesimal generators do not satisfy
the conditions in Theorem 1, we can not use the basic model when taste changes occur.
Corollary I tells us that while the urban area is affected by different exogenous or
endogenous factors, the dynamic system is divergently invariant under the same patterns
of taste changes and the same forms of cost and rent functions as those stated in Theorem
1. On the other hand, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 imply that if we consider that structures
of the housing system are described by infinitesimal transformations, and rent and cost
functions, then we may say that dynamic housing systems with definitions of dynamic
invariance and divergent invariance must have the same structure. Although our
discussions only apply to the models built upon the PF-hypothesis, we may point out that
it is possible for us to analyse other kinds of urban models, which can be kept structurally
consistent under impacts of exogenous changes in a similar way. Forecast results from
existing urban models are not usually accurate when exogenous taste changes alter the
values of parameters and meanings of the variables in the model. However, Lie groups
may supply us with a powerful tool to deal with such problems.
Now, we shall try to investigate structures of the dynamic housing system in more
detail according to necessary conditions for invariance given by Theorem 1 and Corollary
1. By solving eqs. (34) and (35) in terms of infinitesimal generators, a family of
infinitesimal generators which could keep the housing system invariant is obtained. If the
cost functions is linear or nonlinear with respect to Qthe characteristics of the partial
differential equations (34) and (35) change accordingly.
(1) Linear cost function with respect to 0.
Let us assume that the cost function takes a form as
C(A,Q) = coCA) + Po. , (36)
where coCA) is an arbitrary function of A. By substituting eq. (36) into eq. (35),
infinitesimal generators ~2 = (~21'''''''''~2m) become
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~2j = ak exp (kt) (Li Aij Qi) + 'l'j(A.t).
where
Li AijPi = Pj •
Lj Pj'l'j = C1>(A.t)
j=I •...•m •
j=l •...•m
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(37)
(38)
(39)
where C1> and 'l'j are arbitrary functions satisfying eq. (39). (Kobayashi et al. 1986). ~l is
an arbitrary function as
~l = T\(A.Q.t) .
(2) Non-linear cost function with respect to Q
(40)
In the case of a non-linear cost function. the characteristics of the partial differential
equations (34) and (35) depend upon the values of two parameters k and a. It can be
proved that if neither the discount rate k nor parameter a are equal to zero, eqs. (34) and
(35) have no solution. IT either k or a is equal to zero. eq. (35) becomes
Lj~2j aCfcJQj = C1>(A.t) • ( = 0) . (41)
Only the left side of eq. (41) includes the variables Q and Q. In order to hold eq. (41) for
any values of Q and Q, it must be held C1>(A,t) = O. The partial differential equation (41)
has the following two solutions
a) 't = a exp(kt) + 'P(A) ,
~l =T\(A,Q,t),
~2 = O.
b) 't = a exp(kt) + 'P(A) ,
~l =T\(A,Q,t),
~2j = 'l'j(A,Q), j=I,...•m-l •
Lr1 'l'j(A,Q) = - ~(A) 'l'm(A,Q) •
where ~(A) is an arbitrary function. Formally. we have
(42)
(43)
Theorem 2 The infinitesimal generators must satisfy eqs. (37) to (39) for the
housing system to be dynamically invariant for a linear cost function with Q, and
the infinitesimal generators must satisfy either eq. (42) or eq. (43) for a non-linear
cost function.
According to Corollary 1, we can obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The infinitesimal generators must satisfy eqs. (37) to (39) for the
housing system to be divergently invariant for a linear cost function with Q, and the
infinitesimal generators must satisfy either eq. (42) or eq. (43) for a non-linear cost
function.
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Theorem 2 provides the necessary conditions for the system to be invariant. These
conditions determine invariant structures of the housing system under impacts of taste
changes. On the basis of this theorem, we can list all of the patterns of the taste changes
and forms of cost functions which make the system dynamically invariant in Table 1.
Moreover, with respect to each pattern of the taste changes in Table I, we can obtain the
appropriate revenue functions from eq. (35) which make the system dynamically
invariant. However, it is very difficult to obtain explicit solutions from these general
conditions. In Section 8, we will solve the revenue functions according to considerations
of different patterns of taste changes satisfying Theorem 2.
Table 1: Combinations of Cost Functions and Infmitesimal Transformations in
Theorem 2
cost functions a,k infmitesimal transformations
C(A,Q) =ro(A)+pQ t = a exp(kt) + 'P(A)
(linear) ~l = ,,(A,Q,t)
~2j = ak exp(kt). (LiAijQi) + 'l'jCA,t)
Li AijPi = ~ (j=I, ... ,m)
Lj'l'jCA) = (A,t)
C(A,.Q> =ro(A) a;l!:O t = a exp(kt) + 'P(A)
+X(Q) k=O ~l = ,,(A,Q,t)
(separably or
non-linear) a=O ~2j = 'l'j(A,Q)
k;l!:O Lj 'l'jCA,Q)/'Ifm(A,Q) = - ~(A)
a;l!:O, k;l!:O the model is not invariant
(arbitrarily non- a;l!: 0, k = 0 t = 1 or t = 'P(A)
linear) or ~l =,,(A,Q,t)
a =0, k;l!:O ~2 =0
a;l!:O, k;l!:O the model is not invariant
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We will now use Noether's theorem to show that if the necessary conditions for the
housing market to be invariant are satisfied, then there exist functions of the variables and
the derivatives of the variables with respect to time which are kept constant along optimal
trajectories at any point of the study period. We call the result from Noether's theorem the
conservation law in the housing market. Applying Noether's theorem to the basic model,
the conservation law which explains invariant relations among the variables in the housing
market under the taste changes is given by
n =(L - QfJI../dQ) + ~2aUaQ =const. (44)
For those families of infinitesimal transformations given by Theorem 2, with
application of Noether's theorem we can show that the conservation laws take the
following forms. For the linear function with Q, the conservation law becomes
n =(a exp(kt) + 'I'(A)) (U + pQU')exp(-kt) + ~2PU' exp(-kt) =const. (45)
For non-linear cost functions and the infinitesimal transformations (42), according to
Noether's theorem there exists a conservation law
n =(a exp(kt) + 'I'(A)) (U + U'Q aetOQ) =const. (46)
In the case of a non-linear cost function and infinitesimal transformations (43), we have
n = (a exp(kt) + 'I'(A)) (U + U'Q aC/i)Q) exp(-kt) = const. (47)
The conservation laws explain invariant identities which must be held along the optimal
trajectories under taste changes. They can explain structures in the housing system, i.e.•
relations among patterns of the infinitesimal transformations, values of utility, revenue
and cost. Otherwise, if relations among patterns of taste changes, values of utility,
revenue and cost do not satisfy the conservation law given by Noether's theorem, we can
not assume that the dynamic system is invariant. This tells us that if the housing system is
to be kept invariant under given patterns of taste changes, forms of utility, revenue and
cost functions which can be utilized in the basic model, the model would be limited. Here
it will be noted that when the functions of utility, revenue and cost keep the dynamic
system invariant, it is possible to make practical tests of the conservation laws. This
means that even if it is difficult to test the PF-hypothesis directly, we can do so because
the conservation laws are derived from the PF-hypothesis.
8. THE STRUCTURES OF THE HOUSING SYSTEM UNDER TASTE
CHANGES
By utilizing Noether's theorem, we have derived conservation laws in the housing market
under different patterns of infinitesimal transformations and various forms of utility,
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revenue and cost functions. Since structures of the housing market can be described by
conservation laws which hold under taste changes and functions, in order to understand
structures of the housing system it is very important to investigate the patterns of taste
changes and the forms of utility, revenue and cost function under which conservation
laws hold.
The conservation laws are partial differential equations with respect to the utility
function U, the revenue function R and the cost function C. Structures of the system
expressed by utility, revenue and cost functions along the optimal trajectories are defmed
by conservation laws (45) to (47). We shall propose several possible types of taste
changes and decide the structures of the system for each. We shall also count all classes
of Lie groups which make the system invariant (Kobayashi et al., 1986). In order to keep
the discussion brief we shall only outline several typical cases of these patterns.
(1) Case 1 ('t = 1, ~1 = 0, ~2 = 0)
In this case, the Lie groups become t = t + E, A = A, Q = Q. If we consider the
parameter t as normal time, the infinitesimal transformations mean that changes in the
tastes of households do not occur. The conservation law for the housing system can be
written as
n = (U + U'Q iJCIiJQ) =const.
We shall carry out our analyses when the utility functions take the different forms
a) U =a + I3F, 2) U =exp (a + I3F), 3) U =Ln(a + I3F).
Case la) (U = a + I3F)
By substituting the utility function U = a + I3F into eq. (48), we can obtain
a + I3F + I3Q iJCf()Q = '\) ,
where '\) is constant. Since F = R - C, we see
R=C-QiJC/iJQ +a,
(48)
(49)
(50)
where a=(- a + '\»/13. If the developer is neutral to the profit, the optimal profit can be
written
F* ='\) - MC, (51)
where MC = Q iJC/iJQ, which is the total marginal cost. In this situation, the optimal
profit for the developer is equal to '\) - MC at any time.
Case lb) (U =exp(a + I3F»
The conservation law in this case is
n = exp(a + 13F)(1 + I3Q iJCf()Q) = '\) . (52)
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We can obtain
R = C + 1/~ .In(u/(~ MC + 1)) - aI~ .
The optimal profit is
F* = 1/~ .In(u/(~ MC + 1)) - aI~ .
(54)
Case 1c) (U = .In(a + ~F).
In this case, the conservation law is expressed as
.In(a + ~F) + ~/(a + ~F)Q oC(dQ = u .
It can be seen that
«a + ~R - ~C)exp(-u))(a + ~R - ~C) = exp (- ~MC) .
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(53)
(55)
(56)
Eq. (56) is an implicit function of the optimal profit. It is impossible to make an explicit
expression of the optimal profit. That is, if we employ a logarithmic utility function, we
can not explicitly express the optimal profit which makes the system invariant under taste
changes.
Case 2 ('t = 1, Linear cost function)
In this case, the cost function takes the form of
C(A,Q) = ro(A) + Lj PjQj . (57)
According to Theorem 2, in order for the system to be invariant the infinitesimal
transformations have to take the form of
't = 1 , (58)
~1 = T\(A,Q,t) , (59)
~2j = 'l'j(A) , j=1,...,m-1 (60)
Lj Pj'l'j(A) = <D(A) . (61)
If eqs. (58) to (61) hold, the conservation law takes the form of
n = (U + pQU' - <D(A)U') = u(t) , (62)
where u(t) = u exp(kt). By solving eq. (35), the revenue function which keeps the basic
model invariant is
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R(A,Q) =8 1(A) + 82(X1t(A» ,
where
X = Lj Qj + ~(A)Qn '
~(A) =- Lj Vj (A)""m (A) ,
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(63)
(64)
(65)
in which 810 82, 1t, and ~ are arbitrary functions.
In eq. (59), since the infinitesimal generator ~1 for tastes of the amenities is an
arbitrary function with respect to amenities, service values and time, we can say that taste
changes about amenities have no direct impact upon invariance of the dynamic system.
From eq. (60), we see that the tastes of the households for the service values are
dependent only upon the amenities. It should be noted that if we make certain
assumptions about properties of the revenue functions in eq. (63), we can obtain
practically testable revenue functions. For instance, (1) if we consider that 1t(A) in eq.
(63) is constant, the revenue function becomes separable with respect to A and Q; (2) if
we consider 81(A) to be constant, we obtain a multiplicative revenue function.
In Case (1), the basic model is the same as the existing models that are based upon the
PF-hypothesis (Fujita, 1983). In order words, most of the existing models based upon
the PF-hypothesis can be considered as a special case of our model, where the revenue
functions satisfy the necessary conditions for system to be invariant. In Case (2), since
~(A) = 1, the variable Q in the revenue function is not changeable with respect to ~(A);
however, the patterns of the taste changes are limited by Lj Vj (A) =O.
Case 2a) (U =a + ~F)
In this case, the conservation law is
a + ~F + ~(PQ - ~(A» = u(t).
where u(t) =u exp(kt). The optimal profit is
F* = (u(t) - a)/J3 + ~(A) - MC ,
where MC =pQ, u(t) =U exp(kt).
Case 2b) (U =exp(a + ~F»
In this case, the conservation law and the optimal profit can be expressed
exp(a + ~F)(1 + ~MC - ~ ~(A» =u(t) ,
F* =Ln(u(t)/~MC - ~ ~(A) + 1»/~ - <X/~ .
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
Case 2c) (U = Ln(a + ~F»
Just as in Case Ie) the optimal revenue can not be explicitly expressed in this case.
From eq. (61), we can interpret ~(A) as the value measured by the marginal cost that
is required for improvement of housing services. The need for improvement comes from
changes in the tastes of the households. Now, consider the case when the tastes of the
households for housing services are increased. In this case, since ~(A) is greater than
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zero, from eqs. (67) and (69) we can see that the developer can obtain the subsidized
profit ~(A) resulting from taste changes. The subsidized profit is only related to
amenities. That is, if there does not exist scale effects in housing production, under
various location conditions the patterns of taste changes and also the subsidized profits
should be different
Case 3) ('t = 1, Nonlinear cost function)
Now we shall take scale factors in the construction of houses into account. According
to Theorem 2, if the housing system is invariant, the cost function has to take the
separable form
C(A,Q) =ro(A) + X(Q ) ,
and the infinitesimal transformations satisfy
't = 1 ,
~1 = T\(A,Q,t) ,
~2j = 'Vj(A,Q) , G=l,...,m-l) ,
Ij 'Vj (A,Q)!'I'm(A,Q) = - ~(A) .
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73)
(74)
This case is different from Case 2 in that the invariance of the housing system can be
held even if the tastes of the households are explicitly related to levels of housing
services. The functions 'V/A,Q) in eq. (73) may take separated forms as 'Vj(A,Q) =
'Vj(A)K(Q). IT we consider that K(Q) is constant. then the infinitesimal transformations are
ilie same as those in Case 2. From these discussions, we conclude that there are wider
families of taste changes here than in Case 2 which make the housing system invariant.
Otherwise, revenue functions in eqs. (63) to (65) also make the system invariant under
the patterns of taste changes in this case. From the results above, we see that from a
practical viewpoint types of revenue functions would multiplicative or separable with
respect to A and Q.
Case 3a) (U = a + /3F)
IT we let MC = QaeraQ the conservation law and optimal profit are respectively
a + /3F + /3MC = \)(t) ,
F* = \)(t)1/3 - MC - aI/3 .
From eq. (76) it can be seen that the scale factor increases the developer's profit.
Case 3b) (U = exp(a + /3F»
The conservation law and the optimal profit are given by
exp (a + /3F)(l + /3MC) = \)(t) ,
(75)
(76)
(77)
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F* = Ln(u(t)/(~MC + 1))/~ -~ .
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(78)
Case 3c) (U = Ln(a + ~F))
Just as in Case lc) the optimal profit can not be explicitly expressed here.
9. CONCLUSIONS
Upon the basis of the assumption of the developer as a profit-taker and by the use of
infinitesimal transformations in Lie group theory, we have investigated the behavior of the
developer in the housing market under impacts of taste changes of households. This study
applies Lie group theory to regional science and urban economics. Although it is far from
a comprehensive theory we believe that we have demonstrated the potential applicability
of Lie groups in the theoretical analysis of the behavior of developers. In fact, Lie group
theory can serve as a powerful "tool" to capture taste changes and to enable us to
investigate the behavior of human beings in this situation.
From this study we have obtained the following results: (1) there does not exist any
model for the behavior of developers built upon the PF-hypothesis which is invariant
under arbitrary patterns of the taste changes of households; (2) if the revenue function
takes a multiplicative or separable form with respect to A and Q, the basic model is
invariant under certain patterns of taste changes; (3) some existing models built upon the
PF-hypothesis for the behavior of developers in the housing market agree with our
model, which is invariant under certain patterns of taste changes; (4) if the dynamic model
is invariant under taste changes, then there exist conservation laws in the housing market
which are observable; (5) if developers in the housing market are perfectly competitive
and there is no scale factor on construction costs, the developer can obtain "subsidized"
profit from changes in the tastes of households, (6) if there exist scale factors in
construction costs, the "subsidized" profit of the developer can be obtained from the scale
factors and changes in the tastes of households.
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macro-economics, 166-167, 175
macro order, 182
macro-phenomenological level, 181
macro-variables, 166, 184
marginal cost, 224, 293-294, 302-304; pro-
ductivities, 122, 129--130j revenue, 293-294
market area, 16, 20; clearing, 102-103j den-
sity of, 250j followership, 110j leadership,
110; penetration, 23,31; share, 23, 31, 110j
structures, 108, 252
marketplace, 8
Markov chain theory, 83
Markov process, 181, 188
master equation, 8, 166-167, 17l, 184, 189
mature oligopolies, 107
mature product, 37
"max-min correlation" , 134
mean value equations, 171, 185, 190
measurement costs, 256
meso-level, 184
MESSAGE II, 283
methanol production, 282
metropolitan areas, 183-184, 195-204, 273;
nodes, 4; planning, 9, 274j regions, 275,
280
micro-economic, 166-167
micro-stochastic level, 181
micro-variables, 184
minimal positional correlation, 138
minimum correlation, 157
minimum differentiation, 16
minimum standard, 269
mobility parameter, 189
monotonicity of distribution functions, 93j of
penalty functions, 93-94j of utility func-
tions,93
multiperiod network, 223
mUltiple equilibrium, 176, 186--187
multiregional time series, 133
multivariate extensions, 142; techniques, 133
Nash equilibrium, 16, 81, 83, 86, 113, 117
natural gas, 279
near equilibrium, 172
"nearly homogeneous" populations, 86
negotiated solutions, 112
"negotiation set", 112
network f1.ow theory, 95j infrastructure, 3, 9j
model, 236j representation, 227
nodes, 125-126, 208-210
Noether's theorem, 301
nonlinear demand, 17; differential equations,
24; dynamic processes, 5, 8; dynamic sys-
tems, 5, 175, 178j lifecycle, 8j program-
ming, 18i structure, 165; systems, 129
nonlinearities, 182-187
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notional demand, 27
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NyniiBhamn energy complex, 286--288
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oil exporting nations/regions, 67-73j import-
ing nations/regions, 67-71; prices, 71-74,
285
oligopolistic decision making, 108; equili-
brium,19
oligopoly, 107-117
OPEC, 67
optimal initial investment, 271; investment,
9, 271j prices, 18; profit, 302-305
optimality condition, 220
organization development of, 255; optimiza-
tion problem, 28
organizational form, 252
original utility, 93-99
orthogonal complement, 157j decomposition,
140
orthonormal matrix, 144, 153
oscillations, 1
overhead capital, 243
parametric regimes, 20
partial differential equation, 299-302
path f1.ows, 230
payoff functions, 17, 95
penalty functions, 85-99, 103; complemen-
tarity of, 88, 91, 93j continuity of, 97;
monotonicity of, 87,91,103
perfect competition, 244
perfect foresight, 292
periodic f1.uctuations, 7j processes, 133, 136
periodicity, 179
periodogram, 134, 140-142, 161
permutation matrix, 142-143
perturbations, 6
phase shift, 151j space, 123
physical obsolescence, 1
planning horizon, 269
Poisson demand process, 20
pollution control, 276
polynomial, 121
population, 196--198, 203-204j density, 121j
distribution, 215j growth, 8, 121-122,
198-200; movement, 199
positional correlation, 138j replicates, 137,
139
potential demand, 27
power base, 117j structure, 19, 108-109, 112
preference, 33; function, 25-27; structure, 41
pre-industrial phase, 55
price adjustment, 30, 173; competition, 41j
configuration, 169j development, 37j elasti-
cities, 283j equations, 68j equilibrium net-
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work, 225; increases, 269; interactions,
110; movement, 115; setting (conditions),
29; setting (rule), 29, 34; solution, 110;
war, 19, 110
price and rent adjustment, 173
prices of oil, 71-74; relative, 71
pricing algorithms, 19
primary energy, 285
principle components, 152-153; analysis,
133; representation, 152
process innovations, 3
producer capital, 241; "heavy behavior" of,
50; services, 242,247, 250
product competition, 24; cycle, 23; Bows,
255; group, 28-35; substitution, 8, 23-27
production, relocation of, 8
production function, 121-123, 244-245, 249,
267
production processes, 45-51; quality charac-
teristics of, 46-49, 51; technological inno-
vation, 45,47-51,53, 56--{)4
products, characteristics of, 107; quality of,
45
profit, 109-110, 115, 117,292; taker, 306
programming model, 207, 213, 221, 255;
problem, 18,214-217
public goods, 207; regulator, 269
pure competition, 108
quadratic programming problems, 229, 231
quadrature periodogram, 141; spectrum,
140, 162
quantity optimization, 100
qUllBi-concave, 25
qUllBi-production function, 4-6
random behavior, 18
random utility model, 210, 213; theory, 207;
vector, 139, 150
rationed supply, 88, 93
rationing, 97-98
reaction functions, 110--116
real estate, 264, 266--267, 269; investment,
264, 269
real spectral representation, 150
regional development, 241; economics, 175,
292; infrllBtructure, 3, 8; markets, 29, sci-
ence, 291; systems, 175; variates, 134
regression analysis, 133; estimates, 268; resi-
duals, 142
regulation, 264; dynamic efficiency of, 269
regulatory authorities, 263; intervention,
263; standards, 269
relative demand, 8, 81, 90, 94, 103
relative dynamics, 3
relative dynamics, of substitution, 8
relocation, 24; of production, 8
rent adjustment, 173
rentier c1l158, 69
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repelling points, 180
repellors, 178
research and development (R&D), 45; capi-
tal, 4, 5
residual process, 134; variates, 134
resilience, 275
response patterns, 245
restrictive standards, 270
retail structure, 187
retailers, 167
revenue function, 292, 302, 304-305
rival responses, conjectures of, 16,
rivalrous consonance, 8, 19--20; oligopolistic
behavior, 107-117; theory of, 107-117
rivalry, 19
robustness, 275, 283, 288
route lIBsignment, 83, 95-96
saddle point, 125-126, 178
saddles, 126
sample covariance kernel, 141; window, 135
satellite communications, 258
scale factor, 294
sectoral adjustment, 3
self-organizing, 185
self-sustained growth, 6; states, 179
service consumption, 254; economy, 9, 242,
250, 259; markets, 249; production, 243;
sector, 247; sector feminization of, 63; sec-
tor innovation, 63; sector occupations, 63;
sector women, 63; system, 166; values,
292, 294
set-valued maps, 48-49
sexual discrimination, 64
sexual segregation, 8, 55-62
shipment multipliers, 225
shipping decisions, 172
shopping mobility, 168; model, 102; trips,
171; zone, 101
short side boundary, 16
short sides, 16
sigma-process, 159--160
sigmoid distributions, 29; growth paths, 31,
37
simulation, 17
simulative joint profit, 19; theorizing, 18-19
"slaving principle" , 129
socio-configuration, 166, 189--190
solar tower plants, 279
solution cycles, 15
space-time models, 176
spatial distribution model, 210; dynamics,
1-2, 4; economics, 20; economy, 34; equili-
brium, 8-9; interaction, 8, 166, 173;
model, 37; networks, 2; oligopoly, 8,
15-16; price equilibrium, 9, 223-224, 228,
232, 238; product cycles, 37; redistribu-
tion, 37; standard, 209; structure, 186,
258; system, 176; substitution, 8; trajec-
tory, 7
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spatio-temporal, 175
spectral analysis, 8, 133-134; estimates, 142;
estimators, 140; matrix, 160j regression,
134; representation theorem, 133, 140, 149;
representations, 134, 140, 142, 150-151,
160; weight vectors, 140, 146, 148-149,
151-152; weights, 147, 152
stable cycles, 7; nodes, 126
Stackleberg functions, 113; point, 113, 117;
solution, 113
staff,64
stationary distribution, 182; expenditure
flows, 172-173; poi.nts, 185, 190; processes,
133-135, 140; segments, 133-135, 154-155,
159, 161; solutions, 130, 173; states, 29,
102
steady state patterns, 20
steady states, 15-16, 121
stenographers, 63~4
stochastic framework, 173; integral, 140;
processes, 20, 167
Stockholm County, 274, 283, 287
storable goods, 82
structural adjustment, 3; change, 175, 181,
187, 243, 291; dynamics, 2; economic
development, 3; instability, 180; stability,
178; transformation, 242
structure of assets, 256; of incentives, 256; of
links, 256; of organizations, 256
"stuttering Poisson", 20
"subjective time" , 295
"subsidized" profit, 306
subsistence, 123
substitution effects, 8; input factors, 245;
process, 23, 38; model, 40; relative dynam-
ics of, 8
SUMT,18
sunbelt , 195, 200
suppliers, 35, 37
supply assumptions, 88; markets, 225-236;
prices, 232, 235
sustainable system, 276
symmetry Jacobian, 237
synergism, 275
synergy, 122, 188-189, 275
synthesis gas, 279
T-equivalent, 136
T-periodic, 136
T-stationary processes, 136, 138, 154
"tangent cones" , 48
"tangent space" , 48
tangible assets, 252, 256
task redefinition of, 62; standardization of,
63
tastes, 291; changes in, 291-298,301-306
Taylor series, 122
technoeconomic evaluation, 285
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technological change, 1, 3, 8, 9, 45-51,
53-55, 58, 255, 258; efficiency, 121
technologies, obsolescent, 58~0
telecommunications infrastructures, 249,
259; network, 249; systems, 242, 250
temporal coordination, 258; frame, 283; pat-
tern, 40
tensor product, 142
termination criterion, 235
terms of trade, 71
textile industry, 61~2
thermo-dynamic, 186
threshold level, 6
time dependence, 128; horizons, 264; irrever-
sible, 176; use, 255
time series (multiregional), 133
trade links, 24
traditional oligopoly theory, 18
traffic pattern, 95
transaction costs, 258
transformations infinitesimal, 292, 298, 301,
303, 306; of the economic systems, 9
transition probabilities, 184, 188-189; rates,
165-171
transmission services, 249
transportation costs, 166, 172-173, 181,
223-225, 232, 235, 247, 256; links, 225;
network, 166,208; system, 2, 197,208-210
transport capacity, 245; cost, 102; network,
2
trend sequence, 134; term, 135
trip cost functions, 95
two-region model, 67
unbalanced growth, 4
unemployment, "natural" rate of, 82, 103
uniform agreement, 138; representative, 138,
159
unionization, 197-199
unitary matrix, 145
univariate process, 150
unstable behavior, 1, 7
upper semi-continuous, 26
upward mobility, 64
urban agglomerations, 4, 6; economy, 7,291;
infrastructure, 275, 280, 282; planners,
273; system, 7; transportation, 274
utility, 253, 273, 292; expected, 215; losses,
269; maximization, 265, 267
utility functions, 83-89, 94, 166, 172, 208,
216, 254, 262, 266, 293, 302; monotonicity
of, 93; stochastic, 83; strict, 84
utility gain expected, 169
variable costs, 245
variational inequality, 224,228-229,231
vectors, 84; extreme value distributed, 84
Verhulst-Pearl's equality, 30
vertically structured, 286
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viability constraints, 45, 50; niche, 51;
theory, 45
viable controls, 45
vintage properties, 4
"virtual" networks, 249
Volterra-Lalka approach, 183
wage gap, 56
wealth, 264
Weber agglomeration, 17; point, 19
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women, employment of, 53--62; innovation,
53-54; role of, 8, 58
women's movement, 56
women's work, marginality of, 55; structure
of, 55; transformation of, 60
work, blue collar, 58, clerical, 63; division of,
58
zero-mean stationary, 135
zone, 168, 170-173, 208; of attraction,
123-126



